

Reframing Bhāviveka*

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국문요약

티벳 전승에 따르면 중관학파는 바비베카(Bhāviveka)의 자립논증파(Svātantrika)와 붓다팔리타(Buddhapālita) 및 찬드라키르티(Candrakīrti)의 귀류논증파(Prāsaṅgika)로 양분된다. 그러나 자립논증-귀류논증 구분과 관련

* 본 논문은 2004년 및 2007년에 작성된 줄고에 많은 부분 바탕을 두고 작성되었다. 특히 후자는 일본어로 작성되었기에 일본 밖에서는 많은 주의를 끌지 못했던 바 있는데, 본지의 편집위원인 차상엽 교수가 중관학 워크샵에서 발표하도록 추천해 주었다. 발표를 준비하면서 주장을 강화하기 위해 *svatantra anumāna*에 대한 논자의 고찰과 더불어 *paramārthas*에 대한 찬드라키르티의 관점을 추가하였으며 그를 통해 인도의 자립논증파-귀류논증파 구분에 대한 좀 더 큰 그림을 보여줄 수 있었다. 논자에게 이러한 기회를 제공해 준 차상엽 교수와 금강대학교 불교문화연구소의 선생님들께 감사의 인사를 전하고 싶다.

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된 후대의 인도 자료들은 거의 찾아볼 수 없다. 본고는 왜 자립논증과 귀류논증의 구분과 관련한 차이가 생겨나는지에 대해 찬드라키르티, 바비야(Bhavya), 아티샤(Atiśa)의 저작들을 분석함으로써 설명하고자 한다.

먼저, 논자는 바비베카와 찬드라키르티 사이의 논쟁의 핵심과 문제의 원인을 해명하기 위해 『프라산나파다』(Prasannapadā)의 자립논증이 무엇인지를 고찰하였다. 『프라산나파다』에 나타나는 추론식에 관한 논쟁이 자립논증과 귀류논증이라는 이 구분을 낳았다는 것은 널리 퍼져 있는 관점이다. 하지만 조금 다른 방식으로 자립논증과 귀류논증의 구분을 파악하는 것이 가능하다. 또한 논자는 아티샤의 저작들에 초점을 맞추어 널리 퍼져 있는 관점이 바비베카와 찬드라키르티 둘 모두를 지지했던 아티샤가 공유한 관점이 아니라는 점을 보여주고자 하였다. 이 같은 논자의 주장을 강화하기 위해 본고에서는 추론에 관한 찬드라키르티의 입장이 어떻게 아티샤에게 이행되었는지를 고찰하고, 바비야의 *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*가 후대 인도 귀류논증파의 맥을 형성하는 데에 핵심적인 역할을 수행했음을 지적한다.

이 문헌들에 대한 면밀한 연구는 찬드라키르티가 후대 중관학파를 호도함으로써 자신의 관점을 대물림하는 데에 성공했음을 명백히 보여주고 있다.

주제어: 자립논증파(Svāntarika), 귀류논증파(Prāsaṅgika), 찬드라키르티(Candrakīrti), 바비베카(Bhāviveka), 진제(paramārtha), 아티샤(Atiśa)

I. Introduction

According to Tibetan accounts, the distinction between Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika was created after Buddhapālita (c. 470-540?) was criticised for not employing syllogistic inference by Bhāviveka (c. 500-570?) and Candrakīrti (c. 600-650?)¹⁾ later defended Buddhapālita in opposition to Bhāviveka. It is pointed out, however, that there is no clear witness of this bifurcation in India.²⁾ Moreover, Ye shes sde's *Ita ba'i khyad par*, one of the earliest Tibetan account of Indian Buddhism (8-9th C) mentions Śāntarakṣita's Yogācāra-Madhyamaka and Bhavya's (Bhāviveka's)³⁾ Sautrāntika-Madhyamaka,

1) Their dates are as proposed by Ruegg 1981, 58 and 71.

2) For example, Ruegg 1981, 58 states:

The terms Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika — which do not seem to be actually attested as the names of the two branches of the Madhyamaka in the Sanskrit sources now accessible to us — correspond respectively to the Tibetan terms Rañ rgyud pa and Thal 'gyur ba, which have been regularly employed by Tibetan scholars to designate the two sections of the pure Madhyamaka school.

Dreyfus 2003, 3 gives the following remarks:

The late and retrospective nature of the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction, as well as its apparent non-Indian provenance, together signal its unusual status as a doxographical category that should render us cautious about its use in the interpretation of Indian material. Even though terms Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika are not attested in any Indian primary sources, I use them to designate two factions within the Madhyamaka in India as well as those belonged to these factions.

3) In Tibetan accounts and Tibetan translations, Bhavya generally refers to the author of the *Prajñāpradīpa* and the *Madhyamakahr̥daya*, whom we call Bhāviveka. In this paper, therefore, when Bhavya appears in a text, I refer to him as Bhavya (Bhāviveka) in my translation. The author of the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*, who is not identical with Bhāviveka, is simply referred to as Bhavya to distinguish him from Bhāviveka although they do not seem to be distinguished by Atiśa and others.

but not Candrakīrti.⁴⁾ Bodhibhadra (c. 1000), too, mentions only Bhavya (Bhāviveka) and Śāntarakṣita in his *Jñānasārasamuccayanibandhana*:

- [1] Here, these Mādhyamikas are also of two kinds in establishing the conventional (*kun rdzob*, **saṃvṛti*). Those who do not analyse appearance are Bhavya (Bhāviveka) and others, and those who assert that things which appear are not as they are [thought to be external], but only internal cognition appears in various ways are Śāntarakṣita and others.⁵⁾

At a glance, it looks as if Candrakīrti's Prāsaṅgika had been ignored or forgotten in this passage.⁶⁾ When examining related materials carefully, we will have a quite different view on the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction.

4) See Ruegg 1981, 59 and Vose 2009, 20.

5) *Jñānasārasamuccayanibandhana*, 206, 27-30, Derge Tsha 44a7-b1, Peking Tsha 51b7-8:

'dir dbu ma pa de dag kyang kun rdzob rnam par gzhas pa gnyis te / snang ba la mi 'jal ba ni slob dpon bha bya la sogs pa dang / snang ba 'i dngos po ji lta ba ma yin gyi nang gi shes pa kho na sna tshogs su snang bar smra ba slob dpon zhi ba 'tsho la sogs pa 'o //

See Ruegg 1981, 58, note 173.

