What Doesn't Love a Wall:
Human Systems, Emotions, the Russian Doll Fallacy, and Contemporary Cosmopolitanism

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<Abstract>

In its essence human society is not a series of Russian dolls with progressively larger and more complex systems distinguished by distinct but comparable identities, for the history of the species has been driven by an emotional impulse to break down walls of experience in the interest of erecting new walls around a more securely integrated identity. In the contemporary crisis, states, nations, religions, markets, races, ethnicities, and other communities are swept together in this compulsion for a simultaneously expansive and defensive emotional identity. This paper centers on the first three – states, nations, and religions – with examples from different periods and places that illuminate the difficulties posed by this tendency for the cosmopolitan mindset. It nevertheless will argue that human emotions not only play the central role in creating the problem – they are also the key to its resolution. The paper concludes with practical solutions to begin dealing with the Russian doll fallacy in the interest of cosmopolitan values.

[Keywords] *systems, emotional bonding, nationalism, religion, cosmopolitanism*

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무엇이 벽을 사랑하지 않는 가:
인간 시스템, 감정, 러시아 인형 오류와
오늘 날의 코스모폴리탄이즘

Bellomy, Donald C.

<국문요약>

본질적으로 인간사회는 점차적으로 크고 복잡한, 독특하지만 비교할만한 정체성으로 특징지어지는 일련의 러시아인형이 아니다. 왜냐하면 종의 역사는 더 한 층 안정적으로 통합된 정체성을 둘러싼 새로운 벽을 세우는 것을 추구함으로써 경험의 벽을 파괴하는 감정적 충동성에 이끌어진 역사이기 때문이다. 현대의 위기는 주, 국가, 종교, 시장, 인종, 민족, 그리고 다른 공동체는 동시에 팽창하고 방어적인 감정적 정체성을 위한 충동으로 함께 휩쓸려가기 때문이다. 본고는 코스모폴리탄(세계시민)이라는 사고방식에 대한 어려움을 밝히는 다양한 시대와 장소의 예와 더불어 앞에서 언급한 것 중 처음 세 가지, 즉 주, 국가, 종교에 중심을 두고자한다. 그럼에도 불구하고 인간 감정은 문제를 생성하는데 있어서 중요한 역할을 할 뿐 아니라 문제의 해결을 위한 핵심 역할을 한다. 본고는 코스모폴리탄(세계시민)의 가치를 추구하는데 있어서 러시아인형의 오류를 다루는 것을 시작하는 실제적인 해결책으로 마무리한다.

[주제어] *시스템, 정서적유대감, 민족주의, 종교, 코스모폴리탄이즘(세계시민주의)*

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I. Introduction

"Something there is that doesn't love a wall," the narrator announces at the outset of Robert Frost's poem "Mending Wall."What that "something" may be Frost does not tell us, but the reader probably briefly ponders the effects of weather and time. We soon learn, though, that something – or rather, someone – *does* love a wall, in this case a neighbor working alongside the narrator to repair the stone wall between their properties. Ironically, they are cooperating the better to keep themselves separate. The apparent paradox is shrugged off by the narrator's fellow toiler, who is convinced that "Good fences make good neighbors." Frost's narrator would like to know why ("Before I built a wall I'd ask to know / What I was walling in or walling out"), but silently respects the rigid identity – the wall – that his neighbor has built around himself (Frost 1969, 33-34).

"Mending Wall" was first published in Frost's inaugural American poetry volume, *North of Boston*, in 1914, over a century before a successful candidate for U.S. president made building walls a campaign issue, at what may have been an even more decisive historical moment as the walls delimiting the nations of Europe were about to be dismantled, then reshuffled by a world war and its settlement. The larger questions of two eras one hundred years apart might lead us to extend Frost's question as to what people are walling in or walling out to confront a further paradox in the existence of walls of consciousness and emotional identity. Most people, it could be argued, do not love a wall when it separates different aspects of their identity. They try to tear it down. However, many do so only in order to build a new wall a little further out to protect the newly enlarged identity from outsiders. After all, "Good fences make good neighbors."

