

The New Critical Edition of the Nyāyabhāṣya and Its Meaning for the Research in Early Buddhist Debate Tradition—The Case of *jāti* and 相應.*

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I. Introduction

Fundamental research in Indian classical texts in general, including the establishment of the critical editions of the texts, is still in progress to meet the need of further research. One of the most basic text in the field of Indian philosophy, the *Nyāyasātra* (NS), lacks still a well-founded critical edition. Due to the history of its textual transmission, it is a fundamental work to be done for the philological research of the NS to establish a new critical edition of its oldest available commentary of Vātsyāyana, i.e. the *Nyāyabhāṣya* (NBh). The establishment of the critical

text of the *NBh* is prerequisite not only for discerning the ‘spurious’ *sūtra*-s but also for determining the precise wordings of the *sūtra*-s. Vātsyāyana’s detailed explanations on the *NS* and detailed discussions provide us with much information on his contemporary philosophical ambience including Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya, and Mīmāṃsā, and also Buddhist circles.

Considering the importance of the *NBh* in the field of Indian philosophy, it is surprising that we have no reliable critical edition of the *NBh* up to now. A research project aiming at a new critical edition of the *NBh* has been being carried out at the Institute for South Asian, Tibetan and Buddhism Studies of the University of Vienna since August 2004 under the direction of Prof. Dr. Karin C. Preisendanz, funded by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF). Since the project has begun, about more than one hundred manuscripts of the *NBh* are identified and more than

* I am much obliged to the authorities of Jinabhadrasuri (Jain) Bhandar, Jaisalmer und The Oriental Research Institute & Manuscripts Library, Trivandrum for the friendly permission to use the mss materials. My special thanks go to the venerable Jain Muni and also extraordinary scholar Jambuvijaya-Ji for his engagement to make the mss materials available for our academic research. The director of the research project financed by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF P17244-G03), Metaphysics and Epistemology of the Nyāya Tradition—Sources, History, Ideas: A Critical Edition of the Nyāyabhāṣya, Prof. Dr. Karin C. Preisendanz deserves my thanks for initiating the whole research and also for her readiness to share her broad knowledge in the field of Nyāya. Last but not least, it is my pleasure to express my heartily thanks to my colleague, Dr. Yasutaka Muroya not only for the official cooperative work, but also for his readiness to discuss my ideas in detail and read my draft.

All the given translations of original texts are mine, if references are not given.

seventy manuscripts containing the text are collected in diverse forms. Other direct commentarial texts on the *NS* and subcommentaries on the *NBh* are also procured for the editorial work of the *NBh*.

This paper would be an indirect demonstration of the need of the genuine philological work which consists not only in organising of the work of searching and locating, procuring, evaluating and collating the mss materials, but also in weighing all the given and possible readings with the competence in the relevant field.

II. The Theme: *jāti*

Nowadays the intellectual mode in the West which pays much attention to the pragmatic aspects of real arguments, combined with the growing interest for rhetorics in general, tends to direct the perspectives of the Indological research in the field of so-called "Indian logic" to the pragmatic aspect of the Nyāya tradition. Against this background it would be a nice occasion for the Indologists to reconsider the importance of the theme *jāti* in the *NS* and the *NBh*. But new publications dealing with this theme do not show any substantial advance, although they try to do. What is urgently needed is the reliable and careful readers of a text, both in the philological and in the philosophical sense, and a philological work which is the first work to be carried out thoroughly. On the basis of progress in the work in establishing the critical edition of the *NBh*, we are laying much more solid material foundation and at the

same time we do harvest more valuable information about the content of the text.

It is the general concensus of the scholars that the 1st and 5st books of the *NS* constitute the older kernel part of the whole *NS* with very strong affiliation to the debate (*vāda*) tradition of ancient India. The first part (*āhnika*) of the 5th book in the *NS* is reserved for the treatment of sophisticated riposte (*jāti*) and its 24 kinds. Obviously enough the themes relevant to *jāti* were considerably important in the early Nyāya tradition and accordingly deserve detailed clarification. But the actual academic achievement regarding the interpretation and understanding of *jāti* is no less than piteous. This current state is resulted mainly from evading the major interpretational problems regarding *jāti*, partly caused by the lack of philological basis for the research. Taking the example of the history of Buddhist philosophy in ancient India, the consideration of the fact that the development of the whole Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition (*pramāṇa* tradition) and the argumentational mode of Madhyamaka tradition has grown on the soil of the ancient Indian *vāda* tradition makes it clear how strong demand stands for good editorial work in front of us.

It was not the negative evaluation of *jāti*, what has hindered persistent research on *jāti*,¹⁾ but rather the unsolved basic interpretational problems

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1) I do not agree with Prets 2001: 546.


regarding *jāti*, required for any further serious examination on this theme. I will mention only two representative problems. First, the exact meaning of the term *jāti* is still a puzzle, which is more mystified with the time than clarified. Nowhere we can find a reasonable exposition for the exact meaning of the term and also for the reason why all the names of the 24 *jāti*-s in *NS* 5.1.1. end in °*sama*, e.g. *sādharmyasama*, *vaidharmyasama*, *varṇyasama* and *vikalpasama*. Without answering these basic questions any serious Indologist will feel reluctant, from the right beginning, to translate the term *jāti* and the names of individual *jāti*-s in *NS* 5. Ignoring these elementary exegetical problems, we cannot expect any serious advance in the research of the complex theme *jāti*. And the intellectual atmosphere in the second half of the last century, especially in philosophical circles, was not favorable for pragmatically oriented research on the themes such as *jāti*. Of course, the temptation was and is very strong to pick out only some passages from the Nyāya or relevant Buddhist *pramāṇa* texts, which could be presented in the appearance of (pseudo-)formal logical discourses in the ancient Indian classical texts. On the one hand, it was very welcomed by Indian intellectuals, who desired to establish an indigenous intellectual tradition in addition to their 'mystic' spritual traditions. On the other, it was favoured by the analytical philosophers in the West, including some of the Indologists with the methodological orientation supplied by analytical philosophy.²⁾

2) The most prominent example would be the works of B. K. Matilal whose work is more often than not a distortion of the original meaning of the texts.

In the following I will try to confront the first question directly, and on the basis of solid philological data I will demonstrate that the interpretation of the term *jāti* was misled already in the time of Vātsyāyana. Although I will not be in the position to give the illuminative answer to the question, I would like to try to show how concrete and solid step could be laid forward, if we realize that actually we do not know the answer. The cognition will have a far-reaching consequences in the research of the early *vāda* tradition in India, including the Buddhist *vāda* tradition. For the demonstration I will take an example of a word 相應, a very strongly affiliated term to *jāti* out of a Buddhist text, namely 方便心論 (**Upāyahṛdaya* = *UH*). It will, I hope, prove the importance of the theme *jāti*, even in the context of historical placement of Nāgārjuna's philosophy, and I will try to show how meaningful contribution can be made by the establishment of the critical edition of the *NBh* even for the research in the history of Buddhist philosophy in ancient India.

III. Manuscripts of the Nyāyabhāṣya and Its Stemma Codicum

In the detailed discussion on *jāti* we will resort to the research results of mss research of the *NBh* accomplished by the above mentioned project. For this reason it is necessary to take a glance on the the mss transmission of the *NBh*, which is open to revision as the project progresses.

Hypothetical Stemma Codicum of the *NBh*

Based on the examination of and research about the manuscripts done up to now, we are able to classify the extant manuscripts into two primary groups, group Y and Z. The division of these two groups, partly overlapping, does not correspond to the geographical and linguistic division of northern and southern India. We could procure till now only two mss in South Indian scripts:³⁾ one in Telugu from Chennai, the other in Malayālam from Trivandrum. The Telugu ms from Chennai (Madras) belongs to the group A in the transmission of *textus receptus*. But the

3) It is normally accepted that the Nyāya tradition was not very popular in southern India.

complete palm leaf manuscript written in Malayālam script from Trivandrum (T^{ML}) takes an independent position in our stemma codicum as a single member of the Kerala-Group. The widely known version(s) of the NBh could be divided again in two groups: A and B. The majority of the procured mss and the printed editions belong to the group B in the textus receptus group.⁴⁾ The only exception⁵⁾ is the edition prepared by Thakur (D_{EA}), who consults, partly records and follows the readings in J^P. The denomination of Jaisalmer-Group or Kerala-Group as a group is problematic, because each group has only one or two extant mss. But the features of variant readings kept in these manuscripts entitle them to be regarded as a relatively independent groups in the transmission.⁶⁾

4) Cf. Muroya 2006: 48, n. 102.