6) Vose 2009, 17 states as follows:

However, the Indian textual record presents a remarkably different view than fifteenth-century Tibetan scholars' accounts. When we consider this record, we must conclude that Candrakīrti, rather than forming a school of Madhyamaka and triumphing over or refuting Bhāvaviveka, was in fact largely ignored in his day and for some three hundred years in both India and Tibet.

II. Argument over the Use of Inference

First of all, it is necessary to elucidate the attitudes of Candrakīrti and (Candrakīrti's) Bhāviveka towards inference in the *Prasannapadā*. Candrakīrti insists that the Mādhyamika should not employ a *svatantra anumāna*, as follows:

- [2] It is not appropriate for a Mādhyamika to formulate an inference to establish his own theory (*svatantram anumānam*) by himself (*svataḥ*) because he does not admit any other position.⁷⁾

He quotes a verse from Nāgārjuna's *Vigrahavyāvartanī* (v. 29) as an authority:

- [3] If I had some proposition (*pratijñā*), then I would have a fault. Because I do not have any proposition, I do not have any fault.⁸⁾

Then later, Bhāviveka is made to answer as follows:

- [4] Because Mādhyamikas do not address an inference to establish their

7) *Prasannapadā* 16, 2:

na ca mādhyamikasya svataḥ svatantram anumānam kartuṃ yuktam pakṣāntarābhyupagamābhāvāt |

8) *Prasannapadā* 16, 7-8 (= *Vigrahavyāvartanī* v. 29):

*yadi kācana pratijñā syān me tata eva me bhaved doṣaḥ |
nāsti ca mama pratijñā tasmān naivāsti me doṣaḥ ||*

own theory (*svatantrānumānānabhīdhāyivāt*) due to non-establishment of theses, reasons and examples, there must be neither proof of the content of the proposition which is “the negation of arising from self” nor refutation of the opponent’s proposition by means of an inference established for both [parties].

Nevertheless, when [the Mādhyamikas] criticise the opponent’s proposition by reason of contradiction in his inference by no one but [the Mādhyamikas] themselves (*svata eva*), there should be theses and others that are free from faults of theses, reasons and examples [submitted] by no one but [the Mādhyamikas] themselves (*svata eva*).⁹⁾

9) *Prasannapadā* 18, 5-8:

*mādhyamikānām pakṣaheturṣṭāntānām asiddheḥ svatantrānumānānabhīdhāyivāt svata-
utpattipratīśedhapratijñārthasādhanam mā bhūd ubhayaśiddhena cānumānena parapra-
tijñānirākaraṇam | parapratijñāyās tu svata evānumānavirodhacodanāyām⁽¹⁾ svata eva
pakṣaheturṣṭāntapakṣālarahitaiḥ⁽²⁾ pakṣādibhir bhavitavyam || (1) Ed. °*codanayā*. See
Yonezawa 2004, 132, n. 2. (2) Ed. °*drṣṭāntadośarahitaiḥ*. See MacDonald 2015, I, 149,
3-150, 2.*

MacDonald 2015, II, 68-69 (§ 28) translates this sentence as follows:

Even if it were [argued]: [It] may [indeed] be, since Mādhyamikas do not state independent inferences (*svatantrānumāna*) owing to the fact that propositions (*pakṣa*), reasons (*hetu*) and examples (*drṣṭānta*) are not established [for them], that there is neither proof (*sādhana*) of content (*artha*) of the thesis (*pratijñā*) negating arising from self nor refutation (*nirākaraṇa*) of the opponent’s thesis by way of an inference established for both [parties of the debate] (*ubhayaśiddha*); nevertheless, there must be criticism (*codanayā*) of the opponent’s thesis for being in contradiction with an inference just from [his] own (= the opponent’s) [point of view] (*svata evānumāna*) by way of a proposition and so forth that are free of the faults (*apakṣāla*) of the proposition (*pakṣa*), reason (*hetu*) and example (*drṣṭānta*), [each of which is established] only from [his] (= the opponent’s) [point of view].

Although there are no substantial differences between my translation and MacDonald’s in the

Here, (Candrakīrti's) Bhāviveka concedes that an inference to establish their own theory (*svatantra anumāna*) cannot be employed by the Mādhyamikas. He, nevertheless, insists on the necessity of theses and others (i.e. reasons and examples) submitted by no one but the Mādhyamikas themselves (*svata eva*) when criticising the opponent's proposition. This is regarded as the answer to Candrakīrti's criticism that it is not appropriate for a Mādhyamika to formulate an inference to establish his own theory (*svatantram*) by himself (*svataḥ*). (Quotation [2]) It is understood that he here gives up *svatantra* but sticks to *svataḥ* when formulating an inference.

former half of this section, except for that of *svatantra*, in the latter half after 'nevertheless,' there are some disagreements in our interpretations. She takes *svatas* as 'from [his] own (= the opponent's) [point of view].' However, I consider that *svatas* should indicate a Mādhyamika because this is Bhāviveka's answer to Candrakīrti's criticism, which is shown in Quotation [2]. Concerning the problem of *codanāyā* and *codanāyām* (see variant reading 1 of the text), I read with *codanāyām* (locative) in opposition to MacDonald's *codanāyā* (instrumental). MacDonald 2015, II, 69, n. 148 argues as follows:

The ms Q (Potala manuscript) and *LṬ (*Lakṣaṇatīkā*) reading *codanāyām* becomes definitively disqualified when the line of argumentation is taken into consideration, for *codanāyām* brings with it the implication that the Mādhyamika addressed by Candrakīrti's Bhāviveka does indeed, of his own accord, criticise the opponent's *pratijñā* by way of a *svata evānumāna* and needs merely to be reminded that this *anumāna* must have a faultless *pakṣa* etc., an implication in no way supported by the text preceding the sentence; the *svata evānumāna* that will be drawn out of Buddhapālita's *prasaṅga* in the sentence under discussion represents merely Candrakīrti's concession to the demand for a *svata evānumāna*. (Words in parentheses are added by the present author)

I do not understand why she thinks that this 'implication' is not supported. It is what (Candrakīrti's) Bhāviveka, who has given up *svatantra anumāna*, compromised on, and what Candrakīrti, too, can accept, except for the fact that the theses reasons and examples are said to be 'free from faults.' Because inference not established for both parties cannot be regarded as faultless, Candrakīrti discusses this problem in the following sections in the *Prasannapadā*. (See footnote 15.)

