

Once Again on “*Dhātu-vāda*”*

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국문요약

1986년 마츠모토 시로(松本 史朗) 교수는 「여래장 사상은 불교가 아니다 (如來藏思想は仏教にあらず。)」라는 논문을 발표했다. 이 논문에 따르면, 진정한 불교의 핵심 교리는 무아와 연기(*pratīyasamutpāda*)이다. 연기는 ‘기체 (基體, *dhātu*)’라고 부르는 어떤 단일한 공간적인 기반 없이 시간적 인과 관계로 구성된다는 것이 마츠모토 교수의 의견이다. 반면에, 유식과 여래장 전통은 공통된 사상적 틀을 공유한다고 주장하며, 그것을 ‘기체설(基體說, *dhātu-vāda*)’

* The research for this article has been funded by Waseda University Grant for Special Research Projects (project number: 2016B-064) and JSPS Kakenhi Grant (project number: 17K02218). I thank Professor Robert Kritzer for kindly checking the English of this article.

이라고 불렀다. ‘기체설(*dhātu-vāda*)’ 모델은 기체(基體, locus)와 초기체(超基體, super-locus)로 구성되고, 기체는 초기체를 떠받쳐서 초기체를 발생시킨다. 마츠모토는 이 모델을 ‘발생론적 일원론(generative monism)’이라고 부르며, 이 모델이 근본적으로 ‘정통 불교(authentic Buddhism)’의 시간적 인과 모델과는 다르다고 여겼고, 따라서 이 모델은 ‘불교가 아니다’라고 주장했다.

1997년, 나는 두 개의 논문을 발표하여 이 모델의 타당성을 논했고, 2004년에는 마츠모토가 나의 논문들에 대해 상세히 반박했다. 그리고 지금 이 논문에서는 마츠모토의 2004년 논문에 답하고자 한다. 2004년 논문에서, 마츠모토는 두 가지 개념에 초점을 맞췄다. 즉, 본성주종성(本性住種姓, *prakṛtistha-gotra*)과 진여소연연종자(眞如所緣緣種子, **tathatālanbanapratyaya-bīja*)이다. 진여소연연종자에 대해서는, 이미 1990년 출판된 나의 논고에서 자세히 논했으므로, 여기서는 본성주종성에 초점을 맞추고자 한다.


마츠모토는 내가 보살지의 *prakṛtistham gotram*를 ‘본래 존재하는 종성(*gotra existing by nature*)’으로 이해하는데 반대하면서, 이 개념을 ‘본성에 의하여 존재하는 종성(*gotra located on prakṛti*)’이라고 해석한다. 마츠모토는 이를 뒷받침하기 위해, 본성(*prakṛti*)을 보편적인 원리(*tathatā, dharmatā*)로 해석한다. 그러나 관련된 구절에 대한 검토로부터 시사하는 것은 보살지의 종성(*gotra*) 정의에서 이러한 진여(*tathatā*)나 법성(*dharmatā*)이라는 보편적인 요소는 상정되지 않는다는 것이다. 비록 법성(*dhammatā*)이라는 단어가 ‘*prakṛtistham gotram*(*dharmatāpratilabdha*라는 표현의 일부로서)’의 정의로 사용되었지만, 월폴라 라홀라(Walpola Rahula)가 빨리 문헌에서 동의어 *dhammatā*에 대해 논쟁했듯이, 여기에서 *dharmatā*는 세속적인 현상 뒤에 놓여 있는 어떤 것으로 언급하는 것 같지 않다. 그러므로 나는 적어도 기체설 모델을 『유가사지론』 가장 초기 맥락에 적용하는 것은 어렵다고 생각한다.

주제어: 기체, 본성주종성, 법성(*dharmatā/dhammatā*), 월폴라 라홀라

I. Introduction

In 1986, Matsumoto Shirō published a significant and highly provocative article entitled “*Nyoraizō shisō wa Bukkyō ni arazu*” (The Doctrine of *Tathāgata-garbha* Is Not Buddhist).¹⁾ According to this article, the core doctrines of the authentic Buddhism are no-self and *pratītyasamutpāda*. In his opinion, *pratītyasamutpāda* consists of a temporal sequence of causal links without any solid spatial basis (which he calls “*dhātu*”). This structure is shown in the following chart ([1986]1989b, 67):

Chart 1



On the other hand, according to Matsumoto ([1986]1989; 1997a), *Yogācāra* and *Tathāgatagarbha* traditions share a common doctrinal framework, which he calls “*dhātu-vāda*.” According to him, the “*dhātu-vāda*” model consists of “locus” and “super-locus” and can be defined as follows (see also Yamabe 1997a, 194):

List 1


1. “Locus” is the basis for “super-loci.”
2. “Locus” gives rise to “super-loci.”

1) Matsumoto [1986]1989a. This article was later translated into English and published as Matsumoto 1997a.

3. “Locus” is one, “super-loci” are many.
4. “Locus” is real, “super-loci” are not real.
5. “Locus” is the essential nature of “super-loci.”
6. “Super-loci” are not ultimately real, but have some reality in that they have arisen from the “locus” and share its nature.

This structure can be shown as follows:

Chart 2²⁾



Thus, in Matsumoto’s own wording ([1986]1989a, 6), this is a “generative monism” (發生論的一元論) in that all phenomena share a common spatial basis and originate from it. This is fundamentally different from the temporal causality model of “authentic Buddhism” and thus “not Buddhist.”

In social or ethical contexts, what is particularly problematic about this model is that it is not as egalitarian as it seems. The statement that manifold elements (“dharma”) are based on a universal foundation (“*dhātu*”) sounds egalitarian at first glance. However, when, for example, divergent *gotras* or social castes are posited on the universal foundation (e.g., *dharmadhātu*), equality on the level of principle justifies and conceals discrimination on

2) Matsumoto [1986]1989a, 5 (slightly modified).

the practical level. In Matsumoto's opinion, this structure is clearly observed in *Abhisamayālaṅkāra* verse I.39:

Because the *dharmadhātu* (the *dhātu*/locus of all phenomena) is nondifferentiated, it is not reasonable that there are differences of *gotra*.

Because, however, of the differences of the phenomena (dharma) located on [that locus], those differences [of *gotra*] are taught. (Matsumoto 1997a, 171)³

In 1993, a panel entitled, "'Critical Buddhism' (Hihan Bukkyō): Issues and Responses to a New Methodological Movement," was organized at the Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Religion (Washington, D.C.). On that panel, as one of the panelists, I exchanged opinions with Professor Matsumoto in person. These exchanges were later published in the book, *Pruning the Bodhi Tree*, edited by Jamie Hubbard and Paul L. Swanson (Yamabe 1997a, Matsumoto 1997b, Yamabe 1997b).⁴

My conclusion in Yamabe 1997a was as follows:


The Yogacara theory of *gotra* is indeed discriminatory, but it is not based on monism. *Tathāgata-garbha* thought is clearly monistic, but the *gotra* distinction does not seem to signify anything essential. Some texts, such as the *Abhisamayālaṅkāra-vṛtti*, show an apparent *dhātu-vāda* structure, but that structure would appear to be an inconsistency brought about by a reinterpretation of the *gotra* theory. (Yamabe 1997a, 203)

3) dharmadhātor asaṃbhedād gotrabhedo na yujyate /
ādhedayadharmabhedāt tu tadbhedaḥ parigīyate // (Amano ed., 22.11, 16)

4) A Korean version is also available: 류제동역. 2015.