5) To be exact, there are two exceptions, for Thakur has published his edition twice. He published in the year 1967 the first *adhyāya* of the *Nyāyacaturgranthikā* in Mithila Institute Series Ancient Text 20 in Darbhanga.

6) There are two mss from Jaisalmer one of which is incomplete paper ms with 70 fols. This ms is maybe the oldest available NBh ms, for the ms of the *Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā*, No. 1274(2), which is included in the same bundle with the NBh ms, has a colophon with the information of the date of transcription, viz. “*saṃvat 1279 bhādrapada vadi 13 likhitam*,” which would fall on the 5th September 1222. This NBh ms is till now not available for us. The other one is now available to us: J^P. Cf. also Muroya 2006: 41, n. 72. We have some reasonable grounds for the assumption that the independent text transmission and also a separated tradition were alive in Kerala, for some later commentaries probably belonging to the Kerala tradition, e.g. *Nyāyatātparyāḍipikā* and *Nyāyasūtravivaraṇa*, show sometimes the identical readings with T^{ML} deviating from other text transmissions.

IV. Nyāyabhāṣya 1.2.18

To deal with *jāti*, it would be nice to begin with NS 1.2.18 and the NBh to this sūtra, where the *jāti* is defined, I will discuss the possible, or near to most plausibly original version of the NBh 1.2.18.

ata ūrdhvam:

sādharmyavaidharmyābhyāṃ pratyavasthānam jātiḥ. (NS 1.2.18)

prayukte hetau⁷⁾ yaḥ prasaṅgo jāyate sā⁸⁾ jātiḥ. sa ca prasaṅgo sādharmyavaidharmyābhyāṃ pratyavasthānam. pratyavasthānam⁹⁾ upālambhaḥ pratiśedha iti. udāharaṇasādharmyāt¹⁰⁾ sādhyasāadhanam. hetur ity¹¹⁾ asyodāharaṇavaidharmyeṇa pratyavasthānam. udāharaṇavaidharmyāt¹²⁾ sādhyasāadhanam hetur ity asyodāharaṇavaidharmyeṇa pratyavasthānam. pratyamā-kabhāvāj jāyamāno' rtho jātir iti.

7) hi hetau C_{Ed.}, D_{Ed.}

8) sa C_{Ed.}, D_{Ed.}: 51 makes no reference to J^p, but most probably he follows the reading of J^p. Nyāyālaṅkāra: 335 reads also sā.

9) om. pratyavasthānam C_{Ed.}, D_{Ed.}

10) udāharaṇāt T^{ML}.

11) om. ity J^p

12) tathodāharaṇavaidharmyāt D_{Ed.}. In J^p *tathā* is inserted before *udāharaṇavaidharmyāt* in lower margin, obviously by a second-hand who is the scribe of the *ṭippaṇī* on the J^p. This *ṭippaṇī* contains in most cases the information out of *Nyāyālaṅkāra*. The most plausible explanation for this insertion would be that the scribe has seen the following sentences as the quasi-citation of NS 1.1.35. Thakur understands this passage in the same way (cf. C_{Ed.}: 51, n.4 where he refers to NS 1.1.35; *draḥ tad eva*, 11 | 1 | 35).

After this [treatment of quibble (*chala*) follows the definition of sophisticated riposte (*jāti*):

The sophisticated riposte is withstanding (*pratyavasthāna*) on the basis of similarity or dissimilarity. (NS 1,2,18)

It is the sophisticated riposte, namely [unintended] consequence which arises, if the reason is put forward (by opponent). And this [unintended] consequence is the withstanding on the basis of similarity or dissimilarity. The withstanding is reproach [and] rejection. In case the reason is the proof of the [property] to be proved on the basis of [its] similarity to the example, the withstanding [is raised] on the basis of dissimilarity of this [given reason] to the example. In case the reason is the proof of the [property] to be proved on the basis of [its] dissimilarity to the example, the withstanding [is raised] on the basis of similarity of this [given reason] to the example. On account of oppositeness the matter is arising [which is] the sophisticated riposte.

The readings found in the manuscripts, especially T^{ML} and J^D show a remarkable difference in the wording of this passage. For the further discussion I will quote the translation of this passage from Prets, simply because it is the most recent published translation of this passage known to me:

The directly following consequence (*prasaṅga*), which arises when a reason (*hetu*) has been brought forward [in a debate], is a *jāti*. And this “directly following consequence” is an objection (*pratyavasthāna*), [i.e.] a rejection (*upālambha*), a negation

(*pratiṣedha*) by means of similarity or dissimilarity. In case that, [according to NSū 1.1.34], the reason (*hetu*) [put forward] is that which proves the [property] to be proved because of its similarity to the example (*udāharaṇa*), [the *jāti*] is the objection to this [reason] by means of its dissimilarity to the example. In case that, [according to NSū 1.1.35], the reason [put forward] is that which proves the [property] to be proved [in the instance to be proved] because of its dissimilarity to the example, [the *jāti*] is the objection to this [reason] by means of its similarity to the example. That [objection] which comes into existence, because it originates in opposition [to the argument], is the *jāti*.¹³⁾

The translation of Prets is generally following the translation given in Jha's earlier publication:

When a certain reasoning has been put forward, the objection to it that follows, takes birth (*jāyate*)—is called “*jāti*”, “Futile Rejoinder.’ This objection is in the form of opposition, an attack, a denial, – on the basis of similarity and dissimilarity. That is to say, when the Proband put forward by the first party is one that is intended to prove the conclusion through its *similarity* to the Example, – and an objection is taken on the basis of its *dissimilarity* (to that Example); – or when the Proband put forward is intended to prove the conclusion through its *dissimilarity* to the Example, – and an objection is taken on the

13) Prets 2001: 548–549.

basis of its *similarity* to it; – we have what is called ‘*jāti*’ (Futile Rejoinder); because it comes up – is born – as an opponent (to the original reasoning).¹⁴⁾

V. Newly Found Wordings in the Nyāyabhāṣya 1.2.18

Now I will discuss some passages out of *NBh* 1.2.18 in detail. First I will take the passage *prayukte hetau*¹⁵⁾ *yaḥ prasaṅgo jāyate sā*¹⁶⁾ *jātiḥ*. The insertion of *hi* in the *textus receptus* might be intended to smooth the connection of the *sūtra* 1.2.8 with the following part, especially with the first sentence of the *NBh* 1.2.8 in the usage for the statement of a reason. We can notice indirectly by this insertion that the choice of the term *jāti* was baffling already in the beginning of the textual transmission of the *textus receptus*. For the word *jāti* means in the *NS* a primordial source material or the entirety of the individual objects derived from this material or an abstract object,¹⁷⁾ not a sophisticated riposte. The Naiyāyikas in the early text transmission of the *NBh* were, in my opinion, at least just so much despaired as we now, or rather as Vātsyāyana the bhāṣyakāra himself. At any rate, we cannot find an interpretational possibility to derive a meaning of ‘answer, refutation, rejection or riposte’ from the verbal root √jan. Vātsyāyana himself did

14) Jha 1912–1919: 579.

15) *hi hetau* C_{sa}.

16) sa C_{sa}. *Nyāyālaṅkāra*: 335 reads also *sā*.