The problem began to crystallize for this writer while reading Ervin Lázló's *The Systems View of the World*, with its grand vision of "the superposition of system upon system in a continuous multilevel structure traversing the regions of the suborganic, the organic, and the supraorganic" (Lázló 1996, 53). Lázló finds some of the best evidence for this argument within "the sociocultural sphere. Relatively isolated and simple clans and tribes are incorporated in larger, more complex communities with an increase in communication among the incorporated units. The larger communities enter into communication among themselves, and jointly constitute still more embracing societies – nations, states, and empires" (83). Though I found much of Lázló's analysis persuasive, I nevertheless began jotting a phrase in the margins: "Russian dolls." I was thinking about those series of dolls of identical shapes and, usually, likenesses also known as "Russian nesting dolls" or "matryoshka dolls" (Figure 1). They are designed to appear as if they could easily fit inside one another. I wondered, do the various levels of system actually interrelate so neatly?

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<Figure1>
href="//commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:Fanghong"
“Russian Dolls,” aka “Matryoshka Dolls” or “Russian Nesting Dolls”

I began thinking of this approach as a “Russian doll fallacy” in its conceptualization of easily duplicated systems up and down the –ologies of knowledge. The fallacy, I came to feel, derived from the extent to which the notion masked the simultaneously integrative and disruptive role of what are often the most significant forces at play in sociocultural systems: human emotions. Lázló does note the importance of emotions and attitudes, but views them as “overlaid” above “the real and objective factors” (Lázló 1996, 49-50, quotations on 50) – epiphenomenal rather than central to human systems. We need to balance against this assumption the contention of psychologists like Jonathan Haidt in *The Righteous Mind* (2012) and philosophers like Martha Nussbaum in *Political Emotions* (2013) that human emotions act as the crucial glue for cultural systems, at the same time that they can become an acid corroding and sometimes dissolving them.

Emotions are so potent probably because they feed into the feelings of self-worth and place within the nexus of interpersonal bonds that have become associated with individual and social identity, the Janus-faced concept at the root of so many of our current political dilemmas (Erikson 1968; Bauman 2004; Brewer and Hewstone 2004; Burke and Stets 2009; Lawyer 2014 [2008]; Greenfield 2016 [2011]). One lesson from history and recent headlines seems to be that, contrary to the Russian doll model for human systems, emotions drive people to attempt to push all human social structures of belief and activity towards a convergence within a single consistent set of experiences – to cocoon themselves within one big identity, one huge Russian doll. This seems true, the historical record suggests, across the varieties of social experience, whether markets, states, nations, religions, races and ethnicities, or other communities.

II. Markets, States, and Nations

We might start with economic relations, the realm of human experience that has seemed the most immune to emotional perturbations as demonstrated by the extent to which interactions are routinely expressed in mathematical formulae (Backhouse 2010). With that in mind a group of economists recently became excited about the discovery

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of thousands of clay tablets in Kanesh, an Assyrian merchant colony in what is now Turkey, that documented business transactions across central Asia and Europe over a thirty-year period almost 4,000 years ago – between 1890 and 1860 B.C.E. They used the tablets to test the historicity of the "Gravity Model" of Jan Tinbergen, who posited that economic relations within and between societies would correspond to a formula indicating, in essence, that trade volume "will equal the size of the two markets multiplied together and then divided by their distance." For these transactions occurring at least 3,820 years before Tinbergen published his formula in 1962, it seemed to work (Davidson 2015).

But what determines the size of a market? Population? Environment? Technological innovation? And who makes the decisions about how, or even whether to integrate the local market with others? Market size is often a function, not a determinant of history, as we are reminded by the familiar photographs of East Asia in which North Korea's almost non-existent electric grid creates an abyss of darkness between the lights of China and South Korea (Figure 2). Yet what is now North Korea had once included the industrial heartland of pre-partition Korea, and the economies of North and South Korea had been similar in size as recently as 40 years ago. What has changed is not North Korea's physical distance from existing and potential trade partners, but rather a nexus of human decisions driven by values, fears, and ambitions – by emotions, if we want to summarize the motivations with a single word. North Korea, it seems, wants to live in its own small but snug Russian doll.



