Every human being is a “narrative being” in the sense that he or she has a life story. It is not advisable, or even technicall possible, for a physician to separate a patient’s life history when making medical decisions. The best medical decision-making involves the patient, the physician, and concerned family members who come together to mediate conflicts that may arise through the patient’s life stories, rather than merely relying on regulations and principles. The ability to understand the meaning and importance of a patient’s life story is an important one for physicians to have. Physicians with this ability form stronger bonds with patients. This article examines some of the problems caused by scientific medicine and emphasizes the importance of patients’ life experiences and physicians’ willingness to listen to and understand patients’ lifenarratives.
The principle of autonomy has been introduced in lots of bioethics references explaining Kant’s conception of autonomy. “Autonomy in bioethics” is different from “autonomy in Kant.”The former is almost the same as principle of freedom. I examine the meaning of autonomy through the review of Beauchamp and Childress’ analysis and Miller’s, which do not reach Kant’s conception. I also try to propose some practical suggestion after this examination. Autonomy is different from freedom in that autonomy should include moral reflection. The aspect of moral reflection in autonomy may reflect cultural and/or relational consideration beyond individualistic conception of autonomy. This may contribute to establish a new conception of autonomy. Even a new conception of autonomy is still different from Kant’s in that the principle of autonomy is one of principles whereas Kant’s autonomy is one to produce moral norms. Thus principle of autonomy in bioethics cannot be considered to be the supreme one to resolve bioethical issues.
Autonomy may not be respected when respecting one autonomy does harm to others or violates the principle of justice. In this respect, autonomy as a value may conflict other values such as life or justice. Which value is preserved is still a difficult question when we are faced with conflicts of values.
Purpose: The purpose of this study was to analyze attitude that Korean adults have toward dignified dying.
Method: The study employed a Q-methodology, which provides a method of analyzing the subjectivity of test items. Thirty-four selected Q-statements from each of the 34 subjects were arranged in a normal distribution using a 9-point scale. The collected data were then analyzed using a QUANL PC program.
Result: Three types of attitudes toward dignified dying were identified. Type I is a positive self-recognition. These types of people thought positively and was said to be happy and thankful for the time of death. Type II is a rational comport-orientation. These type of people accepted death and want peaceful dying. Type III is emphasis on the supportive relationship. These types of people want to die peacefully in the bosom of family members.
Conclusion: Understanding each type could be helpful that supporting and death education for Korean adult.
This study was designed to investigate the state of research ethics curricula in undergraduate and postgraduate programs at dental education institutions in the Republic of Korea. Educators at 11 institutions participated in the study. Applying Delphi research methods, we evaluated the key elements of the current research ethics curricula at the participating institutions and the educators’ opinions concerning the necessity of dental research ethics. It was found that most of the participating dental schools focus on professional and/or medical ethics rather than research ethics in their educational programs. As such, there is a need for educational programs in the field of research ethics and the composition of a professional group for dental research ethics. We suggest that the main priority should be the development of an educational organization and special training programsin dental research ethics.
Vulnerability typically has been understood in terms of the ability to give or withhold informed consent and the likelihood of being misled, mistreated, or otherwise taken advantage of in research. The re-conceptualization of vulnerability from something that emerges primarily from membership in a specific population to a reality that emerges from characteristics of persons or the environment in which research is conducted also can inform IRB(Institutional Review Board)s’ interpretation and application of the regulations and guidelines on clinical trials.
Vulnerability should be evaluated by IRBs, which have the responsibility of identifying those persons who may require additional protections. This article argues that the widespread and inconsistent use of the concept of vulnerability in Korea has hindered the development of substantive ethical guidance and concrete regulations. It is argued, furthermore, that in order to protect patient welfare and justice, the category of vulnerability should be specified at the time at which a subject consents to participate in medical research.
This article provides a brief overview of some of the recent developments in the new science of moral cognition and examines what relevance they might have for the field of medical ethics. Included here are descriptions of Mikhail and Hauser’s work on a universal moral grammar (UMG), Greene’s fMRI studies of emotional engagement in moral judgment, and Haidt’s crosscultural research on the psychological foundations of morality. It is argued that recent research results in these and other areas exposes a gap between medical ethics and common morality, between some of the methodologies and results of medical ethics on the one hand and the moral judgments and values of ordinary people on the other. This disconnect is explained, in part, in terms of a misunderstanding or misuse of the naturalistic fallacy, which serves to insulate medical ethics from advances in the scientific understanding of morality.