In this passage *svatantram* is translated as ‘to establish one’s own theory.’¹⁰⁾ This is somewhat different from a standard translation ‘autonomous.’ It is ascertained from the fact that *svatantra anumāna* is here mentioned in contrast to ‘criticise the opponent’s proposition.’ It holds true in Candrakīrti’s conclusion which we will examine later. There *svatantra anumāna* is contrasted to “the negation of the opponent’s proposition.” (Quotation [6]) If this is the case, *svatantra* concerns with the purpose of employing an inference, not with what kind of inference it is, and *svataḥ* concerns with who should employ it.

It is also important to notice that *svatantram anumānaṃ* is not a compound. For example, Coulson explains compounds of an adjective and a substantive (*karmadhāraya*), as follows:

- [5] They were used principally where the compound had a conventional significance transcending the separate meanings of its parts. In the same way that ‘blackbird’ in English does not mean just any bird that is black, so the equivalent Sanskrit compound **kuṣṇaśakuni** meant, in fact, a crow. [...] (But this does not apply to *karmadhārayas* forming part of a longer compound [...])¹¹⁾

10) I followed the views of Matsumoto 1997, 362, 2-5, Yotsuya 1999, 47-72, especially 72 and Kishine 2001, 146, 6-7 who translated *sva* as ‘own’ and *tantra* as ‘theory’ or ‘position.’ I attempted to translate it so that it can be understood as an adjectival infinitive as well as an adverbial infinitive, as, grammatically speaking, *svatantram* can be adjectival as well as adverbial. (See footnote 14.)

11) Coulson 1992, 91, 12-32.

There is no compounded ‘*svatantrānumāna*’ without the third element added to it in the *Prasannapadā*¹²⁾ and then a *svatantra anumāna* (not compounded) is very likely to indicate that it is any ‘inference’ that is employed ‘in order to establish one’s own theory,’ which does not have any conventional significance transcending the meaning of each word. As Kishine argues, it is nothing but an ordinary inference because all the inferences are employed in order to prove their own views and therefore *svatantra*, which means that Candrakīrti presupposed inference which was not *svatantra*.¹³⁾ Thus the matter of *svatantra* might not have been such a significant issue for the other Mādhyamikas who took it for granted that an inference was *svatantra*. This might explain why the later Mādhyamikas did not mention the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction.¹⁴⁾

After some argument about the use of an inference,¹⁵⁾ Candrakīrti

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- 12) There are five instances of *svatantra* and *anumāna* appearing together in the *Prasannapadā*. See Quotations [2], [4] and [6]. In addition, after [2] Candrakīrti writes, *yadā caivaṃ svatantrānumānānabhīdhāyitvaṃ mādhyamikasya tadā kuto, nādhyātmikānyāyatanāni svata utpannāni*. (*Prasannapadā*, 16) Therefore, a notation ‘*svatantrānumāna*’ is inappropriate or at least misleading with regard to the *Prasannapadā* because it makes us think that the compound is found in the *Prasannapadā*.
- 13) Kishine 2001, 146. Candrakīrti presupposes an other acknowledged inference (*paraprasiddhānumāna*).
- 14) In addition, Matsumoto 1997, 376-377 shows that *rang dbang gis* (*svātantryena, svatantram*) and *rang dbang du* (*svātantryena, svatantram*) appear together with *rjes su dpag pa* (*anumāna*) in Bhāviveka’s *Prajñāpradīpa* and points out that they are used adverbially. Therefore it is not improbable that *svatantram* is intended to be an adverb in the *Prasannapadā* as well. In that case, *svatantram* does not modify *anumānam*, but goes with a verb in the sentence. Then even ‘*svatantra anumāna*’ (not compounded) does not exist in the *Prasannapadā* at all, which might also explain the fact that the later Indian Mādhyamikas do not mention it.
- 15) For example, Bhāviveka is made to give up *svatantra anumāna* but maintains his view that

concludes as follows:

- [6] This fault arises for those who state an inference to establish their own theory (*svatantram anumānaṃ*). We do not employ an inference to establish our own theory (*svatantram anumānaṃ*) because our inferences result in the negation of the opponent's proposition.¹⁶⁾

Candrakīrti states that he and other Mādhyamikas of his side refrain from employing an inference to establish their own theory but submit an inference whose result is the negation of the opponent's proposition. This statement is surprisingly similar to Bhāviveka's statement [4] (underlined), in which he concedes that the Mādhyamikas should abandon an inference to establish their own theory but upholds an inference for the purpose of criticising the opponent's proposition. Therefore, it is possible to interpret that, in the *Prasannapadā*, Candrakīrti and his Bhāviveka agreed on a compromise that an inference should be used for the purpose of the refutation of the opponent. This is probably how the context of the *Prasannapadā* was understood by the Prāsaṅgikas in India, and might be another reason why the later Mādhyamikas did not mention the opposition between Candrakīrti and Bhāviveka concerning the use of a *svatantra anumāna*.

there should be theses and others that are free from faults of theses, reasons and examples (Quotation [4]). Candrakīrti, however, criticises it because it is impossible for a thesis to be faultless if it is not established for the proponent himself.

- 16) *Prasannapadā*, 34, 4-5:

svatantram anumānaṃ bruvatām ayaṃ doṣo jāyate | na vyaṃ svatantram anumānaṃ prayuñjmahe parapatijñāṇīśedhaphalatvād asmadanumānānām |

III. Inference with *Paramārthatas*

Even if Candrakīrti and his Bhāviveka compromised on the use of inference in the *Prasannapadā*, this does not necessarily mean that there was no controversy between the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika. It seems that the actual dispute between them existed over the use of the term ‘*paramārthatas*’ in probative inference rather than the use of *svatantra anumāna* itself. Candrakīrti questions its purpose after quoting Bhāviveka’s inference from the *Prajñāpradīpa*:

[7] Regarding it, first, it is said [by Bhāviveka], as follows:

Concerning this, the formal demonstration becomes [as follows]:

Ultimately (*paramārthataḥ*), the internal sense fields do not arise from self because they [already] exist, like spirit (*caitanya*).¹⁷⁾

But for what purpose is the qualification ‘ultimately’ applied?¹⁸⁾

In the *Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya*, Candrakīrti quotes a similar passage and criticises the application of qualification ‘ultimately’ as purposeless.

