Inclusivism: the Enduring Vedic Vision in the Ever-Renewing Cosmos

Hyoung Seok Ham(함형석)
(University of Michigan)

국문요약

본 논문은 힌두교가 과연 하나의 종교로서 성립가능한가에 대한 학계의 논쟁을 검토하고 힌두교를 하나로 묶는 기준으로 포괄주의(inclusivism)적인 사고방식을 제시하고 분석하였다. 폴 해커(Paul Hacker)에 의해 인도 사상의 특징적인 경향으로 지목된 포괄주의의 구조를 분석함으로서 그것이 단순히 단편적인 현상들에 공통적으로 보이는 피상적인 요소가 아니라 베다의 우주 창조 신화와 브라만들의 제식에서 기원한 인도 사유를 규정하는 틀거리임을 밝혔다. 그리고 이러한 포괄주의적 틀 속에서 인도의 지식 체계가 발전하였음을 관련 선행 연구를 토대로 보임으로서 인도에서 진리가 천명되고 재확인되는 과정과 서로 다른 종교 간의 이해 방식을 연구함에 있어 베다의 세계관의 확장인 포괄주의적 태도에 대한 분석이 핵심적임을 보이고자 하였다.

주제어: 포괄주의(Inclusivism), 힌두교, 브라만교, 베다, 인도의 진리관

불교학리뷰(Critical Review for Buddhist Studies)
13권(2013. 6) 9p~53p

1

The uneasiness some scholars feel about the incorporation of Hinduism in the list of so-called “world religions” is mainly due to the wide varieties of religious belief and practice that are supposedly denoted by the singular term “Hinduism.” Unlike other world religions, Hinduism does not provide a coherent picture when judged by the major elements of a religion. Multiple gods, scriptures, doctrines, and rituals without a unifying principle have contributed to scholars’ conception of Hinduism as multiple religions, that is, Hinduisms. Considering that the Abrahamic religions (viz. Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) are deemed separate religions, even though they share origins, scriptures, and religious views (such as eschatology), their Hindu counterpart is not a vaguely conglomerated mass called “Hinduism” but rather sub-divisions of it that form coherent and distinct religious entities: “They are indeed religious, while Hinduism is not” (von Stietencron 2001, 46). With this perception of Hinduism’s multiplicity, scholars argue that the notion of Hinduism, which conveys an illusionary idea of a monolithic entity, is constructed, if not invented, out of many discrete religious traditions of India during the British Raj period without a real-world referent.

Although this position on the “invention of Hinduism” reflects critiques on previous orientalists’ scholarship of the colonial period and the modern development of historical and philological knowledge of ancient India, the obvious weakness of this approach is that it does

not take insiders' self-understanding into serious consideration. Although outside observers do not perceive a unifying principle that binds seemingly separate religious phenomena together, it is possible that in the minds of practitioners and believers these phenomena constitute one coherent whole. To counter the claim of the modern invention of Hinduism, therefore, some have searched for expressions of Hindu unity in pre-modern materials to prove that the notion of Hinduism encompassing diverse religious practices does not emerge from outside (or, more accurately, from the encounter with the West) but existed long before British rule. Doxographical literature that presents heterogeneous philosophies in a harmonious hierarchical scheme (Nicholson 2010) and the disparate identities of Hindus and Muslims described by late-medieval poets such as Kabir (Lorenzen 2006) can be regarded as self-representations of the pre-modern Hindu people. Thus, Hinduism, like its religious counterparts, qualifies and should be viewed as one independent religion.

Although these two positions are directly opposed regarding the singularity (or plurality) of Hinduism, the nature of their presentation of Hinduism is common in that they tailor Hinduism(s) so that it fits within the model of and becomes comparable to other belief systems that are well established in the category of "religion." Regardless of whether they explicitly touch upon the relationship between "Hinduism" and "religion as a category," their manipulations and analyses of source materials assume that Hinduism is, or sometimes should be, a religion. Given the long history of changes in meaning the term

"religion" has undergone and the particular status it has attained—which cannot be assessed without considering categorical distinctions such as church/state, private/public, and religion/science, which reflect specific European historical experience — in modern (European) societies, both unitary and pluralistic visions of Hinduism are attempts to translate alien phenomena into European jargon. In other words, listing Hinduism as a religion is a European gesture of understanding toward Indian materials. When this gesture of understanding (i.e., translation) seems so natural that it takes root in both ordinary and scholarly language, the movement of understanding takes a reverse turn: based on the equivalence between two signifiers (Hinduism and religion), the identity of the semantic fields of those terms is taken for granted, and the target language, originally devised to convey the meaning of the source language, exercises its power on the latter.

It is because of this problem in locating Hinduism adequately in modern European languages that, despite a continuity in the unitary vision of Hinduism, the assertion that Hinduism (as a religion) has existed since the pre-modern period cannot be validated. Hinduism, however it is defined, cannot be characterized in relation to such categories as "state," "public," and "science." Thus, arguing that "the religion we now call Hinduism" existed before British rule (Lorenzen 2006, 7) is a projection of the modern European model of religion into the Indian past (Fitzgerald 2010, 127). However, if a pluralistic version of Hinduism is adopted, following the advice of von Stiecron (2001), we find ourselves in a very implausible situation. Driven by the belief

that "comparability with other historical religions" can be ensured "only by distinguishing the various Hindu religions from 'Hinduism,'" von Stiecron divides "Hinduism" into separate traditions, such as Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism, and Śaktism, and suggests comparing them with Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (2001, 46-7). The awkwardness of this project is obvious: do Vaiṣṇavism and Śaivism have the same relationship that is maintained between Christianity and Islam? Do the Vaiṣṇavas distinguish themselves from the Śaivites as Christians do from Muslims? Making Vaiṣṇavism comparable to Christianity and registering it in the list of religions is simply another means of projecting the specific model of religion onto Hinduism.

Implicit in the practice of recognizing Hinduism or Vaiṣṇavism as a religion is that it is a way of viewing others from one's own perspective. Therefore, it is no less a manifestation of the mental framework of the viewer than of the reality of the viewed. In this regard, to elucidate various strands in the formation of or debate about Hinduism as a religion, it is essential to understand the framework that renders Hinduism as such by examining the historical context of its origin in modern European culture. However, if we aim to develop a scholarly discourse that can accommodate and translate more of Hinduism than Hinduism as a religion, there is also a need to put the viewer's perspective (i.e., categorizing Hinduism as a religion equal to Christianity) into a dialectical relationship with the perspective of the viewed (i.e., the Hindu view of Others). Therefore, although "Europeans took the initiative" in the encounter and the dialogue between India and

Europe has been “an uneven, asymmetrical one” thus far (Halbfass 1988, 172-3), we must allow the Hindu voice to Others to converse with the European voice to Others so we can find an adequate realm of discourse that can embrace a more comprehensive perspective on both forms of understanding Others and can do less injustice to either of them.

2

This paper examines the relatively unheard voice of India toward its Others. However, like its European counterpart, this voice is not a homogenous one; India developed various attitudes and strategies of understanding its cultural (including religious) Others. Rather than attempting to make an exhaustive list of these attitudes, I would like to focus on one conspicuous pattern of conceiving Others in Hindu culture: “inclusivism,” as named by Paul Hacker and defined as a way of thinking that “consists in claiming for, and thus including in, one’s own religion what really belongs to an alien sect” (Hacker 1995, 244). Although Hindu inclusivism has been mostly recognized as a modern Hindu attitude toward Western Others and has been discussed within the context of religious diversity with the specific concern of religious tolerance, I take a different approach for several reasons.

