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# Transhumanism and the Land of Cockayne

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## I. Introduction

A central element of most successful utopias is that they provide answers to some of the hardest human challenges. The poem “The Land of Cockayne” which was compiled around 1330 represents a widely shared utopian dreamland. The bioconservative bioethicist Michael Hauskeller claims that “Reinventing Cockayne(2012)” is a central transhumanist goal. That utopia is of enormous importance for transhumanism is being confirmed by Nick Bostrom and his “Letter from Utopia(2008).” I have some serious reservations concerning both of their positions which I will explain here.

There are religious, social, philosophical and many other types of utopias. A utopia can be a good place – an eu topos - or it can also be an ouk topos, a non-place, something which is not desirable, in which case, it can function as a warning. Even though utopias usually serve as a method of exploring alternative futures, some utopias lie in the past. Novalis regarded the middle ages as an utopian ideal, Winkelman Ancient times, and Rousseau a pre-cultural natural world. Of course, even in their cases, past ideals are used in order to present new option for future developments.

These latterly mentioned utopias are interesting from an intellectual perspective, but they were not effective as social movements or as world views which large groups have regarded as appealing.

More effective as social movements are such utopias which present solutions for social challenges, like Marx's utopia, or others which are concerned with the ultimate destiny both of humanity as well as that of individual human beings, like many Christian suggestions. In particular the latter ones have been extremely successful, because they provide answers to the most difficult human challenge, namely to find a way of dealing with death, dying, and human finality.

These issues also made me turn towards philosophy from a very young age onwards, from when I became a teenager, and they are still central to many of my philosophical endeavours. And yes, embracing, presenting, and advertising a weak Nietzschean transhumanism has to do with what I see as a plausible way of dealing with death, dying, and human finality. However, this does not have to imply that I am embracing a utopia, too. Yet, there are quite a few transhumanist approaches with strong utopian traces, but there are also others which can be classified as anti-utopian versions of transhumanism. My approach clearly belongs to the second category, even though; one might be able to argue that anti-utopias are merely a specific kind of utopia. There are uses of the concept of an anti-utopia which simply stand for an utopia with extremely negative outcomes. This is not the meaning which I employ. In addition, what I refer to when I deal with anti-utopias is not simply a non-utopian approach. Anti-utopian approaches include non-utopian versions of transhumanism, but they have additional implications in so far as they are also strongly directed against utopias as they represent an enormous

danger for human flourishing. I particularly wish to stress what has beautifully been pointed out by the demons in the final scene of the music drama “On the Noise of the World”, “Vom Lärm der Welt”, by the most fascinating German composer alive, Sven Helbig, namely that we are doomed, if we actually follow a utopia. I rather hold that the rejection of any kind of ultimate utopia promotes human flourishing. It is central to realize that living a good and a meaningful life does not have to include that your vision is being commonly or even widely shared which, however, is an essential element of utopias. It does not even have to be the case that what you live by, what you hold on to and what provides your life with meaning is shared by any other being. To have a meaning in life, if this is what you need, does not have to imply that you subscribe to a specific religion, either, by the way. Yet, it is this field of discourse which still contains many problematic arguments and polemics.

Germany’s leading philosopher alive, Jürgen Habermas is a prime example in this respect. He has attempted to attack and defeat transhumanism for a long time. In his well-known treatise on liberal eugenic (Habermas 2001, 43), he identifies a naturalist version of posthumanism with all too German Nietzschean breeding fantasies and reflections by the German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk on the rules for the human zoo. Here, Habermas is wrong in many respects.

Firstly, he means transhumanism but refers to posthumanism. Posthumanism is an outgrowth of postmodern philosophy, related to French thinking, and literary theory and cultural criticism. It has both a different origin as transhumanism, as well as a different purpose. Hence, it is misleading to identify post- and transhumanism (Ranisch/Sorgner, 7-28).