17) Cf. *NS* 2.2.67: *samānaprasavātmikā jātiḥ* and Preisendanz 1994: 660ff.

not know a definite answer, but as a bhāṣyakāra he could not evade this problem and he has tried to give an explanation. It is still open to the discussion, whether this etymologizing trial for an explanation comes from Vātsyāyana himself or not. However, all the later explanations, including the ones given in modern scholarly works, impose a semantical connection between *jāti* and $\sqrt{\text{jan}}$ taking this sentence as their starting point; consequently this particular sentence has become the locus classicus for the explanation of the term *jāti*. Therefore it would be sensible to assume that the later followers of Vātsyāyana would have liked to shape this sentence to give the impression that the reason for the choice of the term *jāti* in the *sūtra* is offered in the *NBh* directly after the *sūtra*. In this sense I would consider the particle *hi* as a later interpolation.

First of all, it should be made clear that this explanation for the term *jāti* in the *NBh* is leaning on the *nirukta* style of the explanation, though not in a successful form. It is a common practice for the commentators to begin their explanations with a *nirukta* style explanation of the central term in the passage. The *NBh* could not offer any full-fledged form of *nirukta* style explanation for *jāti* because the explanation for the necessity for the choice of *jāti* is simply missing. But Vātsyāyana's coup was that he inserted a noun in this quasi-*nirukta* style explanation which will allow to explain the meaning of *jāti* as an 'answer or refutation'; such a word was *prasaṅga*. The literal meaning of *prasaṅga* is 'occurrence [of a case]'. In some contexts, especially in the

philosophical literature it means '[unintended] consequence'.

The first question regarding *prasaṅga* would be if *prasaṅga* in this passage implies any unintended consequence in technical sense or not. The next sentence following this passage where the *prasaṅga* is equated with *pratyaavasthāna* imply that this *prasaṅga* was understood as an unintended consequence for the proponent in the debate who brought forward the reason (*hetu*).¹⁸⁾ The feminine form *sā* is the right reading in this place. What was intended, at least in part, with the relative sentence is a kind of emphasis on the term *jāti*; in this consideration the *varia lectio, sa* would not be adequate. The choice of *sā* with the fullstanding relative sentence should be considered in connection with the foregoing *locativus absolutus*.¹⁹⁾ It means the relative sentence should be understood only in the context of expounding the problems of the given reason (*hetu*). The widely attested *varia lectio, sa*, however, has also its good reason. The quasi-*nirukta* style explanation offered by Vātsyāyana, *prayukte hetau yaḥ prasaṅgo jāyate sā jātiḥ*, has inserted the term *prasaṅgo* without any linguistic or semantical clues about *jāti*. On account of this, we can see easily that the term *prasaṅgo* is not the grammatical subject of the relative clause, but equated with the term *jāti*

18) I cannot see any reason for the translation "directly following consequence" in Prets 2001: 548. Jha: 579 "the objection to it that *follows*" contains interpretational addition.

19) In this respect the attempt of Kajiyama to parallelize this passage in *NBh* with 爲生過 ("resulting a failure") in *UH* under the assumption that 爲生過 is the translation for *prasaṅgo jāyate* or *prasaṅgo-jāti* or *jāti-prasaṅgo* is untenable: Cf. Kajiyama 1984: 22. Kang 2006: 164, n. 74 has discussed why this assumption is unacceptable.

through the emendation of *sā* into *sa*. This reveals explicitly how problematic the etymologizing explanation for *jāti* in the *NBh* is.

The next two sentences build a case where *J^D* and *T^M* show a common reading deviating greatly from all the other available materials of the *textus receptus* group. These two mss show a repetition of the word *pratyavasthānam*: *sa ca prasaṅgaḥ sādharṃyavaidharṃyābhyāṃ pratyavasthānam, pratyavasthānam²⁰ upāmbhaḥ pratiṣedha iti*. With the second *pratyavasthānam* removed, these two sentences can be read as one, and it makes a remarkable difference in the interpretation. Vātsyāyana explains additionally (*ca*) on the meaning of *prasaṅga* in the foregoing sentence: the *prasaṅga* is ‘the objection by means of similarity or dissimilarity’. Then, the word *pratyavasthānam* is explained in the following sentence. In this way *pratyavasthānam* is placed in apposition with *upāmbha* and *pratiṣedha*. Then why should we take this repetition of *pratyavasthānam* as a better reading? There seems to be two reasons for that: firstly, the reading in *J^D* and *T^M* reflects the attempt of the *NBh* to integrate the *sūtra* in its explanation; secondly, this reading eschews the problem of appositional equation of the terms, *prasaṅga*, *pratyavasthāna*, *upāmbha* and *pratiṣedha*. Then how can it be explained that the text transmission of the *textus receptus* has taken this false reading? Of course, no one would be able to answer this question definitely, but I am of the opinion that the omission of the second

20) om. *pratyavasthānam* C_{Ed}, D_{Ed}.

pratyavasthānam should not be ascribed to a mere scribal error of *aberratio oculi*, I will rather assume an intended emendation of the text. Since the same words in the same case are coming one after another, it is easy to regard them as a scribal error in the original ms, namely a *dittography*. However, if a scribe throws a glance at the lines, he could easily get the impression that the explaining part of the NS 1.2.18, *sādharmyavaidharmyābhyām pratyavasthānam*, is simply equated with the *prasaṅga*. It could be understood in the sense that NS 1.2.18 can be, (according to this explanation), rephrased as ‘*prasaṅgaḥ jātiḥ*’. In such a situation the correction of the scribe was understandable decision, and all the following *textus receptus* transmissions found this result acceptable.

In this case, however, intended is not the equation, which would allow the substitution *salva veritate*. What is expatiated is the point that the *prasaṅga*, which was according to the context equated with *jāti* in foregoing sentence, should be explained in the way that the meaning of *jāti* in NS 1.2.18 should be explained in relation to the meaning of the *prasaṅga*. At this point we should pay our attention again to the literal meaning of the term *prasaṅga*, i.e. ‘occurrence [of a case]’. Due to this literal meaning, the sentence ‘*sa ca prasaṅgaḥ sādharmaivaidharmyā-*

21) At this place I should remark that the literal style of Sanskrit used in the *NBh* is very close to the natural everyday language in contrast to the later commentaries on the *NS* or the *NBh* which contain much more long nominal sentences and artificial compounds based on the terms used only in the academic Nyāya circle.

bhyām pratyavasthānam' has its own reasonable meaning in Sanskrit;²¹ 'And such an (*sa*) occurrence comes forth from similarity or dissimilarity.' This possibility of interpretation was, in my opinion, the main reason for Vātsyāyana to choose the term *prasaṅga* to explain the term *jāti*. What he could understand of *jāti* was only the verbal root √*jan*, and he had to combine any concept with the meaning of 'reputation, riposte' with the meaning of 'birth, coming forth'. The best candidate for it was *prasaṅga*. In this way the direction of the whole following Nyāya tradition was ascertained. Every Nyāya scholar up to now begins his explanation on *jāti* with √*jan*. To this problematic point I will come back later.

Reading *NBh* 1,2,18 further, we find the explanation on *pratyavasthānam*: *pratyavasthānam upālambhaḥ pratiṣedha iti*. As it is generally known, the Sanskrit used in the *NBh* in general and the terms used for denoting special concepts in the *NBh* stay very close to the spoken language. Sometimes it is simply the examples of the border cases regarding the question whether a term in the *NBh* is used as a technical term or not. Taking into account of the fact that *pratyavasthānam* is a derivative noun from the verbal root √*sthā*, I would prefer the

22) The ground meaning of the Latin word 'objectio' is 'a throwing or putting before'; cf. Lewis 1879, s.v. *objectio*. This term reminds me of two terms used in the *CaS* in the same context: *sthāpana*, *pratiṣṭhāpana*.

23) Prets 2001: 548 translates it as 'negation'. Prets 2003: 272 makes the same translation in *NBh* 1,2,18, but on the next page, in the translation of *NBh* 5,1,40 he uses 'objection' for *pratiṣedha*, for which I do not see any reason.

translation ‘withstanding’ to ‘objection’.²²⁾ Therefore, it is not an almost tautological repetition to give the explanation *pratyavasthānam upā-lambhaḥ pratiṣedha iti*. One further point to be made is on the term *pratiṣedha*. It should be understood literally, as ‘rejection’. The technical sense of this term ‘negation’ is out of place in this passage,²³⁾ since it implicates, at least partly, a negation as a truth functional operator.