First, inclusivism is not a modern phenomenon. As Heesterman (1991) rightly observes, inclusivism — that is, “the claim to all-

embracing unity and universality[,] appears to have ancient roots" (296). In fact, the inclusivistic attitude of Neo-Hindus "stems from hoary antiquity" (Hacker 1995, 244). Therefore, only by investigating claims such as "Hinduism is not a religion, but religion that encompasses all other religions," which have been expressed by modern Hindu thinkers, it is not possible to understand the inner logic of the claims and the historical weight they have on Hindus. The first step to approaching inclusivism should be to acknowledge that this is a recurring assertion toward cultural Others throughout the history of India. In this regard, I will trace the origin of inclusivistic ideas back to the most ancient scriptures of India, the Vedas, and to the various ideologies devised to protect their inviolable authority. Scanning the historical contexts of inclusivism, we will realize that it is not a novel strategy developed to counter Western missionaries; modern Hindu thinkers employ the same method and scheme inherited from antiquity, but with modern concerns in mind (ibid., 245).

Second, inclusivism is not merely part of characteristic Hindu patterns of thinking that are separable from the main body of its philosophy. Just as recognizing Hinduism as a religion in European scholarship is a manifestation of the self-understanding of "religion" in European society, Indian attitudes toward alien Others are also an expression of the self-understanding of its own culture. Therefore, the discussion of inclusivism only within the context of the religious diversity of the modern world becomes superficial in nature. With the recognition that inclusivism is an outflow of the pattern of thinking

that regulates the inner as well as the outer realms of Hinduism, I observe and analyze the general framework in which truth-claims are made in traditional India. A peculiar rhetorical feature of truth-claims in India is that the authority of a claim is not based on its novelty or creativity but on its authenticity and congruency with ancient revelation. As we will see below, this rhetorical framework has at least two presuppositions: 1. truth was fully revealed to mankind at the time of Creation, and 2. truth can be accessed, even in the degenerate age, intact. It is my assertion that these assumptions have their provenance in the Vedic rituals and have been affirmed by various ideologies in defense of the authority of the Veda. It is these cultural (or Vedic) beliefs in the fullness and accessibility of revelation that prevent Hindu thinkers from seeing Otherness: "the other, the foreign is not seen as something that could be added to, or combined with, one's own system; instead, it is something a priori contained in it" (Halbfass 1988, 411).

Finally, inclusivism is not only the characteristic Hindu mode of treating alien cultures but is also a definitive feature that penetrates and provides a unifying vision of diverse forms of Hinduism. In this respect, this essay agrees with Lorenzen (2006) that there has been and continues to be an identity that is shared, at least, by Hindu intellectuals. They share a certain world-view that enables scholars of India to bind them together, and I argue that this vision of the world (or the universe) is inclusivistic. As will be shown later with the case of the Śaivites (as documented in von Stiecron 1995), without recognizing the pervasiveness of the inclusivistic pattern, scholars who share the

constructionist view support their arguments with examples that actually evince the unitary vision of Hinduism. However, this is not to prove the existence of "Hinduism" in terms of institutional, doctrinal, ritual, or customary unity, which is implicitly presupposed in "unity of Hinduism" arguments, such as that of Lorezen (2006). We must note that this tendency to define a unitary religious group based on unified substance —be it a people, scripture, or belief system —is common to both positions. Thus, I argue against the constructionists' claim for the following two reasons: 1. there was no religion in the modern sense in the past in either India or Europe,[1] and 2. despite the existence of discrete groups that can be distinguished on a scriptural, doctrinal, or cultural basis, they all shared inclusivistic attitudes toward each other. This pattern of thinking has always been the model through which Indians have understood their own culture and that has provided them with a unifying vision of differences. Similarly, I would like to differentiate myself from the opponents of the constructionists for the following two reasons: 1. although we can find evidence that there was an awareness of identity and unity in the pre-modern era, this evidence cannot prove the continuing existence of the "Hindu religion" in the modern sense, and 2. unity cannot be defined on a material basis (e.g., people, scripture, institutions); it must be defined based on a pattern of thinking that was perpetuated throughout history and that was shared by the different "religious groups" posited by constructionists. This pattern is inclusivism.

1) See Fitzgerald (2010) for the history of the meaning of the term "religion" in Europe.

3

Although Paul Hacker does not problematize the pre-modern inclusivistic tendencies, he acknowledges their continuing existence and exemplifies them with two cases that have become classical. One is the case of Tulsīdās (1532-1623), who went to the Vārāṇasī Śaivites and insisted that worship of Śiva was not contradictory to his own devotion to Rāma because Śiva himself was the foremost devotee of the god Rāma. In this way, without creating a conflict with the followers of Śiva, Tulsīdās "claimed it [i.e., the religious cult of Śiva] in its entirety for his own" (Hacker 1995, 245). This strategy of absorbing the entire religious system of others into one's own and placing it at a lower level in the hierarchical scheme that culminates in one's own ultimate god is typical of inclusivism. To the example of Tulsīdās, Hacker adds the sermon of Kṛṣṇa to Arjuna at the battlefield of Kurukṣetra:

> Deluded men despise me in the human form I have assumed, ignorant of my higher existence as the great lord of creatures. ··· When devoted men sacrifice to other deities with faith, they sacrifice to me, Arjuna, however aberrant the rites. I am the enjoyer and the lord of all sacrifices; they do not know me in reality, and so they fail.[2] (*Bhagavadgītā* 9.11, 23-4; translation

2) avajānanti māṃ mūḍhā mānuṣīṃ tanum āśritam/ paraṃ bhāvam ajānanto mama bhūtamaheśvaram//11// ye 'py anyadevatābhaktā yajante śraddhayānvitāḥ/ te 'pi mām eva kaunteya yajanty avidhipūrvakam//23// ahaṃ hi sarvayajñānāṃ bhoktā ca prabhur eva ca/ na tu mām abhijānanti tattvenātaś cyavanti te//24//

from Miller 1986, 86-8)

In this passage, Kṛṣṇa, like Tulsīdās, notes the ignorance of people; they are worshipping other gods (anyadevatābhaktā) and performing "aberrant" rituals (yajanty avidhipūrvakam) without knowing that Viṣṇu is the ultimate God. However, this is a slightly different version of the Tulsīdās story. Instead of making other gods devotees of Viṣṇu, Kṛṣṇa says that even sacrifices devoted to other gods are, in reality and ultimately, given to Viṣṇu, who is the sole enjoyer of them. However, despite minor differences in details, we can see that, by placing one's own god over another's and thus absorbing all other religious practices into itself, the basic inclusivistic scheme is retained here.

A more sensitive reading of the passage, however, reveals that the Gītā's version of inclusivism is more fundamental than that of Tulsīdās. The portion to which I want to draw attention is the second half of verse 9.24, which Miller translated as "they do not know me in reality, and so they fail." Here, Kṛṣṇa is saying that those who do not possess the correct knowledge of reality will deviate (cyavanti). Unlike Tulsīdās's position of embracing the religious cult of Śiva in its entirety, albeit as an inferior form of devotion, Kṛṣṇa clearly denounces others' religious practices, even though they are, in reality, worship of Kṛṣṇa himself. Why does he do this? Is this not contrary to the all-embracing sprit of inclusivism? I think the key phrase for understanding Kṛṣṇa's denouncement is "they do not know (na abhijānanti te)." Although Miller translated the verb "abhijñā" as "to

know," the more prominent and appropriate meaning would be "to remember." Accordingly, a more correct translation of the half-verse would be "they do not remember me as reality, therefore, they deviate." What is the difference between "to know" and "to remember"? One of the chief differences between these two actions lies in the difference of the object involved. Remembering something involves recollecting something that was already known; thus, its main object belongs to the past. It necessarily presupposes past experience with a given object of knowing, and the act of remembering takes the knowledge produced as its object. In contrast, in the act of knowing, the actor's past encounter with a knowable object, and previous knowledge about it are not presumed.

