

Globalization and State Rebuilding in China

윤경우 (Yun, Gyong-woo) *

(E-mail : gyongwooyun@kookmin.ac.kr)

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* 학위취득대학 : Temple University
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<국문요약>

글로벌화의 확산으로 인해 국가와 국가의 시간적·공간적 경계가 느슨해지고 국민국가(nation-state)가 독점해왔던 국민에 대한 장악력도 상대적으로 약화되고 있다는 것이 일반적인 견해이다. 또한 글로벌화 과정에서 국민국가는 다소 반응적이거나 수동적인 역할을 하는 것으로 인식되고 있다.

그러나 본 논문은 이러한 일반적인 견해와 인식의 타당성에 대해 중국의 실제적인 글로벌화 경험을 사례로 들어 반박한다. 현대 중국의 글로벌화는 상당한 정도까지 국민국가들의 전략적인 선택·결정과 의식적·의도적인 행동에 의해 발생하고 있다. 중국의 경우 일반적인 견해의 기대만큼 글로벌화에 따라 국민국가의 능력과 역할이 약화되거나 소멸되지 않고 있으며, 오히려 국가가 글로벌화 과정을 주도하면서 자신이 선호하는 방향으로 글로벌화의 방향이 전개되고 있다. 한마디로 말하면, 중국의 글로벌화는 국민국가의 종식으로 귀결되지 않을 것으로 예상된다.

[주제어] 글로벌화, 국민국가, 중국

I. Introduction

Since the reform and open-door(改革開放) policy, China has

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transformed itself from the world's most important opponent of globalization into a committed member of the global institutions and advocate of globalization.

Now China is accepted widely to be one of the biggest winners of globalization in the world. Most of China's economic successes are associated with liberalization and globalization, and each aspect of globalization has brought China further successes.

Before the mid-1990s, the main theme of the globalization literature in China was the decline of the nation-state. Chinese scholars, who recognizing that globalization could challenge the state power, scarcely used the concept of globalization because it was received ideologically as a synonym for capitalism. Even for those few advocates of globalization, the term was used strictly in its economic sense during the 1990s(Yu, 2005).

In 1998, Jiang Zemin, then President and General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, spoke for the first time about economic globalization as "an objective trend for global economic development."¹⁾ The top leader's recognition of globalization gave a great impetus to Chinese scholars and analysts engaged in studies of globalization, making it a hot issue among Chinese intellectuals.

Although globalization has posed serious challenges to the Chinese state, the Chinese leadership has regarded globalization as a unique opportunity to rebuild the Chinese state. A particular

1) Jiang also pointed out that "A developing nation like China should be both daring and good at engaging in the international cooperation and competitions under such economic globalization." (Jiang Zemin, 1998) This point was made emphatically when, despite significant domestic opposition, Jiang and then Premier Zhu Rongji pushed ahead with a deal with the United states on terms of accession for the WTO.

mind-set prevailed among Chinese leaders. While nationalism was directed at building a strong and wealthy China, Chinese leaders recognized that such a goal could only be realized by integration the country into the global community. Such a mind-set and new ideological commitment to globalization have enabled the Chinese leadership to make greater efforts to legitimate capitalism as a means to achieve a prosperous and strong Chinese state. This is why the Chinese leadership has vigorously promoted toward globalization since the reform and open-door policy.

The case of China to cope and deal with globalization is a counter-example against the common assumption that globalization is forcing nation-states to adapt, portraying nation-states as a somewhat reactive, even passive, role in the process. Globalization in China occurred not in spite of the nation-state, but really, to a significant extent, because of decisions and actions by the very Chinese state. The Chinese state has not been a reactive or passive recipient of globalization's effect, but an proactive seeker consciously accelerating and managing the globalization process in the way it can survive(雷新超 2006, 王艷芬 2002).

