

TRANS- HUMANITIES

**Title : Moving Targets: Towards a Post-Humanist Historical
Ontology of Man?**

Author(s) : Jens DE VLEMINCK

Source : *Trans-Humanities*, Vol. 9 No. 3 (2016), pp. 5–17.

Published by : Ewha Womans University Press

URL : <http://eiheng.ewha.ac.kr/page.asp?pageid=book10&pagenum=060600>

Online ISSN : 2383-9899

All articles in *Trans-Humanities* are linked to the Homepage of KCI and
Ewha Institute for the Humanities and can be downloaded:

www.kci.go.kr & <http://www.trans-humanities.org/>



이화여자대학교
EWHA WOMANS UNIVERSITY

Moving Targets: Towards a Post-Humanist Historical Ontology of Man?

Jens DE VLEMINCK (Ghent University)

I. Introduction

April 2016 was the fiftieth anniversary of the release of Michel Foucault's monumental study *The Order of Things*. Originally published in French in 1966 as *Les Mots et les Choses*, the book was immediately selling "like hot cakes" (comme des petits pains) (29), like the newspapers headlined in those days (*Le Nouvel Observateur*). No doubt, *The Order of Things* must be considered one of the most iconic books of contemporary philosophy, having put its stamp on the philosophical discussion of the humanities—as the subtitle of Foucault's book suggests. Moreover, it also influenced discussions in a wide array of the human and the social sciences themselves. More recent disciplines, such as postcolonial studies, queer studies and post-humanist studies, refer to Foucault's work as a major source of inspiration. Whereas in postcolonial studies¹ and queer studies² the methodological influence of Foucault is frequently and explicitly referred to, the Foucauldian connection with the project of "post-human studies" is somewhat more ambiguous (Ranisch and Sorgner 14). Although Foucault testified that his project was fundamentally concerned with creating "a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subject," most of the time, his project is one-sidedly considered to have implied the "end of man" (Foucault, "The Subject" 208). In other words, Foucault's so-called "anti-humanism" is generally presented as announcing a "*post*-humanism." The latter aims at overcoming the universalist anthropocentrism of humanism, it is argued, but without itself contributing to any alternative in a constructive way. Correspondingly, one generally cannot escape the impression of Foucault functioning in "post-

1. Cf. Mbembe, Achille. *Critique de la Raison Nègre*. La Découverte, 2013.

2. Cf. Halperin, David. *Saint Foucault: Towards a Gay Hagiography*. Oxford UP, 1995.

human studies” *either* as an obligatory reference (mentioned in the context of post-humanism’s relation to post-structuralism) (Herbrechter 10, 13) or—in the best case—as a reference point for post-humanism’s genealogies. In the latter case, however, this mostly is effected without further contextualization and thus at the risk of misinterpreting Foucault’s at first sight obscure and puzzling aforementioned claim of “the end of man” (Wolfe xii).

This contribution aims at briefly re-evaluating Foucault’s research program in *The Order of Things*, and, more in particular, his famous thesis on the “end of man.” Although the Foucauldian enterprise, of course, would be further developed during the years to follow, *The Order of Things* can be considered a foundational text in order to understand Foucault’s intellectual trajectory of thinking “subjectivation.” From the perspective of anti-humanism, *The Order of Things* is indeed the text in which Foucault’s critique of Man finds its most radical expression. It is, of course, impossible to develop a comprehensive philosophical reading of this thesis here. This is why I will limit myself only to a very particular discussion of it. More specifically, I want to argue that the further implications of Foucault’s so-called “anti-humanism” can be re-vitalized today, in order to develop a Foucauldian “historical ontology of man” as comprising a critical potential for the contemporary tradition of a so-called “critical post-humanism.” The latter is part of the broad and heterogeneous post-humanist movement, which is generally associated with a techno-utopian discourse. However, critical post-humanism is a particular philosophical variant which critically engages with the anthropocentric and universal claims of humanism. With an openness to the technological changes in our culture, critical humanism aims at taking up anti-humanist critiques in order to radicalize them in thinking new possibilities beyond the universalizing, humanist notion of the human (Herbrechter 1–29). In what follows, the potential of the Foucauldian legacy will be re-evaluated from the perspective of this critical post-humanism. This argument will be elaborated in three steps. Firstly, Foucault’s *The Order of Things* is contextualized in order to elucidate the character and the intellectual roots of the “humanism” that is criticized by his “anti-humanism.” Secondly, it is argued that Foucault’s anti-humanist critique can contribute to the development of a critical post-humanism in a constructive way. Thirdly, and finally, Ian Hacking’s continuation of the Foucauldian project, in terms of a “historical ontology of man,” is presented as holding a promise for the project of a post-humanist philosophical anthropology.

