

Some Citations and Similes Common in the *Ratnagoṭravibhāga* and the *Yogācāra* Texts*

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국문요약

본고는 초기 유식문헌과 RGV에 공통된 몇 가지 인용문과 비유를 검토한 것이다. 공통된 인용문은 『소공경』의 소위 ‘선취공’과 ‘자성청정 객진번뇌’의 구문, RGV I.154의 계송이며, 세 가지 공통된 비유란 허공과 금, 물이다. 이들

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두 문헌군 사이의 대응관계는 유식사상과 RGV의 여래장 사상이 적어도 비슷한 맥락에서 유래했음을 강하게 시사하는 것으로, 본고에서는 RGV의 설명이 어떤 점에서 유식문헌의 맥락과 다른지를 이들 개소들의 검토를 통해 보여주려고 했다. 『소공경』의 ‘공성 속에 남아있는 것’과 관련해 <진실의품>이 이를 vastumātra 또는 tathatāmātra의 두 방식으로 제시하는데 그친 반면, MAVBh는 능취와 소취 양자의 비존재로서의 공성이 바로 여기에, 즉 허망분별 속에 존재한다고 말함으로써 허망분별과 능취소취, 공성의 非一而非異 관계를 보여줄 뿐이고 무엇이 남아있는지는 분명히 말하고 있지 않다. 하지만 MAVBh는 능취와 소취라는 의식작용의 제거가 바로 지각(upalabdhi) 작용의 허망성을 인식하는데 있다고 말함으로써 진실의 증득이 무엇을 통해 이루어져야 하는지를 분명히 한다. 남아있는 것의 성격과 관련된 문제는 허공 등의 세 가지 비유에 의해 나타난다. RGV에서 이들 비유는 여래장의 자성청정을 공통적으로 보여주는 것으로 해설되고 있는데, 이에 따라 『유가론』, MAVBh/MAVT 등의 유식문헌에서 세 비유가 나오는 맥락을 검토했다.

주제어: 유식과 여래장 사상, 허공의 비유, 공성 속에 남아있는 것, 이취(二取), 소공경, 자성청정

I. Introduction

It is well known that the term ‘*anādikāliko dhātu* (無始以來界)’ of the *Mahāyānābhīdharmasūtra* is interpreted as the ‘*tathāgatagarbha*’ in the *Ratnagotravibhāgavṛtti* (henceforth: RGVV) on the *Ratnagotravibhāga* (henceforth: RGV) I.152, and as ‘*ālayavijñāna*’ in the *Mahāyānasamgraha* (henceforth: MSg) I.1. Moreover, in Paramārtha’s Chinese translation of the commentary on the MSg (*Shè dàshènglùn shì* 攝大乘論釋, T31: 156c28-157a14), the parallel explanations as the ‘*tathāgatagarbha*’ and the ‘*ālayavijñāna*’ are given for this term. Therefore, as indicated above, there seems to be the close relationship between the Yogācāra texts and the RGV, which is the first systematic commentary on the *tathāgatagarbha* teaching. Jikidō Takasaki (高崎直道) explains this relationship as follows:

“During the period of the formation of the Mahāyāna texts, the *tathāgatagarbha* teaching was developed before the Idea-only teaching of the Yogācāra school, so it was not related with the Yogācāra school. However, this idea could not but be influenced by the Yogācāra school, when it came to be systematized in the form of the commentary. This assumption is supported by the fact that the RGV cites the *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra* (MSA), and uses the definitions and the terms, such as “the theories of Buddha’s body (*buddhakāya*)”, which is similar with the Yogācāra texts. ... Likewise, though the RGV uses similar terms, their usages in the RGV are not always identical with those of the Yogācāra school. Rather, the RGV does not use the important terms of the Yogācāra school, such as “the three natures (*trisvabhāva*)” and the *ālayavijñāna*. In this way, the

RGV reserves its independent character, and thereby the original teaching of *tathāgatagarba* could be preserved.”¹⁾

According to Takasaki (1982: 153-4), the reason why early Yogācāra texts mention the term *tathāgatagarbha* can be found in the tendency of the Yogācāras, who tried to include all the Mahāyāna ideas in the form of ‘the summary of Mahāyāna (*mahāyāna-saṃgraha*; 攝大乘)’, which is mentioned as the synonym of ‘the foundation of the Bodhisattvas (*bodhisattvabhūmi*)’ in the last page of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (henceforth: BoBh). So, we can safely say that this tendency can be backdated to the early period of the Yogācāra school. We can point out some textual evidences where the term *tathāgatagarbha* appears actually in some Yogācāra texts, like the MSA and the commentaries on the MSg, which may support Takasaki’s assumption. But, we should not overlook the fact that this term is not used in the *Yogācārabhūmi* (henceforth YBh) at all.

In this paper, I will compare some common citations and similes used in the RGV with those of the Yogācāra texts. With some detailed comparisons of their common usage, we can expect to find out the points where the two traditions agree with, and deviate from each other.

II. General remarks on the *Ratnagotravibhāga* I.154-155

After having explained the reason why the ordinary people, the Śrāvakas

1) Takasaki 1982: 152.

and the Pratyekabuddhas do not recognize the *tathāgatagarbha*, the RGV explains that it is also the case for some Bodhisattvas, who just begin the career of the Bodhisattva. “Because of their disturbed mind on the emptiness, they do not properly understand the meaning of emptiness with regard to the *tathāgatagarbha*.”²⁾ The RGV divides these Bodhisattva into the two groups: Those, who understand the emptiness so negatively, that they consider the *nirvāṇa* as the negation per se and extinction. And those, who attempt to substantialize the emptiness through ‘the perception of the emptiness (*śūnyatopalambha*)’.

The Bodhisattvas’ two wrong understandings regarding the emptiness are modelled in the RGV after the two extreme views of the superimposition and the denial. It would not be necessary to attribute these wrong understandings to the position of certain schools. However, it should be noted that the explanation of the wrong understandings seems to adopt the logic and explanation of the “*Tattvārtha*-chapter” of the BoBh. In it, the suchness (*tathatā*), defined as inexpressible, is interpreted as being separated from the two extreme views of the existence and the nonexistence. Moreover, this chapter regards the second type of understanding on emptiness, which consists in the one-sided negation of all things, as ‘the wrong apprehended emptiness (*durgrhītā śūnyatā*)’, and regards the emptiness, in which something still remains, as ‘the well apprehended emptiness (*sugrhitā śūnyatā*)’.³⁾ In this context, it seems that ‘the wrong apprehended emptiness’, i.e. the negative one-sided interpretation of the emptiness, implies the misconception of

2) RGV 75,13-18.

3) see Nagao 1978.

some Nāgārjunians, who misunderstood the emptiness in a very destructive way. On the other hand, ‘the well apprehended emptiness’ is a new interpretation of the Yogācāras which is derived from the *Cūḷasuññatasutta* (henceforth: CSS).

As far as the RGV’s two kinds of wrong understanding are concerned, the first one, i.e. the extremely negative understanding of the emptiness, seems to be almost similar with the explanation in the *Tattvārtha*-chapter, whereas the second one, i.e. the substantialized understanding on the emptiness, seems to reflect another perspective different from the *Tattvārtha*-chapter, for the RGV’s criticism on the second understanding directs toward the attitude of perceiving the emptiness (*śūnyatā-upalambha*). If the emptiness means the non-existence of the intrinsic nature, then the “*upalambha* (perception)” would be no other than the activity of substantializing the emptiness, which the criticism directs toward. This criticism would be related with the attempt on the side of the Yogācāras to establish ‘what remains in the emptiness’ as a kind of the ultimate reality. The RGV’s second criticism would reflect the difficulty that the Yogācāra’s explanation on reality has to be confronted, and often misunderstood.