The next sentence includes a literal quotation of NS 1.1.34 where the *hetu* as the second member of five-membered (*pañcāvayava*) argumentation scheme is defined: *udāharaṇasādharmyāt sādhyasādhanam hetur*.²⁴⁾ After the quotation follows the phrase *asyodāharaṇavaidharmyeṇa pratyavasthānam* (‘the withstanding [is raised] on the basis of dissimilarity of this [given reason] to the example’). The whole structure of the sentence reveals some important implications for the Nyāya research. If we accept this sentence at face value, the consequence would be that any argument supported by a reason which is (well-)formed according to the definition of the reason (*hetu*) in NS 1.1.34 would be confronted with a withstanding (*pratyavasthāna*), which could(?) be equated with *jāti*. But this is not the whole story. As pointed out in so much previous works of other scholars, the *jāti* in NS 1.2.18 and

24) A small *varia lectio* in J^p, namely the omission of *iti* after the quotation of NS 1.1.34 attracts our attention. This omission in J^p appears a bit strange in that the following corresponding sentence including the presentation of the content of NS 1.1.35 is demarcated with *iti*, though the foregoing sentence shows a literal quotation without *iti*. T^{ml} and *textus receptus* show no omission of *iti* in this place. It is highly probable that it is the scribal error.

the *NBh* on this *sūtra*, in contrast to the majority of the 24 *jāti*-s in *NS* 5, shows a very strong similarity with *uttara* in the *CaS*.

VI. The *uttara* in the *Carakasamhitā* and 相應 in the *UH*

The word *uttara* in the sense of ‘reply’ is used in *NS* 2.1.7 and 5.2.18.²⁵ But in the *CaS* we can find *uttara* is used in the technical sense of ‘repost against an analogy argument by means of adopting the same example given by the opponent’. The linkage of *uttara* in the *CaS* with the *pañcāvayava* is more than probable. It is not only on account of the arrangement of the themes in the *Vādamārgapada*-Section in the *CaS*, where *uttara* is directly following the theme group *pañcāvayava* in *CaS* Vi, 8.30–35, but also on account of the analysis of the subject matter given in *CaS* Vi, 8.36. The most essential feature of an analogy argument formulated in a *pañcāvayava* is analysed as *sādharmya* (similarity) and *vaidharmya* (dissimilarity) in *CaS* Vi, 8.36:

athottaram-uttaram nāma sādharmyopadiṣṭe hetau vaidharmyavacanam, vaidharmyopadiṣṭe vāhetau sādharmyavacanam, yathā “hetusadharmāṇo vikārāḥ, śītakasya hi vyādher hetubhiḥ sādharmyaṃ himasīśīravātasamsparsāḥ” iti bruvataḥ parobhrūyāt “hetusadharmāṇo vikārāḥ, yathā śarīrāvayavānām dā-

25) *NS* 2.1.7: *yatra samśayas tatraivam uttarottaraprasaṅgaḥ*. (‘Where there is a doubt, there arises the reply and [counter-]reply [as the consequent].’) *NS* 5.2.18: *uttarasyaṅpratipattir apratibhā*. (‘The [case of the] uninspiredness [consists in] the [inability to] find out an answer.’)

*hausṇyakothaprapacane hetuvaidharmyaṃ himaśiśiravā-
tasamsparsāḥ” iti. etat saviparyayam uttaram.*

Now the rejoinder—what is called ‘rejoinder’ is the statement of dissimilarity, if the reason is given on the basis of similarity, or the statement of similarity, if the reason is given on the basis of dissimilarity. Like someone says “Similar to the cause are the [pathological] alterations, for shivering [shows] the similarity to the causes of the [pathological] alterations, [namely] the contact with frost, hoarfrost and wind” and the other would say “Dissimilar to the causes [are pathological] alterations, like the case of burning, heat and inflammation of the body limbs. Dissimilar to the causes [are the pathological alterations, namely to the] the contact with frost, hoarfrost and wind.” This is a rejoinder equipped with contrariness.

Obviously enough, the pair of the concepts *sādharmya* and *vaidharmya* was not rightly understood by the redactors of the *CaS* in the *Vādamārgapada*-Section.

In *CaS* Vi, 8.36 an adequate example out of medical ambience was taken for the establishment of an argument example for *uttara*. But in these examples *hetu* (reason/cause) is understood as a cause. The interpretation of *hetu* as the second member of *pañcāvayava* (five-membered argument scheme) in such a way is not impossible and acceptable in the *Vādamārgapada*-Section; *hetu* as a part of *pañcāvayava* is defined as *upalabdihikāraṇa* (cause for the cognition), not a

reason for a proposition in *CaS* Vi. 8.33. But the confinement of the *uttara*, as the given argument example in *CaS* Vi. 8. 36 would indirectly imply, to the discussion of whether the effect is similar to the cause or not, would induce the whole theme to nothing. Maybe the remark at the end, namely *etat saviparyayam uttaram* ('This is a rejoinder equipped with contrariness.') is expressing the awareness of the redactor(s) of the *CaS* that the given argument example does not comply with the actual meaning of the term *uttara*. In this way, it seems to me, the redactor tries to present the given argument examples out of medical ambience as a specific sub-kind of *uttara*.

Now it is important to notice that *CaS* Vi. 8.36 gives the affirmation that the rejoinder against an analogy argument is based on similarity or dissimilarity. Assertion of the view that specific forms of counter-argument against a given analogy argument, named *jāti*, *uttara* or other, is based on the two aspects of the analogy, similarity and dissimilarity, is observable in many textual materials.

In *UH*, 20 kinds of **prayoga*²⁶⁾ (相應) in the sense of the formulation of counter-argument are listed, which correspond to *jāti* in the *NS* as far as the meaning is concerned. But the following explanations are given before the names of 20 different 相應 are listed and explained: "20 kinds

26) The reason why I have chosen this term for the translation of 相應, you will find below.

could be summarised to two. The first is dissimilarity and the second is similarity. To show the proposition by means of similarity is called 'similarity' and to show the proposition by means of dissimilarity is called 'dissimilarity'. For anyone holding a proposition should resort to these two, these two themes are penetrating 20 subjects."²⁷⁾ Nobody can disregard the correspondence of this passage with the explanation given in the *CaSVi*, 8.36.

VII. The Meaning of the Ending *sama* and Its Implications

jāti or *uttara* is a very effective, if not most, response to a given analogy argument in that the opponent takes the given example brought forward by the proponent and use it to falsify the proponent's proposition.²⁸⁾ This point is clearly seen in the formulation in *NBh* 1.2.18: the *hetu* given in *NS* 1.1.34 is directly referred to with *asya*. As long as the reason is given on the basis of analogy, such a reason will be confronted with a counter-argument in form of a *jāti*. At this point it is obvious that *jāti* was originally intended as a counter-argument against a reason based on analogy argument. It means practically that *jāti* should be understood as a counter-argument against a reason. Thus I

27) See the quotation of the original passage below.

28) I have dealt with this point in Kang 2006: 166f., where the text material in *NBh* 5.1.2 in *Cet.*: 2005,5-2007,4 is considered in detail. Of course this narrow understanding of *jāti* cannot include all the other 22 *jāti*-s out of 24 listed in *NS* 5. My opinion is that the original *jāti* included only two, under which all the other individual *jāti*-s were later subsumed.

suppose the masculine names of the individual *jāti*-s listed in NS 5, though *jāti* is a feminine noun, should be explained in the way that all the individual names of 24 *jāti*-s in NS 5 should be understood with the complementary noun *hetu* omitted at the end, not with *pratiṣedha*.²⁹⁾

This interpretation opens, in my opinion, the way to the understanding of the identical ending of the *jāti*-s, namely °*sama*. However, we should not simply suppose that °*sama*-s in all the names of *jāti*-s have the same meaning, which has not been seriously considered and articulated in the works on *jāti*. Considering the indifferntiated, or rather, chaotic translation and interpretation of each individual *jāti*-s in NS 5 in publications up to now, I propose that we should differentiate at least two meanings of °*sama* in the NS on the whole. In the NS, °*sama* means either that a reason given in the counter-argument is the same with something (for example, *prakaraṇ asama* in NS 1.2.7) or that it is the same in reference to something (for example, *prakaraṇasama* in NS 5.1.16).³⁰⁾ This variation of the meaning of °*sama* is connected, in my view, with the expansion of the *jāti* list in NS 5. Having a unified translation of °*sama* for the all 24 *jāti*-s is the result of superficial observation and false assumption in almost all modern publications on

29) The suggestion made by Ruben 1928: 129 is to take *pratiṣedha* as the complementary noun after every name of 24 *jāti*-s. But what he indicate as the substantiation of his suggestion out of the *NBh* is not so convincing; cf. Kang 2006: 167f.