Secondly, it is wrong to identify Sloterdijk with transhumanist thinking. Sloterdijk merely stresses the need to ethically consider further emerging biotechnologies. He does not affirm the use of these technologies for a specific purpose, as transhumanists do. In a later speech which he gave at the University of Tübingen at the 6th of December 2005, Sloterdijk even rejects the use of biotechnologies for enhancement purposes, but accepts their use for therapeutic goals. Thereby, his position is more or less identical to Habermas' evaluation. Both approaches have to be classified as bioconservative ones(Sorgner, 2016a, 163-176).

Thirdly, it is false to identify transhumanist goals with all too German breeding fantasies. This position of his is supported by Habermas' use of language. Instead of discussing genetic enhancement issues, he refers to the technologies which need to be discussed as eugenic ones. The word "eugenics" has the connotation that a political system decides which type of human beings ought to be bred. The term "liberal eugenics" does not refer to such procedures, as it deals with the question of genetically altering oneself or one's offspring, due to the special relationship given in these circumstances. The concept "genetic enhancement" refers to the same type of procedures(Sorgner, 2006, 201-209). Still, words are being used as political weapons. Bioconservatives have the tendency of employing the word "eugenics", whereas bioliberals tend to prefer "genetic enhancement" for the same type of procedures. It needs to be noted that transhumanist suggestions function on liberal or libertarian political grounds, and therefore radically reject any type of all too German breeding fantasies. To identify transhumanism and German breeding fantasies means to lie in order to emotionally influence the audience.

It is interesting to note that Habermas' struggle against transhumanism continues. In his most recent publication on biotechnologies (Habermas, 2014, 36), he relates transhumanism to a sect-like way of thinking which is clearly misleading, if not outright false. Transhumanism does not demand cult acts, and does not have religious symbols, nor does it affirm unprovable dogmas. In contrast, it stresses the need to alter and adapt one's evaluations given that better scientific information is available. Yet, this attempt of Habermas to discredit the transhumanist approach became necessary, because his former judgment concerning this intellectual approach is no longer valid. In 2001, he claimed that he is happy that this philosophical perspective has not yet gained wider public support. This is no longer the case. In the meantime, transhumanists teach at leading universities, dominate Academic discussions in specialized disciplines, and are being considered in popular culture, too. The movie "Transcendence" with Johnny Depp from 2014 as well as the Dan Brown novel "Inferno" from 2013, in which transhumanist issues are at the heart of the plot, are clear indications for transhumanism having gained wider popularity. Hence, Habermas needed a further reason for discrediting transhumanism as a serious philosophical approach which was most probably the reason for him making the false above mentioned judgement.

These reflections on Habermas' way of dealing with transhumanism reveal a widespread tendency, namely to identify transhumanism with a quasi-religious approach. This is what he was doing by hinting at a relationship between transhumanist reflections and that of a sect. However, there have been other thinkers who stressed religious elements in transhumanist positions, and this has been done for

a great variety of motives, e.g.:

1 One reason is to stress that concerning their validity transhumanism is in no way superior to the views presented by traditional religious communities. Both are supposed to rest solely on faith. This, however, is not the case for transhumanism.

2 Others use this association in order to justify their own Mormon transhumanist beliefs. I regard these positions as internally problematic.

3 Further thinkers use this line of thought to discredit transhumanism as a non-immanent position, e.g. many posthumanists stress that mind-uploading implies a dualist anthropology which is similar to that of many monotheistic religions. This line of thought is not the case, as it is possible to affirm a naturalist anthropology and a functional theory of mind so that mind uploading can conceptually be thought within a naturalist framework(More, 7).

In any case, I do not think that reflections which identify transhumanism with a religion or a quasi-religion have any plausibility. Furthermore, the ideas presented in these arguments do not go along well with most basic premises of transhumanism and neither do they correspond to my way of thinking.