If my understanding is correct, this gives a clue to find the separating point of the RGV from the early Yogācāra. Instead of explaining and realizing the ultimate, though inconceivable, via the consciousness or the cognizing activities, the RGV represents the viewpoint that if the ultimate is inconceivable, then all the cognizing activities have to be stopped and to be replaced by the faith.

Now, I will explain this topic in detail by examining the two verses of

the RGV I.154-155 and the RGVV. The aim of the two verses is about: giving up the two wrong misunderstanding of the emptiness. The two verses and the commentary around them should be examined to understand the contextual difference between the RGV and the early Yogācāra texts, because the verses and the commentary use many terms and citations, such as ‘natural luminosity of mind (*prakṛti-prabhāsvara-citta*)’, ‘accidental dust (*āgantuka-mala*)’, the citation of the CSS, ‘the beginningless element (*anādikāliko dhātu*)’, ‘undefiled suchness (*nirmalā tathatā*)’, ‘defiled suchness (*samalā tathatā*)’ etc. These terms and citations are also used in the early Yogācāra texts. According to the RGV, the two verses explain the meaning of the *tathāgatagarha* and the emptiness.

Here there is nothing to be removed,
 And absolutely nothing to be added;
 The Truth should be perceived as it is,
 And he who sees the Truth become liberated.⁴⁾ (I.154)
 The Essence [of the Buddha] is [by nature] devoid
 Of the accidental [pollutions] which differ from it;
 But it is by no means devoid of the highest properties
 Which are, essentially, indivisible from it.⁵⁾ (I.155)

The RGV I.154 which seems to have been well known at that time⁶⁾ was

4) RGV I.154: *nāpaneyam ataḥ kiṃcid upaneyam na kiṃcana draṣṭavyam bhūtato bhūtaṃ bhūtadarśī vimucyate*||

5) RGV I.155: *sūnya āgantukair dhātuḥ savinirbhāgalakṣaṇaiḥ/ aśūnyo 'nuttarair dharmair avinirbhāgalakṣaṇaiḥ* // Translation in Takasaki 1966: 300-301.

taught, as indicated above, for the Bodhisattva beginners in order to get rid of their misunderstanding of the emptiness. They have the two extreme views of the superimposition and the denial with regard to the emptiness. And, the RGV I.155 teaches that the essence [of Buddha] is empty of the accidental factors, but not empty of the other Buddha-qualities. In the RGVV, the two verses are commented as follows:

“What is explained by this? There is no defiling element which is to be removed from this Essence of the Tathāgata, perfectly purified by nature, since it is by nature devoid of accidental pollutions. Also, there is no purifying element which is to be added to it, since it is by nature indivisible from the pure properties [of the Buddha]. On account of this point, it is said [in the Scripture]: “The Matrix of the Tathāgata is devoid of all the sheath of Defilements which are differentiated and separated [from the Absolute Essence]. The Matrix of the Tathāgata is by no means devoid of the Buddha’s Properties which are indivisible, inseparable [from the Absolute Essence], inconceivable and far beyond the sands of the Gaṅgā in number”⁷⁾. Thus, wherever something is lacking, this is observed as ‘void’ in that place, whatever remains there, one knows that this being must exist here: This is really the true [conception on Non-substantiality]. [Thus], by removing the extremities of affirmation and negation, the real characteristic of Non-substantiality is explained by these two verses.”⁸⁾ (Translation in Takasaki 1966: 301-302)

6) According to Takasaki (1989: 334f), this verse is cited, besides MAVT 29, also in the *Saudrananda* xiii, 44 and is similar with the *Abhisamayālaṅkāra* V. 21.

7) 『勝鬘經』T12: 221c16-18: 空如來藏 若離若脫若異一切煩惱藏 世尊 不空如來藏 過於恒沙 不離不脫不異不思議佛法。

According to the RGVV, the abandonment of the extreme view of the superimposition regarding the emptiness is achieved by the knowledge on the fact that, it is not necessary for the *tathāgatadhātu* to be purified by means of the practices because the *tathāgatadhātu* has already the purity as its nature. In other words, the knowledge of the natural purity of the *tathāgatadhātu* consists in abandoning the extreme view of the superimposition. On the other hand, the abandonment of the extreme view of the denial regarding the emptiness is achieved by the knowledge that for the *tathāgatadhātu* the dust (*mala*, 垢) is wholly accidental. In other words, there is for the *tathāgatadhātu* no abandonment of any factors at all, because the abandoned factors do not constitute the essential part for the *tathāgatadhātu*.

This explanation of the RGV could be understood as an adoption of the *Āryaśrīmālāsūtra*'s (ŚMS) explanation, which explains that the purity and the defilement coexist in the one moment of thought. Noteworthy is the explanation of the RGV that the *tathāgatagarbha*, as the a defiled suchness, is inconceivable, because it is simultaneously purified and defiled.⁹⁾ This passage is contextually related with the explanations, which teach the

8) RGVV 87,5-11: *kim anena paridīpitam | yato na kiñcid apaneyam asty atah prakṛtipariśuddhāt tathāgatadhātoḥ saṃkleśanimittam āgantukamalaśūnyatāprakṛtivyād asya | nāpy atra kiñcid upaneyam asti vyavadānanimittam avinirbhāgaśuddhadharmaprakṛtivyāt | tata ucyate | śūnyas tathāgatagarbho vinirbhāgair muktajñaih sarvakleśakośaih | aśūnyo gaṅgānādvālikāvyatirvtair avinirbhāgair amuktajñair acintair buddhadharmair iti | evaṃ yad yatra nāsti tat tena śūnyam iti samanupaśyati | yat punar atravaśiṣṭaṃ bhavati tat sad ihāstīti yathābhūtaṃ prajānāti | samāropāpavādāntaparivarjanād aviparītaṃ śūnyatālakṣaṇam anena ślokadvayena paridīpitam |.*

9) RGV 21,17: *tatra samalā tathatā yugapad ekakālaṃ viśuddhā ca saṃkṣipthā cety acintyam.*

existence of the *tathāgatagarbha* as “inconceivable”, in the context that the *tathāgatagarbha* is beyond the understanding of the Pratyekabuddha. It is in the prose commentary on the RGV I.15 that the explanation of the *tathāgatagarbha* is combined with the two factors of the purity and the defilement: “Here, it is quite difficult to understand these two factors, i.e. the natural luminosity of mind and the defilement of mind, in case of the immaculate sphere (*amalo dhātuḥ*)¹⁰, for the two [moments of] mind, whether good or bad, are activated independently each other, in the way that the one does not associate with the other.”¹¹)

So, in the RGV I.154, the abandonment of the two extreme views of the superimposition and the denial is achieved, when the Bodhisattva sees that in the *tathāgatadhātu* there exist the natural purity and the accidental dusts simultaneously, and that the defilement does never touch the natural purity.

In this connection, it is important to note that the RGV lays much stress on the faith rather than on the cognitive aspect, for realizing the ultimate reality, because the coexistence of the purity and the defilement is cognitively inconceivable, and beyond the capacity of the cognition. This marks an important difference between the RGV and the early Yogācāra texts. However, as already pointed out by Ruegg (1989: 46ff.), the emphasis on faith differs from the general viewpoint of the Mahāyāna texts. Moreover, the argument that the faith is needed for understanding the inconceivable coexistence of the purity and the defilement in the mind seems to be a simple substitution

10) For *amalo dhātuḥ* in this passage, see Schmithausen 1971: 138.