In my understanding, the *gotra* theory in the early Yogācāra tradition (*Bodhisattvabhūmi*, etc.) has the following structure:

Chart 3



Namely, each of the three vehicles is based on a separate *gotra*. This is clearly a pluralistic model. On the other hand, later *gotra* theory (in *Ratnagotravibhāga*, etc.) has the structure shown below:

Chart 4



This indeed is a monistic model, but the attainment is not discriminatory. After these exchanges, Matsumoto published a detailed rejoinder to my arguments (2004). In the introduction to this article, he states:

I have to admit the validity of part of Yamabe's critiques. Namely, at least in the system of mainstream Yogācāra, the substratum (A) is not a generative cause (B). In other words, not the single substratum (A) underlying all phenomena

but something (B) called *bīja* or *gotra* placed on that substratum generates manifold phenomena. . . . Nevertheless, even though A and B are differentiated, there is no denying that Yogācāra accepts the existence of the substratum (A). Accordingly, the system of Yogācāra is . . . a variant form of dhātu-vāda. . . . (Matsumoto 2004, ii [my English translation, with emphasis added])

In this article, Matsumoto focuses on the meaning of two key words: *prakṛtistha-gotra* and **tathatālanapanratyaya-bīja*. Of these two, I have already discussed the significance of **tathatālanapanratyaya-bīja* in some detail (Yamabe 1990). In addition, Lambert Schmithausen (2014, 569-95) has recently examined this concept meticulously in his detailed response to Matsumoto (2004) and Hartmut Buescher (2008). On this matter, I basically agree with Schmithausen, and there is not much I can add at this stage. Therefore, at this time I would like to focus on *prakṛtistha-gotra* and respond to some of Matsumoto's points.⁵⁾

II. *Prakṛtistha-gotra*

Prakṛtistha-gotra is defined in the following passage from *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (BBh):

5) Matsumoto's rejoinder (2004) is an extensive one (164 pages), and I cannot respond to all his points in the limited framework of a conference paper. Accordingly, in spite of the many years that have passed since the publication of Matsumoto's rejoinder, my response at this time must remain rather sketchy. On this point, I apologize in advance to Professor Matsumoto. In addition, in what follows some overlap with my former papers is unavoidable. Regarding this point, I beg for the indulgence of the reader.

In brief, *gotra* is twofold: [*gotra*] existing by nature (*prakṛtistha*) and developed (*samudānīta*) [*gotra*].

Gotra existing by nature is the distinct state of the six sense-bases (*ṣaḍāyatana-viśeṣa*) of bodhisattvas. That [distinct state] was naturally attained in the beginningless past and has been transmitted as such [to the present].

Developed *gotra* is what is attained through the practice of merits in the past [lives].

In this case, both meanings are intended. Further, this *gotra* is also called seed (*bīja*), *dhātu*, and origin (*prakṛti*). (Cf. Yamabe 1997a, 195-96)⁶⁾

My translation of *prakṛtistha*- as “existing by nature” is supported by the Tibetan translation (Derge edition, *sems tsam*, Wi 2b4): *rang bzhin gyis gnas pa'i rigs* (emphasis added).⁷⁾ More importantly, however, my interpretation is based on the following passage:

What is the enhancement of *dhātu*? Because of the former practice of wholesome dharmas based on the existence by nature of the seeds of wholesome dharmas, the seeds of wholesome dharmas in each subsequent moment become more enhanced, [then] most enhanced; they arise and they abide. This is called the enhancement of *dhātu*.⁸⁾

6) samāsato gotraṃ dvividham / prakṛtisthaṃ samudānītaṃ ca / tatra prakṛtisthaṃ gotraṃ yad bodhisattvānāṃ ṣaḍāyatana-viśeṣaḥ / sa tādrśaḥ paraṃparāgato 'nādikāliko dharmatāpratīlabdhaḥ / tatra samudānītaṃ gotraṃ yat pūrvakuśalamūlābhyāsāt pratīlabdham / tad asminn arthe dvividham apy abhipretam / tat punar gotraṃ bījam ity apy ucyate / dhātuḥ prakṛtir ity api / (*BBh*, Wogihara ed., 3.1-8; Dutt ed., 2.4-8)

7) The corresponding phrase in the Peking edition is *rang bzhin gyi gnas pa'i rigs* (*sems tsam*, Zhi 3a3, emphasis added).

I understand that *prakṛtyā kuśaladharmabījasampadam* corresponds to *prakṛtistham gotram*, and *pūrvakuśaladharmābhyāsād uttarottarāṇām kuśaladharmabījānām paripuṣṭatarā paripuṣṭatamā utpattiḥ sthitiḥ* to *samudānītam gotram*. Thus, I believe there is good reason to take the first member of the compound *prakṛti-stha-* in the instrumental sense.

Matsumoto disagrees with my view. First, concerning the last line of the *gotra* definition in *BBh* (*tat punar gotram bījam ity apy ucyate / dhātuḥ prakṛtir ity api /*), as shown in my translation above, I understand *gotra*, *bīja*, *dhātu*, and *prakṛti*, to be equivalent. On this point, Matsumoto states as follows:


However, if these four words were completely synonymous, would it not follow that the expression, "*prakṛti-stham gotram*," becomes nonsensical? Namely, if "*prakṛti*" and "*gotra*" were synonymous here, the word in question would mean "x located on x," or if we follow Yamabe's interpretation of the compound, "x existing by x," but both of them would be nonsensical. Thus, even if we understand "*prakṛti-stham gotram*" as "a *gotra* existing by *prakṛti*" ("the *gotra* existing by nature"), as Yamabe does, in this expression "*prakṛti*" and "*gotra*" cannot be synonymous, because the latter is said "to exist by" the former. (Matsumoto 2004, 72 [my English translation])

8) *tatra dhātupuṣṭiḥ katamā / yā prakṛtyā kuśaladharmabījasampadam niśritya pūrvakuśaladharmābhyāsād uttarottarāṇām kuśaladharmabījānām paripuṣṭatarā paripuṣṭatamā utpattiḥ sthitiḥ* / *iyam ucyate dhātupuṣṭiḥ / (BBh, Paripākaṭaḥ, Wogihara ed., 80.12-15; Dutt ed., 56.23-25 [emphasis added])*

Wogihara ed., *utpattisthitiḥ*. Here I follow Dutt. Tib. *skye zhing gnas pa* (Peking, *sems tsam*, Zhi 52a2; Derge, *sems tsam*, Wi 44a1). See Yamabe 1997b, 216.