In this line of argument, I present a critical assessment of the literature on one aspect of the issue: globalization's relationship to the nation-state with reference to China. After a conceptual discussion of globalization in general, I first present the standard approach - that it has caused the 'retreat of the nation-state' - dividing it into three categories: economic, political and social-cultural. I then discuss various criticisms of this paradigm, finding neither of the two paradigm satisfactory, and thus present an alternative approach which is more comprehensive and adequate, arguing that the aforementioned relationship is

multi-directional and multi-dimensional. In the latter part of this article, I discuss, from a macro-sociological perspective, the relationships between economic, political and cultural globalization and China as an empirical application of the alternative approach.

II. Globalization's Relationship to the Nation-State

One of the main themes of the globalization literature is the decline of the nation-state.²⁾ The mainstream argument concerning the impact of globalization on the nation-state holds that the process of globalization is increasing the integration of economies, polities, and cultures, producing a tendency toward uniformity and the domination of transnational capital, ideas, symbols and values on a world scale thereby upsetting the ability of individual nation-states to regulate economic activity, to extract and redistribute surpluses, to harmonize conflicting interests, and to control political processes as well as cultural values and practices within national boundaries(Ohmae 1995, Shaw 2000).

From an economic perspective, globalization is dominated by neoliberal beliefs in free trade and free markets in which minimize the role of the state and maximize the private business sector. Accordingly, there are arguments that economic globalization, especially the activities of the MNCs, massive international

2) Although there isn't a single definition of the nation-state and its related terms, for the purpose of this paper, the nation-state will be regarded as a territory that is both governed by a state and inhabited by a people who not only share a common culture, history, and language but also consider themselves a nation.

financial flows and growth of international trade - which have been supported by technological advancement, innovations, developments of communication and transportation systems - challenges the state. Challenges are numerous: national governments are no longer in control of the spread of ideas, capital, technology, labor, trade or ownership of economic assets. Along this line, scholars describe the crisis of the nation-state, the eclipse of the state, the retreat of the state, and even the end of the state-state(Strange 1996, Danine 1996).

In political terms, globalization is concerned with the impact on the nation-state given the increasing economic interdependence across borders. National sovereignty, autonomy, and notions of national citizenship are weakened, power among states, markets, and civil societies shift such that structures, actors, processes, and values are redefined(Held and McGrew 1998). International organizations and regimes, non-state actors, transnational bodies or national pressure groups, whose activities spill over into the international arena, influence the state's authority in a situation of (Keohane and Nye 1989). Questions arise 'complex interdependence'concerning who governs and how, and on behalf of whom, especially as citizenship is no longer synonymous with nationality.

From a socio-cultural perspective, attention turns to the dialectical strains between global and local cultural changes. There is a tension between the way in which globalization brings forth more standardization and cultural homogeneity, while also bringing more fragmentation and cultural heterogeneity through the rise of locally oriented movements. The popular 'homogeneity' argument holds that the world is sharing a more or less singular global

culture. This is reflected in Ritzer's arguments for the "McDonalization of society", and is understood as the expansion of predominantly American values across the globe(Ritzer 1993). The 'heterogeneity' argument involves the idea that the 'global culture' involves an increasingly ethnic and cultural plurality and that the diversity of modern societies undermines the power of the nation-states from within, weakening its integrative functions and leading to a crisis legitimacy. This new trend towards diversity is also related to the notion of multicultural citizenship(Koopmans, Statham, Giugni and Passy 2005), which leads "states [to] lose their monopoly over the idea of a single global culture, seeing it as a "speculative discourse"(Tomlinson 1999, p. 240).

There also are diverse perspectives challenging the widespread belief that the process of globalization has been undermining the nation-state in economic, political and socio-cultural domains. Against the arguments on the decline or disappearance of the nation-state, counter-arguments explore contradictory processes involved in globalization.

Wallerstein sees the current world-system as driven primarily by economic imperatives stressing the global character of contemporary capitalism, he nevertheless maintains the continuing importance of the nation-state. The world-system involves a global division of labor based on a hierarchy of states, those in the core acting as "politico-economic guarantors" of the system. Thus, for him, although there is one single global economy, which was created by capitalism's internal drive for constant expansion, there is also a multiplicity of nation-states which is useful for the survival of the system.³⁾

In a somewhat similar fashion, Evans makes a case for the

increasingly power/influence of the nation-state in today's economy all over the world. The nation-state's role vis-a-vis the global economy is characterized by an "embedded autonomy." He argues that the state involvement in economy is crucial for the development of national economies, especially in what Wallerstein calls 'semi-peripheral' countries such as Korea, India and Brazil, the leading NICs(Evans 1995).