Kṛṣṇa's denouncement, in this regard, is not aimed at people's ignorance but at their oblivion or forgetfulness of the truth that should be known to them from the past. Indeed, in the earlier chapter of the *Bhagavadgītā,* Kṛṣṇa says that he has given this same teaching to people long before in the ancient past, or, more correctly, when the first mortal beings appeared in the world.

> I taught this undying discipline to the shining sun, first of mortals, who told it to Manu, the progenitor of man; Manu told it to the solar king Ikshvaku. Royal sages knew this discipline, which the tradition handed down; but over the course of time it has decayed, Arjuna. This is the ancient discipline that I have taught to you today; you are my devotee

and my friend, and this is the deepest mystery.[3] (*Bhagavadgītā* 4.1-3; translation from Miller 1986, 51)

According to the passage, the *Gītā* is the second teaching of Viṣṇu. He conveyed the complete teaching to the first mortal beings in the universe, and they, in turn, entrusted it to the first human being, Manu, and to trustworthy persons such as Ikṣvāku. Therefore, all human beings who are descendents of Manu should know the message of Viṣṇu and should uphold it as truth.

However, people gradually forgot about the primordial teaching and began to worship other gods and to perform "aberrant rites." Those practices are not conceived as novel and creative religious activities because the ultimate truth about religious matters has been fully and completely revealed; therefore, that truth formed the original knowledge of human beings. All the creative ideas of mankind stem from the original knowledge bestowed on them, and the Gītā conceives of these creative ideas as "aberrant (avidhipūrvakam)" and "decayed (naṣṭa)." More importantly with regard to inclusivism, it is because of the derivative nature of worshiping other gods that all sacrifices are ultimately devoted to Viṣṇu alone. Although other religious practices are decayed, they are still derivatives of the original worship of Viṣṇu. Because the ignorance of worshippers impedes their

3) imaṃ vivasvate yogaṃ proktavān aham avyayam/ vivasvān manave prāha manur ikṣvākave 'bravīt//1// evaṃ paramparāprāptam imaṃ rājarṣayo viduḥ/ sa kāleneha mahatā yogo naṣṭaḥ parantapa//2// sa evāyaṃ mayā te 'dya yogaḥ proktaḥ purātanaḥ/ bhakto 'si me sakhā ceti rahasyaṃ hy etad uttamam//3//

spiritual advancement, however, Viṣṇu descended to the earth in the form of Kṛṣṇa to instruct people in exactly the same teachings. Hence, the ignorant predicament of mankind is not something irrevocable.

The structure of the *Gītā*'s narrative can be observed in religio-philosophical Sanskrit scriptures of different affiliations in which various truth-claims are made. It is the general framework within which a (religious and philosophical) truth wraps itself and asserts its authenticity and through which a truth can be recognized by others as such. This is the standard way of modeling, formulating, and producing truthful knowledge in traditional India. And this framework is a reflexive product of the paradigmatic knowledge, i.e., the Veda (lit. "knowledge"), and its surrounding cultures.

4

One of the conspicuous effects of the inclusivistic framing of truth is that it makes the truth ever-present in the world. By revealing the whole truth at the time of Creation and transmitting it to the very first progenitor of human beings, Manu, the truth becomes something that has existed since the very beginning of the universe and that should be known and upheld by every individual on earth. It may decay, but when adharma prevails on the earth, God will descend and teach this "undying discipline" again. In this way, the truth (i.e., "dharma," in the case of the *Gītā*) has always been on the earth without changing. If

change occurs, the truth can be and should be renewed.

This "timeless" nature of the truth is reflected in the style of the religio-philosophical texts of India, which are notorious for their "presumed lack of historical awareness" (Pollock 1989, 603). This issue has been noted as a very Indian phenomenon by many outsiders since the beginning of the second millennia.[4] Many explanations have been proposed for the cause of this conspicuous "symptom" of failing to provide historical references, mainly based on the Indian concept of time; to Indian people, time is cyclical, as seen in their Yuga theories. And moreover, anything appears and happens in the course time is seen as illusion (māyā) according to their representative philosophy of the Advaita Vedānta (Perrett 1999, 313-4). Among the many speculations, for our purpose, I would like to discuss a theory proposed by Houben (2002) that attempts to find an answer in the Vedic rituals.

According to Houben (2002), although prominent grammarians such as Bhartṛhari and Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita changed the direction of the Sanskrit grammarian tradition with their ingenious innovations, they do not acknowledge their "newness" but present their theories of language as if they represent the views of *munitraya* (viz. Pāṇini, Kātyāyana, and Patañjali), whose works are incontestable in the tradition. What is worse, from the perspective of modern historians, is

4) Al Biruni, who travelled India around 1020 CE, notes, "Unfortunately the Hindus do not pay much attention to the historical order of things, they are very careless in relating the chronological succession of their kings, and when they are pressed for information and are at a loss, not knowing what to say, they invariably take to tale-telling" (quoted in Perrett 1999, 308).

that Bhartṛhari and Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita, by not presenting concrete historical references in their works, situated their works in the timeless realm. To locate and determine the historical contexts of their works, "much knowledge from outside the text is needed" (ibid., 464). Rather than seeking to provide information from outside the text, Houben looks for a possible reason to explain the "lack of concrete historical references" and proposes the ritual culture as a key to solving this problem. As he notes, finding an answer in Vedic ritual seems promising because this is the domain in which most (if not all) Brahmins, who are the main producers of Sanskrit texts, are supposed to participate.

However, Houben's treatment of Vedic ritual, unlike other studies on this subject, only focuses on its formality. Basing his work on the theory of ritual proposed by Rappaport,[5] who defines the ritual domain as eternal and timeless on the basis of his "research among the Marin of New Guinea's Central Highlands",[6] Houben asserts that regular participation in this timeless ritual realm may have influenced

5) The work to which Houben refers is Rappaport, Roy A. *Ritual and Religion in the Making of Humanity,* Cambridge Studies in Social and Cultural Anthropology. Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

6) Rappaport's theory of ritual time can be seen in the following passage quoted by Houben: "[Liturgical acts] repeatedly recover the eternal which, being nothing if not immutable, is intrinsically true and thus moral … That which occurs in ritual's intervals is not historical but … timeless, and to participate in a canon is to escape from time's flow into 'what is, in fact, often regarded as the unbounded, the infinite, the limitless, the absolutely true and the immortally vital" (quoted in Houben 2002, 469).

Hindus' perception of time: "in their scholarly and creative textual productions, Brahmin authors can afford to remain close to the ritually created 'time out of time' and need not descend to the time-experience of social reality" (473). It was the obligation of Brahmins to participate in the cyclical ritual activities that overruled "one's engagements in daily life" and eventually "impose(d) a schedule and organize(d)" intellectuals' lives (470).