<Figure2>

Photograph (with boundary lines supplied by NASA) taken by the Suomi NPP spacecraft, 2012

Skyview of the Electric Grids of Northeastern China, North Korea, and South Korea

Another aspect of world history that has seemed especially amenable to a systems approach drained of fermenting emotions has been the balance of power among states in international relations (Jervis 1997, 82-124). The model is usually considered the network of changing alliances in Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries to keep any one power from becoming dominant. But it seems telling that the efforts to reinvent the dynamic stasis of the balance of power proved disastrous in the run-up to World War I, and possible only in the context of a "balance of terror" during the Cold War. Corollaries like the domino theory were implemented at least as much for domestic politics as for balance of power

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considerations. In this context the crucial difference between 1670 or 1770 and 1970 was that in the intervening centuries, even international relations had become less a calculation in statecraft than another source of emotional involvement in democratic politics. Cardinal Richelieu only had to worry about the needs of one man, Louis XIII, to serve the national interests of France in the first half of the seventeenth century; Henry Kissinger not only had to deal with a far more emotionally complex boss in Richard Nixon, but also had to accommodate the president's needs in the re-election process and the tumult of public emotions in the continuing convulsion of the Vietnam War while trying to re-balance the relations of the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Europe, and Japan.

Engaged in finding universal meaning within an era of intellectual and cultural flux as the range of political decision- makers widened, the leading figures of the Enlightenment of the 18th century reinvented the concept of citizen to capture the range of rights, responsibilities, and emotional commitments that had become available (Heater 2004, 38-57; Fahrmeir 2007, 27-55). Ironically, though, in reinventing the citizen, many Enlightenment figures also recognized the artificiality of the state vis-à-vis the web of human relationships. For Immanuel Kant, the outcome would therefore have to become world citizenship, as "the highest purpose of nature, a universal *cosmopolitan [weltbürgerlicher]* existence, will at last be realized as the matrix within which all the original capacities of the human race may develop" (Kant 1991 [1784], 51, italics in text; Kleingeld 2012). Yet Kant's vision of cosmopolitan system-building recognized, indeed derived from the difficulties created by human nature – by "the unsocial sociability of men, that is, their tendency to come together in society, coupled, however, with a continual resistance which constantly threatens to break this society up" (Kant 1991 [1784], 44, italics in text). As he warned, "Nothing straight can be constructed from such warped wood as that which man is made of" (46). He looked for systems in nature to justify his vision because, "Since men neither pursue their aims purely by instinct, as the animals do, nor act in accordance with any integral, prearranged plan like rational cosmopolitans, it would appear that no law-governed history of mankind is possible…" (41-42).

Others wondered if Kant's emergent cosmopolitanism might be so abstracted from human emotions as to be undesirable, in analyses of human bonding that would prefigure more recent emphases on psychological factors. Jean-Jacques Rousseau despised "pretended cosmopolitans" who "make a boast of loving all the world in order to enjoy the privilege of loving no one" (Heater 2004, 57). For Johann Gottfried Herder, the emotions of Rousseau would eventually take precedence over the ideas of his former teacher Kant (Zammito 2002). Declaring "I feel myself! I am! *[Ich fühle mich! Ich bin!]*," Herder had no use for social

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relations based on anything other emotion – his concept of *Einfühlung* that would be later translated as "empathy" (Evrigenis and Pellerin 2004, xxvii-xviii) – and emotional bonds, he decided, could be found most readily in the shared language and customs of the nation. Herder's position as the "father of nationalism" was facilitated by the political and social transformations of the age. First, although his nationalism was non-political (Evrigenis and Pellerin 2004, xxxv-xxviii), statesmen found nationalism a useful addition to state power in the context of emerging democratization. Second, amid the changes of modernity, peoples needed new emotional bonds that they could convince themselves, or be convinced by others, were contained in the "nation."

