

Ineffective Border Security and Role of Entrenched Migrants Networks

– Focus on ‘Sulu Intrusion’ into Sabah, East Malaysia –

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Abstract

The Sabah borders milieu has been described as porous. Intrusion of about 200 armed Filipinos, followers of Jamalul Kiram III, the self-proclaimed Sultan of Sulu into Lahad Datu, Sabah, East Malaysia on 12th February 2013 have been viewed as a threat to the Malaysian’ security. It changed the Malaysian government’ security and enforcement strategies in dealing with the cross-border migration and other cross-border activities (such as cross-border kidnapping, smuggling and other criminal activities) between the Southern Philippines and Sabah, East Malaysia. This paper will also provide an insight and a critical assessment of the Malaysia’ borderlands security strategies.

Key words: Intrusion, border, social networks, migration inflow, illegal migrants

국문초록

말레이시아 사바(the state of Sabah) 국경은 빈틈이 많은 것으로 알려져 있다. 2013년 12월 12일 말레이시아 동부 사바주의 Lahad Datu에 ‘술루의 술탄’(the Sultan of Sulu)으로 자칭하는 Jamalul Kiram III의 추종자인 약 200여명에 이르는 필리핀인들의 침입으로 인해, 필리핀인들은 말레이시아 안보의 위협 요인이 되고 있다. 이 침입으로 말레이시아-필리핀 국경을 넘는 이주자와 국경에서의 활동들(예를 들어, 국경에서의 유과-납치, 밀수, 그리고 다른 범죄적인 활동들)에 대한 말레이시아 연방정부의 안보와 법 집행 전략은 변화되었다. 본 연구는 말레이시아 동부지역의 국경에서 이루어지는 다양한 활동들에서 이주자 네트워크가 어떻게 작용하고 영향을 미치는지를 분석하였다. 본 연구는 말

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레이시아 국경의 안보 전략에 대한 평가를 통해 안보 전략에 대한 이해를 높이는 것을 목표로 하였다.

주제어 : 침입, 국경, 사회적 관계, 이주자 이동, 불법 이주자

I . Introduction

Like many other countries in the Southeast Asia, cultural tradition in Malaysia is not homogeneous. The population are members of different ethnic groups, having their own languages and their own cultural heritage, live within the same national border. For example, in Sabah East Malaysia, there are many ethnic groups living in the state originated from the southern Philippines. Therefore, the intrusion of about 200 armed Filipinos, followers of Jamalul Kiram III, the self-proclaimed Sultan of Sulu which entered a town in Lahad Datu district of Sabah on 12 February 2013 triggered a new interest into the discussion of Suluk ethnic in Sabah.

The armed group, led by the self-proclaimed sultan Jamalul Kiram III's brother, is pressing their ancestral claim to an area of northern Borneo that has been disputed by Malaysia and the Philippines since the formation of Malaysia in 1963. The incident in Lahad Datu in Feb 2013 is very much relevant to the issue of the long historical and socio-cultural ties between Sabah and the Philippines. The close socio-cultural and kinship ties between the population of the southern Philippines and many ethnic groups in Sabah have been highlighted by many researchers(refer to Paridah and Darussalam, 1992, Sadiq, 2005, Azizah Kassim, 1987; 2009, Hilsdon, 2006; Dayang Suria Mulia, 2011a, 2011b; Majid-Cooke & Dayang Suria Mulia, 2013). Once a part of the Sultanate of Sulu, Sabah's centuries-old ties with the Philippines are indicated by the fact that inhabitants of both came from the same racial stock and have similar customs and traditions. Sabah's ruler, Tun Mustapha who became a chief minister of Sabah during 1972-1976 was a Suluk/Tausug(Paridah and Darussalam, 1992: 556-558).