[8] Therefore the Master [Nāgārjuna] generally negated arising saying “not

17) *Prajñāpradīpa*, Derge Tsha 49a2-3, Peking Tsha 58b1-2:

’dir sbyor ba’i tshig tu ’gyur ba ni don dam par nang gi skye mched rnams bdag las skye ba med par nges te / yod pa’i phyir dper na shes pa yod pa nyid bzhin no //

18) *Prasannapadā* 25, 9-26, 2: *tatra yat tāvad evam uktam | atra prayogavākyam bhavati | na paramārthata ādhyātmikāny āyatanāni svata utpannāni | vidyamānatvāt | caitanyavad iti | kimarthaṃ punar atra paramārthata iti viśeṣaṇam upādīyate |*

... from self’ without applying qualification. Some apply qualification, saying:

Ultimately, entities do not arise from self because they [already] exist, like spirit.

It should be considered that the qualification ‘ultimately’ is purposeless.¹⁹⁾

This qualification ‘ultimately’ is used in inference when Bhāviveka attempts to prove his (or Nāgārjuna’s) own view. If *svatantra anumāna* is an inference to establish one’s own theory, whether or not this qualification is upheld will be regarded as a criterion to distinguish between the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika.

The ultimate is non-conceptual for the Mādhyamikas and cannot be the object of verbal or conceptual activity. Bhāviveka, nevertheless, attempts to prove entities’ ‘non-arising from self’ with the qualification ‘ultimately.’ He explains the relation between the ultimate and inference when analysing the term ‘ultimate’ (*paramārtha*) in the *Prajñāpradīpa* on verse 24:8 of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*:

[9] Regarding *paramārtha*, (1) it is *paramārtha* because it is the object (*artha*) and also ultimate (*parama*). (*karmadhāraya* compound) Or,

19) *Madhyamakāvataṛabhāṣya* 86, 11-15:

*de nyid kyi phyir slob dpon gyis khyad par du ma mdzad par / bdag las ma yin zhes spyir skye
ba bkag pa yin no // gang zhig dngos po rnams ni don dam par bdag las skyes pa ma yin te
/ yod pa 'i phyir sems can bzhin no zhes khyad par du byed pa de 'i don dam par zhes bya ba 'i
khyad par don med do zhes bsam par bya 'o /*

(2) it is *paramārtha* because it is the object (*artha*) of the ultimate (*parama*) cognition which is non-conceptual. (*tatpuruṣa* compound)

It is the reality (*de kho na, tattva*) whose definition is ‘being not dependent on others’ (*aparapratyayam*) and so on.²⁰ Due to being the truth (*satya*) which is nothing but *paramārtha*, it is the ultimate truth (*paramārthasatya*), since it stays in that way for all times in all aspects.

(3-a) A non-conceptual cognition whose object is that [ultimate] is also *paramārtha* due to its way of not having objects, because it takes *paramārtha* [as the object]. (3-b) The explanation of non-arising and so forth, which conforms with the elimination of that [object], and (3-c) the wisdom arisen from hearing, thinking and meditation are also *paramārtha*, because they are unmistaken due to being the means of understanding *paramārtha*. (*bahuvrīhi* compound)²¹

20) The definition of the reality (*tattva*), including *aparapratyayam*, is given in verse 18:9 of the *Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā*, *Prasannapadā* 372, 12-13:

aparapratyayam sāntam prapañcair aprapañcitam⁽¹⁾ |
nirvikalpam anānārtam etat tattvasya lakṣaṇam⁽²⁾ ||

(1) Ed: *aprapañcitam*. (2) Ed: *lakṣaṇam*.

21) *Prajñāpradīpa*, Derge Tsha 228a3-6, Peking Tsha 286a7-b3:

don dam par ni de don kyang yin la / dam pa yang yin pas don dam pa'am / rnam par mi rtoḡ pa'i ye shes dam pa'i don yin pas / don dam pa ste / de kho na gzhan las shes pa ma yin pa la sogs pa'i mtshan nyid do // don dam pa nyid bden pa yin pas / don dam pa'i bden pa ste / de dus thams cad dang rnam pa thams cad du de bzhin du gnas pa'i phyir ro // rnam par mi rtoḡ pa'i ye shes de'i yul can yang yul med pa'i tshul gyis don dam pa ste / de la don dam pa yod pa'i phyir ro // de 'gog pa dang rjes su mthun⁽¹⁾ *pa skye ba med pa la sogs pa bstan pa dang / thos pa dang bsams*⁽²⁾ *pa dang / bsgoms*⁽³⁾ *pa las byung ba'i shes rab kyang don dam pa*⁽⁴⁾ *ste / don dam pa rtogs pa'i thabs kyi phyir phyin ci ma log pa'i phyir ro //*

(1) D: *mthun*, P: *thun*. (2) D: *bsams*, P: *bsam*. (3) D: *bsgoms*, P: *bsgom*. (4) D: *pa*, P: *par*.

In these passages, Bhāviveka interprets the compound *paramārtha* in three different ways: as (1) *karmadhāraya*, (2) *tatpuruṣa* and (3) *bahuvrīhi* compounds. Of these, (1) the ultimate object, (2) the object of the ultimate cognition, and (3-a) a non-conceptual cognition whose object is the ultimate are non-conceptual. However, (3-b) the explanation of non-arising and so forth is not non-conceptual and only conformable to *paramārtha*. According to Avalokitavrata, this conceptual *paramārtha* interpreted as a *bahuvrīhi* compound is called the ‘concordant ultimate truth’ (*brdar brtags pa'i don dam pa'i bden pa, *sāṅketikaparamārthasatya*).²²⁾

In a similar way, Bhāviveka explains the meaning of *paramārtha* in the *Tarkajvālā*, as follows:

[10] As for [the term] *paramārtha*, because *artha* is what is to be known, *artha* means what is to be examined and to be grasped. *Parama* is a term denoting ‘supreme.’ The compound *paramārtha* is:

- (1) The ultimate object because it is the object (*artha*) and is ultimate (*parama*). (*karmadhāraya* compound) Alternatively, (2) the object (*artha*) of the ultimate (*parama*). It is the object of the ultimate because it is the object of the ultimate cognition which is non-conceptual. (*tatpuruṣa* compound) Alternatively, (3) what is conformable to *paramārtha*. It is conformable to *paramārtha* because the wisdom which accords with the understanding of *paramārtha* takes *paramārtha* [as an object] (*bahuvrīhi* compound).

22) *Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā*, Derge zha 236b6, Peking za 282b8. I use this term to denote the interpretation of *paramārtha* as a *bahuvrīhi* compound that is not non-conceptual.