It is important to recognize that this "nationalism" was not something bubbling up from the masses, but rather a convenient social construct offered to them. This conception of an artificial, often highly engineered nationalism that only coalesced in modern times has become widely known and generally accepted through the analyses of political scientists (Anderson 2006), anthropologists (Gellner 2006), and historians (Hobsbawm 1990). The instability of the concept of nationalism has, for example, led a social scientist to analyze the "three identities of France" up to the French Revolution (Greenfeld 1992, 89-188), yet the emergence of a new identity after 1789 hardly firmed up the notion of a "French nation" that remained in the process of formation throughout the 19th century. Even Herder's indispensable criterion of a shared language was questionable: not only were non-Romance Breton, Basque, and German languages still in use in places, but most people in the southern third of the nation spoke Occitan, a Romance language different from "French" (the name came from the different word for "yes" – not oui but oc). A third, transitional language, Franco-provençal, developed along the linguistic frontier between Occitan and French. And that is setting aside dialects, which could be sharply different only 30 or 40 miles away (Robb 2007, 50-70).

Nor was language the only distinguishing factor. As the 19th century dawned a merchant found regional differences within France as sharp as some observers would later discern when delineating national character. "The *Lyonnais* acts high and mighty, talks in a clear, sonorous voice, is witty but arrogant with a filthy, impudent mouth. The *Languedocien* is gentle and courteous and has an open face. The *Normand* spends more time listening than speaking. He is suspicious of other people and makes them suspicious of him." Even so, few in France then identified themselves by nation or region, but rather by local village or community (Robb 2007, 24-25 and passim).

Over time the national education system smoothed over many of these actual or perceived differences. In a sign of the significant role that education had come to

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play by the 1870s in the formation of French identity, many readers were moved by Alphonse Daudet's story of the "last lesson" of a French teacher in Alsace who is being displaced by a German teacher. His last act is to write defiantly on the blackboard, "*Vive la France!*" (Daudet 1873). Unstated is the reason why German-speaking Alsatians needed a French teacher in the first place. But even if we accept Daudet's emphasis on education, schools could only go so far in shaping the meaning and direction of French emotional identity. Coloring Daudet's own concept of the nation, for example, was anti-Semitism; his son welcomed the Germans in 1940 and died happy in Vichy France because the Nazis would rid France of "outside influences" like Jews and democracy (Wikipedia 2015). His views were held by many other Frenchmen in positions of political power.

The most effective statement of national emotional bonds created during World War II, however, appeared in 1942: *Casablanca*. In the film Rick's Café Américain is very cosmopolitan, open to a mix of peoples and languages. When the German Colonel Strasser asks Rick, "What is your nationality," he replies, "I'm a drunkard." The Vichy police chief adds sardonically, "And that makes Rick a citizen of the world." Yet later the husband of the woman Rick loves, angry after hearing German soldiers singing "Watch on the Rhine," goes to the band and demands, "Play 'La Marseillaise.' Play it!" Soon the patrons are all singing the French national anthem, including a French girl who had come in with a German soldier. Tears streaming down her face, she is the first to shout "Vive la France!" at its conclusion (Epstein, Epstein, and Koch 1942).

III. State, Nation, and Religion

The depth of emotions obvious in the film dislikes boundaries. The call to "play 'La Marseillaise'" comes not from a French patriot, but rather from a Czech resistance leader making common emotional cause with the French. Permission for the band to play has to come from the American Rick. The Czech patriot's voice is quickly joined by the club's Spanish female singer before the rest of a cosmopolitan audience drawn from across Europe, not just France, joins in, for the song has touched an emotional identity reaching out to embrace as broad and as complete a cross-section of humanity as possible. But how much of humanity should be included within the emotional identity, and on what grounds? And how should those excluded from the emotional identity be viewed and treated? How, for instance, would they treat the German soldiers?

There are few better examples of human emotions seeking a single integrated, consistent life experience than the desire to merge state, nation, and religion. In the United States, this often occurred through public education, until in 1962 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled the use of prayers in

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the classroom an unconstitutional violation of the separation of church and state. The legal system was trying to protect the cosmopolitan value of respect for diversity of belief, but many Americans were furious at the forcible separation of their most important emotional bonds. The decision helped trigger the "culture wars" that have threatened to turn America into an angry, ugly nation (Hartman 2015).