30) For a short discussion of this theme cf. Kang 2006: 169f. Of course there are forms of individual *jāti*-s like *prāptisama* (NS 5.1.7) or *ahetusama* (NS 5.1.18) which have nothing to do with the analogy or similarity. Further detailed discussion will be published in a separate work.

this theme, so far as I know. My assumption that the 24 *jāti*-s in NS 5 were the extended list out of the two original kernel *jāti*-s, *sādharmyasama* and *vaidharmyasama*, wins further support in the explanational force regarding the ending °*sama*. The origin of this ending °*sama* lies in the *hetvābhāsa* as implicated by the case of the term *prakaraṇasama* in NS 1.2.7. After some themes originally subsumed under *hetvābhāsa* were converted to *jāti*-s, the ending of the name for the *hetvābhāsa* was also imported and generally used for the all *jāti*-s.³¹ These explanations in the whole show that the argument scheme dealt with *pañcāvayava* and *jāti* was originally made for analogy arguments. The later or chronologically partly overlapping development initiated by the introduction of theoretical attempt to stratify the relation of probans and probandum, for example, by means of the concepts like *avinābhāva* or *trairūpya*, is not directly relevant in this respect.

VIII. The Usage and Evaluation of *jāti*

One additional widely accepted view, at least after Uddyotakara's work,³² is that the *jāti* is inherently unjustified form of argumentation in two different senses, which should be differentiated again in my opinion; it is an invalid and spurious argumentation, thus, a morally illegitimate

31) An example of not thoroughly carried out trial to unify all the names of *jāti* can be found in *UH*: 27c,27ff.

32) Of course there is a dim starting point for the negative evaluation of *jāti* in the *NS* itself; cf. *NS* 1.2.2.

argumentation. Ui has already noticed in all clarity that 相應 in the *UH* was used as a valid argumentation form, and his outcome of this observation was that the description of 相應 as a valid argumentation form should be ascribed to the translator's failure.³³⁾ Nowadays no sincere scholar would feel uneasy that *uttara* in *Vādamārgapada*-Section, *jāti* in *NS* 1.2,18 and 相應 in *UH* hardly ever presuppose the argumentational invalidity or moral unjustifiedness of these kinds of riposte. They are a scheme of special ripostes against an analogy argument staying outside of the evaluation regarding their cogency or moral justification.

In this context we might pay our attention to the *TŚ*, where 難 (*khaṇḍana*) is picked out as a theme and explained as the three invalid argumentation styles; 顛倒難 (*viparītakhaṇḍana*), 不實義難 (*asatkhaṇḍana*) and 相違難 (*viruddhakhaṇḍana*).³⁴⁾ Interestingly enough, however, after a small portion of the discussions, the five valid objections were explained separately under the same theme 難 (*khaṇḍana*): 破所樂義 (*iṣṭārthaduṣaṇa*), 顯不樂義 (*aniṣṭārthavyakti*), 顯倒義 (*prasaṅgavyakti*), 顯不同義 (*viṣmārthavyakti*) and 顯一切無道理得成就義 (*sarvānyāyasiddhilābhavyakti*).³⁵⁾ In this respect, regarding the evaluation of *jāti* the translations of the term *jāti* itself reflects accurately the understanding

33) Ui 1925: 577. Kajiyama 1991: 108 makes reference to this passage out of Uī's work.

Ui was of the opinion that an author of such a work like the *UH* must have known that 相應 corresponding to *jāti* could not be a valid form of argumentation.

34) Cf. *TŚ*: 30b,25ff. and Tucci 1929: 12. The translation is Tucci's.

35) Cf. *TŚ*: 34a,26ff. und Tucci 1929: 30. The translation is Tucci's.

of each modern author on this theme. The majority of the authors makes their negative evaluation of *jāti* explicit in their translation, Junankar is a rarity in this respect: he uses the translation “legitimate objection”.³⁶⁾

IX. Consequences of the Interpretation of *Nyāyabhāṣya* 1.2.18

The penetrative analysis of *NBh* 1.2.18 reveals some crucial information to the understanding of the status of *jāti* in the general debate (*vāda*) traditions of ancient India. We have seen that the whole explanation of *jāti* that it is derived from √ *jan* roots in Vātsyāyana’s explanation in quasi-*nirukta* style. On the contrary, all the other available textual testimonies speak against the choice of the term *jāti*: the corresponding terms are 相應 in the *UH* and 難 in the *TS*. Furthermore the term *uttara* in the *CaS* also stands for this complex theme. It seems highly likely that the term *jāti* is not a derivative from verbal root √ *jan*.

36) Junankar 1978: 309ff.

37) I suppose that the term *jāti* is of late origin and (the whole *NS* 5 does not declare the list in *NS* 5.1.1 as *jāti*) originated from a misunderstanding, maybe from a false reconstruction of the term from a middle Indic word. At the same time, I am sceptical on the suggestion that the term *jāti* should be rather explained from the verbal root √ *ji*, because semantically *jāti* has nothing to do with ‘victory’ or ‘winning the game’. There are much more text materials to be considered, if I would try to deal directly with the etymological problems of the term *jāti*, Katsura 1982: 98 refer to a trial of etymological explanation probably from *Di nāga*: **tajjātyatvāt*. It is based on the phrase 是彼類故說名過類 in the *Nyāyamukha* of *Dinnāga*. Does *Dinnāga* relate the implication of the term *jāti* to the unified ending **sama*? Mayrhofer 1956: 428, s.v. *jātiḥ* brings the term *jāti* in the connection with *janati* also. This complex theme should be investigated in other separate work.

To my regret, I have not yet come up with any alternative explanation for the term.³⁷⁾ It is my hope that the clarification of *jāti* given in this paper will stipulate other researchers to try to find out any other plausible explanation. Dealing with the relevant term *uttara* in the *CaS* and 相應 in the *UH* alongside the ending °*sama*, I have demonstrated that we should approach these problems with differentiating chronological insight based on concrete textual materials. Considering substantially relevant materials, we could notice that the problems had been caused by the over-simplifying evaluation of the argument style dealt with under *jāti*.

My argument will now be complemented with an attempt to suggest a more plausible retranslation, if not more plausible historical original term, of the important term in Chinese, namely 相應. In the following sections, suggestions and their reasons are given with a view to show that the establishment of a critical edition of the *NBh* and critical interpretation of the text involved in the making of the edition will supply solid ground for a better understanding of the history of the Buddhist philosophy.

X. prayoga in Nyāyavārttika and Nyāyabindu

As Okazaki points out, the term *prayoga* in *Nyāyavārttika* (*NV*) written by Uddyotakara is used mainly in the meaning of an official formulation of an argument in the almost formal sense mostly

associated with *pañcāvayava*, though not strictly taking the form of *pañcāvayava*. What is formulated as examples of *prayoga* is only a kind of analogy argument which can be easily reformulated in *pañcāvayava*, but not actually formulated in *pañcāvayava*:

Although Uddyotakara's clear mention of the argument scheme (*prayoga*) is actually few, most of its exemplifications are in the form of 'like A (A-*vat*)'.³⁸⁾

Now let us examine one concrete case of the use of *prayoga* taken from the eight cases listed by Okazaki from the NV.³⁹⁾ In NS 2.1.63 the *anuvāda* is explained: *vidhivihitasyānuvacanam anuvādaḥ* ('Recapitulation is recapitulating of what is prescribed by an injunction'). In the following *sūtra* 2.1.64 we can find a hypothetical opposition: *nānuvādapunaruktayor viśeṣaḥ śabdābhyāsopapatteḥ* ('There is no difference between the recapitulation and repetition because of the recurrence of a word [in them]'). Then the NS tries to differentiate the recapitulation (*anuvāda*) from the repetition (*punarukta*) in NS 2.1.65: *śīghrataragamanopadeśavad abhyāsān nāviśeṣaḥ* ('It is not the case that there is no difference, for the recurrence [in case of *anuvāda* is] like the [usage of a word to give] instruction to go faster'). To illustrate the exact meaning of the *sūtra* 2.1.65, Uddyotakara gives the following explanation.