In addition, migration from the Sulu Archipelago in the Philippines to Sabah has a long history. Barter trade existed as early as the ninth century. The first migrants to Sabah from the Sulu archipelago arrived in the late fifteenth century when the Spanish began pushing southwards toward Sulu and Tawi-Tawi in the southern Philippines(Sadiq, 2005: 106). Migration inflows from the Southern Philippines continued even after the formation of Malaysia in 1963. After 1970s, many scholars and analysts(such as Azizah, 1997; Kurus, 1997; Narayanan *et al.*, 2005; Killias, 2010) who have written about migrants in Sabah started using the word 'influx' to reflect the increase of immigrants in Sabah. The migrants came to Sabah after 1970s can be divided into

three categories: refugees, economic migrants and undocumented immigrants.

This paper has two objectives. First, it seeks to fill the gap in the knowledge of state' policy, citizenship and borders security by examining the current issues of international migration in Sabah. Second, it examines the main factors that contributed to the incident of 'Sulu Intrusion' by closely examining the entrenched migrant social networks and its association with the said incident. Data from the existing materials and the author's own fieldwork interviews in Sabah, East Malaysia will be used to provide a sense of how entrenched migrants networks have contributed to the porous border and the incident of 'Sulu Intrusion'. The paper is structured as follows. Section one explaining the conceptual framework of migrant networks and how it contributes to the issue of porous border and irregular migration into East Malaysia. Section two maps the relationship between citizenship, porous borders and state' policy as well as rules and regulations concerning immigrants, irregular immigrants and other cross-border activities in Malaysia. Section three discusses how the incident of so-called 'terrorist' intrusion in Lahad Datu, East Malaysia on 12th Feb, 2013 has made an impact on security policy and citizenship in Sabah.

This study is based on the autor's longstading research interest in the issues of border security and migrants in South East Asia and much of the analysis presented in this paper derives from ongoing policy and document collection and review. Furthermore, this study presents a case study of Ease Malaysia.

II. Migrant Networks as A Root of Irregular Migration into Sabah, East Malaysia

The perpetuation of migration from neighbouring countries specifically the Philippines and Indonesia to Malaysia can be best explained by Social Networks Theory advocated among others by Massey, *et. al.*(1993; 2005), Hugo(1995) and Hagan(1998). A better understanding of the roles of social networks will help us better understand the issue of porous border and how the intrusion of so-called 'terrorist' in Lahad Datu district of Sabah as well as on how other incidents of kidnapping in the east coast of Sabah occurred repeatedly. This study argues that the established and extensive social networks of immigrants in Sabah, East Malaysia with the peoples in the southern Philippines facilitate the crossing-border of peoples without being easily detected by the security. While the economic factors play an important role in facilitating the continuation of irregular migration into Sabah, the approach in this paper takes a stand otherwise by emphasizing the vital roles of entrenched migrant networks or as Sadiq(2009: 57) called it 'networks of complicity'

Understanding social network of migrants is important because migration flows based on the social network is difficult to curb using policy interventions and policy makers. Spaan(1994) argues that the networks of illegal migration from Indonesia to Malaysia have become well established and entrenched. On the same vein, Hugo(1995: 289) argues that once networks have been established, they become a very strong force for perpetuating particular migration flows. Similarly, experience in Sabah, East Malaysia has shown that migratory movements from the Philippines for the past centuries, once started, develop their own dynamics and cannot easily be stopped by any rules and state' regulations(Azizah1997, Pillai,1998).

The entrenched social network of migrants also facilitates the process of getting citizenship. Hagan(1998) in her study illustrates that the circulation of information through networks facilitated many community members' decision (Mexican) to legalize in the host country(the United States). In the case of Sabah, Sadiq(2005) argues how easy the migrants in Sabah getting citizenship in the process of what he called 'documentary citizenship'. Immigrants settling in communities with well-established networks generally seem to be incorporated into society more smoothly than do those in communities with poorly developed networks. Communities with mature networks provide newcomers with emotional and cultural support and various other resources. Over time, networks in the settlement areas develop ethnic associations that provide organizational support for newcomers and additional settings for circulating information and assistance(Massey, *et. al.*, 1993). Geographic concentration is the main indicator of social networks and is often an inevitable result of immigration(Hagan, 1998). For example, in Sabah, Bugis ethnic coming from South Sulawesi, Indonesia concentrates in certain areas in Tawau. Filipino immigrants concentrate on Gaya Island and certain areas in Sandakan, Semporna, and Lahad Datu in the east Coast of Sabah.