II. Anti-Humanism and Humanism: Which Humanism?

When re-contextualizing Foucault's research program in *The Order of Things*, including its concluding thesis on the "end of man," to bring back to attention that this thesis was in fact prefigured in his secondary thesis of 1961 is important, for together with his primal thesis, *Folie et Dérison*, which later became renown as *The History of Madness* (1964), Foucault defended his critical commentary and translation of Immanuel Kant's *Anthropology From a Pragmatic Point of View* (1798). At the very end of Foucault's *Introduction to Kant's Anthropology* (1961), Foucault points out the foundational role of Kant at the threshold of the Modern Age. In contrast to most other authors, focusing on the Copernican Revolution in the context of *Critique of Pure Reason*, Foucault reads Kant's critical project centering the critical project around *Anthropology*. In line with Kant's *Logic*, which suggests the question of "What is Man?" being the most fundamental philosophical question, Foucault addresses the "anthropological turn" that took place with the inauguration of the Modern Age, including the "invention" of Man. This latter goes together with the constitution of "anthropology" as "the strictly philosophical structure responsible for the fact that the problems of philosophy are now all lodged within the domain that can be called that of human finitude" ("Philosophy and Psychology" 250). Since Kant, Foucault argues, Man is fundamentally finite. "Since Kant, the infinite is no longer given, there is no longer anything but finitude; and it is in that sense that the Kantian critique carried the possibility—or the peril—of an anthropology" (257). For Foucault, anthropology indeed simultaneously implies a threat, which he, with an allusion to Kant's "dogmatic slumber," calls the "anthropological slumber" to which post-Kantian philosophy is said to be fallen prey. Foucault thereby is referring to the very particular and problematic way in which man was staged as "an invention of recent date"—that is, as a 19th-century invention (*The Order* 386)—for, Man is understood by Foucault as "the anthropological postulate" (350), a strange "empirico-transcendental doublet" (347, 350), presenting man as Janus-headed, at once both the object and subject of knowledge. Foucault unmasks this "paradoxical figure" (351) of a finite and contingent being, pretending to be the universal foundation of knowledge, in terms of "an anthropological illusion." According to Foucault, this illusion is in fact "proper to philosophy since Kant" (*Introduction* 121). Man is correspondingly referred to by Foucault, using the Nietzschean metaphor of Baron Munchausen, pulling himself up into existence by the hair,

out of the swamps of nothingness. At the end of his *Introduction to Kant's Anthropology*, Foucault announces a "veritable critique of the anthropological illusion," making an appeal to "the Nietzschean enterprise." According to Foucault, "[t]he trajectory of the question *Was ist der Mensch?* in the field of philosophy reaches its end in the response which both challenges and disarms it: *der Übermensch*" (124). Here, we can read the announcement of the claim which Foucault makes in *The Order of Things* five years later. With the announcement of the "end of man," he formulates a critique towards the overall essentialist, universalist, and anthropocentric tendencies of philosophy in general, but at the same time, and more in particular, he is also questioning the status of philosophical anthropology as such. Besides a critique of the post-Kantian philosophical tradition in general, Foucault's critique equally implied an explicit critique of both French positivism and—not in the least—of humanist phenomenology, presenting a subjectivist reading of authors like Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Karl Marx, Edmund Husserl, and Martin Heidegger, by philosophers like Jean-Paul Sartre, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, amongst others (Janicaud 21). Given the French philosophical context of the 1960s, it must be clear that, simultaneously, for Foucault, also political issues, such as the impact of Marxism and the discussion with Althusser, were at stake (Bidet 105–53).