11) RGV 14-15: *prakṛti-prabhāsvaratā-darśanāc ca cittasyādi-kṣaya-nirodha-darśanāc ca tad-upakleśasya | tatra yā cittasya prakṛti-prabhāsvaratā yas ca tad-upakleśa ity etad dvayam anāsrave dhātu kuśalākuśalayoś cittayor ekacaratvād.*

for the cost of the dynamic process of the cognitive acts in Yogācāra. Now, return to the point of criticism in the RGV toward the perception of the emptiness (*śūnyatā-upalambha*). The simple replacement of *upalambha* through faith is, without doubt, the characteristics of the RGV's position. It goes without saying that this approach of the RGV is sharply contrasted with that of the Yogācāra texts, which strive to solve the problem still in the context of cognition *per se* (*upalambha*) depending on the language and concept,¹²⁾ thereby, finding the proper place for 'the right knowledge (*jñāna*)'.

III. Explanations in the Yogācāra texts with regard to the abandonment of the two extremes

Some Yogācāra texts, such as the BoBh, the *Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya* (henceforth: MAVBh) and the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* cite the CSS. The formal similarity of the citation between these texts and the RGV is shown in their citation that is used in the context of the separation from the two extremes of the existence and the nonexistence. The difference lies that in the citation of the CSS in these Yogācāra texts the passages using the terms, such as 'the natural luminosity of mind (*cittasya prakṛti-prabhasvaratā*)' and 'the accidental dust (*āgantuka-mala*)' do not occur side by side. Below,

12) Though the characterization of reality to be inexpressible can be attributed to the main Mahāyānic idea, it is by the Yogācāra texts that this idea takes a clear shape. For example, the distinction of *vyavasthāpita-satya* (= Four Noble Truths) from *avyavasthāpita-satya* (= *tathatā*) etc.

I will firstly focuss on the explanation of the CSS in the BoBh and the MAVBh, which are related with the aforementioned RGV I.155, and then on the meaning of the ‘Idea-Only’ in the MAVBH and MAVT as abandonment of the two extremes, for the interpretation of which the similar verse as the RGV I.154 is taken into consideration.

1. Citation of the *Cuḷasuṃnātasutta* in the BoBh and the MAVBh

The “*Tattvārth*-chapter” of the BoBh explains that the practitioner should give up the attitude of the superimposition and the denial, when he sees the true suchness, which has the inexpressibility as its essence, to be the middle way. In this context, whereas the extreme view of the superimposition is an attitude, which superimposes some linguistic and conceptual designations on the existent phenomena (*vastu*), the extreme view of the denial is an attitude, which negates all the existent phenomena totally in all the aspects. In the *Tattvārtha*-chapter, the CSS is cited in the explanation of ‘the well apprehended emptiness’, which means the so-called ‘what remains in the emptiness’. As its counterpart, ‘the wrong apprehended emptiness’ represents the extreme view of the denial of reality that it does not exist in all sides, and ‘the well apprehended emptiness’ is the middle way, because it is achieved through the negation of this extreme view of the denial. If everything is nonexistent, then there would be no basis to makes the negation of something possible.

The acceptance of something in negation is expressed by the term ‘what remains’ in ‘the well apprehended emptiness’. It reads as follows:

“What is the well apprehended emptiness? When something (B) is not in somewhere (A), [the Bodhisattva] sees that somewhere (A) is empty of something (B); yet there remains (C) in this [emptiness]. He apprehends as it really is that what [remains] exists really in A. This is said to be the right, non-perverted understanding of the emptiness.”¹³⁾

Likewise, ‘the well apprehended emptiness’ is not the negation of a certain existence in all the ways, but the affirmation of something in the emptiness. In that case, the emptiness should not mean the absolute negation, but the relative negation (*pariyudāsa-pratiśedha*)¹⁴⁾. Here, it is again disputable how this ‘what remains in the emptiness’ should be understood in the *Tattvārtha*-chapter. If ‘What remains’ means something that is not negated even by the emptiness, then it seems to accord with the expression ‘*X-mātra*’, which is terminologically used in this chapter (BoBh 28,12): “*vastu-mātra* (唯事)” and “*tathatā-mātra* (唯真如)”. Seen in this way, the phenomena superimposed by means of the language and the conceptualization can be negated in all the ways, but something inexpressible remains as the thing-in-itself (*vastu*) or the suchness (*tathatā*) even after the negation of the superimposed factors. Moreover, in the BoBh, the *tathatā-mātra* is enumerated as the synonym of the *vastu-mātra*, it is more reasonable in this place to assume ‘what remains’ to be the *tathatā-mātra*.

In the BoBh, the theory of the three natures (*trisvabhāva*) is not taught

13) BoBh 32,6-9: *kathaṃ ca punaḥ sugr̥hītā śūnyatā bhavati/ yataś ca yad yatra na bhavati/ tat tena śūnyam iti samanupaśyati/ yat punar atr̥vaśiṣṭaṃ bhavati/ tat sad ihāstīti yathābhūtaṃ prajānāti/ iyaṃ ucyate śūnyatāvakraṅtir yathābhūta aviparītā.*

14) On the two kinds of negation, see Kajiyama 1973.

yet, so it is difficult to name ‘what remains’ directly with the concept of *trīsvabhāva*. Yet, we can suggest that, if ‘what remains’ is interpreted as the *vastu-mātra*, then this would be pure part of ‘the dependent nature (*paratantra-svabhāva*)’, but if ‘what remains’ as the *tathatā-mātra*, then this would be ‘the perfect nature (*pariniṣpanna-svabhāva*)’ in the sense of the *Trīṃśikā* (henceforth: Tr) 21cd, where the perfect nature is explained as being empty of the conceptualized nature (*parikalpita-svabhāva*) in the dependent nature (*paratantra-svabhāva*).¹⁵⁾

The MAVBh on MAV I.1 also cites the typical phrase of the CSS. The MAV I.1 reads: “The unreal thinking exists, but the two do not exist in the [unreal thinking]. However, the emptiness exists in the [unreal thinking], but this [unreal thinking] also exists in the [emptiness].”

The MAVBh explains: “the two refer to the perceiving act (*grāhaka*) and the perceived object (*grāhya*), and the emptiness means that the unreal thinking becomes separated from the state of the perceiving act and perceived object.” Then, the CSS is cited as the textual evidence for showing the relationship among the unreal thinking, the perceiving act, the perceived object, and the emptiness. What is cited in the MAVBh is a part of the aforementioned passages in the BoBh: “When A does not exist in B, we see as it really is that B is empty of A. However, we also know as it really is that what remains exists there (*iha*).”

When we compare this explanation with the MAV I.1, ‘A’ would be the

15) Tr 21cd: *niṣpannas tasya pūrveṇa sadā rahitatā tu yā*. see the close explanation of the perfect nature in the TrBh 124,9: *avikārapariniṣpattiyā sa pariniṣpannaḥ*.

two, i.e. the perceiving act and the perceived object, and ‘B’ means the unreal thinking (*abhūtaparikalpa*). Moreover, ‘what remains’ is the remainder in the emptiness, and ‘there (*iha*)’ means ‘in the unreal thinking’.