However, one does not have to subscribe to a religious outlook to present a utopian philosophy, and there are quite a few transhumanists who argue in favour of utopias or whose thinking contains many utopian traces. Three examples in this context are: Nikolai Fyodorov's concept of the perfection of the human race, Robert

Ettinger's Cryonics Institute, and The Abolitionist Project by David Pearce. There is a lot to be said about each one of these projects. However, for pragmatic reasons, I will merely focus on a specific topic which is employed fairly often by a great variety of transhumanists, namely that of "Immortality". It is also at the centre of many controversies about transhumanism from my point of view.

## II. Immortality

With immortality we have reached a topic which has been of great importance in the history of philosophy. It is also one where misunderstandings arise very easily. Russel Blackford stresses that I "am too quick (and too keen) to absolve transhumanism of any commitment to pursue physical immortality(Blackford, 203)." He might be right, but I do not think that this is the case, because it seems to me that many transhumanists do not seriously consider the meaning of the word "immortality" which is the reason for them using it.

It is a grave misunderstanding to claim that any serious transhumanist affirms immortality in any literal sense, as it is not the case that serious transhumanists strive for immortality, if immortality is taken in the literal meaning of the word. Given a wide-spread acceptance of several versions of a naturalist world-view among transhumanists, immortality cannot even be thought as a realistic option. Let us say, it will be possible to download your personality first onto a hard drive and then again into a new body, does this mean that you can be immortal? Of course this is not the case. Even in this

case, you live in a solar system which will exist for just another 5 billion of years. Maybe, we will have been able to move to another solar system by then so that human, or trans- or even posthumans can continue to exist there. Even in that case, we do not achieve immortality in this way, as it is highly likely that the movements of the universe will either come to a complete standstill or that the entire universe will collapse eventually and a black hole of infinite density will come into existence. How should it be possible for any human or trans- or posthuman to survive such situation? Hence, there are plenty of reasons for claiming that immortality in the literal meaning of the word is not a realistic option.

Still, there are transhumanists who use the word immortality and refer to it as a transhumanist goal? How are such utterances to be understood then? Immortality in these cases needs to be grasped as a specific type of utopia, not as one, which can actually be achieved. Personally, I think that in most historical cases, utopias were used not as realistic goals but in order to highlight the relevance of specific qualities, situations or characteristics. Such utopias, if understood correctly, are unproblematic. Yet, it is up to further investigations to clarify whether this is how most people understand the notion of a utopia.

In the case of the word “immortality”, it hints at the relevance of a long and healthy life. It must also be noted that in most cases human beings do not aim for a prolonging of their life-span but a prolonging of their healthspan, i.e. of the duration of time during which they live a healthy life. By using the word immortality the likelihood increases of getting media attention, of getting financial support, and of being talked about in many diverse social circles



and circumstances, even in theology departments. Any transhumanist who wishes to be taken seriously employs the word “immortality” for rhetorical reasons only. What is important in this context is not that immortality is a realistic goal, but that a prolonging of the health span is a realistic goal which is being affirmed by most human beings around the world, and, hence, deserves further attention. When discussing immortality and transhumanism, it is this issue which needs to be stressed. We talk about immortality in order to get public attention and to get funding for an event, but not because we regard immortality as a realistic option. Furthermore, it needs to be highlighted that affirming the importance of a prolonged health span does not imply a strong claim concerning a valid concept of the good life. It simply describes what most, but not all people value. To affirm a strong concept of the good life would have to imply claims concerning what is necessary for all people for living a good life which is not what I am doing, and which is a highly implausible goal.