“*śīghrataragamanopadeśavad abhyāsān nāviśeṣaḥ iti, yathā 'śīghraṃ gamyatām', 'śīghrataraṃ gamyatām' iti ca tarapā kriyā-*

38) Okazaki 2005: 31: 實際, Uddyotakara가 論証式(*prayoga*)とはっきり言及している記述は少ないが, そのほとんどの例示は, 「Aのように(A-*vat*)」という形式のものである.

39) Cf. Okazaki 2005: 31, n. 57.

*tisāyo 'bhidhīyate tathānuvādalakṣaṇanābhyaśena kriyātisāyo 'bhidhīyata iti. asya prayogaḥ, arthavān anuvādalakṣaṇo 'bhyāsaḥ pratyayaviśeṣahetuvāt, śīghrataragamanopadeśavat, yathā śīghraśabdāt śīghratarāśabdaḥ prayujyamānaḥ pratyayaviśeṣahetuvāt na punaruktadoṣaṃ labhate, tathānuvādalakṣaṇo 'bhyāsaḥ pratyayaviśeṣahetuvāt na punaruktadoṣaṃ lapsyata iti.*⁴⁰⁾

[The sūtra 2.1.65] says [the following:] “śīghrataragamanopadeś-avad abhyāsān nāviśeṣaḥ (‘It is not the case that there is no difference, for the recurrence [in case of *anuvāda* is] like the [usage of a word to give] instruction to go faster’).” [This sūtra means the following:] As [in the expressions] ‘Go fast, please!’ and ‘Go faster, please!’ the emphasis of the action is expressed by the suffix °*tara*, in the same way by the recurrence [of the word], which is characterised as the recapitulation (*anuvāda*), the emphasis of the action is expressed. The formulation of this [argument in the sūtra is as follows:] The recurrence [of the word] characterised as the recapitulation is meaningful, for it is the cause for the specified [additional] ascertainment like the [usage of a word to give] instruction to go faster. Like the term “faster” used additionally to the term “fast” is the cause for the specified [additional] ascertainment, [therefore] does not make up the fallacy of repetition, so the recurrence [of the word], which is

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40) NV: 256,14–257,4. The same passage is in NV: 563,13–17.

characterised as the recapitulation, [Therefore] the recurrence will not make up the fallacy of repetition, because it is the cause for the specified [additional] ascertainment.

In this passage the expression *prayoga* is on purpose used in the meaning of formulation of an argument. The preceding part of *asya-prayogaḥ* has already explained the meaning of the *sūtra*. But the same content was formulated as a *prayoga* in the style which strongly leans against the form of the five-membered argumentation form (*pañcāvayava*), but it does not follow the strict form of the *pañcāvayava*. Of course the argument formulated as *prayoga* in this passage can be easily reshaped in *pañcāvayava*. Considering the formal requirement of fullstanding members of *pañcāvayava*,⁴¹⁾ however, regardless of the question whether the *pañcāvayava* constitutes a strict formal standard of a proof or not,⁴²⁾ one can accept that the term *prayoga* was understood not as the *pañcāvayava*, but as a clear expressive formulation of an argument.

Moreover, almost the same usage of the term *prayoga* is observable in

41) In almost all texts of the early *vāda*-traditions in India we can find this requirement of completeness in the formulation of *pañcāvayava*: cf. *nyūna* in CaS Vi. 8.54; *nyūnain* NS 5.2.1 and 5.2.12; 不具足分 in TS: 35b, 17-24; 語少 in UH: 26c,14 and 言減 in UH: 24c,15ff.

42) In the passage in the NBh 1.1.1 where the five-membered argumentation scheme is explained (in D_{sa}: 4,14), only T^M and J^P have *pñca bhāgāḥ* deviating from all the other mss with the reading *pañcāvayavāḥ*. It could be a vague indication that the five-membered argumentation scheme was taken afterwards as the scheme in a more strict formal sense.

a later Buddhist *pramāṇa* text, namely *Nyāyabindu* of Dharmakīrti of the ca. 7th century. In his *Nyāyabindu* (*NB*) we can find following passages:

NB 2.31: *sā ca prayogabhedād ekādaśaparakārā.*

And that (scil. *anupalabdhi*) is of eleven kinds according to difference of the formulation.

Nyāyabinduṭīkā (*NBT*) explains the meaning of *prayoga* as following:

*kutaḥ prakārabhedāḥ prayogabhedāt, prayogaḥ prayuktiḥ śabdasyābhidhānavyāpāra ucyate.*⁴³

Wherefrom is the difference of the kind? From the difference of the formulation. The formulation is application [explained as] the words' function of denoting.

Furthermore, there is one more occurrence of the word *prayoga* in *NB*: NB 3.3: *tad dvividham* ('That[, namely *parārthānumāna*] is of two kinds.') After NB 3.3 comes the following passage out of *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* (*NBT*) including the related *NB*:

[NB 3.4:] *prayogabhedāt.*

[NBT 3.4:] *prayogasya śabdavyāpārasya bhedāt, prayuktiḥ prayogo 'rthābhidhānam, śabdasyārthābhidhānavyāpārabhedād dvividham anumānam.*

[NBT 3.5] *tad evābhidhānavyāpāranibandhanaṃ dvaividhyaṃ darśayitumāha.*

43) *NBT* 30,16–17.

[NB 3.5:] *sādharmyavad vaidharmyavac ceti.*

[NBṬ 3.5:] *sādharmyavad vaidharmyavac ceti. samāno dharmo yasya so 'yaṃ sadharmā. tasya bhāvaḥ sādharmaṃ. visadrśo dharmo 'sya vidharmā. vidharmaṇo bhāvo vaidharmaṃ. dṛṣṭāntadharminā saha sādhyadharmināḥ sādṛśyaṃ hetukṛtaṃ sādharmaṃ ucyate. asādṛśyaṃ ca hetukṛtaṃ vaidharmaṃ ucyate.*⁴⁴⁾

[NB 3.4:] On account of the difference of the formulation,⁴⁵⁾

[NBṬ 3.4:] On account of the difference of formulation[, in other words,] the words' function. Application is the formulation [explained as] denoting the object. On account of the difference of the words' function of denoting object, there are two kinds of inference.

[NBṬ 3.5] The following is told to show the two-foldness founded on the function of denoting.

[NB 3.5:] Equipped with equality and equipped with inequality [are listed].

[NBṬ 3.5:] Equipped with equality and equipped with inequality [are listed]. [The one] whose property is the same, such a one is with equal property. Its state is the equality. [The one] whose property is not same, [such a one] is with unequal property. The

44) NBṬ42,9-16.

45) H. Nakamura (Nakamura 2000: 490) translates prayoga as 論式 in this passage. Since I could find such Chinese translation neither in early buddhist texts pertaining to debate traditions nor in *AKośa-Index*: 256-257 and in *Mahāvīyutpatti*: 171, no. 2317, I believe this Chinese translation is introduced by modern scholars.

state of [the one] whose property is dissimilar is the inequality. The bearer of the property to be proved is similar with the bearer of the [property taken as an] example with [respect to the property which is] given [as the] reason, [such a case] is called equality. And [these two are] dissimilar with [respect to the property which is] given [as the] reason, [such a case] is called inequality.