This focus on the formality of Vedic ritual based on an absolute demarcation between the ritual and mundane realms — in this case, the timeless vs. the historical realm — is reminiscent of the work of Fritz Staal (1979), who sees "no meaning, goal or aim" in Vedic ritual (8-9). According to Staal, because "ritual is pure activity without meaning or goal" (9), what matters in the ritual setting is the exactitude of ritual activities, not the result that can be obtained through those actions. In this way, Staal finds in his materials pure syntax devoid of any semantic meaning. Although Houben, unlike Staal, is not concerned with the grammar that governs ritual activities but with the side effects of ritual activities (i.e., their influence on the mentality of participants), they share the same attitude toward the Vedic rituals in that they are not concerned with self-understandings of the Vedic rituals provided in the Veda itself. Instead, they draw conclusions on the same material without referring to traditional explanations of the meaning of ritual activities.

This neglect of the explanations provided by the Veda itself is partly due to the prevalent presupposition called "the paradox of the Vedas"

in Western scholarship on the authority of the Veda in ancient India. According to Renou (1965), an Indian intellectual “always believes oneself to be in the wake of the Veda, when one turns one’s back on it” (1). In other words, Indian orthodox schools never doubted the absolute authority of the Veda, but they were unconcerned about its contents, and they eventually developed their own philosophies without dependence on the Veda. Halbfass aptly summarizes the situation as follows: “The preservation and glorification of the text seem to coincide with its neglect and the obscuration of its meaning” (Halbfass 1991, 2). The authority and role of the Veda in the intellectual history of India is so nominal that “even in the most orthodox domains, the reverence to the Vedas has come to be a simple ‘raising of the hat’” (Renou 1965, 2).

5

This seeming neglect of the contents of the Veda by the tradition should not lead modern scholars to dismiss these contents altogether. If we assume that “both he (i.e., Bhartṛhari) and Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita had been Vedic students for several years of their life” (Houben 2002, 470), is it reasonable to conjecture that they did not concern themselves with the contents of the Veda? Does the lack of reference to the Veda or the discontinuity of their thought with the Veda prove their ignorance or neglect of the Vedic revelation? Moreover, does

their disinterested attitude toward the contents of the Veda justify our investigation of only the external formality of the Veda? As Halbfass notes, Renou, who initially posed the question of the Vedic paradox, observes that "real extensions" of the Veda in later Hinduism are found in its "process of transformation into the living substance of Hindu practices and speculation" (Halbfass 1991, 2-3). Therefore, the influence of the Veda in the later thinking of Hindu philosophers should not be assessed solely by these philosophers' continuity with the Veda in terms of its philosophical agenda. In this section, by reviewing the cosmogonic myths contained in the Veda, we will attempt to understand the timeless nature of the ritual realm. Furthermore, we will encounter the inclusivistic scheme found in the *Gītā* again in the Vedic creation myths, and we will realize that the *Gītā* developed its model based on the Vedic model. In this way, we will see that the "real extensions" of the Veda in the intellectual history of India lie in its peculiar pattern of thinking, namely, "inclusivism," which is perpetuated throughout history.

Unlike the revelations of other monotheistic religions, the Veda was not revealed at a certain point in time (Wilke & Moebus 2011, 349). Although the universe continuously undergoes cycles of creation and destruction, the Veda is not affected by the transient phenomena of the universe; it transcends time. According to Mīmāṃsā, the most orthodox school specializing in the Vedic hermeneutic, the Veda does not have an author because the existence of a specific author would indicate that it was produced at some point and that there was a time

when the Veda was not in the universe. The authorlessness (apauruṣeyatva) theory, in this sense, is devised to prove the eternal existence of the Veda by depriving it of historicity. Efforts by Mīmāṃsā to erase historical traces from the Veda also took more audacious forms. While projecting the Veda as an anonymous work is an attempt to give it an eternal outlook, they also attempted to find evidence in the text to demonstrate its eternality by taking a specific hermeneutical position.

Because it is believed that the text was seen by ancient Ṛṣis (lit. "seers"), we often find that portions of it are recorded under their personal names. Because those seers are regarded as the transmitters of the eternal truth, the appearance of their names in the text does not harm the timelessness and, thus, the absolute authoritativeness of the Veda. However, the problem is that we also see in the Veda proper names of people other than the seers. For example, we find a sentence such as, "Babara Prāvāhaṇi [son of Pravāha] once desired⋯" (*Taittirīya Saṃhitā* 7.1.5.4, quoted in Pollock 1989, 608). Undoubtedly, this sentence evinces the sensitivity of the "authors" (or seers) of the Veda to their phenomenal surroundings; we can establish a partial genealogy based on it (Pravāha - Babara). However, later Mīmāṃsakas, by deliberately reading "concrete references" such as this to denote eternal objects, effaced historicity from the text. In this case, Mīmāṃsakas read "Prāvāhaṇi" not as the name of a historical person but as "howling wind." Reading this as a historical figure is an illusion, according to them, that arises due to the similarity of sounds of the

word (śrutisāmānyamātram), which denotes two different objects (one eternal and the other phenomenal). It is Pollock's (1989) assumption that Mīmāṃsakas intentionally chose to follow the "*nairukta* or etymological analysis of the Veda" over the *aitihāsika*s' approach, which seeks "to explain the Vedic texts on the basis of the things that have 'actually happened' (itihāsa)" to deprive the Veda of a "dimension of historical referentiality" and make its truth eternal (608). In this way, the eternality of the Veda based on its authorlessness (apauruṣeyatva) is "confirmed by their [i.e., the Veda's] contents" (ibid.)

Considering this transcendence of the Veda, we might think that whatever truth or knowledge it contains would be irrelevant to this transient world. However, the situation is quite the opposite. The Veda, existing eternally, is revealed at the time of every creation to the Creator god Prajāpati and serves as a manual or blueprint of the universe so that he can create the same universe repeatedly. However, the significance of the Veda at the time of Creation is more than simply a guidebook. The Creator god Prajāpati uses it as physical material for the entire universe; everything is literally made from the text or, more correctly, the sounds of the Veda. The way of using the Vedic sounds is ritualistic.

Because there is considerable variety in the cosmogonic myths in the Veda, it is difficult to conflate them into a standard version of a creation story. However, although the narratives differ from one another, one common theme is that the universe was created by ritual activities. In the *Puruṣa-Sūkta* (ṚV 10.90),[7] one of the more famous

creation stories in the Veda, the whole world is created by sacrificing the cosmic giant "Puruṣa." Space (sky, mid-region, earth), the four varṇas (Brāhmaṇa, Kṣatriya, Vaiśya, Śūdra), various inhabitants of the world (cows, goats, sheep), and heavenly gods (Agni, Indra, Sūrya, Vāyu) all emerged out of the sacrifice of that primordial man (ṚV 10.90.10-5).

One interesting point in the story is that the Veda refers to itself as one of the products (in fact, the first product) created from this first ritual performance: "From that sacrifice in which everything was offered, the verses and chants were born, the metres were born from it, and from it the formulas were born" (ṚV 10.90.9). Here, "the verse" denotes the *Ṛg Veda*, "the chants" denote the *Sāma Veda*, and "the formulas" denote the *Yajur Veda.* All three principle Vedas came into being through the medium of ritual activities.