“Ultimately” (*paramārthatas*) [in syllogistic inference] is ultimately also concerning that same ultimate [as a *bahuvrīhi* compound].²³⁾

The first two interpretations — as (1) the ultimate object and (2) the object of the ultimate cognition — are considered to refer to that which is non-conceptual. However, the third is explained as (3) that which is conformable to *paramārtha* or that which takes *paramārtha* [as an object] i.e. as a *bahuvrīhi* compound. These explanations in the *Prajñāpradīpa* and in the *Tarkajvālā* are slightly different²⁴⁾ but in both passages Bhāviveka assumes the concordant ultimate, which is not non-conceptual and can be dealt with in inference. This concordant ultimate is accepted by the later Svātantrika Mādhyamikas such as Jñānagarbha, Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla and Haribhadra.²⁵⁾

23) *Tarkajvālā*, 82, 33-83, 8, Derge Dza 59a7-b2, Peking Dza 63a1-4:

don dam pa zhes bya ba la don zhes bya ba ni shes par bya ba yin pa'i phyir/ don de brtag par bya ba dang go bar bya ba'i tha tshig gol dam pa zhes bya ba ni mchog ces bya ba'i tshig gi sgra yin te/ don dam pa zhes bsdu ba ni/

de don yang yin la dam pa yang yin pas don dam pa'o// yang na dam pa'i don de rnam par mi rtog pa'i ye shes dam pa'i don yin pas dam pa'i don to/ yang na don dam pa dang mthun pa ste don dam pa rtog pa dang rjes su mthun pa'i shes rab la don dam pa de yod pas don dam pa dang mthun pa'o// don dam par na zhes bya ba ni don dam pa de nyid du 'ang⁽¹⁾ don dam par ro// (1) D: 'ang. Ed, P: 'am.

24) This difference suggests that the author of the *Tarkajvālā* might not be Bhāviveka.

25) See Nagashima 2004, 74 ff. The opponent mentioned in Kamalaśīla's *Madhyamakālamkārapañjikā*, ad. v. 70 (Ichigo 1985, 233, 11), which is quoted in Haribhadra's *Abhisamayālamkāralokā* (Wogihara 1932, 636, 14-16) could be a Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika (Cf. quotation [8]):

Objection: The qualification ‘ultimately’ (*paramārthatas*) is purposeless. To explain, in [the statement:] ‘reasoning which does not falsify is ultimate,’ the word ‘ultimate’ (*paramārtha*)

In this way, Bhāviveka uses term “ultimately” (*paramārthatas*) when establishing non-arising from self (Quotations [7] and [8]) and it is understood as concordant ultimate (Quotation [9], 3-b). On the other hand, when *svatantra anumāna* is abandoned, it is impossible to employ a probative inference whose content is the negation of arising from self (Quotation [4]) because it is the Mādhyamika’s own theory. Therefore, it is reasonable to regard the use of term “ultimately” (*paramārthatas*) as a criterion to distinguish the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika.

IV. Atiśa’s Position in the Madhyamaka

Some Tibetan doxographers regard Atiśa (982-1054) as a Prāsaṅgika.²⁶⁾ He explains the ultimate in verses 4 of the *Satyadvayāvātāra*, as follows:

- [11] The ultimate is only one. Others hold that it is twofold. How can reality (*chos nyid*, **dharmatā*), which cannot be established as anything, be two, three and so on? (v. 4)²⁷⁾

designates apprehension (*dhī*) produced from a three-fold inferential mark. In this case, because this [apprehension] also is conventional, how [can it simultaneously] be ultimate?
*nanu paramārthata iti viśeṣaṇam anarthakam | tathā hy avisamvādako nyāyaḥ
 paramārtha iti paramārthaśabdena trirūpaliṅgajanitā buddhir abhidhīyate | tadā tasyā
 api samvṛtirūpatvāt kathaṃ paramārthatvam |*

26) See translation of ICang skya’s *Grub pa’i mtha’i rnam par bzhas pa* in Lopez 1987, 260 as well as Mimaki 1982, 27-38.

27) *Satyadvayāvātāra*, 362:

dam pa’i don ni gcig nyid de // gzhan dag rnam pa gnyis su ’dod //

It is clear from this verse that Atiśa does not accept the Svātantrika way of distinguishing between the non-conceptual ultimate and the concordant ultimate.

[12] A fool who sees this side says that Buddhists accept these two: direct perception and inference, and realise emptiness by the two. (v. 10)

[Then] it would follow that even outsiders and Śrāvakas understand reality (*chos nyid*, **dharmatā*), not to mention the proponents of representation[-only], and Mādhyamikas would be no different [from them]. (v. 11)

Therefore, all doctrines would also agree because they understand [the doctrines] through the valid means of knowledge. Because all reasonings are not in agreement, does reality (*chos nyid*, **dharmatā*), which is understood through the valid means of knowledge, not become manifold? [In fact] direct perception and inference are unnecessary. The learned make use of [them] to refute the objection of outsiders. (vv. 12-13)²⁸⁾

cir yang ma grub chos nyid de // gnyis dang gsum sogs ga la 'gyur // 4 //

28) *Satyadvayāvatāra*, 363-364:

mngon sum dang ni rjes su dpag // sangs rgyas pa yis de gnyis gzung //
gnyis pos stong nyid rtogs so zhes // tshu rol mthong ba 'i rmongs pa smra // 10 //
mu stegs nyan thos rnams kyis kyang // chos nyid rtogs par thal bar 'gyur //
rnam rig pas lta smos ci dgos // dbu ma pa la mi mthun med // 11 //
des na grub mtha' thams cad kyang // tshad mas 'jal phyir mthun par 'gyur //
rtog ge thams cad mi mthun pas // tshad mas gzhal ba 'i chos nyid kyang // 12 //
mang po nyid du mi 'gyur ram // mngon sum rjes dpag dgos pa med //

As Ejima points out,²⁹⁾ the same attitude is seen in his *Bodhimārgapradīpapañjikā*:

- [13] Why were many treatises composed by Dharmakīrti, Dharmottara and others? The learned composed [them] to refute the objection of outsiders.³⁰⁾

These verses deny the efficacy of the valid means of knowledge, including direct perception and inference, in realising emptiness or reality. The texts on *pramāṇa* are, however, used in order to refute the objection of outsiders. This is nothing but the point Candrakīrti and his Bhāviveka agreed on in the *Prasannapadā*.³¹⁾

In addition, he mentions Candrakīrti by name and quotes a verse from the *Madhyamakāvatāra*:

- [14] If one asks who understood emptiness, [I reply] Nāgārjuna, who was predicted by the Tathāgata and saw the truth of reality, and his disciple Candrakīrti. (v. 15)³²⁾

mu stegs rgol ba bzlog pa 'i phyir // mkhas pa rnams kyis byas pa yin // 13 //

29) Ejima 1983, 371.