Thus far, I have tried to make clear that Foucault's anti-humanism, announcing the "end of man," in fact implies a critique of "anthropology" and of its corresponding image of Man, which, Foucault argues, dominated contemporary philosophy until 1966, when *The Order of Things* was published. This implies that Foucault was in fact criticizing a very specific kind of humanism, that is, an anthropocentric humanism that both essentializes the humanity of man, presenting it in terms of a universal human nature and presupposing it to be an absolutely free human subject. In other words, the sovereign subject of the Modern Age was Foucault's central target.

A subsequent question that can be raised at this point is the following: Can the Foucauldian anti-humanist project, as it was briefly summarized here, be reduced to a mere "negative" or deconstructive project, making an end to the unfruitful anthropocentric humanism it was attacking, or, can it also lead us towards a "positive" alternative, opening up the possibility of thinking a post-humanist anthropology?

III. Anti-Humanism and Post-Humanism: What Post-Humanism?

It must be clear that Foucault, in the wake of Friedrich Nietzsche, was not merely deconstructing post-Kantian philosophy, in order to leave it behind. Hence, the death of humanist man does not necessarily need to be the end of humanism as such, nor the death of philosophy to the contrary. Analogous to his *Introduction to Kant's Anthropology*, Foucault ends *The Order of Things* with the Nietzschean metaphor of the open sea, “opening the future to us as both promise and task” (373). In other words, the same Foucault who announced that “one can certainly wager that man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea” (422), also acknowledges the following:

[T]he end of Man [...] is the return of the beginning of philosophy. It is no longer possible to think in our day other than in the void left by man's disappearance. For this void does not create a deficiency; it does not constitute a lacuna that must be filled. It is nothing more, and nothing less, than the unfolding of a space in which it is once more possible to think. (373)

In other words, this new space or field of possibilities also includes a potential openness for new forms of subjectivity.

In this way, it becomes clear that Foucault's critique of humanist anthropology, implying a deconstruction of the anthropocentric-essentialist conception of human subjectivity, opens up the possibility of thinking “post-subjective” forms of agency. The latter is exactly what is at stake in the so-called “critical post-humanism,” questioning the limits of subjectivity and trying to grasp the multitude of ways of what it means to be human. For, it can be called “post-humanist” in the sense that it is critically engaging in a deconstruction of humanism, and as such goes beyond humanism. Foucault thus anticipates the project of critical post-humanism in the sense that his anti-humanism in fact entails a post-anthropocentric humanism, that is, a continuation-through-transformation of humanism (Herbrechter 1–29).

The suggestion of Foucault's shared stake with critical post-humanism in fact seems to be in line with a working hypothesis Foucault himself developed himself in one of his latest texts, that is, in “What Is Enlightenment?” (1984). In this text, in which he is explicitly re-defining his philosophical endeavor as being indebted to Kant, Foucault argues taking up from Modernity a critical

attitude, that is “a philosophical ethos consisting in a critique of what we are saying, thinking, and doing, through *a historical ontology of ourselves*” (45, emphasis mine). Foucault explicitly characterizes this philosophical ethos as “a limit-attitude” (45). He explains this limit-attitude as follows:

Criticism indeed consists of analyzing and reflecting upon limits. But if the Kantian question was that of knowing what limits knowledge has to renounce transgressing, it seems to me that the critical question today has to be turned back into a positive one: In what is given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory, what place is occupied by whatever is singular, contingent, and the product of arbitrary constraints? The point in brief is to transform the critique conducted in the form of necessary limitation into a practical critique that takes the form of a possible transgression. (45)

Foucault is aware of the fact that the critical program he is proposing implies a transformation of the Kantian conception of critique. He defines the consequences of this shifting away from Kant’s original project in the sense:

that criticism is no longer going to be practiced in the search for formal structures with universal value, but rather as *a historical investigation* into the events that led us *to constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects* of what we are, doing, thinking, saying. In that sense, that criticism is not transcendental, and its goal is not that of making a metaphysics possible: it is genealogical in its design and archeological in its method. (45–46, emphasis mine)

Although he is explicitly pointing at his indebtedness to the Kantian project, he aims at escaping the “anthropological slumber” post-Kantian philosophy has fallen prey to by engaging in what he calls a “historical ontology of ourselves” (45). It can be argued that Foucault himself, at this point, is suggesting an alternative way to think about the humanity of man beyond humanism, taking into account both the historicity and the diversity of the possibilities of the post-human condition.