Namely, Matsumoto argues that *gotra* and *prakṛti* cannot refer to the same thing. Rather, in his view, *prakṛti* refers to a universal basis, on which heterogeneous *gotras* are based, in the following way (this chart is mine, though I believe it reflects Matsumoto's understanding):

Chart 5



As Matsumoto notes, a statement very similar to the *gotra* definition in *BBh* is found in *Śrāvaka bhūmi*.⁹⁾

Then what is the distinctive nature of the *gotra*? It is a distinct state of the personal basis (**āśrayaviśeṣa*),¹⁰⁾ comprised in the six sense-bases (**śaḍāyatanasaṃgrhīta*),¹¹⁾ naturally attained (**dharma tātpratilabdha*),¹²⁾ and transmitted as such in continuity from the beginningless past (**anādikālikāḥ paraṃparāgatas iādṛśaḥ*).¹³⁾ What

9) This portion is extant only in the Tibetan and Chinese versions.

10) Tib. *lus las khyad par* literally means “distinct from the body,” but considering the *śaḍāyatanaviśeṣa* found in the *BBh* definition of *prakṛtistha-gotra* quoted above, I believe the underlying Sanskrit is **āśrayaviśeṣa*. On the other hand, in the corresponding portion the Chinese version has 附在所依, which suggests **āśrayasanniviṣṭa*. It is difficult to reconstruct a Sanskrit expression that can explain both the Tibetan and Chinese versions.

11) Again, this expression should be compared with the *śaḍāyatanaviśeṣa* in *BBh*.

12) The same expression is used in the *BBh* definition of *prakṛtistha-gotra* as well.

has *gotra*, *bīja*, *dhātu*, and *prakṛti* as variant appellations is called *gotra*. (Translation primarily based on the Tibetan version.)¹⁴⁾

Referring also to other relevant passages from *ŚBh*, Matsumoto acknowledges that in this text, *bīja*, *dhātu*, and *prakṛti* were considered synonymous with *gotra* (2004, 81). On the other hand, regarding the line in *BBh* (*tat punar gotraṃ bījam ity apy ucyate / dhātuḥ prakṛtir ity api /*), he suggested in his earlier article the following translation: “But that *gotra* is also called *bīja*, and the *dhātu* is also called *prakṛti*” (1997b, 206; quoted in Matsumoto 2004, 70). In his rejoinder to me, this translation is slightly modified: “Then, that *gotra* is also called *bīja*, [and it] is also called *dhātu* and *prakṛti*” (2004, 69).¹⁵⁾

In Matsumoto’s understanding, when the concept *prakṛtisthaṃ gotraṃ* was introduced into the *gotra* definition of *BBh*, the “synonymity” between *prakṛti* and *gotra* was denied, because these two words cannot refer to the same thing.¹⁶⁾ This is corroborated by the fact that neither Asvabhāva nor Sthiramati

13) Tib. *thog ma med pa’i dus nas brgyud de ’ongs pa de lta bu*. Ch. 從無始世展轉傳來法爾所得。
(For the reference, see n. 13 below.) Cf. *sa tāḍṣāḥ paramparāgato ’nādikālīko* in *BBh*.
These similarities between *ŚBh* and *BBh* are also noted by Matsumoto (2004, 79-80).

14) ’o na rigs de’i rang bzhin ji lta bu zhe na / de ni lus las khyad par du gyur pa dang skye mched
drug gis zin pa dang chos nyid kyis ’thob pa dang thog ma med pa’i dus nas brgyud de ’ongs
pa de lta bu yin te / gang la ’di lta ste / rigs dang sa bon dang khams dang rang bzhin zhes bya
ba’i ming gi rnam grangs ’di dag yod pa de ni rigs zhes bya’o // (Taishō Daigaku Sōgō
Bukkyō Kenkyūsho Shōmonji Kenkyūkai ed., §(I)-A-I, 2.22-3.2)
問今此種姓以何爲體。答附在所依有如是相。六處所攝。從無始世展轉傳來法爾所得。於此立
有差別之名。所謂種姓種子界性。是名種姓。(T30:395c24-27)

15) “しかるに、その種姓は、種子(bīja)とも言われ、界(dhātu)、本性(prakṛti)とも言われる。”

16) Matsumoto (2004, 89-91). See also Matsumoto’s argument (2004, 72) quoted above.

equates *prakṛti* with *dhātu* in their commentaries on *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra*.¹⁷⁾ This is because, according to Matsumoto, both Asvabhāva and Sthiramati were aware that *prakṛti* must be differentiated from *gotra*, *bīja*, and *dhātu* (2004, 83-84). Regarding *BBh*, however, its author could not entirely ignore the preceding system of *ŚBh*, and *prakṛti* was retained in the list. Nevertheless, *prakṛti* was separated from *gotra* by the insertion of *ucyate*, “is called,” in the line of *BBh*. In Matsumoto’s opinion, *prakṛti* was introduced here as a universal “basis for all phenomena,” and *gotra*, *bīja*, and *dhātu* came to be understood as “manifold super-loci” (ibid., 90-91). I understand his model is as follows:

Chart 6

gotra = *bīja* = *dhātu* (super-loci)
 ≠ *prakṛti* (locus)

There are, however, a few questionable points in this argument. First, in the original passage in *BBh* (*tat punar gotraṃ bījam ity apy ucyate / dhātuḥ prakṛtir ity api* /), “*ity apy ucyate*” is inserted between “*gotraṃ bījam*” and “*dhātuḥ prakṛtir*.” The Tibetan translation, on which Matsumoto based his original translation, similarly reads “*rigs de ni sa bon zhes kyang bya // kham de ni rang bzhin zhes kyang bya’o //*” (Peking, *sems tsam*, Zhi 3a5; Derge, *sems tsam*, Wi 2b5), “But that *gotra* is also called *bīja*, and the *dhātu*

17) Asvabhāva, *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāraṭīkā*, Peking, *sems tsam*, Bi 58a2-7, Derge, *sems tsam*, Bi 51a3-7; Sthiramati, *Sūtrālamkāravṛttibhāṣya*, Peking, *sems tsam*, Mi 46a6-b2; Derge, *sems tsam*, Mi 42b4-7. Referenced in Hakamaya [1981]2001, 247, n. 23 and n. 25. The relevant portions are quoted in ibid., 240.

is also called *prakṛti*." Thus, if "*ity apy ucyate*" is a significant separator as he argues, then the model should be as follows:

Chart 7

gotra = *bīja* (super-loci)
 ≠ *dhātu* = *prakṛti* (locus)

Matsumoto does not accept this model because he is aware that *bīja* and *dhātu* are frequently equated in the Yogācāra literature (2004, 71). The model in Chart 6, however, contradicts his own argument on the placement of "*ity apy ucyate*" and would appear to be rather arbitrary.