30) *Bodhimārgapradīpapañjikā*, Derge Khi 282b5, Peking Ki 326b6-7:

chos grags chos mchog la sogs pas // gzhung mang byas pa ji lta bu //
mu stegs rgol ba bzlog pa 'i phyir // mkhas pa rnams kyis byas pa yin //

31) See Quotation [6].

32) *Satyadvayāvatāra*, 364:

stong nyid gang gis rtogs she na // de bzhin gshegs pas lung bstan zhing //
chos nyid bden pa gzigs pa yi // klu sgrub slob ma zla grags yin // 15 //

The *ācārya* Candrakīrti says as follows:

He who does not know the distinction between the two, the conventional truth as a means and the ultimate truth as the goal, gets a bad birth because of erroneous conceptualisation. (v. 19)³³⁾

These verses show that Atiśa follows Candrakīrti. As we have seen above, Atiśa does not accept the concordant ultimate and uses inference to refute the objection of outsiders. These could be regarded as an adequate rationale to classify Atiśa as a Prāsaṅgika.

There are, on the other hand, many pieces of evidence that contradict this conclusion.

[15] The *ācārya*, learned Bhavya (Bhāviveka), says that [the ultimate] cannot be understood clearly even from scriptural authority [or] by [either of] two thoughts: that with conceptual construct or without conceptual construct. (v. 14)³⁴⁾

33) *Satyadvayāvatāra*, 365-366:

slob dpon zla grags 'di skad du //

thabs su gyur pa kun rdzob bden pa dang // thabs las byung ba don dam bden pa dag //

gnyis po 'i dbye ba gang gis mi shes pa // de dag log par rtogs pas ngan 'gror 'gro // 19 //

Madhyamakāvatāra, 175, 3-6 (v. 6:80):

tha snyad bden pa thabs su gyur pa dang // don dam bden pa thabs byung gyur pa ste //

de gnyis rnam dbye gang gis mi shes pa // de ni rnam rtog log pas lam ngan zhugs //

Quoted in the *Subhāṣitasamgraha*, 22, 7-10:

upāyabhūtaṃ vyavahārasatyam upeyabhūtaṃ paramārthasatyam |

tayor vibhāgaṃ na paraiti yo vai mithyāvikalpaiḥ sa kumārgayātāḥ ||

34) *Satyadvayāvatāra*, 364:

lung las kyang ni gsal po ru // rtog bcas rtog pa med pa yi //

Without depending on common usage (*tha snyad, vyavahāra*), the ultimate is not understood. Without a ladder of true conventions, it is impossible for a learned one to reach the top of the palace of reality. (v. 20)³⁵

Atiśa mentions Bhavya (Bhāviveka) in v. 14, which is just before he mentions Candrakīrti in v. 15. In the same way as he quotes from Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra*, he presumably quotes from Bhāviveka's *Madhyamakahrdaya*.

In the *Bodhimārgapradīpapañjikā*, Atiśa explains his Madhyamaka lineage:

shes pa gnyis kyis mi rtog shes // slob dpon mkhas pa bha bya gsung // 14 //

Ejima 1983, 384, n. 11 and 389, n. 65, points out a similarity between *pāda* b and c, verse 3:285cd of the *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* and verse 5:6 of the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*.

Madhyamakahrdayakārikā, 39, 16 (v. 3:285cd):

savikalpāvikalpena jñānenāpy eṣa durdṛśaḥ |

Madhyamakaratnapradīpa, v. 5:6, Derge Tsha 272a6, Peking Tsha 342b6:

rtog bcas rtog pa med pa yi // shes pa gnyis kyis 'di mi rtogs //

sgra dang tshad ma 'i tha snyad dag // de don bsgom la dgos pa med //

35) *Satyadvayāvatāra*, 366:

tha snyad la ni ma brten par // dam pa 'i don ni rtogs mi 'gyur //

yang dag kun rdzob rnams kyi skas // med par yang dag khang chen gyi //

steng du 'gro bar byed pa ni // mkhas la rung ba ma yin no // 20 //

Cf. *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, 494, 12 (v. 24:10ab):

vyavahāram anāśritya paramārtho na deśyate |

Abhisamayālamkāraśloka, 169, 19-20:

tathyaśamvṛtisopānam antareṇa vipaścitaḥ |

tattvaprāsādaśikharārohaṇam na hi yujyate |

Madhyamakahrdayakārikā, 8, 11-12 (v. 3:12):

tattvaprāsādaśikharārohaṇam na hi yujyate |

tathyaśamvṛtisopānam antareṇa yatas tataḥ ||

See Ejima 1983, 385, n. 18 and 389, n. 65.

[16] The *ācārya* Nāgārjuna explained the essence of teaching. He understood that the meaning of *prajñāpāramitā* was the meaning of the great Madhyamaka, which transcends existence and non-existence. It is taught in this way in the lineage of other learned men. At present, the *guru* Bodhibhadra and the reverend Kusulu pa think in this way.

The nectar of the venerable noble Nāgārjuna had satisfied Āryadeva, Candrakīrti, Bhavya (Bhāviveka) and Śāntideva, down to Bodhibhadra. A little has been sprinkled even on me.³⁶⁾

Atiśa understands that his lineage starts from Nāgārjuna and continues through Candrakīrti, Bhavya and Bodhibhadra to Atiśa himself. It is also understood that Bodhibhadra was his teacher when the text was written.

Lastly, Atiśa translated only two of Candrakīrti's works: the *Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa* and the *Triśaraṇasaptati*, although he was involved in translation of 104 texts into Tibetan.³⁷⁾ On the other hand, he took part in translation of the *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā*, a genuine work of Bhāviveka,

36) *Bodhimārgapradīpapañjikā*, Derge Khi 280a5-7, Peking Ki 323b5-8:

slob dpon klu sgrub kyis ni bstan pa'i snying po bshad de / des shes rab kyī pha rol tu phyin pa'i don yod pa dang med pa las 'das pa'i dbu ma chen po'i don thugs su chud cing / mkhas pa gzhān gyi rgyud la yang de ltar gsungs so // de ltar bla ma byang chub bzang po dang / rje btsun ku su lu pa yang de ltar dgongs so //

'phags pa klu sgrub zhal gyi bdud rtsi des // a'a rya de ba zla grags bha bya dang // zhi ba'i lha dang byang chub bzang po'i bar // tshim par gyur ba bdag la'ang cung zhig 'thor //

37) The *Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa*, Derge 3866, Peking 5267 and the *Triśaraṇasaptati*, Derge 3971, Peking 5366. Concerning Candrakīrti's works, see Ruegg 1981, 111 and 105. The list of texts which Atiśa translated is given by Inaba 1966, 23 and 31.

and its commentary, *Tarkajvālā*, as well as the *Madhyamakārthasamgraha* and the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*, which are ascribed to him but not currently regarded as his genuine works. In this way, Atiśa follows Candrakīrti's view concerning inference, but at the same time he espouses Bhāviveka.