Spaan(1994) concludes in his study that informal networks play a vital role in the flows of migrants from Indonesia to Malaysia, Singapore and Saudi Arabia. In the case of undocumented international migration, the individual migrant cannot rely on government institutions or official agencies for support, guidance or protection. Therefore, they turn to unofficial recruiters or to their own social networks for help. Similarly, Hugo(1995) argues that in the case of the predominantly undocumented migration to Malaysia, the dominance of friends and relatives in supplying prospective migrants with information about migration and assistance in settlement at destination is crucial. As Hugo(1995) argues, "once networks have been established, they become a very strong force for perpetuating particular migration flows." Empirical evidence on migrants from Indonesia(Spaan, 1998; 2002) suggests that despite the risk of exploitation, prospective

migrants from this country, who are lacking necessary information or social capital to undertake the venture on their own, initially contact the local broker and middlemen who have extensive networks in the country of destination (e. g., Malaysia).

III. Citizenship, Porous Borders and State's Policy

There are three main themes that are always been discussed by the analysts and scholars with regard to the issue of international migration in Sabah namely the issue of citizenship, porous borders and state' policy. Sabah's population was 651,304 in 1970 and by 2010; it had grown to 3,117,405, a staggering 479 percent increase. Foreigners now make up 28 percent of the population (Population and Housing Census of Malaysia, 2010). The estimated number of undocumented migrants in Sabah, East Malaysia ranges from 200,000 to 1 million (Azizah, 2009). Malaysia's ethnic politics have made the high estimates of undocumented immigrants in Sabah as a political issue for a long time. Chinese politicians (Martin, 1991) and also Kadazan Dusun politicians in Sabah, East Malaysia (Sadiq, 2005) generally are concerned about the big number of undocumented immigrants because most of them are Indonesian and Filipino Muslims. They argue that because the immigrants are fellow Muslims from the southern Philippines and also Indonesia, the Malay-dominated government (UMNO) does not take vigorous action to reduce the undocumented immigration particularly in Sabah. Other main concern is the allegation on how easy the immigrants in Sabah getting documents (Malaysian identity cards) and eventually allowed to vote.

1. The issue of Citizenship

The issue of citizenship of immigrants became a debated issue especially during Malaysian election every five years. Works on the immigration and citizenship have focused mainly on fake identification given to foreigners in Sabah (e.g. Sadiq, 2005; Ramli Dollah & Jong-Eop Kim, 2010; Wan Shawaluddin, *et, al.*, 2012,). An allegedly state-sponsored program popularly known as 'Project IC' began in the 1990s with the objective of altering the demographic pattern of Sabah. Most importantly, it was to make it more favorable to certain political parties (UMNO), especially in regards to changing the electoral voting patterns. Malaysian government was being accused of supporting/favouring the large undocumented influx of Indonesians and Filipinos specifically in

Sabah for economic and politic reason(Gurowitz, 2000) and to modify Malaysia's contemporary ethnic balance(Castles, 2002).

Pertaining to the issue of citizenship in Sabah, Sadiq(2005) exposed the ploys and networks that enable undocumented immigrants to acquire genuine or fake documents to gain the Malaysian citizenship or what he called 'documentary citizenship.' Sadiq(2009: 111) argues that 'documentary citizenship' is acquired by undocumented immigrants by using 'networks of complicity' in Sabah. Furthermore, state uses undocumented immigrants from neighbouring countries to "Malayize" or homogenize Malaysia and use undocumented immigrants as voters to assure political control by a Malay/Muslim party such as the United Malays National Organization(UMNO). As a response to a long overdue issue about undocumented immigrants and citizenship in Sabah, on June 1st 2012, the federal government finally agreed to set up a Royal Commission of Inquiry(RCI) to investigate problems related to undocumented immigration in the state. One of the Terms of Reference(TOR) in RCI is "To investigate if the award of such ICs or citizenships were according to the law. In the RCI Proceeding in 2013, National Registration Department director-general Datuk Jariah Mohd Said told the five-man RCI panel that there were 113,000 "problematic" identity cardholders in Sabah(Malaysian Insider online, 21 Sept 2013).