Second, as Matsumoto is also aware (ibid., 73), one finds the following list in *Manobhūmi* of the Basic Section of *Yogācārabhūmi*:

Then, equivalents of *bīja* are *dhātu*, *gotra*, *prakṛti*, *hetu* ("cause"), *satkāya* (i.e., five *upādāna-skandhas*), *prapañca* ("worldly existence"),¹⁸⁾ *ālaya* ("that which is clung to"), *upādāna* ("that which is grasped"), *duḥkha* ("suffering"), *satkāyadr̥ṣṭyadhīṣṭhāna* ("basis of the notion of Self"), and *asmimānādhiṣṭhāna* ("basis of the feeling of identity"). These sorts [of words] should be known as equivalents [of *bīja*].¹⁹⁾

18) On this concept, see also Saka 2016.

19) *bījaparyāyāḥ punar dhātur gotraṃ prakṛtir hetuḥ satkāyaḥ prapañca ālaya upādānaṃ duḥkhaṃ satkāyadr̥ṣṭyadhīṣṭhānaṃ asmimānādhiṣṭhānaṃ cety evambhāgīyāḥ paryāyā veditavyāḥ //* (*Manobhūmi*, Bhattacharya ed., 26.18-19)

I have referred to and partly made use of the English translation in Schmithausen [1987]2007, §3.11.2, §3.11.4.2, and §7.1B.2.1.2.

Prakṛti is clearly mentioned among the *paryāyas* of *bīja* in this passage from *Manobhūmi*, which Matsumoto himself believes is later than *BBh* (2004, 74-75). If *BBh* were indeed the turning point of the *bīja* model of Yogācāra that introduced *prakṛti* as a universal basis of all phenomena, one would expect some differentiation of *prakṛti* from *bīja*, *dhātu*, and *gotra* here. In fact, no such differentiation is observed in this passage, which makes Matsumoto's argument less convincing.

Finally, Matsumoto (2004, 72) takes my translation “*gotra* existing by nature” (for *prakṛtistha-gotra*) as “*gotra* existing by [substantive] *prakṛti*”²⁰ and argues that if *gotra* and *prakṛti* were synonymous, “*gotra* existing by *prakṛti*” would not make sense. This, however, is a misunderstanding of my English expression. In my earlier article, I wrote as follows:

Thus, I believe that here both *prakṛti* and *dharmatā* are used in an instrumental (adverbial) sense (“by nature”) and do not refer to anything transcendental. (Yamabe 1997b, 217)

“By nature” is an English idiom defined in the *Oxford English Dictionary* (online version, accessed March 27, 2017) as follows: “by virtue of the character or essence of a thing or person; inherently, innately” (s.v., “nature, *n.*”). I used “by nature” in the second sense (i.e., “inherently, innately”). In my understanding, the *prakṛti* in the expression *prakṛti-stham gotram* is not a substantive. Thus, the problem Matsumoto raises does not exist.

20) “prakṛti によって存在する gotra.”

III. On *Prakṛtistha*

As I have pointed out before (1997a, 195), the *gotra* definition in *BBh* is clearly linked to the following description of *dhātu* in *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī*, §III.7.1 (Peking, *sems tsam*, 'i 330a3-6; Derge, *sems tsam*, Zi 288b1-3; T30: 846c18-23):²¹⁾

In sum, *dhātus* are twofold: those existing by nature and those nourished through habitual practice.²²⁾

Of these, the *dhātus* existing by nature are like the eighteen *dhātus*, which are distinct seeds belonging to their own respective continuities.²³⁾

Of these, the *dhātus* nourished through habitual practice are the present seeds nourished and resting [in the body] so that the good and bad elements practiced in former lives will arise. Therefore, even depending on only a small condition, these [seeds] are led and actualized.²⁴⁾

21) For the section number, see Mukai 1985, 36. For the Sanskrit reconstruction of this passage, see Yamabe 1987, 26-29.

22) Ch. 当知諸界略有二種。一住自性界。二習增長界。

Tib. mdor bsdu na khams ni gnyis yod de / rang bzhin gyis gnas pa dang / goms pas yongs su brtas pa'o /

Skt. *dhatavaḥ samāsato dvividhaḥ / prakṛtisthās cābhyāsaparipuṣṭās ca /

23) Ch. 住自性界者。謂十八界墮自相統。各各決定差別種子。

Tib. de la rang bzhin gyis gnas pa ni ji ltar khams bco brgyad po 'di dag so sor nges par rgyud la yod pa'i sa bon no //

Skt. *tatra prakṛtisthā dhātavo yathaite 'ṣṭādaśadhātavaḥ svasaṃtānapatitāni pratiniyatāni bījāni /

24) Ch. 習增長界者。謂則諸法或是善或是不善。於余生中先已數習。令彼現行故。於今時種子強盛依附相統。由是為因。暫遇小緣。便能現起。定不可轉。

Here, **prakṛtisthā dhātavaḥ*, which clearly corresponds to the *prakṛtisthaṃ gotraṃ* in *BBh*, is defined as the eighteen *dhātus* and is equated to *bījas*. This is definitely a pluralistic model. It appears that in Chart 6 Matsumoto equates *bīja* and *dhātu* because he is aware of this kind of usage (2004, 86-88).

Another passage important for determining the exact meaning of *prakṛti-stha-* is found in *BBh*:

The divisions of *dhātu* should be known, in sum, as fourfold: the seed existing by nature (*prakṛtisthaṃ bījaṃ*); the seed actualized by former habitual practice (*pūrvābhyāsasamutthitaṃ bījaṃ*); the seed to be purified, namely, [the seed] of those who have the nature of *parinirvāṇa*; and the seed that cannot be purified, namely, [the seed] of those who do not have the nature of *parinirvāṇa*. (Yamabe 1997a, 443, n. 24)²⁵)

Here, *prakṛtisthaṃ bījaṃ* is translated as *rang bzhin du gnas pa'i sa bon* in Tibetan (Peking, *sems tsam*, Zhi 239a3; Derge, *sems tsam*, Wi 206b6,

Tib. de la goms pas yongs su brtas pa'i khams ni dge ba 'am mi dge ba'i chos sngon gyi skye ba gzhan dag tu kun tu brten pa gang yin pa de dag yang dag par grub par bya ba'i phyir / da lta sa bon yongs su brtas pa rten la gnas pa yin te / des na de rkyen chung ngu tsam la yang dmigs nas des bkri zhing des 'gro bar 'gyur ro /