The well apprehended emptiness aims both in the *Tattvārtha*-chapter and the MAVBh at giving up the extreme view of the denial. Yet, the citation of the CSS in the MAVBh seems to be more similar with the content of the MAV I.1. In particular, MAV I.1cd is well coincided with the CSS: What remains in the emptiness (C) exists there (B), i.e. in the unreal thinking. Noteworthy is the fact, that what is negated in this context are the two factors of the perceiving act and perceived object (A). In other words, what is negated are the two factors constituting the consciousness. In this sense, the MAV I.1 is intending to give up the subject-object-duality in the stream of the unreal thinking. In the MAVBh, it is called “the characteristic of the non-perverted emptiness”. If we remind of “the non-perverted” aspect of the emptiness among the two kinds of emptiness taught in the MAVBh, this characterization of the emptiness implies that it should be cultivated in the stages of the practice.

However, the MAVBh does not deliver the clear message of what remains in the emptiness. This topic will be discussed in the fourth chapter through the similes of the space etc.

2. Realization of the *vijñaptimātra* as the abandonment of the two extremes in the *MAVBh* and the *MAVT*

I will compare the RGV I.154 with Sthiramati’s *Madhyāntavibhāga-Ṭīkā* (henceforth: MAVT) 29,7-8. The verse of the RGV I,154 is cited in the MAVT,

where ‘the non-characteristic of the perceived object and the perceiving act’ is dealt with under the subtitle of “the methodological characteristic for entering into the non real characteristic (*asallakṣaṇāmupraveśopāyalakṣaṇa*, 入無相方便相)”. The MAVT is similar with the RGV in the point that the MAVT intends to give up the two extreme views, but it deviates from the RGV in the point how to avoid two extreme views. Here, it matters the central role of the perception (*upalabdhi*) for the realization of the reality.

“From the nonexistence of the object, the perception (*upalabdhi*) is nonexistent in the sense that it takes the perception [itself] as its intrinsic nature. Therefore, it is said ‘its nonexistence by itself’. The perception, which has the perception itself as its intrinsic nature, is not negated. The perception, which has the non-perception as its intrinsic nature, is not affirmed. How? These two are equal in the sense of the non-conceptualization. Therefore, without the affirmation and the negation, the perception and the non-perception should be understood as the equality by means of the innate realization. It is said as follows: nothing decrease, and nothing increase (*prakṣepatavyam*). The reality (*bhūta*) should be seen from the perspective of the reality. One who sees the reality is liberated.”¹⁶⁾

The underlined part has the corresponding content with the RGV I.154,

16) MAVT 29,1-6: *arthābhāvād upalabdher upalabdhisvarūpatvenābhāvāt svarūpeṇa tadabhāva ucyate/ upalambha upalabdhisvabhāvo nāpanīyate/ nāpi anupalabdhisvabhāvaḥ prakṣipyate/ kiṃ tarhi samam etad ubhayaṃ nirvikalpatayā/ tasmān nopalambhopalambhayoḥ samāropā-pavādanirapekṣeṇa pratyātmasamatā jñeyeti/ āha ca nāpaneyam atah kimcit prakṣepatavyam na kimcana / draṣṭavyaṃ bhūtato bhūtaṃ bhūtadarśī vimucyate //*. (underline indicates the verse of the RGV)

even though there is a subtle difference. However, the context in the MAVT is very different from the RGV in the sense that it deals with the *asallakṣaṇāmupraveśopāyalakṣaṇa* as the realization of the Idea-only (*viññaptimātra*). I will examine the meaning of this explanation in detail.

It is hard to understand the MAV I.6¹⁷⁾, which deals with the *asallakṣaṇāmupraveśopāyalakṣaṇa*, without the commentary. Here in this verse, the term *upalabdhi/nopalabdhi* is used four times. According to the MAVBh 20,3-5, the first *upalabdhi* means the perception of the Idea-only (*viññaptimātra*), the second *nopalabdhi* means the non-perception of the object, the third *nopalabdhi* the non-perception of the object, the fourth *nopalabdhi* again the non-perception of the Idea-only (*viññaptimātra*). It explains further, that the verse means “having depended on the perception of the Idea-only, the non-perception of the object occurs. Having depended on the non-perception of the object, the non-perception of the Idea-only occurs.” The *asallakṣaṇāmupraveśopāyalakṣaṇa* aims at understanding the unreal characteristic of the perceiving act and perceived object. Based on this, the MAV 1.7ab says that “it is proved that the perception (*upalabdhi*) has the non-perception as its nature.” On this verse, MAVBh 20,7 comment: “Because the perception is not suitable when the object to be perceived is nonexistent (*upalabdhyārthābhāve upalabdhyayogāt*).” On the verse “Therefore, it should be understood that the non-perception and the perception is same” (MAV I.7cd), the MAVBh comments that “it is called the perception, even though it has the non-perception as its nature, because the perception is not proved to be the

17) MAV I.6: *upalabdhiṃ samāśritya nopalabdhiḥ prajāyate/ nopalabdhiṃ samāśritya nopalabdhiḥ prajāyate//*

perception on the ground of the appearance of the unreal object.”¹⁸⁾

According to the MAVT, the explanation of the *asallakṣaṇānupraveśopāyalakṣaṇa* aims at giving up the two extreme views of the superimposition and the denial by means of the perception of the Idea-only. On the one hand, if the perception of the Idea-only has the perception of something as its nature, then it could be considered to the antidote against the extreme view of the denial, because in that case the aspect of the perceiving act is not yet abandoned. On the other hand, if the perception of the Idea-only has the non-perception of the object as its nature, then it would not function as the perception, for every perception must have the intentional object. So, the perception of the Idea-only would mean the cognizing aspect of the knowledge that the object does not exist. In this regard, it is considered as the abandonment of the extreme view of the superimposition.

If this interpretation is correct, the perception of the Idea-only could be linked with the emptiness in the MAV I.1. If the emptiness means the separation from the perceiving act and perceived object in the unreal thinking, then the perception of the Idea-only has the same connotation, as indicated above. In this regard, the verse “nothing decreases, and nothing increases” can be related with the meaning of the *asallakṣaṇānupraveśopāyalakṣaṇa*, which speaks for the nonexistence of the object, and, thereby, the nonexistence of the consciousness. The extreme view of the denial is given up by the perception of the Idea-only, and the extreme view of the superimposition by the non-perception of the object. And the sentence “the reality (*bhūta*)

18) MAVBh 20,9f.: *upalabdher upalabdhitvenāsiddhatvād abhūtārtha-pratibhāsatayā tūpalabdhir ity ucyate 'nupalabdhi-svabhāvāpi satī.*

should be seen from the perspective of the reality”, as showing a middle way, can be connected with the realization of the Idea-only.

In this regard, it is worthwhile to note the explanation of the MAVT that lays stress on the dynamic aspect of the perception (*upalabdhi*). This aspect is discussed in the MAVT 29,1ff. in the problematic of the perception of the Idea-only and the non-perception of the object, and in the *Dharmadharma-tāvibhāga* (henceforth: DhDhV) in the four kinds of the cultivation which produce the non-conceptual knowledge. In this way, we can see in the Yogācāra texts the strong tendencies, which attempt to give up the two extreme views of the superimposition and the denial in the cognition process. This marks the sharp contrast with the position of the RGV, which tries to solve the problem of the inexpressibility of the *tathāgatagarbha* by leaning on the faith.

IV. Three Similes common in the *Ratnagotravibhāga* and the Yogācāra Texts

The Similes of the space, the gold, and the water¹⁹⁾ are found in the RGV I.30 and I.31,²⁰⁾ where the meaning of the *tathāgatagarbha* is explained in the two categories among the ten. These two categories are ‘the intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*)’ and ‘the cause (*hetu*)’. The RGVV explains that the three

19) In other places of RGV II.3 and II.4 etc., one or two similes are mentioned.