2. Porous Borders

Among the factors that contribute to the porous borders are the geographical proximity between Sabah and the Philippines and Indonesia, historical ties and cultural similarities. The relationship between Malaysia and the Philippines has it's up and down. Sabah for example has remained a source of territorial dispute between the Malaysia and the Philippines(Paridah & Darusalam, 1992; Battistella, 2002). Healey(2000) sums up the relationship of Malaysia with the Philippines mainly characterize by the porous borders and 'tug of war' between the two countries over ownership of Sabah. Geographical proximity as well as ethnic and religious ties between the Muslim people of Sabah and the Philippines allow easy transmigration. Because of the cultural similarity and historical links(Prasai, 1993), it's much easier for the migrants from the southern Philippines and Indonesia to assimilate and eventually gain citizenship.

The Lahad Datu incident has opened the eyes of local Sabahan on how easy it is to enter the state. Many claims that the 'terrorist intrusion' and their ability of occupying a village(Kg Tanduo in Lahad Datu) for more than two weeks have undermined the sovereign state's ability to exercise authority and control the international borders. However, the incident of kidnappings are

not new in the case of eastern part of Sabah. There were several incidents in Sabah prior to 'Sulu intrusion' reflecting on how cross border activities are difficult to trace by the marine enforcement. The first most publicized incident of 'border intrusion' in Sabah occurred in April 2000, when the group claimed themselves as Abu Sayyaf kidnapped 23 people including 12 tourists, 6 resort workers, 4 Sabah Wildlife Department staff and a policeman from Sipadan Island, in Semporna. In the same year, on Sept 10, 2000, 14 gunmen in two speedboat and armed with M-16 rifles kidnapped three Malaysians on Pulau Pandanan, 38km northeast of Semporna. In Feb 2010, a seaweed farm manager and one of his workers on the farm around Sebangkat Island, near Semporna, were kidnapped by a group of men armed with rifles and machete (New Straits Times online, 10 Feb 2012). Before 'terrorist' intrusion in Lahad Datu on the Feb 12th 2013, there was abduction in Lahad Datu, in November 2012. Five armed men robbed and kidnapped two West Malaysians from a bird's nest house in an oil palm plantation in Timbun Mata about 50km from Lahad Datu district. Observers believed that these incidents easily executed because of the entrenched networks utilized by those who were involved.


In recent years, the issue of 'border intrusion' or porous border has become a security issue (Ramli & Jong Eop Kim, 2010; Wan Shawaluddin, *et. al.*, 2011). The recent 'Sulu Intrusion' in Feb 2013 further exacerbates the discussion about the borders' security and how easy the peoples from neighboring countries cross the borders. Lahad Datu in Sabah where the Sulu intrusion in 12th Feb, 2013 occurred was flooded with undocumented immigrants, who are looking for economic opportunities. There are about 77,000 undocumented immigrants staying in various locations around Lahad Datu according to the Lahad Datu district officer Zulkifli Nasir (The Malaysia Insider Online, 20th Sept, 2013). He also acknowledged that there were two popular landing points in Lahad Datu for undocumented immigrants coming in by boat. One was Kampung Tanduo in Felda Sahabat and the other was Felda 1.

3. Understanding of State's Policy: Rules & Regulations

Malaysia's long coastline and the historical affinity between peoples in Sabah and the Philippines, make it hard to promote a vigorous anti-undocumented immigration policy. Azizah (1998) contends that the Malaysian policy towards immigration is reactive rather than proactive. Malaysia introduced the foreign worker policy which became fully implemented in 1992. The policy has two objectives, firstly to regulate the inflow of foreign workers; and secondly, to stem the inflow of irregular migrant workers into the country. The implementation of the policy

has led to a spectacular increase in the number of legally recruited migrant workers. However, it has not been able to curb the expansion of irregular migrants; instead their number has risen in parallel with that of legally recruited ones(Azizah, 2009).