Hirst and Thompson, starting from a very different point, come to the same conclusion. They insist that "there is no strong tendency toward a globalized economy and the major advanced nations continue to be dominant."⁴⁾ According to them, globalization does not lead to the "end of politics." However, there is growth in trans-border political issues and problems that erode the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs(internal/external). There are overlapping interests in such issues as environment, health, human rights, trade and finance.

3) Wallerstein emphasized the development of a capitalist world economy with a division of labor between core countries specialized in highly skilled and capital intensive activities, a periphery of low skill and low capitalization, and a semi-periphery that mediated between them(Wallerstein 1979, p. 162).

4) They present a five-point criticism of globalization theories: (1) The present international economy is not unique in history. Statistical evidence shows that it is rather less open now than it was between 1870 and 1914; (2) Genuinely transnational corporations appear relatively rare; (3) Capital mobility is exaggerated. Foreign direct investment is highly concentrated among the advanced industrial countries; (4) Trade, investment and financial flows are concentrated in the triad-Europe, Japan and North America; (5) Major economic powers have the capacity, if they coordinate policy, to exert powerful governance over financial markets and economic tendencies(Hirst and Thompson 1999, p. 186).

Thus there is a need for trans-boundary coordination and control. Hence, in certain regions, there are multiple power centers and there are both overlapping authority structures (a state of affairs in which the fortunes of different political communities are bound together) and divided authority structures(Hirst and Thompson 1999).

There is another perspective that treats the relationship between globalization and the nation-state, offered by Giddens. He assumes that the nation-state system of globalization will remain as part of the globalized modernity as long as it remains a universal form of the legitimate control of power, and as long as states maintain successful monopoly over the means of violence. Moreover, he argues that nation-states find it useful to cooperate with one another, which results in losing some control over their internal affairs via international institutions such as the EU.⁵⁾

A number of other theorists are reexamining the relationship between globalization theory and state theory to argue that nation-states as the principle agents of globalization as well as the guarantors autonomous global state, as the repositories of a new sovereignty, this emerging theoretical position conceptualizes globalization as a new form of American imperialism(Barrow 2004).

5) However, this provides them with greater global influence at the expense of autonomy. Giddens furtherer argues that the late modernity has increased the significance of "life politics" as opposed to traditional notion of power [in the Weberian sense], which in turn has led to the individualization of politics. He argues that the increasing significance of social movements and identity politics has not reduced the relevance of the nation-state, because its judicial and administrative functions still have some degree of significance in terms of life politics(Giddens 1991, pp. 210-214).

III. Globalization and the Changing Role of the Nation-State

Main contours of the two paradigms within the debate on the impact of globalization on the nation-state have been presented so far. The first set of approaches sees, from economic, political and socio-cultural perspectives, that the authority or power has leaked up, down, and out from the nation-states in the process of globalization because its borders no longer correspond to economic, cultural and social spaces. The second set criticizes these views maintaining, from yet different perspectives, that the nation-state system is part and parcel of contemporary globalization and thus preserves its importance in the face of various globalizing trends.

Although there are a large heterogeneity in the degree of globalization over time and across countries and regions of the World as well as within countries, The two opposing approaches, regardless of their position in the debate, are paying little attention to one crucial aspect of globalization: that of variation. Instead, many of them establish all-encompassing generalities they claim hold true for the entire globe as a unit of analysis. Most arguments in the literature purport to be globally inclusive whereas the process actually involve different dimensions. In fact, the process of globalization is not only multi-dimensional, but also multi-directional, involving different trends that are often in conflict with each other. This multi-directionality holds true in terms of globalization's impact on the autonomy and sovereignty of the nation-state as well: some aspects of the nation-state have been weakened, others have not.