Not all religions, though, act as emotional adhesives and dividers, at least to the same extent. In a conclusion that many might feel calls the concept of progress into question, an early sociologist of war argued that, "In general,… only advanced peoples wage war on account of religious differences" (Davie 1968 [1929], 118). And not all "advanced peoples," and not all "advanced religions." Although adherents of Buddhism and Confucianism have at times rubbed each other the wrong way in Asian history, the deepest emotional bonds and divisions have derived from religions that tried to dissolve internal divisions in the interest of shared belief, but then created a binary opposition between believers and unbelievers. Especially for Christianity and Islam, the assertion of faith as the single preliminary requirement of membership also tended to separate their adherents from everyone else (Bellomy 2015; cf. Lilla 2008 [2007], Norris and Inglehart 2011 [2004], Laine 2014).

The result can at times sound cosmopolitan. A recent document complained about a tax imposed on foreigners "as if they are not equal to the people of the country in work, in healthcare, in social life and everything else. To hell with these laws, to hell with nationalism! Instead of this, in my state here,… lineages are mixed, tribes merged and races joined under the banner of monotheism, resulting in a new generation integrating the cultures of many different peoples into a beautiful and harmonious alliance." The document, though, is an ISIS manual, in behalf of a new religious state in which previous identities are merged, usually violently, often barbarically, in the universal Umma (tribe) of believers described in the Qur'an (Pelham 2015, 30).

Even when national revolutions created secular states, the pull of a single religio-national identity has proved powerful. In his utopian novel Old New Land (1902) describing a future Palestine, Theodor Herzl, the founder of modern Zionism, foresaw a Jewish land adhering to "the fundamental principles of humanitarianism" with "Christian, Mohammedan, Buddhist, and Brahmin houses of worship near our own synagogues," with Moslem and Christian guests at Passover seder. He assumed that the major opponents to its creation would be traditional religionists (Herzl 1997 [1902], quotations on 67). Yet Israel has come to represent for many ultra-orthodox Jews and messianic Zionists a new polarization in opposition to foes both religious and secular in an evolution recently described in Michael Walzer's The Paradox of Liberation: Secular Revolutions and Religious Counterrevolutions(2015). As an

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Orthodox rabbi explained in the 1970s in an ultimate demonization of the Other, “The whole world is on one side and we are on the other”(Walzer 2015, 58).

Another example chosen by Walzer is India, whose secularist first president Jawaharlal Nehru had predicted that in a liberated India the strong religious commitments pitting Hindus against Moslems would disappear alongside the superstitions feeding them. Instead, in the climate created by Prime Minister Narandra Modi, secularism has been on the defensive and religious extremism on the rise. Strict bans on the slaughter and consumption of beef recently led to mob murders of Moslems accused of stealing, transporting, and/or killing cows in four separate incidents over a span of six weeks (Barstow and Raj 2015), most notoriously the fatal beating of a man and the savage mauling of his son due to rumors that they had killed and eaten a cow(Raj 2015). In other examples of rising intolerance as the Indian state becomes identified with the emotional bonds of Hindu belief, an opponent of Hindu idol worship was assassinated in August 2015, the Nobel laureate but secularist Amartya Sen was booted out as chancellor of a major university in favor of a Hindu ideologist, the minister of culture and tourism vowed to “cleanse every area of public discourse that had been westernized,” and the Nehru Museum and Library in New Delhi is being repurposed as a quasi-religious shrine for Modi(Faleiro 2015).