After the Sulu intrusion incident in Lahad Datu on the 12th Feb 2013, the government upgraded the security infrastructure protecting the east coast of Sabah. Esscom was set up on 1st April, 2013, is a coordinating agency of the Armed Forces, police, the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency(MMEA) and other relevant agencies to oversee Sabah’s east coast security. The main focus is on boosting the defense of Sabah, with the government approving an initial allocation of RM300 million, which would be used to set up the initial infrastructure for the Eastern Sabah Safety Command(Esscom). In addition, RM75 million allocated in the 2014 budget to boost security along Sabah’s east coast(The Star online, 28 October, 2014). Apart from boosting maritime defense, the government is also stationing five battalions of security personnel in east Sabah to ensure the security of the region. As a long-term solution, the government is overhauling the security apparatus on the east coast of Sabah to prevent any future intrusions. This means maritime defense is the main element of the long-term solution to the intrusions. The government believes this move was necessary as Sabah’s long coastline is relatively porous, and also barely a few hours away by boat from the southern Philippines.



※ Source: Adapted from Azizah Kassim(2009: 54)

<Figure 1> Migration inflow into Sabah

The increase of the budget and enforcement in the East Sabah Security Zone(Esszone) may be a rational attempt to mitigate the security risks in the border areas. Such strategies typically lead to the increase of budget allocation for the enforcement such as police and army securing the borders of Sabah. The emphasis on the role of the enforcement might lead one to think that

irregular migration, the intrusion of terrorists and other cross-border activities could be curtailed. Such beliefs have always been the basis of the government strategies. The relevant question here is, does the government response by establishing ESSCOM zone and tighten the security in the borders adequate to stop the inflows of irregular migration or maybe stop the 'intrusion' as well as other cross-border activities into Sabah? On the surface, the intrusion or 'terrorist attack' demand security solutions. But to stop the incursion such as the incident of 'Sulu intrusion' and secure the borders, upgrading the security defence solely might not be sufficient. Case in point, even after the government spent millions to establish Esscom, there were at least three kidnappings of Chinese and Taiwanese nationals in the past six months in 2014 in Semporna Islands. In April 2014, a Chinese tourist and a Filipino resort worker were kidnapped from Sipadan. In the latest development, on 12th July 2014, a policeman is believed to been killed and another taken hostage by gunmen from the Philippines after an ambush on Mabul Island, Semporna(Malaysia Today Online, 13 July, 2014).

IV. Sulu Intrusion into Lahad Datu: Porous borders, weak enforcement or migrants entrenched solid networks

The recurring territorial dispute over Sabah between Malaysia and the Philippines (Paridah & Darusalam, 1992) are an example of the type of sovereignty and security issues that trouble the region's politics. The authorities were unable to completely prevent undocumented entry, since the coast-line of Sabah is about 2500 km and hard to control. Short distances between the islands in the southern Philippines and east coast of Sabah make it easy to travel by the sea undetected by security enforcement. These conditions have facilitated the proliferation of undocumented migration, smuggling, and kidnapping in border regions of Malaysia.

The issue of porous borders present a problem to the sovereignty and security of Malaysia. Because border control is at the core of notions of sovereignty(Castles, 2002), in response to the intrusion by terrorists from Southern Philippines, the Malaysian government launched 'Ops Daulat' on March 5th 2013 to defend the country's sovereignty. However, as argued earlier in this paper, the intrusion of armed Sulu into Lahad Datu, Sabah cannot be attributed solely to the failure of border's security forces. Rather, it must be traced to the long historical and unresolved political issue in the southern Philippines(e.g the struggle of Moro National Liberation Front(MNLF) to establish Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao) and most importantly the entrenched social

networks between peoples in Sabah and the southern Philippines which were expanding for decades.