In these passages we can observe again the meaning and usage of the term *prayoga* in the sense of articulated formulation in the form of analogy argument which could be easily rephrased into *pañcāvayava*.⁴⁶⁾

The usage of the word *prayoga* as a technical term is, as I have presented, nicely documented, but only in the later texts than the *NBh*: in the *NV* of the 6th century and in the *NB* of the 7th century. The usage of this term in the *NV* and later in the *NB* of Dharmakīrti might mean that such a usage of this term as a quasi-terminology may come from the Buddhist circle of the *vāda*-tradition. The terminology in the *vāda* traditions in ancient India in general shows a large variety of meanings in their early developments. But with the progress of time some terms

46) Stcherbatsky makes a note on *prayoga* in Stcherbatsky 1930: 112, n.6:

prayoga has the meaning of a formula, or mode of a certain syllogistic figure, [...] it is identified with *abhidhā* or *śakti*, i. e., the direct expressive force of words is compared with their capacity of indirect suggestions (*lakṣaṇā*, *vyakti*). The two methods of inference are here (scil. NET 3,4) ascribed to a difference in the direct meaning (*abhidhāna-vyāpāra*) of the propositions composing a syllogism.

were established as a technical term with a fixed meaning, and others not. It is very often the case that the *NBh* testifies the development of some terms on the way to the established technical terms. This is, on the other hand, connected with the fact that the Sanskrit used by Vātsyāyana was very close to the real living Sanskrit, which sometimes with its idiomatic usage of words and rare syntactical constructions caused a serious problem of understanding for later Naiyāyikas. On the basis of given textual materials it is at present impossible to decide when the term *prayoga* has begun to be used in the sense of 'formulation'. But it seems almost certain that this usage was generally confirmed by the Naiyāyikas in the 6th century and also by the Buddhists in the 7th century. Textual materials above mentioned show that *prayoga* was a formulation of an argument strongly affiliated to an analogy argument but not corresponding to *pañcāvayava*. This fact indicates that the term *prayoga* could be used in comparable meaning to *uttara* in the *CaS*, if it is used as the formulation of a counter-argument.

X. The Term *prayoga* in the Nyāyabhāṣya

A counter-argument against a given analogy argument making reference to the similarity (*sādharmya*) or dissimilarity (*vaidharmya*) in the given analogy argument occupied an important portion in the early *vāda* texts, too. Therefore we may expect that some textual testimonies in earlier texts attesting the usage of the term *prayoga* in the context of counter-argumentation based on analogy should be found. Such a case

is found in the *NBh* 1.1.1:

*chalaḥjātinigrahasthānānām pṛthagupadeśa upalakṣaṇārthaḥ.
upalakṣitānām svavākye parivarjanaṁ paravākye paryanuyogaḥ.
jātes tu⁴⁷⁾ pareṇa prayujyamānāyāḥ sulabhaḥ samādhiḥ svayaṁ ca
sukaraḥ prayoga iti.⁴⁸⁾*

Quibble, sophisticated riposte and the point of defeat are enunciated separately in order to notice [them]. [If they are] noticed, [there will be] avoidance of [them] in one's own statement, and [there will be a critical] inquiry⁴⁹⁾ about the statement of the opponent. For the sophisticated riposte brought forward (*pra-√yuj*) by the opponent will be certainly adjusted⁵⁰⁾ and [the same] will be easily applied (*prayoga*) for himself.

What is obvious in this passage is that the *prayoga*, whether it be used in the technical sense or not, shows the near to the counter-argument on the basis of *sādharmya* and *vaidharmya*. The wordings of the *NBh* is in such a way that the proponent himself can make use of *jāti*, only if he can thoroughly master this way of formulating counter-argument, without any mention, if such a usage by the proponent himself would be something to be avoided or not.⁵¹⁾

47) The majority of mss reads *ca*. But *J^D*, *T^M* and also, maybe following *J^D*, *D^{et}* read *tu*. *NBh* in *D^{et}*: 5,15–17.

49) The terms, *anuyoga* or *pratyanyoga* were well-established terms in the *vāda*-tradition. On *anuyoga* and other relevant terms and their interwoven relations, cf. Kang 2004.

XI. The Matter with 相應 (*prayoga) in the *UH*

The *UH* is an important text material for the research of *vāda*-traditions in ancient India in general, and especially for the research of Buddhist *vāda*-tradition. But we have only a pitiable Chinese translation by 吉迦夜 and 曇曜 made in 472. An earlier Chinese translation by Buddhahadra is lost.⁵²⁾ For I have already examined the problems in understanding 相應 in the *UH* with regard to the interpretational approach of Kajiyama in another article of mine,⁵³⁾ I will at present mention some problematic points in the suggestions of Kajiyama in interpreting 相應 in the *UH*. Kajiyama supposes that 爲生過 (literally “just arises a failure”) in the *UH* is the translation of *prasaṅgo jāyate* or *prasaṅgo-jāti* or *jāti-prasaṅga*.⁵⁴⁾ First of all, his suggestion is problematic, for the two members of the suggested compound, *prasaṅga* and *jāti* will result at the end a compound with the meaning “arising of arising [of unwanted consequence]”. Regardless of his problematic maneuver with Chinese terms, one can easily notice his motivation: he

50) The word *samādhi* in the context of meditational praxis is used in NS 4.2.38: *samādhiviseṣābhyāsāt* (“Out of the repeated practice of concentrating meditation (*samādhi*) in a special form [there will be the knowledge of the truth]”). *ā-√dhā* in the sense of “to place” with the prefix *sam°* could be understood in the sense of “to place the point of argument in right way” and might be translated as “to adjust”.

51) But the later development in the Nyāya tradition takes the direction to the negative evaluation of *jāti* in general. Such an evaluation is formulated in the NV with open and intended confrontation against the *bhāṣyakāra*. Cf. NVc: 63, 6ff.

52) Cf. Kajiyama 1984: 12 and Tucci 1929: ix.

53) Kang 2006.

wants to bring the *UH* in the chronological line of the development including the *NS* and the Works of *Nāgārjuna*.⁵⁵⁾ I have already demonstrated that the quasi-*nirukta* explanation of Vātsyāyana on the term *jāti* is too shaky to be taken as a starting point for further interpretational attempt. I will not repeat the reason why his hypothesis of a linear development of the *CaS*, the *NS* and the Works of *Nāgārjuna* advocated by Kajiyama is untenable, nor mention his assumptions of *Nāgārjuna*'s authorship of some texts, especially in the case of *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa*, which is no longer ascribed to *Nāgārjuna* by serious scholars.⁵⁶⁾ For the present, I will only emphasize that the discussion over 相應 is the key link of the widely propagated view in the history of Indian and Buddhist philosophy. This view can be summerised roughly as follows. The Nyāya tradition originally had the form of a debate manual just like the one documented in the *Vādamārgapada*-Section. On account of the sharp critique brought forward by *Nāgārjuna* with impressive argumentational skills, the *Naiyāyikas* had to develop and

54) Cf. Kang 2006: 164, n. 74. PW does not show the meaning "occurrence" (of an event) for *jāti*; cf. PW III: 78-79 s.v. *jāti*. No case is known to me that *jāti* has such a meaning as the second member of a compound like *utpatti*. His re-translation could be motivated by the fact that the term *prasaṅga* is also translated into 相應 in Chinese texts; cf. Ogihara 1986: 877a, s.v. *prasaṅga*.

55) In his consideration on this possibility the prime importance of the term *prasaṅga* in the whole Madhyamaka tradition in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism could have played a deciding role. On the important role played by the term *prayoga* in the *Mādhyamika* philosophy, cf. Ruegg 1991.

56) Cf. Kang 2006: 165.

57) I have tried to demonstrate in Kang 2006 why this assumption of over-simplified linear development is not acceptable.

enlarge their teachings of counter-argument (*jāti*) as given in *NS* 5.⁵⁷⁾ In this sense the discussion and the correct understanding of the complex theme *jāti* have a paramount bearing on the history of Indian Buddhist philosophy.