A retreat from secular revolution to religious state similar to the trends within Jewish Israel and Hindu India can be found throughout most Moslem countries, including governments spared the turmoil of the“Arab Spring.” Turkey represents an Islamic variant of the Indian template, as the autocratic secular state associated with Mustafa Kemel Atatürk continues its metamorphosis into the strong-man religious state of Recep Tayyip Erdogan offering a vision of Turkey as “the leader and protector of all Muslims around the world,” as a Turkish commentator has explained (Akyol 2015). Erdogan differs from his predecessor primarily in his appeal to Turks who want a bigger Russian doll embracing both the political state and their religion; what Atatürkand Erdogan share, along with an apparent majority of contemporary Turkish voters, is their unconcern for diversity, whether represented by yesterday’s Armenians or today’s Kurds. Egypt seems for the moment to have returned to the authoritarian secular nationalism of its own Atatürkfigure, Gamal Abdel Nasser, but at the price of vigorous oppression of political or religious dissent and of a new terrorist opposition associated with ISIS that was apparently responsible for the bombing of a charter jet from Egypt to Russia in 2015 (Kirkpatrick 2015). The single positive development in the Islamic swath of western Asia and northern Africa, the achievement (at least for now) of a pluralistic democracy in Tunisia, has merited a Nobel Peace Prize, which under the circumstances

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could be considered an admission of failure everywhere else.

Some have viewed the American Revolution as an exception to the trend of secular revolution feeding a later religious counterrevolution (Walzer 2015, 134-144). However, although Thomas Jefferson and James Madison had hoped for a secular republic, the nationalism emerging in the early 19th century was religious in nature – the question was, what kind of religious (Haselby 2015). The United States can nevertheless look secularist because it had to deal with a massive influx of non-Protestant immigrants from the 1840s until 1920, and the fissures within Protestantism could create coalitions among smaller denominations against political control by a majority of believers. Religious nationalism reignited after 1970, though. The Obama years saw an apparent lull that led a historian of the phenomenon to conclude that "The logic of the culture wars has been exhausted. The metaphor has run its course" (Hartman 2015, 285). But there was no peace, for religious nationalism came out in force on November 8, 2016. Despite what might have been rational reasons to doubt Donald Trump's doctrinal and social allegiance to their values, emotional factors led white evangelical Christians to form the bedrock of his support on election day, with a stunning 81% voting for the Republican nominee (Jones 2016).

IV. Summary and Possible Solutions

To summarize the problem: When applied to human social relations the concept of concentric circles of discrete systems can lead to a "Russian doll problem" because humans tend to want all their dolls, all their concentric systems, to merge. This can occur because the adhesive force in social relations is human emotions. From one perspective this helps the prospects for global citizenship by fostering empathy. However, as people push to encompass all of their emotions, including fear, disgust, and anger, into their social identities, the result is all too often destructive of the hopes of modern cosmopolitans.

However, we need not despair, for there are at least two possible solutions. The first can be called the "James Madison solution," for his perception in Federalist 10 that because greater size is more likely to include a variety of countervailing interests, larger political entities are less, not more likely to act oppressively (Madison 1999 [1787]). Recent events have demonstrated that, other factors being even, larger governmental entities are more likely to include the diversity that can blunt the effect of emotion-driven pushes to erase the boundaries between social systems. Tellingly, the opposition to a perceived flood of predominantly Muslim refugees into Europe was originally centered in the often smaller, relatively ethnically and religiously homogeneous states of Eastern Europe (Lyman 2015). The prime minister of

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Hungary, whose government objected to the European Union plan to absorb 120,000 largely Muslim refugees only a year and a half after it volunteered to open the country's doors to up to 70% more Christian refugees from Ukraine, explicitly proclaimed that the current crisis "provides the opportunity for the national-Christian thinking to regain its dominance not only in Hungary but in the whole of Europe." He firmly believed that, as Robert Frost's fellow wall mender would put it, "good fences make good neighbors" – to the existing fence on the border with Serbia, he went about adding a new one across from Croatia (Rev 2015). As Madison might have predicted, the hope for a cosmopolitan, humanitarian response came to rest, however uneasily, on the larger, already more diverse nations of Germany and France, and on the umbrella authority of the European Union.