Skt. *tatrābhyāsaparipuṣṭā dhātavo ye dharmāḥ kuśalā vākuśalā vā pūrvam anyajātiṣṭv āsevītā teṣāṃ samudāgamāya vartamānabījāni paripuṣṭāny [āśraya]saṃniviṣṭāni / tasmāt tāny alpam api pratyayamātram ālambya tena nīyante tena cābhinirvartante /

25) sa punar dhātupravibhāgaḥ samāsataś catusprakāro veditavyaḥ / prakṛtisthaṃ bījaṃ pūrvābhyāsasamutthitaṃ bījaṃ viśodhyaṃ bījaṃ / tadyathā parinirvāṇadharmakāṇām / avīśodhyaṃ ca bījaṃ / tadyathā aparinirvāṇadharmakāṇām / (*BBh*, Wogihara ed., 401.6-10; Dutt ed., 276.20-23; quoted in Yamabe 1997a, 443, n. 24; Matsumoto 2004, 85)

emphasis added) and as 本性住種子 in Chinese (T30:573b1). Regarding *prakṛtistha-*, Schmithausen states as follows:

This is not the place to enter into a discussion of the meaning of *prakṛtistha*, but as far as I can see two aspects stand out: 1. “innate, inherent” (Tib. *rang bzhin gyis gnas pa*; cf. BoBhVy D yi 5a7f: *rang bzhin gyis gnas pa zhes bya ba ni ngo bo nyid kyis {s}grub pa ste / ma bsgrubs pa ...*); 2. “being in its natural, unrefined state” (Tib. *rang bzhin du/la gnas pa*; cf. BoBh_w 331,11f: *suvarṇam prakṛtistham* [BoBh_D 226,21 °*sthitam*]). (Schmithausen 2014, 119, n. 490)²⁶

On earlier occasions (1997b, 216-17; 2002, 368-69), I maintained that *prakṛtistha-* in *YBh* should be interpreted in the first sense above (“innate, inherent”), but now I feel that the second sense (“being in its natural, unrefined state”) cannot entirely be ruled out. Nevertheless, even if that is the case, I still do not think that *prakṛti* in the relevant context refers to a universal element. It is an individual element.

IV. On *Prakṛti* and *Dharmatā*

In order to understand the meaning of *prakṛti*, first see the following passage from *Divyāvadāna*, which shows the usage of *prakṛti* in Traditional

26) See also Matsumoto 2004, 87-89. Here, BoBhVy=*Bodhisattvabhūmi-vyākhyā* of rGya mtsho sprin (*Sāgara- or *Samudra-megha); BoBh_w=*Bodhisattvabhūmi*, Wogihara ed.; BoBh_D=*Bodhisattvabhūmi*, Dutt ed.

Buddhism:

Then, that brāhmaṇa developed faith [in the Buddha]. Thereupon, the Blessed One knew the [brāhmaṇa's] intention (*āśaya*), disposition (*anuśaya*), humor (*dhātu*), and nature (*prakṛti*) and taught the Dharma conforming [to the brāhmaṇa's character] and leading to penetration into the Four Truths of the Nobles. Hearing that, the brāhmaṇa broke the twenty-peaked rock[-mountain] of self-view with a cudgel of wisdom and attained the fruit of stream-entrant.²⁷⁾

Here, *prakṛti* is clearly used in the sense of individual nature. I think even if the *prakṛti* in *prakṛti-stha-* is to be understood in the locative sense, *prakṛti-* should be taken to be an individual element.

One of the reasons Matsumoto thinks that *prakṛti-* of *prakṛtisthaṃ gotram* in *BBh* is universal is that the expression *dharmatā-pratīlabdhaḥ* is found in the definition of *prakṛtisthaṃ gotram* (2004, 96). Based on this expression, he argues that the *gotra* theory of *BBh* presupposes universal *dharmatā*. Matsumoto further argues that even in *ŚBh*, *prakṛti* is sometimes equated with universal *dharmatā*, based on the following passage:

What is reasoning based on the natural way (*dharmatā*)? Why do the aggregates thus exist? Why is the world thus arranged? Why does earth have the characteristic of solidity, water the characteristic of fluidity, fire the characteristic of heat,

27) atha sa brāhmaṇo 'bhiprasannaḥ / tato 'sya Bhagavatā āśayānuśayaṃ dhātuṃ prakṛtiṃ ca jñātvā tādr̥śī caturāryasatyasamprativēdhakī dharmadeśanā kṛtā yāṃ śrūtvā brāhmaṇena viṃśatīśikharasamudgataṃ satkāyadr̥ṣṭīśailaṃ jñānavajreṇa bhittvā srotaāpattiphalaṃ sākṣātkṛtam / (*Divyāvadāna*, IV. brāhmaṇadārikāvadānam, Cowell and Neil eds., 71.23-27)

and wind the characteristic of setting in motion? Why are the aggregates impermanent, and why is nirvāṇa pacified? Likewise, why does matter have the characteristic of destruction, sensation the characteristic of experiencing, ideation the characteristic of cognition, volitions the characteristic of mental formation, and consciousness the characteristic of recognition? This is the nature (*prakṛti*) of [each of] those elements. Such is the intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*), and it is the natural way (*dharma*tā) [of each of these elements]. That natural way itself is here the reasoning (*yukti*), the mode (*yoga*), and the means (*upāya*) [of recognition]. It might be this way, or otherwise, or entirely different; in every case the natural way itself is the recourse (*pratisaraṇa*) and reasoning (*yukti*) for the mind to reach settlement and cognition. That is called reasoning based on the natural way.²⁸⁾

Takasaki Jikidō's interpretation of this passage is as follows:

28) dharmatāyuktiḥ katamā / kena kāraṇena tathābhūtā ete skandhāḥ, tathābhūto lokasaṃniveśaḥ / kena kāraṇena kharalakṣaṇā pṛthivī dravalakṣaṇā āpa uṣṇalakṣaṇaṃ tejaḥ samudīraṇalakṣaṇo vāyuḥ / *kena kāraṇenā*nityāḥ skandhāḥ *kena kāraṇena śāntaṃ* nirvāṇam iti / tathā *kena kāraṇena rūpaṇa*lakṣaṇaṃ rūpam, anubhavanalakṣaṇā vedanā saṃjñānālakṣaṇā saṃjñā, abhisamṣkaraṇalakṣaṇāḥ saṃskārāḥ, vijñānālakṣaṇaṃ vijñānam iti / prakṛtir eṣāṃ dharmāṇāṃ iyam, svabhāva eṣa tīrṣṇaḥ, dharmataiṣā / yaiva cāsau dharmatā saivātra yuktir yoga upāyaḥ / evaṃ vaitat syāt, anyathā vā, naiva vā syāt, sarvatraiva ca dharmataiva pratisaraṇaṃ dharmataiva yuktiḥ / cittanidhyāpanāya cittasaṃjñāpanāya / iyam ucyate dharmatāyuktiḥ (*ŚBh.*, Taishō Daigaku Sōgō Bukkyō Kenkyūsho Shōmonji Kenkyūkai, ed., §(I)-C-III-10-b-(2)-ii-(d), 240.3-13; corresponding to Wayman 1961, 79.19-29; quoted in Matsumoto 2004, 92; here the letters in italics indicate supplements by the editor based on parallel expressions in *ŚBh.*) The translation is my own. I have referred to and partly made use of the English translation in Wayman 1961, 79-80.