20) RGV I.30: *sadā prakṛtyasaṃklišṭaḥ śuddhatatnāmarāmbuvat/ dharmādhimuktyadhīpra-jñāsamādhikaruṣānvayaḥ //*.

similes of the *manīratna*, the space, and the water refer respectively to the three meanings of the *tathāgatagarbha*, i.e. ‘the *dharmakāya* of the *tathāgata*’, ‘the non-changeability of the *tathatā*’, and ‘the *gotra* of the *tathāgata*’ from the viewpoint of the own characteristic in the RGV. When explained from the viewpoint of the common characteristic, the three similes have the undefiled and natural purity in common.²¹⁾

The explanation that the three meanings of the *tathāgathagarbha* have the natural purity as the common characteristic shows that the *tathāgatagarbha* is understood as the basis of or the ground for obtaining the purified state. In the RGV 79,10 etc., the natural purity is used for the transformation of the basis (*āśraya-parivṛtti*). The RGVV, defining the *āśraya-parivṛtti* as having the purity as its nature,²²⁾ divides the purity into two kinds: “the purity is of two kinds: the natural purity and the purity separated from the defilement. The natural purity consists in the liberation, but not in the non-association with [the defilements], whereas the purity separated from the defilement consists in the liberation and the non-association with [the defilements]. Because the natural luminosity of the mind is completely separated from the accidental dusts, as if the water is [from the viewpoint of its nature] dissociate with the accidental dust etc.”²³⁾

21) RGVV on RGV I.31: *ya ete trayo 'tra pūrvam uddiṣṭā eṣu triṣu yathāsaṃkhyam eva svalakṣaṇaṃ cārabhya tathāgatadhātoś cintāmaṇinabhovāriviśuddhiguṇasādharmyaṃ vedītavayam/*.

22) In RGV, the *nirmalā tathatā* is correspondent to the fifth *Vajrapada* (= *bodhi*) of the seven. *Bodhi* refers to the *dharmakāya*, the resultant aspect of the *tathāgatagarbha* and to the *āśraya-parivṛtti*. For the explanation that the *āśraya-parivṛtti* has the purity as its nature, see the first definition of the *āśraya-parivṛtti* in DhDhV (in: Mathes 1996: (Vs) 12-13).

23) RGV 80,15-18; cf. RGVV on RGV I.38: *samāsato dvābhyāṃ kāraṇābhyāṃ tathāgata-*

Here, the natural purity functions as the cause for the *āśraya-parivṛtti*, whereas the purity separated from the defilements would point out the result aspect of it or the non-association with the defilement. It may be interesting to note that the similes of the water etc. are used also for the purity separated from the defilements.

In the early Yogācāra texts which precedes the RGV, the similes of the space, the gold, and the water are usually combined in a set, and used explicitly for the *āśraya-parivṛtti*, the emptiness, and the perfect nature (*pariniṣpanna-svabhāva*). For example, the three similes are used in the main section (*Maulī Bhūmiḥ*) and the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* of the YBh for the *āśraya-parivṛtti*, and in the DhDhV 685-6; in the MAV I.16 and the MAVT for the emptiness, and in the MSA XI.13 for the perfect nature. Below, I will choose some passages, which deal with three similes more closely, of the YBh, the DhDhV and the MAVBh/MAVT.

1. Three similes of space, gold and water in the *Yogācārabhūmi*

In several passages of the YBh,²⁴ the three similes are used for the *āśraya-parivṛtti*. Below, I will choose only one passage which shows the context very clearly and give a brief observation.

In the so-called *Pañcavasū*-chapter of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*, three similes of the water, the gold, and the space are used for the *āśraya-parivṛtti* in the context, whether this transformation of the basis is valid for those,

dharmakāye śubha-pāramitā veditavyā | prakṛti-pariśuddhyā sāmānya-lakṣaṇena | vaimalya-pariśuddhyā viśeṣa-lakṣaṇena |

24) Cf. Schmithausen 1969: 51ff. There are some other places dealing the three similes, for example, VinSg(D) 14b4ff. (= T30: 701b24ff.; Sakuma 1990: VinSg 14).

who enter into the *nirvāṇa* without remainder. The answer to this question is that it exists for them. In order to explicate the character of the *āśraya-parivṛtti* the three similes come to use. The text identifies the highest *āśraya-parivṛtti* with the unconditioned *nirvāṇa*, which means nothing but the purity of the *dharm*-sphere (*dharmadhātu-viśuddhi*), which does not mean the nonexistence of the defilements but their calmness.²⁵⁾ In other words, one should not regard the *āśraya-parivṛtti* as the simple annihilation, but as the non-association with the aspects of the truth of suffering and arising. This is because the *dharmadhātu-viśuddhi* consists in “the suchness which manifests itself when all the mental images (*nimitta*) are abandoned after the cultivation of the right knowledge.²⁶⁾ Of the four kinds of purity mentioned in MSg II.26,²⁷⁾ the *dharmadhātu-viśuddhi* should be considered not as the natural purity, but as the purity separated from the defilements. The three similes come to use just in the context to explain, that the *āśraya-parivṛtti* does not mean the nonexistence of the defilements and the sufferings.²⁸⁾ Let me cite the wording of the passage:

25) VinSg(D) 14b4ff (T30: 701b24ff.; Sakuma 1990: VinSg 14; Kramer 2005: [3.5.2.4.1]): *mya ngan las 'das pa gang zhe na/ chos kyi dbyings rnam par dag pa gang yin pa ste/ nyon mongs pa dang sdug bsngal nye bar zhi ba'i don gyis yin gyi/ med pa'i don gyis ni ma yin no//*

26) VinSg(D) 15a1 (= Kramer 2005: [3.5.2.4.1]): *chos kyi dbyings rnam par dag pa gang zhe na/ yang dag pa'i shes pa bsgom pa la brten nas mtshan ma thams cad bsal bas de bzhin nyid gang yin pa ste/*

27) These four are: *prakṛti*-, *vaimalya*-, *ālambana*- and *mārga-viśuddhi*. Cf. MAVT 112,10f.

28) VinSg(D) 14b6-7 (= Kramer 2005: [3.5.2.3]): *gang gi tshe nyon mongs pa dang sdug bsngal nye bar zhi ba tsam la mya ngan las 'das pa zhes bya ba'i tshe/ ci'i phyir de med pa'i don gyis ma yin zhe na/*. This passage of the VinSg seems to be the source of the later citations of three similes.

