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2014, Vol.23, No.

  • 1.

    Some Ideas Proposed to Innovate the Regulatory Reform System of Korea

    Byung-Sun Choi | HYUKWOO LEE | 2014, 23() | pp.3~42 | number of Cited : 21
    Abstract PDF
    The regulatory reform system of Korea, with the Regulatory Reform Committee(RRC) as its centerpiece, has been analyzed to have no critical problems and be presently working fairly well. Factors preventing this system from working more effectively are found mostly of software variety; including the serious shortage of resources for strong regulatory enforcement, weak participation on the part of the private sector, and the backwardness of administrative democratization. This paper thus emphasized that the resolution of these operational problems should precede over any kind of hardware reforms, an issue mooted frequently by the press in particular. Our argument was that such attempts as to operate the Ministerial Meeting for Regulatory Reform presided by the President that the current government has revived from its dissolution a decade ago, would add almost nothing to the existing reform system’s performance, except for a political symbolism, which would be short-lived anyway. Instead, taking an incremental approach outlook, the authors stressed that the gate-keeping role played by the RRC, via RIA, is not trivial at all, despite some allegations to the contrary. In the same vein, in reviewing the most innovative approaches of late, such as the One-In-One-Out (OIOO) system of Britain, this paper gave more attention to examining the preconditions for their adoption. Finally the authors called for renewed attention to the alternatives to regulation, such as self-regulation and judicial relief, in the belief that the time is ripe for their wider use, as the society becomes far more complex and professionalized.
  • 2.

    Key Challenges of Regulatory Reform in the Executive Branch of the Korean Government

    CHOI, Jin-Wook | 2014, 23() | pp.43~68 | number of Cited : 8
    Abstract PDF
    This article aims to identify the key challenges of regulatory reform in the Executive branch of the Korean Government and make suggestions to overcome these challenges. For the last 30 years, regulatory reform, albeit emphasized amply by every administration. has not been successful in Korea. Previous research on the unsatisfactory progress of regulatory reform consistently point out the inadequacies of the reform system, the passive work attitude of public officials, discord between the regulatory policymaking of the central government and its implementation by local governments, lack of motivation of and incentives for public officials, and ineffective monitoring and feedback mechanisms of performance of regulatory reform as key hurdles to regulatory reform. Among various obstacles to regulatory reform, this article focuses on the insufficiency of continuous and consistent reform leadership of the president and the low capacity and expertise of key actors in the arena of regulation including the Regulatory Reform Committee (RRC) and regulatory agencies in the Executive branch. This article suggests that regulatory reform is more likely to succeed and, accordingly, increase public interest when it is preceded by the continuous strong reform leadership of the president, science- and evidence-based regulatory impact analyses, adequate allocation of resources to reform organizations, and transparency and accountability through more information disclosure related to regulatory policies and reform.
  • 3.

    The National Assembly and Regulatory Reform in Korea

    Tae-Yun Kim | 2014, 23() | pp.69~114 | number of Cited : 10
    Abstract PDF
    The disappointment and despondency of Korean citizens about the National Assembly have been heightened, especially disbelief about the quality and content of the legislation, which is the most significant assignment of the National Assembly. The case of regulation will not be special exceptions. In terms of regulatory reform, this study tries to analyze problems of the legislation of the Korean National Assembly and to present institutional and non-institutional alternatives, particularly focusing on the quality level of the regulation. To do this, this study identifies the theoretical principles of the legislation based on constitutional studies, and scrutinizes the specifics of the process and procedures of the Legislative Assembly of the Korean National Assembly, and discusses the problems associated with the Legislative Assembly raised in previous studies respectively. After that, a common response was addressed as a non-institutional and institutional solution. Consequently, the introduction of necessity and expected effect of the regulatory impact analysis regarding the legislative regulation prove the corresponding argument on the principle of the legislation. In addition, this study proposes the implications of institutional and non-institutional alternatives as a method to respond to the problems of the legislative regulation.
  • 4.

    Regulatory Reform and the Role of the Judiciary in Korea

    KIM, IL-JOONG | 2014, 23() | pp.115~160 | number of Cited : 4
    Abstract PDF
    As the main purpose of this paper I probe the role of the judiciary in embarking with fuller force the regulatory reform in Korea. Although courts, in general, have been very passive in regulatory reform over the past decades, they are equipped with solid bases of the Korean Constitutional such as §107-1 and §111(for the Constitutional Court of Korea) and §107-2(for the Supreme Court of Korea) in order to make meaningful contribution to regulatory reform. First of all, I define regulatory reform as exerting efforts to find an optimal method of constraining private property rights when it is necessary. I then demonstrate how judicial review can be set in motion regarding inappropriate regulations, In particular, I emphasize the comparative advantage of judicial review in regulatory review in terms of sufficient evidence, transparency, accountability, and relatively stronger independence from interest groups. Finally, I explain the doctrine of ‘regulatory taking,’ which is stipulated in §23-3 of the Korean Constitution, as a backbone of the innovative regulatory reform. I have stressed its importance over the past two decades, but, in this paper, I reexamine the doctrine and add new examples as I currently perceive its wider applicability as of 2014.