So far, we do not have a counter proposal differing from the Kajiyama's, and now I would like to offer one in this paper. It is in my view that *prayoga* is the best candidate for the original Sanskrit term for 相應. The translation of *sambandha*, which was taken in the re-translation or rather reconstruction of the text by Tucci, does not fit into the context of a counter-argument against an analogy argument. 相應 is the conventional translation for *sambandha* in the translations of 真諦 and of 玄奘.⁵⁸⁾ But 相應 can hardly mean any riposte in the context of a debate. As demonstrated above, the term *prayoga* is more likely to have been used in the sense of riposte in a debate. One further fortifying fact for my proposal would be a plausible explanation why 吉迦夜 and 曇曜 has selected 相應 as the translation for *prayoga*.

We can find only 3 occurrences of the word 相應 in the *TS* in different passages and various contexts. I will quote only the second occurrence of this word:

反質難品中道理難品第二：論曰。難有三種過失。一顛倒難。二不實義難

58) Cf. *AKośa-Index*: 386-7. *Mahāvīyutpatti* does not list directly 相應 as the translation for *sambandha*; cf. nos. 4479, 4482-4484, 4579-4584.

三相違難。若難有此三種過失則墮負處。一顛倒難者。立難不與正義相應。是名顛倒難。顛倒難有十種。⁵⁹⁾

The re-translation of Tucci takes *saṃyuktaṃ* for 相應.⁶⁰⁾ Here we can see the usage of the term 相應 for the case, which would be an adequate place for the use of the verbal form of the noun *prayoga*. As this passage cited from the *TŚ* indicates, 相應 was adopted for the translation of the verbal expression based on *pra-√yuj*, e.g. the passive singular form *prayujyate*, in the sense of ‘corresponding, matching, true’ and it was also used, without any alteration of form (which is not demanded in the written Chinese), for the noun form of *pra-√yuj*, namely *prayoga*.

Let us now try to find a possible explanation why this kind of misdirecting usage of 相應 as a translation of *prayoga* was employed. In the whole text of the *UH*, 相應 appears only three times, all of them in the same passage, namely in the beginning of the chapter on 相應 itself:

相應品第四：問曰。汝已分別如法正論。云何名為相應義耶。答曰。問答相應有二十種。若人能以此二十義助發正理。是人則名解真實論。若不如是。不名通達議論之法。此二十種。要則有二。一異二同。以同顯義名同。以異顯義名異。凡為義者必依此二故。此二者通二十法。⁶¹⁾

The first occurrence is in the title of the chapter and the other two

59) *TŚ*: 30b,24–28.

60) *TŚ*_{IV}: 12,1–7: *atha dviṭyaṃ prakaraṇam: (śāstram āha) khaṇḍanasya trividhadosā-pattiḥ. viparītakhaṇḍanam asatkhaṇḍanṃ viruddhakhaṇḍanaṃ ceti. yadi khaṇḍanam etat trividhadosopetaṃ tadā nigrahasthānam, [tatra] viparītakhaṇḍanam. yadi pratīṣṭhāpitaṃ khaṇḍanaṃ samyag arthena na saṃyuktaṃ syāt tadā tad viparītakhaṇḍanam ity ucyate. viparītakhaṇḍanaṃ daśavidham.*

function only to introduce the term 相應 itself. If the original text of the *UH* had also the same occurrences of *prayoga*, it would have been very hard to expect that the readers were able to notice that they were dealing with a special terminology. And if the word *prayoga* was not a part of firmly established technical terminology widely used in the *vāda* traditions at the time of the translation of the *UH*, then the best solution for the translators would be to choose the Chinese term for *pra-√yuj* used in other context. The two translators of the *UH* were probably not proficient in Chinese.⁶²⁾ One more fundamental fact is that the term 相應 is used only in the beginning part of the chapter on 相應, but never mentioned or exemplified later. This reminds me so strikingly of the textual state in the *NS*. In the passage quoted above from the *UH*, a hypothetical opponent asks for a definition of 相應, after which no direct answer but only a statement that there are 20 kinds of 相應 was given. This passage is astonishingly similar to *NS* 5 where we cannot find any direct explanation or even a direct mention of *jāti*. In *NS* 5 *jāti* was simply listed and explained, after the explanation on *jāti* in *NS* 1.2.18 and

61) *UH*: 27c,8–15. Tucci re-translate this passage in *UH*¹⁰: 26: *atha caturthaṃ prakaraṇam: nanu bhavatā vyākhyāto yathā dharmasadvādaḥ. kaḥ punaḥ sambandhaḥ. atrocyate. praśnottarasambandho viṃśatavidhaḥ. yadi kaścit tena viṃśatavidhenārthena samyagnyāyam ārabhate sa sadvādasya jñātety ucyate. yadi naivaṃ tadā nāyaṃ vivādadharmāvagantā. eṣāṃ viṃśatavidhānāṃ sāro dvididhaḥ. vaidharmyaṃ sādharmyan ca. sajātyatvāt sādharmyaṃ vijātyatvād vaidharmyam. arthasya hi tatsamāśrayatvāt te viṃśatidharmān vyāpnuvataḥ.*

62) We are in possession of very little information on these translators. But the known facts include that they are coming from South Asia. I am not sure, if 吉迦夜 actually comes from the Sanskrit name Kekaya.

another bare mention of the this noun in the first book. In the *UH* also no single 相應 listed as one of 20 相應 is expressively identified as 相應. These all make suspicious that the term *jāti* might not belong to a technical term transmitted from the earliest time of the development of Nyāya tradition. It is also possible that the word *prasaṅga* was one of the terms which were competing for the status of the established term with *jāti* or *uttara*.

Furthermore, I would like to clarify the meaning of 問答相應⁶³⁾, which would literally mean “correspondence of question and answer”. This passage should be able to be explained and understood in accordance with my proposal for the original term *prayoga*. Very striking is the fact that there are no disputes in the form of question and answer (問答) in the following passages, although the Chinese translation presents the individual themes in the frame of ‘question and answer’. This ascertainment demands a clarification of the expression “question and answer” (問答). Tucci translates 問答相應 literally as *praś-nottarasambandha*. Ui speaks out a vague guess, that it is going around a disputation like a question-and-answer.⁶⁴⁾ I am of the opinion that Ui has right in essence. In *UH*: 23c, 25ff the theme 執相 (**siddhānta*) is discussed. The explanations on the four kinds of 執相 is given by means of the disputation examples in which the two dialogue participants are

63) *UH*: 27c,11.

64) Ui 1925: 569.

called 說者(speaker) and 問者 (inquirer). In this passage the 問者 (inquirer) cannot mean the one who are really asking. The given examples of the disputation show clearly that 問者 is a participant of a disputation who makes a counter-argument or riposte. Since 答 literally means an answer for an inquiry (問), 答 can be understood as a response to a counter-argument (問). In this way we reach a scheme of a disputing procedure; argument (說) – counter-argument (問) – riposte (答). This scheme of disputing procedure is neatly applicable for 相應 in the *UH*, in the sense of a riposte of the Buddhists against a counter-argument brought forward by anti-Buddhist groups. In other words, the hypothesised disputing procedure in the *UH* presupposes that the argument and riposte are coming from the Buddhist side to encounter the possible counter-argument of the opponents. Additionally the two 負處 (**nigrahasthāna*) explained in *UH*: 26b, 27ff, namely 應問不問 and 應答不答, display the parallel explanations to the explanations given in the *Vādamārgapada*-Section: *anuyojyasya ananuyoga* ('non-inquiry of [a statement] to be inquired') as a *nigrahasthāna* in *CaS* Vi. 8. 65, *anuyojya* ('[a statement] to be inquired') in *CaS* Vi. 8. 50, *ananuyojya* ('[a statement] not to be inquired') in *CaS* Vi. 8. 51, *anuyoga* ('inquiry') in *CaS*. Vi. 8. 52 and *pratyanuyoga* ('counter-inquiry') in *CaS* Vi. 8. 53.⁶⁵⁾ All these observations show clearly that we have nothing to do with questions and answers in the passages translated with 問答, but rather a

65) Regarding this theme cf. *NS* 2.2.12 and relevant explanations in Ruben 1928: 43 and Kang 2004.

counter-argument and a riposte. Then we can easily understand 問答相應 in the sense of “formulation of a riposte against a counter-argument [based on analogy]”.

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