Again in his *Ratnakaraṇḍodghāta Madhyamakopadeśa*, Atiśa distinguishes texts of teachers, as follows:

[17] (1) The *ācāryas* Bhavya (Bhāviveka), Buddhapālita, Devaśarman, Avalokitavrata, Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla and others wrote texts of the Madhyamaka in detail.

(2) The *ācārya* Candragomin, the *ācārya* Śūra, the *ācārya* Sāgaramegha, the *ācārya* Śāntideva, the *ācārya* Luntaka(?) and others wrote, for novices just after generation of mind (**cittopāda*), texts of very extensive practice beginning from the four infinities (**apramāṇa*) and the four things of attraction (**saṃgrahavastu*), up to *prajñāpāramitā* in detail.

(3) Those texts written by the five *ācāryas*, the *ācārya* noble Nāgārjuna, the *ācārya* Āryadeva, the *ācārya* Maticitra, the *ācārya* Kambala and the *ācārya* Candrakīrti, are the foundation (*phyi mo*, **mātrikā*) of all the Madhyamaka texts. Because they are the roots (*rtsa ba*, **mūla*) of all the Madhyamaka texts, there is no rival.³⁸⁾

38) *Ratnakaraṇḍodghāta*, 19-20, Derge Ki 112b5-113a1, Peking A 126a5-b2:

*slob dpon bha bya dang / bu ddha p'a li ta dang / de ba shar ma dang / spyan ras gzigs
brtul zhugs dang / sh'a nta ra kshi ta dang / ka ma la sh'i la la sogs pas ni dbu ma'i gzhung
rgyas par mdzad do//*

slob dpon tsa ndra go mi dang / slob dpon dpa' bo dang / slob dpon rgya mtsho sprin

The authors of the Madhyamaka texts are divided into three: (1) the authors of texts of the Madhyamaka (*dBu ma*), (2) the authors of texts of practice and (3) the authors of the root (*rtsa ba*, **mūla*) texts of all the Madhyamaka texts. Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Maticitra, Kambala and Candrakīrti are regarded as the authors of *mūla* texts, whose views are in unity. On the other hand, Bhavya (Bhāviveka) and Śāntarakṣita are regarded as authors of Madhyamaka texts, which presumably have distinct tenets.

V. *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*

Atiśa's understanding of his lineage and classification of the Madhyamaka teachers may look unfamiliar. However, it can be explained from the relationship between Atiśa's *Satyadvayāvātāra* and Bhavya's *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*.³⁹⁾

Candrakīrti is referred to in this text many times. Bhavya quotes verse 6:80

dang / slob dpon sh'a nta de ba dang / slob dpon lu nta ka la sogs pas sems bskyed ma thag pa las dang po pa'i phyir tshad med pa bzhi dang / bsdu ba'i dngos po bzhi dang / pha rol tu phyin pa la sogs pa ji ltar nyams su blang ba'i spyod pa rgya chen po'i gzhung rgyas par mdzad do //

slob dpon 'phags pa klu sgrub dang / slob dpon a'a rya de ba dang / slob dpon ma ti tsi tra dang / slob dpon ka mba la dang / slob dpon zla ba grags pa dang / slob dpon lnga bos mdzad pa'i dbu ma'i gzhung de dag ni dbu ma'i gzhung thams cad kyi phyi mo yin no // dbu ma'i gzhung thams cad kyi rtsa ba yin pas 'gran zla med pa yin no //

39) Lindtner 1981 and Ejima 1983 have already pointed out the close relationship between the *Satyadvayāvātāra* of Atiśa and the first chapter of the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*. Del Toso 2014, 514-517 proposes the end of the ninth century to the first half of the tenth century for the date of the composition of the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*. It is certain that its author, Bhavya, is not identical with the sixth century Bhāviveka.

of the *Madhyamakāvātāra*,⁴⁰⁾ which is also quoted in the *Satyadvayāvātāra*.⁴¹⁾ He, moreover, mentions the *Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa*⁴²⁾ of Candrakīrti by name and quotes on four occasions from the *Triśaraṇasaptati*⁴³⁾ of Candrakīrti. They are the only works of Candrakīrti translated into Tibetan by Atiśa.⁴⁴⁾ In addition to this, the five *mūla* teachers Atiśa mentions in the *Ratnakaraṇḍodghāṭa* are all found in the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*. Maticitra is mentioned by name in the seventh chapter⁴⁵⁾ and verse 13 of Kambala's *Ālokamālā* is quoted in the fifth chapter.⁴⁶⁾ This means Atiśa thought that Candrakīrti had been a teacher before bifurcation in the Madhyamaka.

Atiśa's dependence on Bhavya is again ascertained from a similar attitude towards inferential reasoning and the understanding of *paramārtha*. Bhavya states in the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*, as follows:

[18] This [ultimate truth] is not understood by two cognitions: that with conceptual construct and that without conceptual construct. The common usage (*tha snyad*, **vyavahāra*) of verbal authority (*sgra*, **śabda*) and the valid means of knowledge (*tshad ma*, **pramāṇa*)

40) *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*, Derge Tsha 261a2-3, Peking Tsha 328a5.

41) Verse 19 of the *Satyadvayāvātāra*. See Quotation [14].

42) *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*, Derge Tsha 266b4, Peking Tsha 335b3.

43) *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*, Derge Tsha 284b6, Peking Tsha 327b2-3 [= v. 3 of the *Triśaraṇasaptati*], Derge 272a7-b1, 275b6, Peking 342b5, 347a6 [= v. 28] and Derge 284b6, Peking 359a3 [=v. 4]. See Lindtner 1982, 175.

44) See footnote 37.

45) *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*, Derge Tsha 282a2, Peking Tsha 355b2. This is pointed out by Yamaguchi 1943, 87.