Thus, no matter which side of the argument one takes, a singular and linear understanding of the globalization process, whether it is predominantly economic, political or socio-cultural, proves to be inadequate in the face of empirical variations especially among existing states. For instance, economic globalization undermines some national states in the administration of certain aspects of their economies, but at the same time national governments function as a medium of the regulation of increasingly globalizing economic relations as well.

In this context, concrete instances of the encounter between the forces of globalization and nation-states need to be studied before asserting such across-the-board generalizations. To study those concrete instances an alternative theoretical approach that takes into account the notions of multiplicity of trends and variations within the process of globalization is necessary.

Such an alternative account is provided by Mann who argues that globalization has not ended "the rise and rise of nation-state" as well as supported by Bhandari and Heshmati's empirical research on the measurement of globalization and its variations among countries, regions and over time (Mann 1997, Bhandari and Heshmati 2005).

Mann argues that, unlike the argument put forward by the enthusiasts of globalization, there is no single global society or economy, rather the contemporary world involves multiplicity and variation. More specifically, he draws four conclusions in relation to the impact of globalization on the nation-state: (1) it has differential impacts on different states in different regions, (2) some global trends weaken, others strengthen nation-states, (3) some national regulations transform to international and

transnational as opposed to global regulations, (4) some trends simultaneously strengthen both the nation-state and transnationalism.

Bhandari and Heshmati's empirical research proves that the experiences with globalization in different part of the world are different. Global processes produce different effects in different continents, countries, regions and localities because they are always shaped by specific social and natural characteristics of each. As a result, there is a large heterogeneity in the degree of globalization over time and across countries and economic and geographic regions of the World as well as regions within countries. Geographic diversities across the world arise as a conflict with globalization.

The case of China, specifically its last two to three decades of deep economic and social transformation, constitutes a fascinating example in this respect. Globalization has weakened the power of the Chinese state in some areas, and the state responded to its declining power consciously in some cases and unconsciously in others. The Chinese state has not merely played the role of the fire brigade, reacting passively to the negative consequences of economic transformation and globalization. Instead, the state has adopted a proactive approach to re-make the state system. These conscious actions have not only modernized the Chinese state but also strengthened the power of the state in many aspects.

IV. China's Embrace of Globalization

Before reform China tried to close its doors and resisted

globalization. This produced the image of China as the world's greatest opponent of globalization and greatest disrupter of the global institutions created. At present, however, it has been transformed into a committed member of those institutions and advocate of globalization, thus, has become a far more open economy than Japan.

The liberalization and globalization of China brought its success. China has now become a leading economy in the world, the second largest in FDI inflow, the third largest in foreign trade, the fourth largest in GDP, and an important engine for the global economic growth. One of the key factors for China's success is its integration into the world economic system, enabling it to utilize the global market resources (market, capital and technology). The WTO accession has made the Chinese economy more open, more transparent and more integrated into the world economic system. China's new regional strategy, i.e. forming FTA with its partners, as well as its 'foreign investment strategy', have deepened and will continue to further intensify its economic integration and cooperation with its partners.

In a regional perspective, the Asia-Pacific is the major region from which China receives the most FDI inflows, as well as the principal destination of its exports, with the US and Japan being the two largest markets. East Asia accounts for half of China's foreign trade and more than 70% of FDI inflow. China's trade with South Asia is still small in volume, but high in growth rate. With the emergence of the Indian economy, trade and services between China and India have increased very rapidly in the recent years.

Economic relations between East Asia and South Asia used to be very weak. But this now seems to change with Indian

economic dynamism and its active “Eastward strategy.” Considering its geographical location and its further economic expansion, China can play an important and special role in bridging East and South Asian regions through trade, investment, service, technology, as well as broad economic cooperation activities.

China’s globalization is not confined to opening the economy but more importantly to globalization of institutions(Zweig 2002). Today China is the country that sends missions throughout the world seeking best practice. Of course, such changes occur gradually. But the changes are startlingly fast compared what other countries do. It adapts not just foreign technology and foreign corporate management techniques but also a wide variety of foreign institutions and practices: international accounting standards; British, U.S. and Hong Kong security laws; French military acquisition systems; a central bank structure modeled on the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank; Taiwan style regulations for foreign portfolio investment; an economic development strategy adapted from South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan; and many others.