The historical connections of the people living on both sides of the border have resulted in the border being extremely porous. Cross-border activities between Sabah and the southern Philippines not just an economic phenomenon: flows of capital, goods and services but historically it also involved flows of ideas, cultural products and peoples even before the nation state existed. These flows tend increasingly to be organized through transnational networks of the most varied kinds(Castles, 2002). Field works in Kampung Puyut Lahad Datu on 4th Dec, 2013 clearly indicated that some Suluks who have resided in Sabah for decades still maintain their connections with their kin and ancestors in the southern Philippines where they were originated. One of our respondents(a woman), first generation of Suluk descendent in Kampung Puyut stated that everytime she has a new born in the family, she and her husband make effort to go back to the Parang Island in the southern Philippines to sort of 'introduce' the new born to their family who still live in the southern Philippines. There will be a ritual in the island celebrating the new born.

The perceptions of various ethnic in Sabah towards the Sulu intrusion and the influx of irregular migrants in general are rather varied. The more 'hostile' perception is coming from Kadazandusun towards the Filipino migrants and other ethnics originated from the Southern Philippines. To the Kadazandusun and Murut(KDM) communities, the largest ethnic group of Bumiputera(son of Soil) in Sabah, the Sulu gunmen's easy entry into Sabah in Feb 2013 was largely because foreigner infiltration was made so easy for decades by the 1980s initiative or so-called 'project IC'(The Malaysian Insider online, 26 March 2013). Other ethnics in Sabah such as Bajaus or Suluks(Malaysian Citizen) are more accommodating towards the Filipino migrants(newcomers) perhaps because of the similar root and cultures. The Kadazandusun and Murut(KDM) ethnic believe the militant group from the Sulu archipelago in the southern Philippines had managed to organize their attacks better as many of their sympathizers and family members were already residing in Sabah. In short, they perceived the Sulu gunmen's easy entry into Sabah in February 9th 2013 was largely because foreigner infiltration was made so easy for decades by the previous 'administrators' since 1980s(The Malaysian Insider online, 26 March 2013).

Surely, the Sulu intrusion into Sabah triggered the interest for the Suluk ethnic in Sabah. There was a general perception that those people who were involved in the intrusion in Kg Tanduo, Lahad Datu comprised mainly of Tausug ethnic from the Southern Philippines. In contrast with the general perception, our qualitative data gathered from fieldworks on 4th-6th December 2013 at Kampung Silam, Kampung Lok Buani, Kampung Pulau Tambisan and Kampung Puyut,

Lahad Datu suggested that majority of people who were involved in the 'Sulu Intrusion' was Bajau ethnic. Because of lack of knowledge about Suluk ethnic in Sabah, there was some misinterpretation about this ethnic. Based on the literature review about Suluk in Sabah (e.g. Kee Sabariah and Asmiaty Amat, 2012) and our qualitative data in Lahad Datu suggested that the re are groups of Suluk that had settled in the northern and eastern part of Sabah namely Kudat, Sandakan and Lahad Datu before the formation of Malaysia in 1963. Most prefer to be identified as Suluk ethnic group in their birth certificates, distinguished from their newly arrived Filipino counterparts which known as the Tausug. An estimated of 64,282 Suluks (Malaysian citizenship) living in Sabah in 2000 and increased to 79,205 in 2010 (Department of Statistics, Sabah, 2010). Because of the 'Sulu intrusion' incident in Lahad Datu, Suluk community in Sabah have to defend themselves. Respondents that we have interviewed (through Focus Group Discussion - FGD) have pledged their loyalty and full support to the Malaysian government and condemned the intrusion in Lahad Datu. Suluk community in the areas concerned was against the intrusion by the followers of the so-called Sulu Sultan Jamalul Kiram. Descendants of Suluks that we have interviewed in Kampung Silam and also Kampung Pulau Tambisan, Lahad Datu expressed their loyalty to the Malaysian government and also wanted to disassociate themselves from the Sulu terrorists. The first generation of Suluk community in Kampung Silam also sharing their experiences and involvement in defending Malaysia in the Malaysia-Indonesia confrontation back in 1963-1966. Therefore, their loyalty and commitment to Malaysia as Malaysian citizens are unquestionable. They stand solid and uphold the sovereignty and justice of Malaysia. Apart from that, Malaysian Suluk dissociates themselves from the Sabah claim but not the Tausugs (Wan Shawaluddin, 2013).