To the question in what way Foucault would have further elaborated his hypothesis into a full-blown project of post-humanist anthropology, there is of course no answer. For, Foucault, of course, could not—and did not want to—provide his readers with anything like a blueprint for the new ways of

“subjectivation” he had in mind. In order to get a slight idea of what that project could have been, we might, however, have a look at the work of the Canadian philosopher of science Ian Hacking. Taking up Foucault’s idea of a “historical” and/or “critical ontology of ourselves” (“Enlightenment” 47), Hacking further develops it in his project of “historical ontology.” Hacking’s project is about how new forms of being come into being. Or, in Hacking’s own words, “[h]istorical ontology is about the ways in which the possibilities for choice, and for being, arise in history” (*Historical Ontology* 23). In what follows, I take a closer look at what Hacking’s Foucauldian project is about, including its potential for considering post-human subjectivities.

IV. Towards a “Historical Ontology” of Man as a “Moving Target”

The reference to Hacking’s work might at first sight seem rather bizarre, given the fact that his name is generally and spontaneously associated with the research domain of the “history and philosophy of science.” It comes as no surprise that the Foucauldian idea of the historicization of knowledge was received very critically in a domain that is mainly dominated by analytically oriented epistemological and ontological approaches. Nevertheless, Hacking himself did not conceal his great indebtedness to Foucault’s work. Quite the opposite. Although the Foucauldian influence on Hacking’s philosophical work was hardly the subject of further research—a recent exception is the work of Colin Koopman³—it seems worthwhile taking into account Hacking’s reflections on human subjectivity as the object of the human sciences (psychiatry, psychology, anthropology, and so forth). Hacking’s particular interest in the humanities, of course, already itself evokes similarities to Foucault’s own interests. In the context of discussions concerning the specific status of the humanities and natural sciences, including the question whether they differ with respect to the kind of objects they are engaged with, Hacking distinguishes between “natural” or “indifferent” kinds—investigated by the natural sciences—and “human” or “interactive” kinds—studied by the human sciences. In both cases, Hacking is arguing from within the research

3. Koopman, Colin. *Genealogy as Critique: Foucault and the Problems of Modernity*. Indiana UP, 2013.

frame of the aforementioned “historical ontology,” articulating the Nietzschean idea that with new names, new objects come into being. In line with Foucault, Hacking points at both the historical character of concepts—as underlined by the French tradition of historical epistemology—and the historical coming into being of “kinds” of “things.” This implies that Hacking is re-taking up the “nominalist” line of thought that already could be discerned in Foucault (Flynn 31–47). Given his explicit interest in the epistemological and ontological status of the humanities and philosophical anthropology, Hacking is particularly interested in the status of “human kinds” or “kinds of people.” “What is curious about human action,” Hacking writes, “is that by and large what I am deliberately doing, depends on the possibilities of description. [...] Hence if new modes of description come into being, new possibilities for action come into being in consequence” (108).

In contrast to natural kinds, the specificity of these “human kinds” consists in the fact that they are dynamically interacting with the historically contingent and changing classifications (circulating in the social sciences, in psychology, and in psychiatry, for example). People are not only capable of identifying with the classifications of the contingently prevailing classificatory systems, implying as such the coming into being of different “possibilities for personhood” or possible “identities,” Hacking argues (107). But people are also aware of what is said about them and, thus, interact with the categories they are classified in. People are “interactive” kinds, according to Hacking. He thereby takes into account man’s being, as both classifying and classified, as subjected to a “looping effect.” This “looping” describes the reciprocal relationship (or in fact: a whole network of interactions) between people and categories. The feedback mechanism as such is the cause of the transient character and the modification of the classifications. This is why Hacking defines his view as a “dynamic nominalism,” pointing at the historically contingent, transient field of classifications and corresponding “identities” or “possibilities for personhood.” Hacking sees this specific feedback mechanism, characterizing the human or interactive kinds, at play since the beginning of the nineteenth century, equally referring to the post-Kantian tradition and the “invention” of the human sciences. Initially, Foucault seems to have stressed the problematic aspect of the essentializing and universalizing tendency of the Kantian project, reducing “what it is to be human” to a seemingly a-historic humanist essence, leading to the aforementioned “anthropological slumber.” In line with the later Foucault, however, Hacking is able to reveal the critical potential and the new

opportunities that Foucault's historicized version of Kant entails.