However, *dharmatā* was not always used in the sense of *tathatā* of all dharmas. In some cases, it was used in a more general sense of “the nature of something.” For example, in *Śrāvakahūmi* of *Yogācārabhūmi*, the same *dharmatāyukti* is taken to mean individual characteristics, like the solid character of earth, the moist character of water, and so forth, and it is said to be synonymous with *prakṛti* and *svabhāva*. (Takasaki 1990, 6, quoted in Matsumoto 2004, 94 [my English translation])

Matsumoto disagrees with this view as follows:

What is mentioned here as “*prakṛti=svabhāva=dharmatā*” is not “individual characteristics” at all but the “eternal and unchangeable reason or truth” that makes all dharmas what they are, namely what makes these respective dharmas exist “thus” (*tathā-bhūta*) and “as they are,” having their own “individual characteristics.” (Matsumoto 2004, 94-95 [my English translation])

In my view, *prakṛti* in the expression *prakṛti-stham gotram* and *dharmatā* in the expression *dharmatā-pratilabdhaḥ*, “acquired through *dharmatā*,” in the *BBh* passage [1] are synonymous. Moreover, the validity of this interpretation is . . . to some extent confirmed by the following statement in *Abhisamayālaṅkāravṛtti*. (ibid., 96 [my English translation]; here “the *BBh* passage [1]” refers to Wogihara ed., 3.1-8; Dutt ed., 2.4-8 quoted above [p. 16 of this paper])

He then quotes the following passage from *Abhisamayālaṅkāravṛtti*:

[1] Therefore, [*kārikā* 1.5cd of the *Abhisamayālaṅkāra*] teaches that the

dharmadhātu itself, [namely] the *gotra* existing by nature, is the basis for practice, because [the *dharmadhātu* is] the cause of the noble dharmas . . .

[2] Others hold that *gotra* is the distinct state of the six sense-bases, which is twofold: [*gotra*] developed by conditions and [*gotra*] existing by nature.

[This position is problematic.] They should explain the meaning of the term "*prakṛti*" in *prakṛtistha-gotra*. If it is equivalent to "cause," then that [*prakṛtistha-gotra*] also is developed by conditions. Thus, what difference would there be [between the two types of *gotras*]? On the other hand, if [*prakṛtistha-gotra*] is equivalent to *dharmatā*, this fault does not exist.²⁹⁾

Matsumoto believes that this interpretation is correct to the extent that it equates *prakṛti* with *dharmatā*, and he thinks that it is applicable to the *gotra* definition in *BBh* itself (2004, 96-97). It should be noted, however, that here two interpretations are given of *prakṛtistha-gotra*. The first interpretation identifies *prakṛtistha-gotra* with *dharmadhātu*, the second with *ṣaḍāyatana-viśeṣa*. The last portion of the above quotation is clearly a critique of the second interpretation from the point of view of the first (note that *dharmatā* is equivalent to *dharmadhātu*). As I have already pointed out (1997b, 217),

29) tad anena dharmatā<dhātuḥ evāryadharmānām hetutvāt> prakṛtisthaṃ gotraṃ pratipattyādhāra ity upadarśayati / . . .

/ ṣaḍāyatana-viśeṣo gotraṃ tad dvidham: pratyayasamudānītaṃ, prakṛtyavasthitaṃ cety apare /

taiḥ prakṛtisthagotre prakṛtyabhidhānasyārtho vācyaḥ# / kāraṇaparyāyaś cet tad api pratyayasamudānītaṃ / iti kim arthaviśeṣaḥ / dharmatāparyāye punar eṣa doṣo nāsti / (Pensa ed., 76.17-77.3; emphasis added; partly quoted in Yamabe 1997a, 202)

This is my own translation. I have referred to and partly made use of Sparham 2006, 84.

The original edition: *vācyaḥ*. I follow Matsumoto 2004, 96.

the first interpretation becomes possible by rejecting the second. The second interpretation (*prakṛtistha-gotra = śaḍāyatanaviśeṣa*), however, agrees with the express statement of *BBh* itself (as Matsumoto himself admits [2004, 97]), and the first position is clearly a later reinterpretation. Matsumoto's argument is not convincing here.

In discussions of the early usage of *dharmatā*, Walpola Rahula's "Wrong Notions of *Dhammatā* (*Dharmatā*)" deserves full attention, though its main focus is Pāli texts. He points out that *dhammatā* "contains mostly the meanings: 'nature', 'natural', 'way', 'habit', 'custom', 'customary', 'usual'" (1974, 182). He further argues as follows:

To consider *dhammatā* as some mysterious force or power which guides or causes these natural events is to introduce the idea of something external which is foreign to Buddhism. In simple language *dhammatā* means "it is so", "it happens this way", "it is natural". *Dhammatā* is not some thing or some power that stands behind these happenings. (Ibid., 183-84)

As an example, he quotes the following passage:

Then one young snake, moving around according to its habit, has come to the hermitage of an ascetic.³⁰⁾

Regarding this passage, he argues as follows:

30) Ath 'eko āsīvisapotako attano dhammatāya caranto aññatarassa tāpasassa assamapadam patto (*Jātaka*, Fausbøll ed., 1:245.9-11 [Velukajāṭaka], emphasis added; quoted in Rahula 1974, 182)

It does not signify any mysterious or eternal power, or a mystical idea which is behind the snake's going about. Its going about is not caused by any supernatural power called *dhammatā*, but its going about itself is its own *dhammatā*, its own habit. (Rahula 1974, 182)

He further mentions the following example:

The Buddha, just after his Enlightenment, still staying at Uruvelā on the banks of the river Nerañjarā, seated under the Goatherd's Banyan tree (*ajapāla-nigrodha*), thought that there was no one more perfect than himself in virtue (*sīla*), in concentration (mental discipline, *samādhi*) and in wisdom (*paññā*), under whom he could live obeying him and paying him reverence, and decided to live honouring and reverencing the *Dhamma*, Truth, which he had just realized. At this moment, Brahmā Sahampati appeared before him and said that all the Perfect Buddhas who were in the past, all the Perfect Buddhas who will be in the future, and the Perfect Buddha who is now, all of them lived, live and will live honouring the *Dhamma*: it is their way, *esā Buddhāna dhammatā*, "It is the way of the Buddhas." Here quite clearly *dhammatā* means "the way", "the custom". (Ibid., 184)

Though not mentioned by Rāhula, a similar usage is found in a Sanskrit text, *Divyāvadana*:

Then, at one place the Blessed One smiled. When the Buddhas, the Blessed Ones, show a smile, it is a natural course of events that rays of blue, yellow, red, and white come out of their mouths, and some go downward, others

upward. . . .³¹⁾

Then, the perfectly awakened Ratnaśikhin gave rise to a worldly thought. When the Buddhas, the Blessed Ones, give rise to a worldly mind, at that time it is a natural course of events that deities such as Śakra and Brahmā read in [their] mind the Blessed Ones' thought.³²⁾

I think Rahula's argument is convincing. In these examples, *dharmatā* or *dharmatā* is used in both Pāli and Sanskrit texts in the sense of an individual nature, or a fixed course of events people expect of a particular type of being in a particular situation. It is unlikely that *dharmatā* or *dharmatā* in these passages refers to a universal nature or principle underlying all phenomena.