### **III. An Anti-Utopian Transhumanism**

Instead of embracing and presenting a utopian transhumanism, I am arguing for an anti-utopian transhumanism. By means of utopian projects the danger exists that the present gets sacrificed for a utopian future which will never happen and which might and most probably ought to be seen as a vision which cannot even be properly conceptualized. The Third Reich, the various communist utopias, and mediaeval Christian political system clearly reveal the harm which can come about as a consequence utopian political projects. Utopias

are fine, if they are meant as rhetorical devices to hint at certain social and individual challenges. If they are meant literally and worse still, if they are understood literally, then utopias can have problematic implications. Fundamentalists can use them to try to install all types of totalitarian means to bring about the desired utopias which, however, cannot be realised. In these cases, people and the present in general get sacrificed for an impossible future. Unfortunately, there have been too many such social experiments in the history of humanity already, and which had dramatic consequences. Instead, my anti-utopian transhumanism focuses and stresses the importance of realistic goals:

### 1. Dynamic Politics of Freedom, Equality and Solidarity

It stresses the central importance of the norm of negative freedom, not as a fact, but as a social achievement for which generations of different interest groups have been fighting within the enlightenment. It enables human beings to live in accordance with all of their idiosyncratic concepts of a good life. I am not claiming that it has been realised in the appropriate manner in any society, but it has gained more social relevance than ever before in many enlightened countries at least. However, its relevance must never be forgotten and must permanently be fought for, if it is supposed to be considered in an appropriate manner. This, however, does not imply that equality and solidarity should not be important. This is definitely not a claim of mine. Still, I see the other two norms mentioned as derivative of the norm of freedom and in a dynamic dialectical relationship with freedom(Sorgner, 2015a, 225-236).

## 2. The Importance of a Radical Plurality of Goodnesses

The focus on the norm of freedom also has to do with my concept of the good. In difference to other transhumanists who uphold a Renaissance ideal of the good or a common sense ideal of the good, I regard any non-formal concept of the good as highly implausible and argue in favour of the radical plurality of goodness. Someone lives a good life by following one's very own idiosyncratic psychophysiological demands, one's very own desires, passions and fantasies. Most of us might not even be fully aware of what we want, because we are too strongly influenced by the one, Heidegger's 'man'. What one regards as appropriate gets taken over as a second nature by many people. One should not do this and that, and by living in any type of culture certain ought's or ought not's become the basis of a second nature whereby we do not even realize anymore in most instances that these established habits do not correspond to what we actually desire. To become aware of one's very own drive is much more difficult than is often believed(Sorgner, 2016b, 141-157). Yet, to embrace this concept of the good has significant cultural, political and social implications. It concerns cases like the following one: Person A wishes to have her healthy leg removed, as she does not regard it as belonging to her. A radical concept of the good does not exclude the possibility that his wish can be an authentic one.

### 3. Affirmation of a Culture of Plurality, Science, and Relationality

If we stick to and promote norm of freedom, we can hopefully even promote the coming about of a culture of plurality, and it is this direction which I also regard as appropriate for Europe, without claiming that there will ever be a perfect culture of plurality from which time onwards we will all live blissfully ever after. Most traditional utopias, which are taken as realistic goals, go against this suggestion, as they demand more uniformity within a culture. In addition to this, we need to attribute a special role to scientific insights, but not because they provide us with the truth in correspondence to the world, but because they work, and have proven themselves to work, as they are based on empirical studies. If insights no longer hold due to further studies, then we need to give them up, develop further and embrace new insights. It is this affirmation of flux, chance and dynamic processes which is lacking in most traditional utopias which present an unchanging perfect future state to which we should aspire. Finally, it is the element of relationality which I am stressing and with which goes along the need to revise many ethical paradigms. This one is quite a complex thought, and therefore, I will merely refer to one example in order to reveal the impact of this premise. It has to do with the implausibility of the culturally dominant way of conceptualizing humans, embryos and other animals. Human beings count as subjects. Animals, in most legal constitutions, fall under the object law and are to be treated like things, with the German foundational law being a paradigm case for this outlook. However, this understanding is not being shared widely any more

today which leads to the need to revise the way we deal with these issues(Sorgner, 2010, 212-266). Herein, many transhumanists agree and stress the need to introduce personhood for non-human animals. Maybe, this demand even needs to being expanded to personhood for non-human entities with sentience, and self-consciousness, and maybe even to post-personhood for entities with hyper-autonomy, superintelligence, nano-sentience, and meta-self-consciousness. Consequently, there might be the need to attribute post-personhood to Data from Star Trek, if he came into existence. This example merely reveals the paradigm shifting impact of this way of thinking.