Hacking describes the historical possibilities for personhood or identities in terms of "making up people" (*Historical Ontology* 99–113). What it means to be a human being is made possible by a contingent, historical "space of possibilities" resulting in a multitude of possible identities. The looping, the classificatory feedback or interaction, makes that these potential identities are in transition. This is why Hacking is not talking about Man, but about kinds of people in terms of so-called "moving targets" ("Kinds of People" 312). Such moving targets cannot be tamed by a static philosophical anthropology aiming to define a universal and a-historical essence of what it is to be human. In this way, Hacking's historical ontology seeks to do justice to Man, as continuously and historically constituting and being constituted, by defining human beings as moving targets. This idea of man as a "moving target" mercilessly unmasks the ideological character of each attempt to ground the answer to Kant's *Was ist der Mensch?* on universal and a-historical structures, as this was done in post-Kantian philosophy and in humanist philosophical anthropology more in particular.

A concrete example of this "historical ontology" of subjectivities can be found in the domain of human sexuality, which, as stressed by both Foucault and Hacking, came into being as a proper domain of scientific research in the nineteenth century.⁴ This implies that only since the nineteenth century have come sexual "identities"—such as being "heterosexual" or "homosexual"—into being as "possibilities of personhood." Whereas these particular forms of subjectivation are still informed by the binary opposition between the male versus female sex, we can see how the further expansion and institutionalization of both sexology and psychiatry as scientific disciplines—including journals, experts, and research institutes—has contributed to the coming into being of an extreme diversity of sexual "possibilities of personhood" (bisexuals, transsexuals, a-sexuals, object-sexuals, and so on) (Davidson XIII). Correspondingly, we can see that the nineteenth-century category of "homosexuality" of course no longer equals "homosexuality" in the twenty-first century: Homosexuality has a conceptual and ontological history of its own. This is what is meant by the ideas of the looping effect and of moving targets. The issues of "sexual identity" became the subject of feminist studies, gay, lesbian, and gender studies, and

4. Cf. Foucault, Michel. *History of Sexuality*. Translated by Robert Hurley, Éditions Gallimard, 1978–1986. 3 vols; Hacking, Ian. *Historical Ontology*.

queer studies, amongst others. From the perspective of historical ontology, it leaves no doubt that, for example, also the strongly increasing digitalization of the domain of sexuality will open up new spaces of possibilities of (sexual) personhood and thus new kinds of people will come into being. A concrete example of post-human possibilities of (sexual) personhood includes the post-human scenario of taking into account the availability of so-called “sexbots” (Hauskeller 11–23).

Hacking’s particular claims of “making up people” and human kinds as moving targets seems to hold a promising insight for a post-human philosophical anthropology, for, in line with the latter project, Hacking continues to think what is human beyond the idea of an absolute and a-historical sovereign subject and from the expanse of a through and through historically contingent field of “possibilities for personhood.” The static essence of Man is demolished with the Nietzschean hammer and Kant’s “What is man?” is re-contextualized in a historical matrix of a multitude of possible identities, opening up to an undefined future. In this way, Hacking’s continuation of the Foucauldian project contributes to an ontological turn towards the post-human, with disturbing (future) notions of what constitutes subjectivity.

V. Conclusion: Thinking with Foucault, against Foucault?

In *The Order of Things*, Foucault stressed the foundational role of Kant’s *Anthropology* for the Modern Age, including the invention or “coming into being” of Man. At the same time, however, the Kantian tradition was held responsible for the “anthropologisation” of Western thought, implying a universalist, anthropocentric, humanist essentialist conception of what Man is or ought to be, insofar as can be discerned in the *classical* project of a philosophical anthropology.