Among the most important of these changes are the decision to adopt the Western concept of rule of law; adaptation of competition as a centrally important economic practice; and adoption of English language as virtually a second language for the educated Chinese population. Perhaps most importantly, China has sent its elite youth abroad for education in an exercise of internationalism.

China is also experiencing globalization of tastes. The exposure of Chinese population to foreign brands has been incorporating

them into global culture. Chinese people have been so much more exposed to global culture than South Koreans of a generation ago that no car could succeed in China unless it incorporated global designs and prestigious foreign technologies. Ten to thirty years ago, when South Korea was at a phase of car industry development more comparable to China today, one hardly saw a European nor American car on the road, and they are still very rare today. But in China the roads are packed with European, Japanese, and American cars.

China has come to believe in globalization more than most third world countries and many first world countries. China's success have all coincided with 'reform and opening'(改革開放), that is, with globalization. In contrast, Japan's and South Korea's successes occurred in an era when, although they were globalizing, they employed far stricter controls on trade, foreign investment, and domestic economic activity than today's China.

However, the process of globalization in China also presents drawbacks or problems, which serve to hinder the full development of the Chinese economy. It has been reported that globalization has required extremely painful adjustments by China. Employment in the state enterprises has declined from 110 million in 1995 to 36 million in 2007. Manufacturing jobs have declined from over 54 million in 1994 to under 20 million in 2005. Even these striking numbers understate the adjustments China has had to accept due to greater competition and from WTO membership.

The different problems presented, which have been the drawbacks of globalization, have been the result of the lack of appropriate management of the Chinese government. It has emphasized that under the old management of socialism, there was

practically no achievement motivation, innovative capabilities and competitive attitudes of workers from the top to the bottom. However, the change in the management due to globalization and world integration provided and opened opportunities for workers to display their motivation, innovative and competitive attitudes and capabilities. In addition, the new Chinese management is based on the Chinese cultural tradition, thus giving each worker the chance to grow and develop as an individual. In this regard, it can be perceived that the success of the economy of China does not only rely on the consequences of the globalization process, but on the management and leadership of the Chinese itself. In this sense, it can be understood that the success of a nation does not depend on sole determinants, but depend on a variety of factors in the society.

It is hard to overstate the social adjustment Chinese are experiencing. But because China has been willing to accept such adjustments, no large country in human history has ever experienced such rapid improvements in living standards and working conditions. When reform began in 1978, workers in Shanghai all wore the same clothes, looked tired and listless, and seldom owned basic appliances like TV. The World Expo opening May 1 in Shanghai will not only showcase continuing improving living standards of the Chinese people but also display the country's pride and growing power, just as the Beijing Olympics showed China's growing economic and geopolitical influence in 2008.

V. State-Guided Globalization as an Optimal Choice for China

China is rising in the age of globalization. Although China initially accepted greater interdependence largely out of economic necessity early in the reform era, it has since come to embrace interdependence and globalization with increasing enthusiasm. However, the Chinese political leadership recognize that for China economic globalization is a double-edged sword(一把雙刃劍) that brings both opportunities and challenges(張伯里 2000, 陳德照 2001). Globalization may well help stimulate the rapid development of Chinese economy, but politically can pose the most daunting challenges to the Chinese state power. Thus, the Chinese Communist Party government has actively sought to manage the course of globalization, although China has embraced overall.

Authoritarian states like China often exercise tight control over domestic economic transactions. However, globalization has created an economic sector which is beyond state control, and this sector-related population is undoubtedly beyond state control. Moreover, globalization has also created international civil societies such as international non-governmental organizations, which are not confined to national boundaries and are beyond the reach of national power. Thus, will the Chinese state come to end?

This study shows a different direction of development for the Chinese state. Although economic transformation and globalization have undoubtedly challenged state power, the Chinese state has been an integral part of China's globalization process and its has played an important role in pushing globalization and economic

transformation(李濱 1997). Rather than sitting idle and awaiting its demise, the Chinese state has responded to globalization and its consequences very forcefully. The responses of the state to globalization are leading to a drastic transformation of the Chinese state system.