Another notable point in the *Puruṣa-Sūkta* is that it shows the beginning of the Vedic "homological thinking," often characterized as the cardinal feature of the corpus of the Veda (Smith 1989, 31). In the *Sūkta*, the sacrificial products do not emerge randomly; they are created in an orderly, though not entirely systematic, way, as seen in later Brāhmaṇa ritual texts. We see that relationships (*bandhu*) are made between Puruṣa's mouth and the Brahmin, the head and sky, the mind and the moon, and so on. This "system of equations," as Renou calls it (ibid.), was further developed in other cosmogonic myths and

7) For the translation of the Ṛg Veda and the *Puruṣa-sūkta* in particular, I referred to Doniger (1981, 29-32).

defined the nature and status of the Veda itself.

In another cosmogonic narrative introduced in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, the Creator god Prajāpati builds a sacrificial altar, which represents the primordial man Puruṣa, and practices tapas (i.e., asceticism) out of a desire to multiply (i.e., to reproduce). After accumulating creative power, Prajāpati "first created Brahman, that is threefold knowledge (trayī vidyā – the Vedas)" and then spoke the language of creation. In other words, by reciting or calling out mantras, every corresponding object came into being. Most important among those words are three vyāhṛtis (bhūḥ, bhuvaḥ, svaḥ); upon their recitation, there emerged the earth, mid-region, and heaven, respectively (Wilke & Moebus 2011, 416-8). Everything has arisen from these three regions, including the Veda.[8)]

> From him who had exerted himself and practiced tapas the three worlds — earth, midregions, and heaven — were brought forth. He infused warmth into these three worlds. From those heated [worlds] three lights were produced: Agni, fire; he who purifies here [Vāyu, wind]; and Sūrya, the sun. He infused warmth into these three lights. From those heated [lights] the three Vedas were produced: the Ṛg-Veda from Agni, the Yajur-Veda from Vāyu, and the Sāma-Veda from Sūrya. (*Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*

8) The apparent circularity of creation (the Veda creates three worlds, and from three worlds, the Veda is created), according to Holdrege (1994, 49), is "a typical Vedic paradox of mutual creation."

11.5.8.1-4; translation from Holdrege 1994, 49)

This tripartite creation activity of Prajāpati continues to fill the world and give it a natural and social order. His creation includes the social classes (the three upper classes), seasons, parts of day, cardinal directions, and the meters of the Vedic hymns (for a chart of his creations and their homological interrelationship, see Smith 1994, 82-3).

The most important feature in this narrative is that the creation activity of Prajāpati was a linguistic one, and the linguistic expressions that were once used by the Creator god are left to mankind in the form of the Veda. However, Prajāpati's linguistic activity was not an ordinary, communicative one; rather, it was "a statement of truth which makes everything that was uttered true" (Wilke & Moebus 2011, 416; see also Wheelock 1989, 118) which became an important theme of Indian epics. However, there is a slight difference between a truth statement and the Vedic mantras used in the creation ritual. Whereas the former makes itself true by creating the corresponding physical reality depending on the truth value of a claim, the Vedic mantras transform themselves into the physical material of the products of the ritual. In other words, mantras become the physical substance of their production; the fundamental callings (vyāhṛtis, viz. bhūḥ, bhuvaḥ, svaḥ) of Prajāpati *are themselves* the earth, mid-region, and heaven. With these correspondences "established between the realm of sound and the realm of form" (Holdrege 1994, 48), gods on earth (i.e., Brahmin priests who aspire to assume the role of Prajāpati)

gain access to the secret of the universal creation and control over the entire universe. By resonating mantras in the ritual setting, the Brahmin priests can manipulate reality, which is made of mantras.

6

Upon closer examination of the cosmogonic myths of the Veda, we realize that the same inclusivistic pattern of the *Gītā* works within them. The Creator god Prajāpati creates everything in the universe by reciting the Vedas (or the Vedic mantras), which exist eternally as the universal principle in the primordial ritual, similar to Viṣṇu's revelation of truth to the first human being, Manu. The only difference between them is that the truth of Viṣṇu is to be transmitted to later generations, whereas the Vedic words are not to be transmitted because they ontologically constitute every being in the three worlds. Furthermore, we find the counterpart of Viṣṇu's regular descent to the earth: the primordial creative activity of Prajāpati is continuously emulated and enacted by the Brahmin priests at every significant juncture of human time, such as morning, the new and full moon days, and the last and first day of a year. This activity signifies that the entire universe is regularly renewed by human rituals using the same eternal linguistic materials. Just as Viṣṇu reminds mankind of the same truth, the Brahmin priests, as human gods, repeatedly reveal the same everlasting cosmological secret. Finally, just as Kṛṣṇa sees no otherness, but only

decay, in devotion to other gods, the Veda sees no otherness, but only remoteness, in the derivative order of things because everything is made of itself in sequence.

Although the Veda claims universality by presenting itself as the source of the universe, later interpretations of the Veda show that its subject matter was conceived exclusively in relation to the dharma (the ritual obligations of Brahmins) and mokṣa (liberation from the cycle of rebirth). Except for the Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta schools, which devoted themselves to the hermeneutic of the Veda, other scientific knowledge systems that developed in traditional India did not inherit the topics of their investigation from the Veda. Therefore, the Veda's self-declaration that it is the source of universal knowledge seems easily refutable, and one might think that the actual influence of the Veda was minimal compared with the respect paid to its authority by the tradition. Nonetheless, despite the apparent dearth of knowledge on everything in itself, the Veda realized its universalistic claim by providing the standard model for true knowledge in the course of history.

The most exemplary phenomenon to prove this case is the continuous appearance of texts that claim to be the "Veda" or to be fully rooted in the Vedic revelation. For example, the Dharmaśāstras, which prescribe the normative behaviors of Hindus, assert that they derive all their rules directly from the Veda. If a certain rule is not found in the extant Veda, this does not indicate its non-Vedic origin; rather, it affirms the existence of a "lost Veda." In addition to this

rhetoric of the "lost Veda," we see throughout Indian history numerous texts that were counted as the last addition to the Vedic corpus, namely, "the fifth Veda": various Purāṇas, Mahābhārata, Āyurveda, Nāṭyaśāstra, and, more recently, the Bible. By emphasizing their revelatory origin in accordance with their title "Veda," these texts verify the universal claim of the Veda that knowledge of everything was completely revealed at the time of creation.

This process of making the foundational text of a tradition a Veda is not merely the act of calling one's own scripture a Veda. It reflects a prevalent cultural ideology about legitimate religious and scientific knowledge systems. In this regard, traditional intellectuals not only called their own canon a Veda but also projected their ideas of the Veda onto their own canon. The gradual elevation of *munitraya* in the Sanskrit Grammarian tradition (vyākaraṇa) to the status of Ṛṣis, traced and documented by Deshpande (1998), is illuminating on this point. Sanskrit grammar was developed as one of the auxiliary sciences (Vedāṅga) to keep the Veda intact. As an auxiliary science, the status of its core text, the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* of Pāṇini, differed from that of the Veda. Whereas the latter was the full manifestation of the truth, the former was a study on that revelation and a human effort to understand the eternal truth. Because of this difference in their status, unlike the Veda, whose text or sound was to be preserved with the utmost exactitude, Pāṇini's text was considered improvable by later generations of scholars, and Pāṇini's grammatical rules were indeed criticized and emended by later grammarians such as Kātyāyana and

Patañjali. Over time, the works of these three grammarians (munitraya) were viewed as quasi-Vedas ("chandovat"), as mythical narratives developed around them. From Bhartṛhari's time on, grammarians designated them "[Maha-]Ṛṣis" (the same title as those who saw the Vedic truth), recognizing Pāṇini's work (especially the *Śivasūtra*) as the revelation from Śiva (Maheśvara) and revering Patañjali as the incarnation of Śeṣa, the king of all Nāgas (Deshpande 1998, 19-27). In these mythical thoughts, we can clearly observe how grammarians transformed their fundamental texts into Vedas by making Pāṇini a seer who received the complete (grammatical) knowledge from the god Śiva and by making Patañjali an avatāra of Śeṣa who reaffirmed the same truth.