Now back to the issue of 'networks of complicity' of migrants in Sabah. In the Sulu intrusion case in February 2013, there was a proof of help by the locals in the areas concerned. For instance, a local policeman claimed trial at the High Court in 2013 was alleged to voluntarily withholding information about terrorism activities. Corporal Hassan Ali Basari, 55, from Semporna allegedly committed the offence at the office of the Special Branch chief, Lahad Datu police headquarters between Feb 9th and March 3rd 2013. It was believed that the co-ethnic networks in the areas concerned have helped and provide information to the so called 'terrorist'. Sultan's younger brother Agbimuddin Kiram is a key player in the incursion, who is believed to have fled to Mindanao. He worked as assistant district officer in Kudat when the late Tun Datu Mustapha Datu Harun was a Sabah chief minister. Tun Mustapha was a chief minister of Sabah between 1967 and 1975. This partly suggest how well connected those who were involved in incursion in

Lahad Datu. He was given Malaysian citizenship during Tun Mustapha's time, although the officials still in doubt whether he is still holding Malaysian citizenship. Therefore, in order for the Malaysian enforcement to be successful in the border areas, it would require an increase in manpower, improvement in acquiring information and intelligence who can penetrate into the settlements where the immigrants(newcomers) concentrated in the east coast of Sabah.

V. CONCLUSION

Political and Geographical borders obviously do not correspond well with life, culture and communities on the ground. As discussed in this paper, this argument is particularly true in the case of Sabah which has a very long and complex history with the southern Philippines. For one, the people living on opposite sides of the Malaysian-the Philippines borders are not always strangers to each other. Some ethnics in Sabah and also in the Philippines(on both sides of the borders) are frequently family or friends coming from the same ethnic, divided nominally into two or more nationalities after international boundaries were drawn and nation state existed. The historical connections and culture similarities of the peoples living on both sides of the border have resulted in the border being extremely porous. Short distances between islands in Sabah and the Philippines make it easy to travel by sea undetected. Porous borders present an important challenge to the sovereignty and security of maritime Southeast Asian countries such as Malaysia. These conditions partly have facilitated the proliferation of irregular migration and cross-border activities. However, the free movement of people and goods between these islands has happened for centuries, before present-day borders and nation states existed. Because of the existence of nation state, the continued exchange of people and goods that has gone on for centuries is now considered illegal. Despite territorial boundaries officially delineating the authority of states, peoples in Sabah and southern Philippines(especially borders community) continue to live as a transnational society tied to islands that are still connected by the seas. Thus porous border, historical claim and the existence of the networking facilitated the intrusion in 2013. In order to secure the borders of Sabah, the government needs to recognize the inherent transnationalism and at the same time increase the manpower, improve the intelligence capacity and solidify the enforcement.

Meanwhile, this study presents few limitations, even though the study has achieved a meaningful results from analysis of border security and migrant network. This study focused on

east Malaysia(State of Sabah). Furthermore, the study did not consider the other variables about the border security and migrants. Therefore, subsequent research should consider these limitations.

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김종업: 영국 웨일즈대학교 'Political and Cultural Studies' 박사과정에서 수학하였고, 현재 연세대학교 사회과학연구소 전임연구원으로 재직 중이다. 주요 관심분야는 도시 및 지방행정, 전자정부, 그리고 위기관리이다. 주요 논문으로는 "스마트 시대의 보 안위협: EU5의 대응과 시사점"(2011)", "한·일 지방정부의 위기관리 체계에 관한 연구(2012)", "Illegal Immigrants and the Elections in Sabah, Malaysia(2012)", "개인정보보호의 현황과 개선방안(2013)", "CCTV Evaluation for the Prevention and Reduction of Crime and Disorder(2014)" 등이 있다 (kimje49@hanmail.net).