Globalization has created opportunities for the Chinese leadership to remake the state system. With reform measures properly thought out and implemented, the state can not only survive globalization, but can also borrow external pressure to transform itself. In order to cope with globalization and its consequences, the Chinese state has to accommodate market forces and accept the internationally negotiated sets of rules and institutions(段會娟 2003). The Chinese state leadership has introduced great changes into its state system. These changes are undoubtedly pushing the Chinese state to become more modernized. In this sense, the Chinese state is becoming more Western. Nevertheless, it is debatable whether all these changes are westernizing the Chinese state. Besides importing Western state products to modernize the state, the leadership has also frequently borrowed from their own country's tradition to serve its goals. Traditional factors such as Confucian values and communist legacy have been built into modern institutions, and the functioning of modern institutions often takes traditional forms(馬振清 2007, 馬峰成 2000). As a result, great divergences between the Chinese state and modern Western states exist, and convergence and divergence co-exist in China.

The convergence and divergence in China is not only the results of national cultures and institutions. More importantly, they are the products of conscious actions by the Chinese leadership in

response to globalization and its consequences. National cultures and institutions are important in shaping the form of the Chinese state, but the leadership plays an even more important role in this process. While the modernizing of the state system has become inevitable, the choice of the leadership in reshaping the form of the state is a reflection of nationalism, the politics of identities, regime survival, and the monopoly of power by the Chinese Communist Party. Consequently, while globalization becomes an irreversible trend, the Chinese state has also displayed its Chineseness.

Like elsewhere, globalization in China can be understood as a process of the internationalization of Western states. To a great degree, globalization leads to international convergence of the Chinese state since the leadership has to import Western products in order to cope with globalization driven by Western capitalism and states. In doing so, the Chinese state has also deliberately increased its divergence in order to accommodate and survive globalization and its consequences. Globalization has made the Chinese society more complicated and more difficult to govern and frequently leads to the rise of nationalism(王金良 2008). Facing these challenges and enormous practical difficulties, the leadership cannot westernize the state at will; instead, it has to appeal to traditional means to cope with the negative impact of globalization. Consequently, globalization is making the Chinese state more modern while maintaining its Chineseness.

Successful economic initiatives led to a wave of importation of Western state products. Though China's economic development still has its uniqueness, it is increasingly clear that what has supported economic activities are Western forms of economic institutions(郭忠華 2002). To a large extent, the more successful the economic

reforms, the greater the threats to the present political system. Capitalistic reform measures have challenged the Chinese Communist Party to cleanse itself of rigidity and inefficiency, to move from the 'dead hand' of centralized planning to a new combination of the visible hand and invisible hand. The loosening of central controls has released more energy than expected. Growth has been uneven, with the favored coastal areas developing much faster than the relatively neglected interior. Many divisions of government have failed to cope with the speed of change. Furthermore, rapid development benefited the enterprising and the bold, but unfortunately also the greedy and the corrupt. Thus the mood among the majority of ordinary people is for a stronger sense of direction, for greater checks on growth, and even nostalgia for the days when things were more certain and predictable. These desires undoubtedly pose serious challenges to the leadership.

An important question can be raised by the leadership: How can the various challenges arising from capitalistic development be dealt with? We have seen different discourses regarding China's future path. Heated debates have arisen among social groups, especially intellectuals, despite tight control from the government. These debates are not markedly different from those taking place almost a century ago when China faced challenges from foreign imperialism. There are not many alternative views, and some of them are more realistic than others(Wang 2002).

Among Chinese leaders, some have argued that the country needs to be saved from the immoral and the wicked by a return to better planning and tighter controls, and powers need to be more centralized to enable the national government to correct the

growing imbalance between the interior and the coastal regions. Some even have called for a return to traditional values to combat the rapid spread of Western ideas(王東聖·李文孝 2005).