Whereas Deshpande's (1998) study addresses the diachronic dimension of a phenomenon that can be called the "Vedicization of all knowledge systems" by outlining how the Sanskrit grammarians' canons (viz. the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* and the *Mahābhāṣya*) gradually came to resemble the outlook of the Veda, Pollock's (1985) study treats the synchronic dimension of the same phenomenon by considering how much the Vedic model of knowledge was prevalent in traditional India. Delving into the notion of "śāstra" and its ideological power over actual practices in every aspect of Indian life, Pollock enumerates diverse ranges of fields in which strict rules have been established. According to his documentation, it seems that all human activities have prototypical, paradigmatic counterparts laid out in śāstras. From everyday activities such as boiling rice, raising cattle, and sexual

intercourse to technical matters such as making a pot or building a house, śāstras prescribed the normative model to be followed. By locating their origination in the time of cosmological creation, these śāstras take the same outfit of the Veda. In this process of making Vedas in every realm of human life, the Veda's claim that they are the source of all knowledge about everything gradually became true.

In relation to our subject matter, inclusivism, one of the most important implications of this Vedic self-realization process is that it virtually prevents one from seeing any novelty in human life. The standard model of human behavior was revealed at the very beginning of the universe, and mankind inherited that knowledge of everything in the form of the Vedas. Consequently, any effort to improve one's knowledge does not consist in discovering yet unknown truth but in reminding oneself of once fully revealed but now forgotten truth. In this respect, the main task for traditional Indian intellectuals was to re-appropriate the past (rather than to pioneer the future) because, to borrow the words of Jayanta, "all sciences have existed, precisely like the Vedas, from the first creation" (from the *Nyāyamañjarī*, quoted in Pollock 1985, 516).

7

As evident from the previous section, the Veda, as "the śāstra par excellence" (Pollock 1985, 518), provided the template or framework

through which any system of knowledge should present itself to be recognized as the truth. However, as we have seen in the case of the Vedicization of the canonical treatises of the Sanskrit grammarians, this process of making every śāstra a Veda is not devoid of a historical dimension. It was not the case from the beginning of scientific studies in India; rather, it was a gradual process. Although lucid elaboration on this phenomenon, which occurred over two thousand years, would require more rigorous future research with a more comprehensive outlook, I would like to briefly conjecture regarding a condition that may have maintained this Vedic or inclusivistic model of truth by focusing on the role of the *śiṣṭa* (a learned one) in the degenerate age.

In the study abovementioned (Deshpande 1998) that traces how the traditional maxim ("yathottaraṃ hi munitrayasya prāmāṇyam"), which granted Ṛṣi-like status to the munitraya and affirmed the highest authority of Patañjali, was popularized in the tradition, Deshpande sees a rupture of the tradition between Patañjali and Bhartṛhari with regard to the final authority in the domain of Sanskrit grammar. His observation is in accordance with the traditional categories for distinguishing two generations of grammarians, namely, "lakṣyaikacakṣuska" ("those whose attention is solely fixed on the Sanskrit usage to be described") and "lakṣaṇaikacakṣuska" ("those whose attention is solely fixed upon the rules of grammar"). The first three grammarians (viz. Pāṇini, Kātyāyana, and Patañjali) belong to the first group, which is characterized by their right to modify grammatical rules based on their observation of the correct usage of

Sanskrit. All later grammarians belong to the second category, indicating their inability to emend the established rules of the first three sages (Deshpande 1993, 33).

When this distinction between the two groups of grammarians is made explicit, it reflects reality because Patañjali, while paying due respect to his seniors, exercises his right to oppose their opinions, whereas Bhartṛhari does not. Moreover, and more significantly, it reflects these two grammarian-philosophers' self-awareness of the nature of the era in which they lived. The difference between their self-awareness can be assessed by examining the difference in their notion of the *śiṣṭa*s (or social elites). For Patañjali, the *śiṣṭa*s are "the normative speakers of Sanskrit" who can be defined "by their way of life and place of residence" (ibid., 62). Thus, they were a contemporary and neighboring community in which he could collect correct usage of Sanskrit and on which he could base his investigation. In contrast, according to Deshpande (1998), "Bhartṛhari could not point to grammar-independent contemporary usage of Sanskrit" (20) and identified the *śiṣṭa*s with the ancient grammarians who lived in the golden age: "there is a strong feeling that the current times are decadent, and that there are no truly authoritative persons around" (ibid.).

To support his argument on the difference between Patañjali and Bhartṛhari's notions of "*śiṣṭa,*" in another study, Deshpande (1994) collected relevant primary materials that evince each grammarian's understanding of the term. Although it is clear in his presentation that

Bhartṛhari feels remote from the glorious period of munitraya, it is conspicuous in the materials that whenever Bhartṛhari speaks of the "tradition of the *śiṣṭa*s," he is emphatic about its unbroken continuity. For example, in the *Vṛtti* on *Vākyapadīya* 1.27, he uses the expression "received through uninterrupted tradition consisting of successive teaching of the cultured (śiṣṭopadeśapāramparyāgamāvicchedenāgatāni)" along with another expression of more or less the same meaning. Deshpande also comments on this phrase that "the *śiṣṭa*s of one generation transmit their knowledge to the next generation of *śiṣṭa*s in an unbroken way, and presumably the latter-day *śiṣṭa*s derive their authority from their being in line of transmission from the *śiṣṭa*s of the older generation" (Deshpande 1994, 103). Furthermore, it is not only in the *Vṛtti* but also in a verse of the *Vākyapadīya* that we find the expression regarding the "uninterrupted lineage of the *śiṣṭa*s." Verse 133 in the first chapter reads as follows: "Knowledge of the correctness of words is the subject of this tradition called Grammar. It is here that *the uninterrupted tradition of cultured people* is recorded."[9] (quoted in ibid. 106; emphasis added)

Bhartṛhari's belief in the "uninterruptedness of lineage of the *śiṣṭa*s" culminates in *Vākyapadīya* 1.125, where he clearly states that the lineage of the *śiṣṭa*s will never be severed, even in the decadent age.