46) *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*, Derge Tsha 272b4-5, Peking Tsha 343a2-3. This is pointed out by Lindtner 1982, 175. Bhavya may quote v. 176 of the *Ālokamālā*. See Lindtner 1981, 203 n. 45.

are not necessary for cultivation of the goal.⁴⁷⁾

- [19] On occasions when one refutes the objections of outsiders, a large treatise is written and a large dispute should happen, the Madhyamaka texts of reasoning should be mentioned.⁴⁸⁾

Bhavya explains that the Madhyamaka texts of reasoning should be mentioned when one refutes the objections of outsiders. This is in line with Candrakīrti's position in terms of employing reasoning when refuting the objections of opponents. In addition to this, Bhavya's definitions of the ultimate truth lack the most important mark of the Svātantrika:

- [20] *Artha* [of *paramārtha*] means what is to be examined and to be grasped. *Parama* is supreme.

Alternatively, it is (1) the ultimate object because it is the object and is ultimate. (*karmadhāraya* compound) Alternatively, it is (2) the object of the ultimate. It is the object of the ultimate because it is the object of the ultimate wisdom. (*tatpuruṣa* compound)
The truth does not falsify.⁴⁹⁾

47) *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*, Derge Tsha 272a6, Peking Tsha 342b6:

*rtoḡ bcas rtoḡ pa med pa yi // shes pa gnyis kyis 'di mi rtoḡs //
sgra dang tshad ma'i tha snyad dag // de don bsgom la dḡos pa med //*

Cf. v. 14 of the *Satyadvayāvātāra* (Quotation [15]).

48) *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*, Derge Tsha 281a3, Peking Tsha 354a5-6:

*pha rol rḡol ba bzlag pa dang // bstan bcas chen po'i gzhung dang ni //
rtsod pa chen po byung dus su // rigs pa'i dbu ma'i gzhung smra bya //*

49) *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*, Derge Tsha 260b6-7, Peking Tsha 327b8-328a1:

don zhes bya ba ni brtag par bya ba dang/ go bar bya ba'o // dam pa ni mchog go /

Although this analysis is similar to that in the *Tarkajvālā*, Bhavya does not mention the interpretation of *paramārtha* as a *bahuvrīhi* compound. It is therefore appropriate to regard Bhavya, the author of the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*, as a Prāsaṅgika.

VI. Conclusion

Bodhibhadra distinguishes between the side of Bhavya (Bhāviveka) and that of Śāntarakṣita (Quotation [1]). They should not, however, be regarded as the subdivisions in the Svātantrika. According to Atiśa, Bodhibhadra is his teacher in the lineage from Candrakīrti through Bhavya (Bhāviveka) to himself. Taking Atiśa's dependence on the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* into account, Bodhibhadra's Bhavya (Bhāviveka) is most likely to include Bhavya, the author of the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*, who is regarded as a Prāsaṅgika.⁵⁰⁾

It seems that there are two main factors which caused discrepancy between Indian witnesses and Tibetan accounts. On the one hand, Candrakīrti and his Bhāviveka can be understood to have agreed on how to employ inference in the *Prasannapadā*. This does not mean Bhāviveka actually compromised on the use of *svatantra anumāna*. His concession in the *Prasannapadā*

*yang na don yang yin la / dam pa yang yin pas don dam pa 'o // yang na dam pa 'i don de
ye shes dam pa 'i don yin pas na dam pa 'i don no // bden pa ni mi bslu ba 'o //*

Compare this with Quotation [10] from the *Tarkajvālā*.

50) See Quotations [16] and [17]. It seems that Atiśa regarded Candrakīrti as a *mūla* teacher and thought that the Madhyamaka bifurcated after him. If Bodhibhadra, Atiśa's teacher, understood their lineage in the same way as Atiśa, it is quite understandable that he mentioned Bhavya (Bhāviveka) as the representative of his lineage.

is indeed Candrakīrti's creation, which, however, led the later Indian Mādhyamikas to form the Prāsaṅgika lineage by including Bhavya in it. Thus, Candrakīrti's attempt induced misunderstandings about Bhāviveka among the later Mādhyamikas, such as Atiśa. Nevertheless, on the basis of his fabricated view, the later Indian Prāsaṅgika lineage was actually created, by way of the composition of the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*, which is now regarded as an apocrypha. On the other hand, the Madhyamaka is considered to have separated into the Svātantrika of Bhāviveka and the Prāsaṅgika of Candrakīrti, and then the Svātantrika into the Sautrāntika-Madhyamaka of Bhāviveka and the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka of Śāntarakṣita, according to Tibetan accounts. This interpretation may be right in terms of classifying Madhyamaka thoughts retrospectively, but whether or not they resulted in actually creating sub-schools or lineages is a different matter. In fact, it is impossible for us to find any trace of dispute over the use of *svatantra anumāna* or the opposition between Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti in Indian treatises after Candrakīrti. It would indeed be strange if the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika were established as two opposing factions.

It is now evident that we were looking for the wrong clues. The actual controversy between the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika existed over the application of qualification 'ultimately' to probative inference, not the use of *svatantra anumāna*. Moreover, Bhavya (Bhāviveka) was regarded as being in the lineage from Candrakīrti by some Indian Mādhyamikas. This is derived from the understanding that Candrakīrti and his Bhāviveka agreed on a compromise regarding how an inference should be employed in the *Prasannapadā*. These could explain why we were not able to find any

testimony concerning the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction in later Indian sources.

I hope this paper elucidated how Candrakīrti's view was transmitted to the later Mādhyamikas, and demonstrated the complicated nature of the distinction of the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika in India.

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Abstract

Reframing Bhāviveka

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According to Tibetan accounts, Madhyamaka bifurcated into the Svātantrika of Bhāviveka and the Prāsaṅgika of Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti. However, we can hardly find any trace concerning the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction in later Indian sources. This paper attempts to explain why this discrepancy occurred by analysing the works of Candrakīrti, Bhavya and Atiśa.

Firstly, I examine what is *svatantra anumāna* in the *Prasannapadā* to elucidate the cause of the problem and the point of controversy between Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti. It is a widespread view that the dispute over the use of probative inference in the *Prasannapadā* resulted in this division of the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika. It is, however, possible to read it in a different way. Then, I focus on Atiśa's works to show the widespread view was not shared by him, who endorses both Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti. In order to bolster my argument, I look into how Candrakīrti's position

regarding inference was transmitted to him, and point out that Bhavya's *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* played a crucial role in the formation of the later Indian Prāsaṅgika lineage.

A close examination of these texts makes it clear that Candrakīrti succeeded in handing down his view by misleading the later Mādhyamikas.

Key words : Svātantrika, Prāsaṅgika, Candrakīrti, Bhāviveka, paramārtha, Atiśa

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