4. *Darśanamārga* in *Yogācārabhūmi*

If *dharmatā* or *dharmadhātu* as a universal principle plays an essential role in the system of *ŚBh*, one would expect it to be mentioned as an object of realization in the context of *darśanamārga*, as in the *Nivṛtti* Portion of *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*.

31) atha Bhagavān anyatarasmin pradeśe smitam akārṣīt / dharmatā khalu yasmin samaye Buddhā Bhagavantaḥ smitaṃ prāviṣkurvanti tasmin samaye nīlapītalohitāvadātāḥ arciṣo mukhān niścārya kāścīd adhaṣṭād gacchanti, kāścīd upariṣṭād gacchanti / . . . (*Divyāvadāna*, XIX. Jyotiṣkāvadāna, Cowell and Neil ed., 67.15-21 [emphasis added]; Hiraoka 2002, 175-78; 2007, 1:473)

32) tato Ratnaśikhinā samyaksambuddhena laukikaṃ cittam utpāditaṃ / dharmatā khalu yadā Buddhā Bhagavanto laukikaṃ cittam utpādayanti tasmin samaye Śakrabrahmādayo devā Bhagavataś cetasaṃ cittam ājānanti / (*Divyāvadāna*, III. Maitreyāvadāna, Cowell and Neil ed., 63.11-14; Hiraoka 2002, 180; 2007, 127)

[The cultivation of good dharmas] is practiced for the sake of first entering the realization of the Four Truths of the Nobles (**satyābhisamaya*). It is because those who have not seen the truths or have not attained the eye to the truths cannot penetrate into (**praty-vyadh-*) *ālayavijñāna* either. One who has thus entered [the realization] becomes destined for the correctness (**samyaktvanyāma*)³³ of *śrāvaka*[*yāna*] or *bodhisattva*[*yāna*] and penetrates into the *dharmadhātu* of all elements and also into *ālayavijñāna*. (Translation primarily based on the Tibetan version)³⁴

Here, *dharmadhātu* is expressly mentioned in addition to the traditional *āryasatyas* as an object of realization. It is clear that at the stage of the *Nivṛtti* Portion, *dharmadhātu* in the Mahāyānist sense (equivalent with *dharmatā* and *tathatā*) is presupposed. This, however, is not the case in earlier strata of *YBh*, such as *ŚBh*.

33) *Samyaktva* refers to the right goal, i.e., *nirvāṇa*,

34) §I.5.b)B.2: de'i dang por bden pa mngon par rtogs pa la 'jug par bya ba'i phyir bsgom ste / bden pa ma mthong ba bden pa nmams la mig ma thob pas ni kun gzhi nam par shes pa sa bon thams cad pa yang rtogs par mi nus pa'i phyir ro // de de ltar zhugs shing nyan thos kyi yang dag pa nyid skyon med pa la zhugs sam / byang chub sems dpa'i yang dag pa nyid skyon med pa la zhugs te chos thams cad kyi chos kyi dbyings rtogs par byed pa na / kun gzhi nam par shes pa yang rtogs par byed de / (Hakamaya [1979]2001, 405.5-9 [emphasis added])

能入最初聖諦現觀。非未見諦者於諸諦中。未得法眼。便能通達一切種子阿賴耶識。此未見諦者修如是行已。或入聲聞正性離生。或入菩薩正性離生。達一切法真法界已。亦能通達阿賴耶識。(Xuanzang, T30:581b24-29)

初觀諸諦。若證四諦得眼智明慧。則能破壞阿羅耶識。未見四諦則不能破。何時能見阿羅耶識。如是進行。若諸聲聞入不退地。又諸菩薩入不退地。得通達法界則能得見。(Paramārtha, T30:1020b2-6)

[At *darśanamārga*, the practitioner] knows the characteristic of the truth of suffering in four aspects, namely, the aspects of impermanence, suffering, emptiness, and selflessness; [the characteristic] of the truth of origin in four aspects, namely, as cause, origin, source, and condition. He knows the characteristic of the truth of cessation in four aspects, namely, as cessation, tranquility, superiority, and deliverance. He knows the characteristic of the truth of path in four aspects, namely, as path, method, practice, and conduciveness to deliverance.³⁵⁾

Just after the effort [in the *prayogamārga*], non-discriminatory wisdom of determination, i.e., wisdom of direct perception, arises successively with respect to the truths, perceivable or not, in the order they were reflected on before. Because it arises, the *dauṣṭhulya* resting in the body and belonging to the defilements of the triple world-realms to be severed by seeing [the truths] is severed. Because it is severed, if [the practitioner] has been detached from the object of desires [in the *kāmadhātu*], at the moment he realizes the truths, he is

35) caturbhir ākārair duḥkhasatyasya lakṣaṇaṃ pratisamvedayate / tadyathānityākāreṇa, duḥkhākāreṇa, śūnyatākāreṇa, # anātmākāreṇa ca / caturbhir ākārair saṃudayasatyasya tadyathā hetutaḥ, samudayataḥ, prabhavataḥ, pratyayataś ca [/] caturbhir ākārair nirodhasatyasya lakṣaṇaṃ pratisamvedayate## / tadyathā nirodhataḥ, śāntataḥ, praṇītato, niḥsaraṇataś ca [/] caturbhir ākārair mārgasatyasya lakṣaṇaṃ pratisamvedayate### / tadyathā mārgato, nyāyataḥ, pratipattito, nairyāṇikataś ca / (Shukla ed., 470.13-21 [emphasis added]; Wayman 1961, 130; Tib. Peking, *sems tsam*, Wi 214a7-b3; Derge, *sems tsam*, Dzi 177b6-178a2; Ch. T30:470c18-23) # Shukla ed., om. *śūnyatākāreṇa*. Supplemented based on Wayman 1961, 130. Tib. *stong pa'i rnam pa* (Peking, *sems tsam*, Wi 214a7; Derge, *sems tsam*, Dzi 177b6); Ch. 空行. ## Shukla ed., *pratisamvedayate*. Following Wayman, I have replaced “m” with an *anusvāra* (*m̐*). ### Shukla ed., *pratisamvedayate*. Following Wayman, I have replaced “m” with an *anusvāra* (*m̐*).

called a non-returner.³⁶⁾

Here, the “non-discriminatory wisdom of determination” (*nirvikalpaniścayajñana*) might be suggestive of the universal *tathatā*. However, what is mentioned in this passage as the object of realization is the [*ārya*]satya. In other words, this seems to be a traditional model of *satyābhisamaya*. Penetration into *tathatā*, *dharmadhātu*, *dharmatā*, and so forth is not mentioned.