“In the example of the water, it can be [defined] as being clear, only when it is [originally] separated from the dirty factors, but [it may be also reasonable to think] that there does not happen [in the water] the nonexistence of the clearness, because the water has been changed to be separated from its dirtiness. [In the example of] the gold, it is pure, only when it is [originally] separated from the impurity, but [it may be also reasonable to think] that there does not happen [in the gold] the nonexistence of the purity, because the gold has been changed to be separated from its impurity. [In the example of] the space, it is bright, only when it is [originally] separated from the clouds and fogs, but [it may be also reasonable to think] that there does not happen [in the space] the nonexistence of the brightness, because the space has been changed to be separated from the clouds and fogs. Likewise, we should see the logic in the same way.”²⁹⁾

In this passage, the *dharmadhātu-viśuddhi* is not assumed as the newly ‘produced one’ which is to obtain after the removal of the unclear or impure factors, but as the ‘manifestation’ which appears simultaneously when they are removed. This is proved in the following passage, which speaks clearly that the *dharmadhātu-viśuddhi* means the manifestation of the *tathatā* by clearing away the mental images (*nimitta*). As the text speaks

29) VinSg(D) 14b7-15a1 (= Kramer 2005: [3.5.2.3]): *'di lta ste dper na chu'i khams la rnyog pa dang <bral> ba tsam gsal ba yin yang rnyog pa dang <bral> bar gyur pas gsal ba nyid med pa ma yin pa dang/ gser skyon dang bral ba tsam bzang ba nyid yin yang de dang bral bas bzang ba nyid med pa ma yin pa dang/ nam mkha' sprin dang khug rna la sogs pa dang bral ba tsam rnam par dag pa nyid yin yang de dang bral bas rnam par dag pa nyid med pa ma yin pa bzhin du/ 'di la yang tshul de bzhin du blta bar bya'o//* (Correction in underline is mine; my correction is supported by the following sentences!)

further, the abandonment of the mental image and the manifestation of the *dharmadhātu* must be simultaneous. By using the similes of the clearness of the water, the purity of the gold and the brightness of the space, this explanation shows clearly that we should not regard the manifestation of the *dharmadhātu* as a newly produced, conditioned element, but we should see this *dharmadhātu* as an unconditioned factor, ever existing, natural purity. In using the concept of the three intrinsic nature, we have two options to interpret it: Either with the ‘pivotal model’, to use the terminology of Sponberg, according to which the perfect nature only means the removal of the conceptualized nature in the dependent nature, or with the ‘progressive model’, according to which the *dharmadhātu*-sphere is understood as the ontologically existent reality that can resist the negation of the emptiness, and remains in the emptiness.³⁰⁾

The similes of the spaces etc., used to explain the *tathatā* and the *tathāgatagarbha* in both the *Yogācāra* and the *tathāgatagarbha* thought, are in agreement with the point, that they are not a newly produced factor, which was produced as the result of giving up the defilements, but a naturally existent factor, which manifests itself when the accidental factors disappear. The main difference lies, however, in the fact that in the *tathāgatagarbha* thought, the abandonment of the defilements and the manifestation of the reality are simply interpreted in the literal sense of the ‘natural luminosity after the abandonment of accidental defilement’. On the other hands, in the *Yogācāra* thought, the *dharmadhātu* appears, when the mental images

30) It seems to be clear that regarding the nature of ‘what is remained’ the *tathāgatagarbha* should have the character of real existent in the ontological sense.

(*nimitta*) are cleansed away in the cognitive process.

2. Three similes in the *Dharmadharmatāvibhāga* and *-vṛtti*

The similes of the space, the gold, and the water are mentioned in the DhDhV³¹⁾ in the context of the *āśraya-parivṛtti*. Mathes points out³²⁾ that there is a close relationship in the explanation of the *āśraya-parivṛtti* of the DhDhV with that of the RGV. The similar explanatory structure he suggests is: in the first chapter of the RGV the *tathatā* is explained as the suchness accompanied by defilements, and in the second chapter of the RGV the purified Buddha-nature is identified with the suchness free from defilements. Apart from that formal similarity, it is noteworthy that the suchness free from defilements is identified with the *āśraya-parivṛtti* in the both texts.

The three similes in the DhDhV is used in the similar way with the MAVT, i.e. in the question of whether the concept of the change can be applied for the *āśraya-parivṛtti*. If the concept *āśraya-parivṛtti* implies the change, then it would be inevitable to dispute its nature, whether it belongs to the conditioned or unconditioned factor. What is meant here is that, if the concept *āśraya-parivṛtti* points to the ultimate state, then it must be accepted that the suchness as *asaṃskṛta*-element manifests itself in that state. But this does not fit for the case of the *āśraya-parivṛtti* in the stage of

31) see DhDhVV (Mathes 1996: seile 681-710).

32) see Mathes. RGVV 79,10-11: *tatra yo 'sau dhātur avinirmukta-kleśa-kośas tathāgata-garbha ity ukto bhagavatā| tad-viśuddhir āśraya-parivṛtteḥ svabhāvo vedītavayal|*. As in the DhDhV, the *āśraya-parivṛtti* in RGVV is a synonym of *nirmalā tathatā*. DhDhV p. 99 (Skt. 12-13): *svabhāvapraveśas tathatāvaimalyam āgantukamalatatathatāprakhyānaprakhyānāya/* (= Tib. 329-330).

practice, on which the *āśraya-parivṛtti* is achieved step by step. In that case, the concept would, without doubt, imply the change of the mind-body complex.

The three similes of the space, the gold, and the water etc.³³⁾ are introduced in the DhDhVV to answer to this question. The presentation of the first example of the space in this text is worth citing.

“The space is, for example, pure in nature. Notwithstanding this, it is not included³⁴⁾ [in] that [purity], because of its association with the accidental fog etc. When it is dissociated with that [accidental fog etc.], then [it can be described] to be pure. [However it may be,] the phrase ‘the impure [space] undergoes change into the pure one’ indicates that, though the purity of [the space] is not produced newly, [the purity of the space] can be perceived when it is dissociated with the cause [of the accidental clouds etc.] which consists in non-perceiving [the purity of the space]. However, we should not regard the space as something which has the quality of change, even though we perceive [the space] to be utterly pure.”³⁵⁾

33) DhDhV 685-686: *gnas yongs su gyur pa'i dpe ni nam mkha' dang/ gser dang chu la sogs pa yin no.*

34) Mathes (1996: 96; 153 fn. 204) suggests *rtogs* instead of *gtogs* of the reading of all tibetan versions. He translates: “Der Raum zum Beispiel ist von Natur aus ausschliesslich rein. Man nimmt dies ledglich nicht [immer] wahr, da er von hinzutretenden Nebel und anderem bedeckt sein [kann].” But, in that case, there would be no reason to contrast the two sentences by using the particle *la*.

35) DhDhV 687-692: *dper na nam mkha' rang bzhin gyis dag pa kho na ste/ glo bur gyi khug ma la sogs pa dang 'brel ba las de ma gtogs (ed.: rtogs) par zad la/ de dang bral ba las ni dag pa yin no// ma dag pa ni dag par 'gyur ba ma yin no zhes bya bas dag pa nyid skye ba ni ma yin gyi/ 'on kyang ma dmigs pa'i rgyu dang bral bas dmigs par zad do// rab tu dag par dmigs pas*

This citation shows clearly, that the purity and the defilement of the space, to which the *āśraya-parivṛtti* is compared, are explained in the context of the natural luminosity and the accidental defilement. This comparison of the space with the *āśraya-parivṛtti* is clearly figured out in the DhDhV, where all the three similes are mentioned through the concepts of ‘the natural luminosity of mind’ and ‘the accidental defilement’. It reads: “By the same way, it does not mean that in the *āśraya-parivṛtti* the natural luminosity did not exist previously, but rather its luminosity does not manifest itself because of the occurrence of the accidental hindrance.”³⁶⁾ The DhDhV follows the explanation of the MAVBh, for the former uses the three similes with regard to the natural luminosity and accidental defilement.

What is to be noted further is that the explanation of the space as a transcendental, unchanging one beyond all cognitive actions, which imply changes, is intended to imply the natural purity, for the space cannot be regarded as being transformed from the non-pure state to the pure, though we seem to perceive that its purity is just produced. In this regard, the *āśraya-parivṛtti* is no more regarded as a transformation of a mental complex from one state to another, but as the *tathatā*, the natural purity.