> Even if the doctrines perish and there are no more authors to

9) *Vākyapadīya* 1.133, "sādhutvajñānaviṣayā saiṣā vyākaraṇasmṛtiḥ/ avicchedena śiṣṭānām idaṃ smṛtinibandhanam//"

> compose other, cultured people follow the right path mentioned in the śrutis and the smṛtis.[10] (quoted in Deshpande 1994, 105)

Combining all these expressions in the work of Bhartṛhari, we may conclude that even though he perceived himself as living in the degenerate era, he still thought that the lineage of learned people who regulate their behavior in accordance with the Veda continued to exist. The persistent existence of this group of ritualists[11] has particular significance in relation to the inclusivistic pattern of the Veda because it shows that there has always been a possibility of partaking in the primordial ritual of Prajāpati and, as a result, of renewing the eternal truth; regular ritual practice can be read as the equivalent of Viṣṇu's avatāra. Although the Brahmin intellectuals thought of their own era as a decadent one, by performing obligatory rituals they had the opportunity to participate in the eternal realm; they had one foot in the decadent world and the other in the eternal world. The story of Yarvāṇastarvāṇa, mentioned in the *Mahābhāṣya,* further elucidates this situation:

> Thus it is heard. There were in ancient times great sages called

10) *Vākyapadīya* 1.125, "astaṃ yāteṣu vādeṣu kartṛṣv anyeṣu asatsv api/ śrutismṛtyuditaṃ karma loko na vyativartate//"

11) What Bhartṛhari means by "follow the right path mentioned in the Śrutis" (in VP 1.125) is further commented in the *Vṛtti* as "do not violate the rites taught in the Scripture" (śrutivihitāni karmāṇi). Therefore, it is *ritual activity (karma)* that the *śiṣṭa*s perform according to the Śruti (i.e., the Veda).

> Yarvāṇastarvāṇa. They had direct insight into the nature of things, knew this and the yonder worlds, had realized what there is to be realized, and had attained the true knowledge of the world as it is. Those highly honored sages used the [incorrect = Prakrit] expressions *yarvāṇa* and *tarvāṇa* when they should have used [the proper Sanskrit] expressions *yad vā naḥ* and *tad vā naḥ*. However, they did not use these incorrect [=Prakrit] expressions during a sacrificial performance.[12] (quoted in Deshpande 1994, 112)

By applying the inclusivistic pattern we found in the *Gītā* to the situation of the Brahmins in this narrative, we realize that the Brahmins are the embodiments of inclusivism. 1. They are well versed in the complete truth revealed at the time of universal creation (i.e., the Veda). 2. However, because they live in the degenerate age, when the language of the gods (Sanskrit) is no longer used, they speak Prakrit in their ordinary life. 3. Nevertheless, when they remind themselves of the primordial truth, they speak Sanskrit because the Creator god Prajāpati used that language when he created the universe. It is from this dual position, from which the Brahmins could view the pristine as well as the decayed state of the universal truth, that they viewed and understood the world. As I conclude this paper, I

12) Mahābhāṣya on P.2.4.56, “evaṃ hi śrūyate/ yarvāṇastarvāṇo nāma ṛṣayo babhūvuḥ pratyakṣadharmāṇaḥ parāparajñā viditaveditavyā adhigatayāthātathyāḥ/ te tatrabhavanto yad vā nas tad vā na iti prayoktavye yarvāṇastarvāṇa iti prayuñjate yājñe puṇaḥ karmaṇi nāpabhāṣante/ ”

would like to note the doxographical genre of Sanskrit literature as the manifestation of this specific viewpoint of the Brahmins.

8

The Āstika (affirmer) and the Nāstika (denier) are the most widely used categories for describing Indian philosophy. Like many other critical terms in Sanskrit, the meanings of these categories have not been constant. They have been the locus of debate, and their meaning has been negotiated throughout history. Nonetheless, as the Hindu orthodox schools gained the upper hand over (now extinguished) Buddhism and Jainism, the interpretation offered in the *Manusmṛti* was fixed as their "natural" meaning, and it remains the dominant way of reading them: "Any twice-born who disregards these two roots [śruti and smṛti] on the basis of the science of logic should be excluded by the righteous as a nāstika, a reviler of the Veda"[13] (Manu. 2.11; translation from Nicholson 2010, 168). Another famous category is the standard list of six darśanas (viz. Sāṃkhya-Yoga, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, and Mīmāṃsā-Vedānta). According to the definition of Manu. 2.11, all six darśanas belong to the Āstika camp because they accept the Veda as the ultimate source of truth.

All the standardized categories used in Indian philosophy have their

13) Manu. 2.11 "yo 'vamanyeta te mūle hetuśāstrāśrayād dvijaḥ/ sa sādhubhir bahiṣkāryo nāstiko vedanindakaḥ//"

provenance in a specific genre of Sanskrit literature that is referred to by modern scholars as “doxography.” The lack of historiographical literature in India is a well-known phenomenon, and this commonly held observation is also evident in the Indian philosophical works. Indian intellectuals did not record the history of their philosophical development; instead, they enumerated “views” of schools from a fixed list. This peculiar way of presenting and summarizing the philosophy of one’s own tradition was often viewed as a sign of inferiority (notably by Hegel). It was compared with other traditional presentations, such as the Greek, and it determined the way of studying Indian philosophies in the modern period. Rather than examining the interrelationship between various competing groups of philosophers, modern scholars preferred to focus on one specific school depending on their own interest (Halbfass 1988, 349-50).

The doxographical presentation of philosophical schools is indeed a peculiar, uniquely Indian phenomenon when compared with the Greek and Chinese traditions, but it is not an incidental one. Considering the inclusivistic pattern of thinking about truth, there is no way of summarizing all the philosophical traditions other than situating them in an ahistorical realm and treating them as eternal philosophical units. In the doxographical scheme, we find a few interesting characteristics that are pertinent to our topic of inclusivism.

First, Sanskrit doxographies always include the Nāstika schools, such as those of the materialists, Buddhists, and Jains in their list. In the minds of these authors, despite the Nāstikas’ violent rejection of

the Vedic authority, everything has its fundamental roots in the Veda; therefore, although their philosophies are deformed, they must be addressed in the same scheme. Kumārila's severe revilement of the Nāstika is noteworthy in this regard; to him, Buddhists and Jains are not only to be criticized philosophically but also ethically, "for they do not accept the fact that the Vedas are the source [of their teachings], just as an evil son who hates his parents is ashamed to admit his descent from them" (quoted in Smith 1989, 18).

Second, doxographical works give each philosophical school a hierarchical order. This can be explained by the same logic with which we understood Kṛṣṇa's anger toward the worshippers of other gods. Although Kṛṣṇa readily admits that devotion to other gods will ultimately reach Viṣṇu, it fails because these devotions are decayed forms of worship. In a similar vein, the authors of doxographies list Buddhist teachings as a form of philosophy, but they unanimously locate Buddhism at a very low level to signify how much these teachings are deformed from the pristine teaching of the Veda. In addition to the low status of the Nāstika schools in the hierarchical order, it is also interesting that they have the highest teaching that will lead its followers to the ultimate goal of liberation. According to the structure of the inclusivistic pattern, we can interpret this fact as acknowledgement of the possibility of directly accessing the universal truth of the Veda. Viewed in this way, the doxographical scheme that was widely adopted to outline the landscape of Indian philosophy is none other than a manifestation of inclusivism developed out of the

Veda itself.

Before concluding this discussion, I would like to return to the problem introduced at the beginning of this paper. The constructionists assert that Hinduism can be understood as consisting of many different religions. Based on the differences between various religious groups in the main god, scripture, and rituals, they argue, Hinduism should be differentiated, and "the whole concept of the oneness of Hindu religion was introduced by missionaries and scholars from the West" (von Stietencron 1995, 51). However, we realize upon close examination of their source materials that even though they seem to be evidence of the separate identities of different groups, they also emulate the Vedic model of truth and incorporate the inclusivistic pattern in understanding religious others. The analysis of one Śaivite text by von Stiecron (1995) is exemplary in this respect. In the text (i.e., the *Somaśambhupaddhati*), which is his focus of analysis, we see a general roadmap of the Śaivas for ultimate liberation or the goal of becoming Śiva himself.