But in the wake of the shocks of 2016, above all the Brexit vote in Britain and the election of Donald Trump in the United States, for how long can that fragile hope last? Other factors are no longer even. The anti-immigrant, anti-globalization, anti-Europe candidate Marine Le Pen is expected to do well in the 2017 French presidential election, and could well win; even the chancellorship of German's Angela Merkel, currently a lone voice in the wilderness for reason and compassion on the European refugee crisis, is no longer considered safe. The "James Madison" solution is now revealing its inherent flaws, for while ethnic, racial, or religious diversity can create multicultural nation-states, it can also exacerbate intergroup tensions and generate intolerant majorities. Size and diversity no longer guarantee cosmopolitan values – look at India, or look at Madison's America morphing into Donald Trump's. Moreover, not only is the authority of unified supranational institutions such as the European Union now in question, but so too is what had seemed a historical trend towards citizenship within large states. Separatist movements in Spain and elsewhere continue to fester, while in the United Kingdom the Brexit vote gave new life to the movement for a separate Scottish state.

The "James Madison" solution nevertheless will, within limits, continue to make positive contributions to cosmopolitan values. The diversity of the United States, for example, still plays a vital role in politics, only now in protests against the early actions of the Trump administration. One limitation to these protests of course is that the U.S. federal government is a very powerful set of institutions, and as a Republican Trump potentially has his hands on all three levers of power – the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. Moreover, protesters need to impose some limits on themselves. They need to understand what happened on November 8, 2016, and to appreciate the depth of the emotions pushing against diversity – indeed, to empathize with them. In our embrace of outsiders we must not create new ones.

My second recommendation, what I call

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the *Casablanca* solution, acknowledges, in fact embraces the role of emotions, and tries to employ them for cosmopolitan ends (cf. Nussbaum 2013). In *Casablanca*, the cosmopolitanism of the opening scenes revolving around the Café Américain is not negated by the later introduction of the French national anthem, but emotionally transformed in cosmopolitan ways. Contemporary artists and intellectuals often shy away from emotional outbursts and appeals, yet emotional art can be as complex and enriching as, in music, Bach's *St. Matthew's Passion* or Beethoven's 9th Symphony, Mozart's *The Marriage of Figaro* or Mahler's Resurrection Symphony. Or in art, Francisco Goya's *The Third of May 1808* or Pablo Picasso's *Guernica*, Vincent Van Gogh's Potato Eaters or Frida Kahlo's *Wounded Deer.*

Or, to return to the more popular art of cinema, a film with similar themes and even scenes to *Casablanca*, but with a more self-conscious artistic purpose – Jean Renoir's *Grand Illusion*, which had premiered in France five years before the Hollywood film. An equally unforgettable high point of Renoir's film also revolves around a thrilling wartime singing of "La Marseillaise" amid a disapproving audience of German soldiers, in this case the staff of a prisoner-of-war camp in Germany during World War I. Again the singers are not just French, but cosmopolitan – indeed, their diversity is not only national but also humorously gendered, because the camera lingers on an English POW still in drag for a show that the inmates have produced. Again the emotional patriotism of the French people is invoked, for the spontaneous outpouring of the national anthem is triggered by news that the French army has retaken a fort previously captured by the Germans as part of the months-long bloodbath of the Battle of Verdun. Yet the euphoria is misplaced: the Germans quickly dislodged the French. More importantly, the Germans are not portrayed as demonized others as in *Casablanca* – when Jean Gabin as the French officer who announced the recapture of the fort that set off the demonstration is placed in solitary confinement, his German jailer slips him a harmonica to express his emotions of loneliness and despair. For Renoir the patriotism of his working-class protagonist is just as much a "grand illusion" as the honor of his aristocratic superior, yet both are embraced and respected as transcendent expressions of human emotions and spirit, even as Renoir's film transcends them (Spaak and Renoir 1937).

In our art, in our teaching, in everything that can touch human ideals and emotions, it is also our responsibility to embody the complex diversity of human existence. The choices will not be easy and the results will almost always be ambiguous, for we are dealing with the emotional needs of our fellow humans. But in human as well as natural systems, we have an obligation to push for diversity, for an empathetic appreciation of the varieties of existence.

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