The concept *āgantukamala* is introduced in the practice context in order to show the unchanging or unconditioned aspect of the space-like *tathatā*, the realization of which is resulted through the non-perception of this accidental dust. It goes without saying that the perception of the natural

nam mkha' rnam par 'gyur ba'i chos can du khas blang bar bya ba yang ma yin no//

36) DhDhV 701-3: *de bzhin du gnas yongs su gyur pa la yang rang bzhin gyis 'od gsal ba gang yin pa de sngar med pa ma yin te/ 'on kyang glo bur gyi sgrib pa snang bas mi snang bar zad do// ma dag pa dang/ bzung ba ma yin pa dang/ ma dang ba nyid bzhin no//.*

purity of the space should be given up as explained in the Tr 28, for this perception itself also implies the subject-object-duality. The reason, why the term *upalabdhi* occurs in this explanation, lies in the fact that the text does not focus on the epistemological clarification, but on the clarification of the intrinsic nature of the *āśraya-parivṛtti*, which is nothing but the purity itself, namely: *dharmatā*. In the DhDhV, the *dharmatā* indicates the purity of the mind that cannot be newly produced by the *āśraya-parivṛtti*.

3. Three similes in the *Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya* and the *Madhyāntavibhāgaṭkā*

In the MAV I.16, the three similes of the space, the gold, and the water are found. The MAVBh on this verse treats the meaning of the emptiness under the ‘the subdivision of the emptiness (*śūnyatā-prabheda*)’. The MAVT enumerates it in the three aspects.³⁷⁾ And, just in the third aspect, the term “accidental dust (*āgantuka-mala*)” and the simile expressed in the sentence that “the purity of [the emptiness] is admitted to be like the water, the gold, and the space”³⁸⁾ are mentioned. This term and the simile show, more or less, the relationship to the *tathāgatagarbha* thought, for they are also used in the context of the *tathāgatagarbha* thought. Because of the brief explanation in the MAV and the MAVBh, it is useful to examine its meaning through Sthiramati’s commentary, MAVT (51,7ff.; D 214a5ff.), for the proper under-

37) The first aspect concerns with the problem in which state the emptiness is divided into the defiled and the purified one. The second deals with the problem of the division of the emptiness into the state of *samala and nirmala*, and the third with the problem, how the emptiness can be treated with the concept of purity and defilement.

38) MAV I.16cd (MAVBh 24,12): *abdhātu-kanakākāśa-śuddhivac chuddhir iṣyate//*.

standing of the Yogācāra's view.

Vasubandhu does not explain the meaning of this simile in detail, but only adds a short comment. It read: “[the purity of the emptiness is mentioned] because the accidental dust is removed, but [it does] not [mean] that the [emptiness] has been changed naturally to the another state.”³⁹⁾ The point of his comment lies in the previous explanation. The emptiness, though sometimes accompanied by the dust, sometimes separated from it, is not a thing in the literal meaning of the word. But, if this emptiness is considered to be purified or defiled, then it would impose the concept of change on the emptiness. In this regard, Vasubandhu paraphrases an opponent's criticism in the following word: “If [it is accepted that the emptiness] has been changed from the state with the defilement to that without the defilement, then [it follows that] it has the changeable quality. In this case, how [the emptiness] could not be [regarded] as impermanent?”⁴⁰⁾ Sthiramati makes explicit the intention of the opponent, by interpreting its meaning as follows: “Without change, the difference between two states cannot be accepted, because the change is linked with the arising and cessation.”⁴¹⁾ In other words, if the change is admitted for the emptiness, the emptiness has to be the conditioned factor. In this case, it would be impossible to escape from

39) MAVBh 24,11-3: *yasmād asyāḥ abdhātu-kanakākāśa-śuddhivac chuddhir iṣyate// āgantukamalāpagamān na tu tasyāḥ svabhāvānyatvaṃ bhavati/*

40) MAVBh 24,10f.: *yadi samalā bhūtvā nirmalā bhavati katham vikāradharmmīṅtvād anityā na bhavati/ Cf. DhDhVV(Mathes 1996, p. 95, seile 682-3), which deals with the same problem. The difference is: what matters in MAVBh is the *samalatva* or *nirmalatva* of the emptiness, whereas in DhDhVV it matters *āśraya-parivṛtti*.*

41) MAVT 52,2-3: *yadi samalā bhūtvā (ed. syād) iti vistaraḥ/ na hy avasthābhedo vikāram antareṇa dṛṣṭaḥ/ vikāras cotpādaavināśābhyām anusyūta iti/*

the impermanence [through realizing the emptiness of things].

With regard to this objection, Sthiramati points out that “the meaning of the expression ‘change from one state to another (bhūtvā ~ bhavati)’ should not be understood in the usual sense of the word, which applies only to the conditioned factors.”⁴²⁾ On the other hand, Sthiramati suggests to interpret the concept ‘change’ of the emptiness in another way: If we see the change of the emptiness from the viewpoint of the accidental dust, the change does not mean that the defiled state is changed to the purified state. It does not touch its essence. Therefore, abiding in the reality does not mean transcending the old state, thereby replacing it through the newly produced one, but it means only separation from the accidental dust.

Three similes are suggested in the context of the natural purified mind and the accidental defilements. Sthiramati gives a detailed commentary on it.

“Therefore, [the emptiness] does not become impermanent. As the water, the gold, and the space do not have those [accidental elements] as their essence, the thing which has the dusts as its essence is, in the state either when it is accompanied by the dusts or separated from the dusts, pure, even without recourse to other essences. Likewise, the emptiness, though characterized by the unchangeability, is defiled by the accidental dusts, and is purified after the separation from that [accidental dusts]. The quality of the change does not cease for the [existent], which establishes the thing to be characterized by the defilement previously, and thereafter to have the purification as its essence, because it undergoes the change of the essence.”⁴³⁾

42) MAVT 52.4: *ata āha katham vikāradharminītvāt anityā na bhavātīti/*

In this way, the purity of the emptiness does not mean that it changes itself to another purified state by means of the separation from the dusts, for, in that case of the change, the emptiness would fall into the category of the conditioned factor. However, it is also admitted for the emptiness that it is sometimes defiled, and sometimes purified. Sthiramati clarifies this point clearly: “the unreal thinking is just the defilement, and when it is removed, it is called ‘purity’. However, even when it is purified or defiled, something which is purified or defiled is not existent because of its inseparability from the emptiness (*śūnyatāvyatirekeṇa*)⁴⁴.”⁴⁵)

It is by means of the explanation of the natural purity and the accidental dust that the change from the defilement to the purity does not indicate the real change of its essential or ontological state. If the dust is nothing but the accidental factors for the emptiness, the essence of the emptiness cannot be at all influenced, whether or not it is bereft of the accidental factors. If

43) MAVT 52,4-17: *na hi saṃkliṣṭāvasthātaḥ śūnyatāviśuddhāvasthāyām anyo vikāraḥ/ tattvasthitiā tu svabhāvāntaram anāpadyamānā/ āgantukamalāpagamāt/ yasmāt abdhātu-kanakākāśa-śuddhivac chuddhir iṣyate// tasmād anityā na bhavanti/ yathaiva hy abdhātu-kanakākāśānām atatsvabhāvātvaṅ malasvabhāvasyābhavato 'py āgantukamalavaty āgantukamalāpagame ca viśuddhaiva/ svabhāvāntarapratipattim antareṇāpi / evaṃ śūnyatāpy āgantukair malaiḥ saṃkliṣyate/ avikṛtasvarūpāpi tadvigamāc ca viśudhyatī/ yo hi tam eva bhavaṃ pūrvaṃ saṃkleśalakṣaṇaṃ paścād viśuddhisvabhāvaṃ vyavasthāpayati tasya vikāradharmanivṛttir na bhavati svabhāvavikāratvāt/ na tu yatrāpi āgantukaṃ tadubhayaṃ/ tasmān nāsau vikāradharmatām sprśatī/.*

44) Here, the compound *śūnyatāvyatirekeṇa* is analysed as *śūnyatā-avyatirekeṇa*. Tibetan version (D 214a6f.) translates it with *stong pa nyid ma rtogs par* (“did not realize the emptiness”, or *ma rtogs par*?). I follow the Sanskrit reading.