It might also be the case that this anti-utopian thinking is being regarded as a utopia, even though, I rather stress it is a pragmatic way of moving forwards without a final goal by permanently looking for problematic circumstances which need to get fixed and then dealing with them. Yet, there are arguments to regard such an outlook as utopian, too, e.g. if one holds that humans have a widely shared need for utopias, then, paradoxically, my suggestion would have to count as a utopia, too. However, traditional utopian thinking, if it implies that the utopian goals count as realistic ones, usually has problematic paternalistic and totalitarian implications, as the ends can be used to justify any means, and unfortunately, in human history, we have already had too many examples of such political disasters. However, these risks are not given on the basis of the approach I am advertising(Sorgner, 2017a, 193-200). I think one reason why many people today still desire new utopias, is that they do not realise what wonderful achievements we have already realized. Many of these achievements are related to our technological inventions. Of course, for fully dealing with the coming about of the following

list of human achievements further explanations need to be considered, too, e.g. colonialism, imperialism. Let me just briefly refer to three particularly striking examples that highlight the widespread ignorance of such achievements.

### 1. A decent Work–Life–Balance with a lot of Vacation Time

In Europe, we are decelerated, as we have never been before. However, a thinker such as Hartmut Rosa stresses the need to slow down even further(Rosa, 2014) the permanent demand to decelerate is their mantra to all social challenges. If you see and realize how people work in Silicon Valley and in East Asian countries, then it is hard to grasp how anyone can take this suggestion seriously. In the contrast, I regard it as important to realize that we have never had as much free and vacation times as people in Europe have today. There have never been more people who do not have to struggle for the basic necessities of survival as there are in Europe today, too. Social welfare, universal health insurances and good educations systems are of central relevance for this being the case. It is an utterly significant insight to realize that this is the case. Decelerationists have the utopian fantasy that we all could dedicate ourselves to doing pottery in Tuscany all the time, but this is not how life works. Ivory-tower scholarship is not helpful in circumstances, when the need to take the perspective of a globalized world into consideration arises, which reveals that, if we decide to slow down further then the most probable future which Europe will have, will be that it will become the world's Disney land for Americans and Asians.

## 2. Non–Violence as a Social and a Lived Ideal

Sometimes TV seems to tell us that everything is going down the hill. There are wars and bad crimes happening everywhere and all the time. However, it is important to realize what scientists have to say about this claim. Here we have to note that physical violence has never been on such a low level as it is today. Of course, the situation is not a perfect one, and there could always be less violence. However, if you carefully consider the ground breaking and convincing research undertaken by Harvard psychologist Steven Pinker, then it will become clear that human rights, liberalisation and democratisation have led to a world with less violence, child abuse, domestic violence and other types of cruelty than ever before (Pinker, 2011). It shows that the situation is less bad than many think that it is, in particular here in Europe. Furthermore, it seems to me that there is a correlation between cognitive capacities and the likelihood of acting morally. By developing further concerning our cognitive capacities, the likelihood increases that the level of violence in our society gets reduced even further.

## 3. An increased Life–Span or even better: A longer lasting Health–Span

Last but not least, it is health issue which needs to be addressed. Hereby, we return to the transhumanist utopia of immortality. When talking about the use of the word “immortality” as a rhetoric device, I have hinted at a type of utopia to which my utopia-criticism does not apply, as here the idea is merely being used as a way of advertising a certain insight, and not as an idea which is supposed to function

as a realistic goal.