Importation of Western state products had to be selective, and innovation of imported products was imperative. Several factors stood out as contributing to this position. First, for the leadership, importation need not undermine the leadership and the rule of the Chinese Communist Party(David 1999). Importation of Western state products strengthens, not weakens, the Chinese state. What the leadership desires is to change the institutional base of its political legitimacy, but not to change the ruler.⁶⁾

Second, radical importation has become less desirable nowadays because there are no serious external threats. Globalism is taking place in age largely devoid of foreign imperialism. Chinese nationalism has witnessed a great transformation from pursuing power and wealth to expressing power and wealth. Throughout the modern era, Chinese leaders never stopped importing Western state products as a way first to save the nation, and then to build a

6) Globalization has thrown up challenges and opportunities which China has to grapple with. China's leaders have embraced global capitalism and market-oriented modernization. The case of China shows that with reform measures properly implemented, the nation-state can not only survive globalization, but can actually be revitalized through outside influence. To adapt to the globalized age, Chinese leaders have encouraged individual enterprise and the development of the entrepreneurial class. The state bureaucratic system and other important economic institutions have been restructured to accommodate a globalized market economy. In rebuilding the economic system in this way, Chinese leaders have been open to the importation of Western ideas. However, the same leaders are reluctant to import Western concepts of democracy and the rule of law.

strong nation-state. Nevertheless, the process always occurred in the face of serious external threats. As a consequence, the emotional side of nationalism became important and anti-foreignism was a theme in different periods of nation-state building(Zheng 2004, 張豐清 2004).

While China is still pursuing power and wealth, nationalism takes on a new connotation, i.e., expressing its power and wealth in world politics. Capitalist development had brought the country great wealth and power along with enormous problems. Certainly, the leadership had become more confident in selecting which Western state products to import. Importation was used not only to solve the problems the country was facing but also to build an institutional framework for newly rising economic activities and social transformation. More importantly, it was also to build an institution for China to express its power and wealth(徐藍 2007, 賈英健 2005, Zheng 2004).

Globalization did not prevent the state from making choices about development strategy. The path of China to globalization shows that leadership choices mattered. To import Western state products selectively is not to westernize China's political order, but to provide an institutional base for changing social and economic contents. To paraphrase an old Chinese saying, "Chinese learning as the base(中學爲體), and Western learning for application(西學爲用)"(Zheng 2004, 郭海強 2004). This has been a century-long practice in China's dealing with the outside world, and it remains relevant in explaining how the current globalization is unfolding in China. This selectivity may not impede China's progress in rebuilding a nation-state. The Chinese experience shows that globalization does not necessarily promote convergence on a single

model.

China saw itself as backward and needing to catch up with the developed West. Now with the increase of its comprehensive national strength, China wants to change its passive status in international affairs. It wants to be not only a rule-taker, but also a rule-maker in international affairs. No wonder the phrase “soft power” has quietly gained popularity and has been already seen as an integral part of “overall national strength”, which must “develop,” “thrive,” and “move toward the world” as quickly as possible(Hu 2007). Ultimately China will try to guide the world by building a new civilization with Chinese characteristics, neither quite Eastern nor Western. The sense of national citizenship in such a country will not be diminished, surely it will be strengthened by economic success.

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Globalization and State Rebuilding in China

Yun, Gyong-woo
(Kookmin University)

Abstract

In the view of many, globalization is forcing nation-states to adapt to changing circumstances; nation-states are seen as having a somewhat reactive, even passive, role in the process. Proponents of this view see the nation-state as one of several important factors in the globalization process.

This article disputes the validity of this view because it does not correspond to practical experience. Contemporary globalization has occurred not in spite of the nation-state, but because of it. The case of China – specifically, its last two to three decades of economic and social transformation – constitutes a fascinating example in this respect.

Chinese state power, confronting the challenge of globalization, has become neither weaker nor less important. The Chinese experience shows that globalization does not necessarily result in the decline of the nation-state, but can be seen as facilitating the rise of a new nation-state. In a nutshell, the Chinese form of globalization may not spell the end of the modern nation-state.

Keywords : Globalization, Nation-state, China