Thus, it is difficult to conclude that *dharmatā* as a universal principle was presupposed in the system of *ŚBh*.

36) *ābhogasamanantaram yathāpūrvānukramavicāriteṣu# satyeṣv anupūrveṇaiva pratyakṣaparokṣeṣu nirvikalpaniścayajñanam## pratyakṣajñanam utpadyate / tasyotpādāt traidhātukāvacarāṇām darśanaprahātavyānām kleśānām pakṣyaṃ dauṣṭhulyaṃ āśrayasanniviṣṭam### tat prahīyate / tasya prahāṇāt sacet pūrvam eva kāmebhyo vītarāgo bhavati / saha satyābhisamayāt tasmin samaye 'nāgāmīty ucyate / (Sanskrit manuscript [hereafter “MS.”], Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minzu Tushuguan, and Taishō Daigaku Sōgō Bukkyō Kenkyūsho, eds. [1994], 126a6-b1 [emphasis added]; Shukla ed., 500.15-501.1; Tib. Peking, *sems tsam*, Wi 230b4-8; Derge, *sems tsam*, Dzi 190b4-7; T30:475c27-476a4)*

MS. and Shukla ed., *yathāpūrvānukramaḥ vicāriteṣu*. Here and below, I replace -vv- with -v-.

MS. *nirvikalpapratyakṣaparokṣeṣu niścayajñanam pratyakṣajñanam utpadyate*; Shukla, *nirvikalpa-*; Tib. *bden pa mngon sum dang lkog tu gyur pa dag la rim gyis rnam par mi rtog pa shin tu nges pa 'i ye shes dang | mngon sum gyi ye shes skye par 'gyur ro* | (Peking, *sems tsam*, Wi 230b5-6; Derge, *sems tsam*, Dzi 190b5); Ch. 若是現見若非現見諸聖諦中。如其次第有無分別決定智現見智生。I understand that 有 in 有無分別 of the Chinese version is a supplement by the translator. (Perhaps what he had in mind was that 有分別 corresponds to 非現見諸聖諦, and 無分別 to 現見諸諦.) In any case, 有分別 is not supported by the MS. or Tib. ### MS. and Shukla, *kleśānām pakṣyaṃ dauṣṭhulyasanniśrayasanniviṣṭam*. Tib. *nyon mongs pa rnam kyī phyogs su gyur pa 'i gnas ngan len lus la gnas shing | zhen pa gang yin pa* (Peking, *sems tsam*, Wi 230b6-7; Derge, *sems tsam*, Dzi 190b6); Ch. 附屬所依諸煩惱品一切龐重。

V. Conclusion

Matsumoto believes that *dharmatā* and *prakṛti* as a universal principle already played an essential role in the very early portions of *YBh*, i.e., *ŚBh* and *BBh*. Thus, Matsumoto seems to believe that (a variant form of)³⁷ the *dhātu-vāda* model is applicable to the entire *YBh* (2004, 112-19).

However, different stages of doctrinal development are observable in different portions of *YBh*, as Matsumoto himself admits (2004, 81-82). For the reasons stated above, I believe it is difficult to apply the *dhātu-vāda* model at least to the oldest portions of *YBh*, i.e., *ŚBh* and *BBh*.

37) Matsumoto (2002, 117-19) points out that in the standard Yogācāra system, the second element of *dhātu-vāda* (“Locus” gives rise to “super-loci”; see List 1 at the beginning of this paper) is not applicable. In that sense, this is a “variant form.”

약호 및 참고문헌

Abbreviation

<i>BBh</i>	<i>Bodhisattvabhūmi</i>
<i>ŚBh</i>	<i>Śrāvakahūmi</i>
<i>YBh</i>	<i>Yogācārabhūmi</i>

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Abstract

Once Again on “*Dhātu-vāda*”

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In 1986, Matsumoto Shirō published an article entitled “Nyoraizō shisō wa Bukkyō ni arazu” (The Doctrine of Tathāgata-garbha Is Not Buddhist). According to this article, the core doctrines of authentic Buddhism are no-self and *pratītyasamutpāda*. In Matsumoto’s opinion, *pratītyasamutpāda* consists of a temporal sequence of causal links without any solid spatial basis, which he calls “*dhātu*.” In contrast, the Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha traditions share a common doctrinal framework, which he calls “*dhātu-vāda*.” The “*dhātu-vāda*” model consists of “locus” and “super-locus,” in which the “locus” supports and gives rise to “super-loci.” Matsumoto calls this model a “generative monism” and considers it to be fundamentally different from the temporal causality model of “authentic Buddhism,” and thus, “not Buddhist.”

In 1997, I published two articles discussing the validity of this model,

and in 2004 Matsumoto published a detailed response to them. The present paper is an attempt to respond to Matsumoto (2004). In his article, Matsumoto focuses on two concepts: *prakṛtistha-gotra* and **tathatālambanapratyaya-bīja*. Since I discussed **tathatālambanapratyaya-bīja* in some detail in my paper published in 1990, I focus here on *prakṛtistha-gotra*.

Rejecting my understanding of *prakṛtisthaṃ gotraṃ* in *Bodhisattvabhūmi* as "gotra existing by nature," Matsumoto interprets this concept as "gotra located on *prakṛti*." In order to support his interpretation, he takes *prakṛti* as a universal principle (*tathatā, dharmatā*). My examination of relevant passages suggests that no such universal element as *tathatā* or *dharmatā* is presupposed in the *gotra* definition of *Bodhisattvabhūmi*. Although the word *dharmatā* is used in the definition of *prakṛtisthaṃ gotraṃ* (as part of the expression, *dharmatāpratilabdha*), as Walpola Rahula argues (concerning the Pāli equivalent *dhammatā*), *dharmatā* here does not seem to refer to anything that stands behind worldly phenomena. Thus, I believe it is difficult to apply the *dhātu-vāda* model, at least in the case of the oldest portions of *Yogācārabhūmi*.

Keywords: *dhātu-vāda, prakṛtistha-gotra, dharmatā, dhammatā, Walpola Rahula*

2016년 4월 26일 투고
2016년 5월 30일 심사완료
2016년 5월 30일 게재확정