A prolonged health span is a realistic option and various enhancement technologies provide us with several diverse options for realizing this goal. That our life expectancy is not fixed becomes clear when considering the various life-expectancies in countries world-wide today which vary from less than 40 years in some countries in the southern parts of Africa to more than 80 years in many countries in Europe, Northern-America and Australia. Furthermore, the average global life-expectancy has significantly changed in time, too, from an average of 50 years in 1960 to an average of 65 years in 2010. Historical research also confirms important alterations. It shows that the average life-expectancy in ancient times was even lower than this. Scientific research confirms that the increase of our life expectancy is related to a great multiplicity of enhancement technologies from hygiene, to education, over antibiotics and vaccinations to contemporary biotechnologies. Consequently, there are reasons for claiming that technologies have been extremely successful in promoting the human life-span and also our health span which again provides us with a reason for expecting that emerging technologies will continue to help us in this respect, so that this development continues. By focusing our scientific research on the right questions, it can be expected that this development continues in an exponential manner. Here the central question is the following: What are the best possible research topics in this respect? Aubrey de Grey stresses the relevance of the seven deadly sins of aging. Ray Kurzweil refers to the option of mind-uploading. Others might stress the potential of artificial superintelligence, cryonics, genetic modification or genetic selection procedures after in vitro fertilization and preimplantation



genetic diagnosis. It is highly likely that no single answer will be the right one, but that a great variety of technologies will be able to influence and prolong our life-expectancy.

Personally, I regard the field of genetics as most promising concerning a prolonging of our health span. It might be interesting to note that even a bioconservative like Habermas in the context of discussion on gene ethics acknowledges the relevance of longevity. In some passages of his essay on liberal eugenics he talks about preventive measures as well as a prolonged life expectancy in the context of morally legitimate therapeutic purposes of eugenic interventions, as all these measures can be seen as all-purpose goods (Habermas, 2001, 48). Unfortunately, he is not consistent within his reflections, because a couple of pages later, he claims that genetic interventions can only be justified to avoid extreme evils or illnesses. By solely focusing on his former remarks Habermas could be seen as a transhumanist thinker, because enhancement measures can be interpreted as specific cases of therapy. However, such a reading is clearly not in tune with what Habermas has in mind. Still, it needs to be noted that even for a bioconservative thinker such as Habermas, it is not out of the question to employ gene technologies in order to prolong the human lifespan, which reveals the widespread importance of this goal and the praiseworthiness of transhumanists who bring this goal into the right focus by employing special rhetorical methods, e.g. the use of words such as immortality. It is also a timely endeavor, as scientific research reveals that the presence of certain genes in specific circumstances seems to indicate a higher likelihood of longevity, e.g. CETP genes. What is the relevance of such findings?

If longevity or a prolonged health span is identified with a widespread or even an all-purpose good, than there are reasons for allowing genetic enhancements in order to promote these genes. There are several options of how this can be done: 1. Genetic enhancement by modification: Studies reveal that such a modification can be done without there having to be any side effects, and elsewhere I have shown that morally such modifications ought to be evaluated in the same way as parental education(Sorgner, 2015b, 31-48); 2. Genetic enhancements by selection after IVF and PGD: Again it is clear that this procedure is already a reliable one, but also one which is still forbidden or whose use is radically restricted in many countries, e.g. Germany; (Sorgner, 2014, 199-212) 3. Pharmacological, cyborg or morphological enhancements which take into consideration a gene analysis: It is this option which can gain wider acceptance due to the enormous amount of information which is being collected due to big gene data. The impact of this research and the relevance of related moral issues such as that of bioprivacy and gene privacy can hardly be underestimated(Sorgner, 2017b, 87-103). However, these reflections are meant to solely hint at some small area in which enormous developments have already taken place. Many other examples could be mentioned, too.