45) MAVT 51,9-12: *kathaṃ śūnyatāyāḥ prabhedo vijñeya itī/ abhūtaparikalpo hi saṃkleśaḥ/ tasmīn prahīṇe viśuddhir ucyate/ saṃkleśaviśuddhikāle ca śūnyatāvyatirekeṇānyan nāsti yat saṃkliṣyate viśudhyate vā/*

we understand the meaning of change in this way, then there is no reason to regard the changing state of the emptiness as constituting the essence of the emptiness.⁴⁶⁾

It is just in the context of this natural unchanging aspect of the emptiness that Sthiramati uses the three similes of the water, the gold, and the space. Just as the clearness of the water, the purity of the gold and the brightness of the space are the naturally existing in them, so is the emptiness which manifests itself after the removal of the accidental factors.

The unchanging aspect of the emptiness explained in the MAVT seems to coincide with that of the perfect nature in the Tr 21cd.⁴⁷⁾ Therefore, if we relate the aforementioned emptiness as the natural purification with the interpretation on the three nature in the TrBh, it can be interpreted that the perfect nature, which is bereft of the conceptualized nature in the dependent nature, could be in accordance with the aspect of the unchanging aspect of the perfect nature. Accordingly, the accidental dust and the water in the MAVT correspond respectively to the conceptualized nature and the dependent nature.

If my understanding is right, then the *tathatā*, i.e. the natural purity, is correspondent to “what remains” in the CSS. In this regard, Sthiramati’s interpretation of the emptiness can be substituted, more or less, for the concept *tathāgatagarbha* in the RGV, because these two concepts share the similar implication that they function as an unchanging basis for the changing phenomena. But, we should not lose the sight of the difference between

46) On it, see MAVBh on MAV V.20 and V.21.

47) For the classical definition of the perfect nature in Tr 21cd, see fn. 15 of this paper.

these two systems of thought: In the Yogācāra system, the focuss lies in the essential and dynamic role of the cognition for the realization of the ultimate reality.

V. Conclusion

I have examined some citations and similes common in the RGV and Yogācāra texts. The common citations are the so-called ‘well apprehended emptiness’ of the CSS, the phrase of ‘the natural luminosity’ and ‘the accidental dusts’, and the verses of the RGV I.154-155. Three similes are the space, the gold, and the water. Some parallel occurrences of these citations and similes in the RGV and the Yogācāra texts indicate, without doubt, the strong influence of the Yogācāra texts on the RGV. By examining these parallels, I attempted to show on what point these two texts agree with, and deviate from each other.

As far as the sentence ‘what remains in the emptiness’ of CSS is concerned, it can be easily reinterpreted as the *tathāgatagarbha* in the RGV. In contrast, it refers to the *vastumātra* or the *tathatāmātra* in the *Tattvārtha*-chapter, whereas it is not clear what it indicates in the MAVBh; the MAVBh on MAV I.1 focuses on the ‘neither same nor different’ aspect between the *abhūtaparikalpa* and the *śūnyatā* on the one hand, and on the subject-object-duality of the consciousness on the other hand. The MAVBh makes explicit that the elimination of the subject-object-duality is achieved through the right knowledge which realizes the unreal nature of the perception

(*upalambha*).

The problem of ‘what remains in the emptiness’ is dealt with through the three similes of the space etc. In the RGV, these similes are used to refer to the state of the transformation of the basis, and are regarded as showing the common characteristics of the natural purity of the *tathāgatagarbha*. In the Yogācāra texts, such as the YBh and the DhDhV, they are used as an example of the transformation of the basis, whereas in the MAVBh/MAVT as an example of the emptiness. In particular, it is worthwhile to note the explanation of the DhDhV with regard to the ‘what remains’. The problem of ‘what remains’ finds the solution by interpreting it not as the transformation of the basis, which implies the change of the mind-body stream, but as an underlying, unchanging reality, which, like the space, manifests itself, when the unreal duality ceases to operate. I think, on the basis of the unchanging aspect of the reality, namely, the suchness, it would not be a long way for the adherents of the *tathāgatagarbha* teaching to substitute the concept *tathatā* or *āśraya-parivṛtti* for the *tathāgatagarbha*.

It goes without saying that there are some deviating points between these two schools. The main difference can be summarized, in short, as follows: Against the tendencies of the RGV, which reduces, more or less, the knowledge on the ultimate to the faith, the Yogācāra texts hold the position that the problem of the ultimate can be solved by overcoming the subject-object-dichotomy through right knowledge.

약호 및 참고문헌

Abbreviation

BoBh	Bodhisattvabhūmi. Ed. N. Dutt, 1978.
CSS	Culasuññatasutta
D	sDe dge Block print
DhDhV	Dharmadharmatāvibhāga, see Mathes 1996.
DhDhVV	Dharmadharmatāvibhāgavyākhyā, see Mathes 1996.
MAV	Madhyānta-vibhāga. see MAVBh
MAVBh	Madhyānta-vibhāga-Bhāṣya, ed. G. Nagao. 1964.
MAVT	Madhyānta-vibhāga-Ṭīkā, ed. S. Yamaguchi. 1934.
MSg	Mahāyānasamgraha, see Nagao 1982.
RGV	Ratnagotravibhāga, ed. E. H. Johnston, 1950.
SNS	Samdhinirmocana Sūtra. Ed. Étienne Lamotte, Louvain 1935.
T	大正新修大藏經
Tr	see TrBh
TrBh	Triṃśikā-bhāṣya. Ed. Hartmut Buescher, Wien 2007.
VinSg	Viniścayasamgrahaṇī Part of the Yogācārabhūmi
YBh	Yogācārabhūmi (ed. Bhattacharya) 1957.

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Abstract

Some Citations and Similes Common in the *Ratnagotravibhāga* and the Yogācāra Texts

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It is well known that there are many similarities between the terms used in the Yogācāra texts and *Ratnagotravibhāga* (RGV), the latter being the most important treatise of the Buddha-nature idea in India. The aim of this paper is to compare some citations and similes that the RGV and the Yogācāra texts have in common. The common citations are the so-called ‘well apprehended emptiness’ of the CSS, the phrases ‘the natural luminosity’ and ‘the accidental dusts’, as well as verses I.154-155 of the RGV. Three similes were used for space, gold, and water respectively. Some parallel occurrences of these citations and similes in the RGV and the Yogācāra texts indicate, without doubt, the strong influence of the Yogācāra texts on the RGV. By examining these parallels, I attempted to show on which points these two texts correspond with, and deviate from each other. It goes

without saying that there are some points of deviation between these two schools. The main difference can be summarized, in short, as follows: While the RGV tends to more or less reduce knowledge of The Ultimate to faith, the Yogācāra texts hold the position that the problem of The Ultimate can be solved by overcoming the subject-object-dichotomy through right knowledge.

Keywords: Relation of the Mind-Only with the Buddha-Nature, Silile of the space etc., Emptiness, What remains in the emptiness, Two kinds of grasping, common citations, Natural purity

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