According to the text, the universe is the emanation of Śiva, consisting of 36 tattvas (i.e., principles that constitute all worldly existence) and an infinite number of individual souls (aṇu). For an individual soul to reach and attain the omniscient and omnipotent state of Śiva, one must strive to return to the source of universal creation against the stream of Śiva's emanation. This path to the supreme God and the goal of reaching and becoming himself, according to the text, is common to all people, whether they are

Vaiṣṇavas, Buddhists, or Jains. However, these heretics have upper limits, whereas the Śaivas have no hindrance in their pursuit of the ultimate goal:

> The followers of Buddha are situated in buddhi-tattva (as their muktisthāna); the Jainas in (sattvaguṇa which forms) the top of the guṇas; but those who fully know the Veda (i.e., the Mīmāṃsakas) are in (prakṛti which is) the womb of the guṇas; and those who direct themselves towards Bhagavan (Viṣṇu) are in puruṣa (-tattva).[14] (*Somaśambhupaddhati* v. 7; Quoted in von Stiecron 1995, 61.)

Although von Stiecron finds a conclusive corroboration for his constructionist view in this passage, which offers a "clear picture of the relative ranking" and "their own keen sense of superiority" (ibid.), we see this as a variation of the typical doxographical understanding of others that is prevalent in other religious or philosophical groups. Although the Śaivas strive to reach Śiva (not other gods), they employ the same Vedic inclusivistic pattern. Śiva revealed the full roadmap of liberation at the time of creation. By following it step by step, one regains the original truth, although those who follow decayed forms of practice will fail. The "real extension" of the Veda is not to be found in terms of its subject matter. As Halbfass (1990) notes, the role of the Veda in Indian intellectual history is found in the Veda itself because

14) "buddhitattve sthitā bauddhā jainās tu guṇamastake/ vedāntajñās tu tadyonau puruṣe bhagavanmukhāḥ//"

it “exhibits a paradigmatic commitment to an absolute origin and foundation, and seems to provide clues for its own later role in Hindu thought” (41). By showing how the Creator god Prajāpati used itself, the Veda provides the framework through which truth presents itself and is recognized as such by later generations of Hindus.

약호 및 참고문헌

Deshpande, Madhav. *Sanskrit & Prakrit, Sociolinguistic Issues*. 1st ed. Mlbd Series in Linguistics. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1993.

Deshpande, Madhav. "The Changing Notion of *Śiṣṭa* from Patañjali to Bhartṛhari." in *Bhartṛhari, Philosopher and Grammarian: Proceedings of the First International Conference on Bhartṛhari (University of Poona, January 6-8, 1992)*, edited by Saroja Bhate and Johannes Bronkhorst, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1994.

Deshpande, Madhav M. "Evolution of the Notion of Authority (Prāmāṇya) in the Pāṇinian Tradition." *Histoire, épistémologie, langage: HEL* 20, no. 1 (1998): 5-28.

Doniger, Wendy. *The Rig Veda: An Anthology: One Hundred and Eight Hymns, Selected, Translated and Annotated*, Penguin Classics. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England; New York, N.Y.: Penguin Books, 1981.

Fitzgerald, Timothy. "Who Invented Hinduism? Rethinking Religion in India." in *Rethinking Religion in India: The Colonial Construction of Hinduism*, edited by Esther Bloch, Marianne Keppens and Rajaram Hegde, London; New York: Routledge, 2010.

Hacker, Paul, and Wilhelm Halbfass. *Philology and Confrontation: Paul Hacker on Traditional and Modern Vedanta*. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1995.

Halbfass, Wilhelm. *India and Europe: An Essay in Understanding*.

Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1988.

Halbfass, Wilhelm. *Tradition and Reflection: Explorations in Indian Thought*. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1991.

Heesterman, J. C. “Hinduism and Vedic Ritual.” *History of Religions* 30, no. 3 (1991): 296-305.

Holdrege, B. A. “Veda in the Brāhmaṇas - Cosmogonic Paradigms and the Delimitation of Canon.” in *Authority, anxiety, and canon: essays in Vedic interpretation*. L. L. Patton. Albany: State University of New York Press. SUNY series in Hindu studies, 1994.

Houben, Jan. “The Brahmin Intellectual: History, Ritual and “Time out of Time”.” *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 30, no. 5 (2002): 463-479.

Lorenzen, David N. *Who Invented Hinduism: Essays on Religion in History* New Perspectives on Indian Pasts. New Delhi: Yoda Press, 2006.

Miller, Barbara Stoler. *The Bhagavad Gita: Krishna's Counsel in Time of War*. New York: Bantam, 1986.

Nicholson, Andrew J. *Unifying Hinduism: Philosophy and Identity in Indian Intellectual History* South Asia across the Disciplines. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010.

Perrett, Roy W. “History, Time, and Knowledge in Ancient India.” *History and Theory* 38, no. 3 (1999): 307-321.

Pollock, Sheldon. “The Theory of Practice and the Practice of Theory in Indian Intellectual History.” *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 105, no. 3 (1985): 499-519.

Pollock, Sheldon. "Mīmāṃsā and the Problem of History in Traditional India." *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 109, no. 4 (1989): 603-610.

Smith, Brian K. *Reflections on Resemblance, Ritual, and Religion*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.

Smith, B. K. "The Veda and the Authority of Class - Reduplicating Structures of Veda and *Varṇa* in Ancient Indian Texts." in *Authority, anxiety, and canon: essays in Vedic interpretation*. L. L. Patton. Albany: State University of New York Press. SUNY series in Hindu studies, 1994.

Renou, Louis. *The Destiny of the Veda in India*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1965.

von Stietencron, Heinrich. "Religious Configurations in Pre-Muslim India and the Modern Concept of Hinduism." in *Representing Hinduism: The Construction of Religious Traditions and National Identity*, edited by Vasudha Dalmia and Heinrich von Stietencron, New Delhi; Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1995.

von Stietencron, Heinrich. "Hinduism: On the Proper Use of a Deceptive Term." in *Hinduism Reconsidered*, edited by Gunther-Dietz Sontheimer and Hermann Kulke, New Delhi: Manohar Publishers & Distributors, 2001.

Wheelock, Wade T. "The Mantra in Vedic and Tantric Ritual." in *Understanding Mantras*, edited by Harvey P. Alper, Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1989.

Wilke, Annette, and Oliver Moebus. *Sound and Communication: An Aesthetic Cultural History of Sanskrit Hinduism* Religion and Society, Berlin; New York: De Gruyter, 2011.

Abstract

Inclusivism : the Enduring Vedic Vision in the Ever-Renewing Cosmos

Hyoung Seok Ham

University of Michigan

This paper seeks to define a unifying vision of Hinduism from within the tradition and claims that this vision is inclusivistic. By reviewing scholarly discussions on inclusivism, the singularity/plurality of Hinduism, and the timelessness feature of Sanskrit literature, the paper analyzes how truth claims were made in ancient India and identifies a possible provenance of inclusivism in the role of Brahmins who regularly emulated the Creator god Prajāpati. Considering the influence of Vedic ritualistic culture on the perception of truth and otherness, the "real extension of the Veda," despite its seeming neglect in the tradition, should be appreciated for providing Indian intellectuals with a paradigmatic framework of knowledge throughout history.

Key Words : Inclusivism, Hinduism, Hinduisms, Vedic rituals, truth claims

2013년 6월 9일 투고
2013년 6월 21일 심사완료
2013년 6월 24일 게재확정