#### **IV. Conclusion**

What I was trying to show here is that there are two types of transhumanists. Those, who affirm a utopian perspective as a realistic goal, and others who do not. The fantasy, dream or whatever you

wish to call it that there will ever be a world without suffering, full of high jinks and without any fear concerning not even being able to survive on an everyday basis, is one which I regard as highly dangerous, because it has been abused too often to justify limitations, violent actions and paternalistic attitudes concerning currently living human beings. As a counter suggestion, I have sketched the outline of an anti-utopian version of transhumanism, which functions on the basis of some basic guidelines. These could help us detecting morally problematic current structures so that we can try to get rid of them. The wish to long for a utopia often arises, due to a discontentment with the presence which again is very often associated with too high expectation for one's own life. Permanently doing pottery in Tuscany, or a life in the Land of Cockayne are no realistic options. By focusing on the manifold achievements we have already been able to realize, it might be easier not to be tempted into following a life of silly daydreams. I am not a disillusioned romantic or cynical depressive. However, I think that by embracing an anti-utopian stance, we can achieve more, lead more fulfilled lives, and decrease the likelihood of being doomed. I think there is a lot to be said concerning all of these goals.

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## Abstract

### Transhumanism and the Land of Cockayne

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There are two types of transhumanists. Those, who affirm a utopian perspective as a realistic goal, and others who do not. The fantasy, dream or whatever you wish to call it that there will ever be a world without suffering, full of high jinks and without any fear concerning not even being able to survive on an everyday basis, is one which I regard as highly dangerous, because it has been abused too often to justify limitations, violent actions and paternalistic attitudes concerning currently living human beings. As a counter suggestion, I have sketched the outline of an anti-utopian version of transhumanism, which functions on the basis of some basic guidelines. These could help us detecting morally problematic current structures so that we can try to get rid of them. The wish to long for a utopia often arises, due to a discontentment with the presence which again is very often associated with too high expectation for one's own life. Permanently doing pottery in Tuscany, or a life in the Land of Cockayne are no realistic options. By focusing on the manifold achievements we have already been able to realize, it might be easier not to be tempted into following a life of silly daydreams. I think that by embracing an anti-utopian stance, we can achieve more, lead more fulfilled lives, and decrease the likelihood of being doomed.

**Keywords:** Transhumanism, utopia, immortality, Nietzsche, Sloterdijk, Habermas.

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## 국문초록

### 트랜스휴머니즘과 무릉도원

트랜스휴머니스트에는 두 가지 유형이 있다. 유토피아적 관점을 현실적인 목표로 받아들이는 이들과 그렇지 않은 이들이다. 나는 꿈, 공상, 혹은 뭐라 부르건 온통 신나는 일뿐 고통은 전혀 없고, 일상의 기반에서 남아남지 못할지 모른다는 두려움도 전혀 없는 세상이 있기를 바라는 마음을 대단히 위험한 것으로 본다. 왜냐하면 이러한 소망이 현재 살아있는 인간들과 관련하여 한계나 폭력적인 행동, 온정주의적 태도를 정당화하기 위해 너무 많이 남용되었기 때문이다. 나는 이와 반대편에서 트랜스휴머니즘의 반유토피아적 판본을 대략적으로 묘사했다. 이것은 기본적인 가이드라인의 토대로 작용한다. 이것들은 우리들이 도덕적으로 문제가 있는 현재의 구조를 제거할 수 있도록 탐색하게 도와준다. 유토피아를 바라는 소망은 현존에 대한 불만족에서 일어나는 경우가 많으며, 이는 다시 삶에 대해 지나치게 높은 기대와 이어진다. 언제까지나 토스카니에서 도자기를 굽거나 무릉도원에 사는 것은 현실적인 선택안이 아니다. 우리가 이미 실현할 수 있었던 다양한 성취에 초점을 맞추므로써, 어리석은 백일몽이나 꾸는 삶을 좇게 될 유혹을 물리칠 수 있을 것이다. 나는 반유토피아적 입장을 수용함으로써 우리가 더 많은 것을 성취하고, 더 성취감 있는 삶을 이끌고, 불운을 겪을 확률을 줄일 수 있다고 본다.

**키워드:** 트랜스휴머니즘, 유토피아, 불멸, 니체, 슬로터다니크

Received:	1	November	2017
Reviewed:	7	February	2018
Accepted:	14	February	2018