In this contribution, I have tried to show how the very same critical tradition of Kant, as it was further developed by Foucault and Hacking, can give rise to a *post-humanist* philosophical anthropology that seems to be an intellectual ally for critical post-humanism. As I have tried to show, Hacking’s Foucauldian “historical ontology of Man” thereby holds promise for the tradition of critical post-humanism—whether this implies post-human philosophical anthropology or post-humanities—moving from a dissolution of a universalist anthropocentric human subject to the exploration of post-humanist fields of

possibilities for personhood. At the same time, and as a remainder, we can raise the question of whether we cannot leave the identitarian perspective—that seems inherent to both Foucault’s and Hacking’s research program—behind either, and, whether we cannot try to think human subjectivity in terms of a multitude of “post-identitarian” subjectivities. Although we can find traces of this post-identitarian way of thinking in both postcolonial and queer studies, it is clear that these “post-identitarian” possibilities were also originally influenced by Foucault. This means that, perhaps, at the end of the day, a further crystallization in considering possible post-humanist subjectivities might even result in a future thinking with Foucault against Foucault, throwing away the Foucauldian ladder in order to think the post-human condition in a new light.

Works Cited

- Bidet, Jacques. *Foucault Avec Marx*. La Fabrique, 2014.
- Davidson, Arnold I. *The Emergence of Sexuality: Historical Epistemology and the Formation of Concepts*. Harvard UP, 2001.
- Flynn, Thomas R. *A Poststructuralist Mapping of History*. U of Chicago P, 2005.
- Sartre, Foucault, and Historical Reason.
- “Foucault comme des petits pains.” *Le Nouvel Observateur*, 10 Aug. 1966, p. 29.
- Foucault, Michel. *Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology*. Edited by Robert Nigro, translated by Roberto Nigro and Kate Briggs, Semiotext(e), 2008.
- . *The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences*. 1966. Routledge, 1970.
- . “Philosophy and Psychology.” 1965. *Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology*, edited by James D. Faubion, translated by Robert Hurley, vol. 2, The New Press, 1988, pp. 249–59. Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984.
- . “The Subject and Power.” 1982. *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, U of Chicago P, 1983, pp. 208–26.
- . “What Is Enlightenment?” *The Foucault Reader*, edited by Paul Rabinow, Pantheon, 1984, pp. 32–50.
- Hacking, Ian. *Historical Ontology*. Harvard UP, 2002.
- . “Kinds of People: Moving Targets.” *Proceedings of the British Academy*, vol. 151, 2007, pp. 285–318.
- Hauskeller, Michael. *Sex and the Posthuman Condition*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.
- Herbrechter, Stefan. *Posthumanism: A Critical Analysis*. Bloomsbury, 2013.
- Janicaud, Dominique. *L’homme va-t-il dépasser l’humain?* Bayard, 2001.
- Ranisch, Robert, and Stefan Lorenz Sorgner, editors. *Post- and Transhumanism: An Introduction*. Peter Lang, 2014.
- Wolfe, Cary. *What Is Posthumanism?* U of Minnesota P, 2010.

Abstract

April 2016 was the fiftieth anniversary of the release of Michel Foucault's monumental study *Les Mots et les Choses* (1966), translated four years later as *The Order of Things* (1970). This contribution wants to revisit the enigmatic last part of Foucault's book in the light of the past half century of philosophical thinking, more particularly with regard to the post-humanist condition. Although Foucault's thesis of the "end of man" is an obligatory reference in studies on post-humanism, the specific presuppositions and implications of Foucault's so-called anti-humanism generally remained unexplored. In this contribution, Foucault's *The Order of Things* is re-evaluated, considering its potential for the project of "critical post-humanism." In this context, the following questions are taken into account: What humanism is targeted by Foucault's critique? What are the specific aspirations of Foucault's so-called "anti-humanism"? And, what is the latter's critical potential for the development of a post-humanist philosophical anthropology understanding post-humanism as a continuation-through-transformation of humanism? Further expanding on the fore-mentioned questions, this contribution reconsiders Ian Hacking's *Historical Ontology* (2002) as a further elaboration of the Foucauldian enterprise. In line with both Foucault and Hacking, the conditions of a post-humanist "historical ontology" of man are questioned in order to consider a philosophical anthropology for the 21st century.

Keywords: post-humanism, anti-humanism, historical ontology, humanism, Foucault, Hacking

Jens DE VLEMINCK is BOF Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Department of Philosophy and Moral Sciences at Ghent University, Belgium. He works in philosophical anthropology with a particular interest in psychiatry and psychoanalysis, and in the early works of Michel Foucault.
Jens.DeVleminck@UGent.be

Received: 4 August 2016 Reviewed: 8 September 2016 Accepted: 26 September 2016
--