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pISSN : 2005-8284 / eISSN : 2234-3598

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2018, Vol.21, No.3

  • 1.

    A Critical Examination of Dworkin’s Value-Argument Concerning Abortion

    Kim, Sang Deuk | 2018, 21(3) | pp.179~198 | number of Cited : 1
    Abstract PDF
    Abortion raises two distinct but related ethical issues: one concerns the moral status of a fetus; the other concerns the conflict between the rights of a fetus and those of a pregnant woman. While conservatives claim that a fetus has a right to life, which outweighs a woman’s right to bodily autonomy, liberals who support abortion rights focus rather on the meaning of pregnancy for women. Dworkin argues against both the liberal and the conservative views, claiming that each is inconsistent with our considered moral judgements. He claims that a fetus has, not rights, but rather intrinsic value, and different views on the intrinsic value of fetal life give rise to different views on the morality of abortion. This argument from Dworkin, which I call the “value-argument,” is critically examined in this essay. While the value-argument helps to explain our considered moral judgements concerning abortion and integrates the two aforementioned problems into one, the “intrinsic value problem,” it fails to resolve the ethical problem of abortion. Rather than justifying its central claim that a fetus has some intrinsic value, Dworkin presupposes it as a working hypothesis. Nor does he provide objective criteria for evaluating the intrinsic value of a fetus. As such, Dworkin does not present a unique position on the ethics of abortion but rather explains why differences of opinion concerning abortion arise. This critical examination of the value-argument concludes that rather than solving the moral problem of abortion Dworkin merely provides an analysis of it.
  • 2.

    Criminal Issues of Artificial Abortion

    Lee Keun-Woo | 2018, 21(3) | pp.199~218 | number of Cited : 3
    Abstract PDF
    Korean criminal law punishes abortion in principle and treats it as illegal unless it falls within the scope of specific exceptions. However, the provisions of the criminal law and the Mother and Child Health Act are not entirely consistent with each other. In addition, societal views on the status of women in abortion have changed in recent years. Views now range from the total abolition of the ban on abortion to the strengthening of punishment for the crime of abortion. This article critically examines some of the theoretical issues that are overlooked in typical discussions concerning abortion. More specifically, the article examines abortion from the perspective of the criminal law in an effort to provide some suggestions on how to resolve the moral conflict at the heart of the abortion debate.
  • 3.

    Determining of Legal Parenthood in Full/Gestational Surrogate Mother: Focusing on the Case Related to 2018V15 Decision by the Seoul Family Court on May 9 2018

    Eun-Ae Kim | Sujung Yoo | 2018, 21(3) | pp.219~240 | number of Cited : 4
    Abstract PDF
    South Korea’s “Civil Act” and the “Act on the Registration, etc. of Family Relationships” does not reflect the reality concerning the use of assisted reproductive technology and surrogate pregnancy. Legal questions still arise for children born through surrogate pregnancies. In some cases, birth registrations are being rejected because the personal information of the intended mother listed on the birth registration form is inconsistent with the personal information of the surrogate mother listed on the birth report. Moreover, the Seoul Family Court recently ruled that the rejection of birth registrations in such cases is appropriate due to the invalidity of surrogate contracts that violate public order, citing the need to maintain parent decision standards as per the existing “Civil Act.” This article addresses some of the ethical and legal issues surrounding surrogacy, especially the formation of legal parenting policies for parents and children, by examining the facts and recent decisions of the Seoul Family Court.
  • 4.

    A Three-fold Approach to Medical Ethics Education That Combines Quantitative and Qualitative Reasoning

    JEON Daeseok | 2018, 21(3) | pp.241~261 | number of Cited : 0
    Abstract PDF
    This article consists of two parts: the first explores the content and purpose of medical ethics; the second explains some of the practical difficulties with medical ethics education while presenting relevant analytical methods based on logic and critical thinking. The development of Information and Communication Technology(ICT) has given rise to ethical issues in a number of areas, including the field of medicine. Recent research in medical ethics education tends to focus on quantitative reasoning, which has the advantage of being able to identify trends regarding which ethical theories are considered important to medical students. On the other hand, quantitative reasoning is limited in its understanding of the underlying reasons for such trends. There is also the criticism that medical ethics education lacks rigorous analysis and is simply reciting professional codes of conduct. As such, medical ethics education needs to establish a method that combines quantitative research with qualitative reasoning. Accordingly, in this article a three-fold approach to medical ethics education is developed and proposed, one that consists of three types of inferences or evaluations: intuitive-qualitative, quantitative, and analytical qualitative. The proposed approach is an effective and workable method for medical ethics education under the circumstances of limited time and restricted educational resources.
  • 5.

    Ethical Principles for Consent in Human Subject Research: A Focus on Research Involving Vulnerable People and the Disabled

    Kyungsuk Choi | 2018, 21(3) | pp.262~277 | number of Cited : 2
    Abstract PDF
    Research involving human subjects is necessary in the biomedical sciences. One of the main ethical issues involved in this area is how research involving human subjects can be carried out without infringing upon human dignity. In this article I argue that respect for autonomy is not the only ethical principle for research on human subjects. I identify and explain the other ethical principles that are required for obtaining informed consent. For competent human subjects, respect for autonomy demands that informed consent be obtained, but in the case of substituted consent I argue that the principle of autonomy is insufficient and that a best-interest standard is required. However, this standard should be applied with some qualification. I claim that the only principle that can justify the waiver of informed consent is utilitarian in nature, but in this case the research should not involve more than minimal risk to the human subjects. In addition to describing the ordering and qualifications concerning the three core principles of autonomy, best-interest, and utilitarianism this article examines international codes for the protection of vulnerable people, substituted consent, and the waiver of informed consent.