

## Two Brazils: In Search of *New Order and Progress*<sup>†</sup>

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### Abstract

Since the end of the 20th century, the state of democracy has become increasingly complicated. In many parts of the world, traditional representative democracy is frequently influenced by “street politics” often divided into extremes. There are two contradictory views of this phenomenon: as an “extension of democracy,” or as a “crisis of democracy.” The slogan inscribed in the middle of Brazilian flag is “*Ordem e Progresso*,” which means in English “order and progress.” However, Brazilians say their country is only “progressing” at night when politicians sleep. In addition to the question of why countries succeed and why they fail, the growing inequality and polarization within a country adds to the uncertainty of the future. This article examines whether the collapse of the leftist regime, which has been in power in Brazil for 15 years, represents an “edge of democracy” or whether the ruling of the leftist regime was a “crisis of democracy,” as argued by the currently ruling right-wing forces. It aims to project the possibility of integration and the “new order and progress” they are looking for in a severely divided society.

**Keywords:** *Brazil, Crisis of Democracy, Edge of Democracy, Neoliberalism, Inequality, Populism, Order and Progress*

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<sup>†</sup>This research was supported by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the national Research Foundation of Korea (NRF-2018S1A6A3A02081030).

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Received: January 17, 2020, Revised: January 29, 2020, Accepted: February 20, 2020

## 두 개의 브라질 -새로운 질서와 진보를 찾아서-

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### 국문요약

20세기 후반 이후의 민주화는 더 복잡한 양상을 띠어가고 있다. 세계 곳곳에서 전통적인 대의민주주의가 ‘거리정치’에 영향을 받거나 거리정치가 양극단으로 분열되는 장면을 심심치 않게 목격할 수 있다. 이런 현상을 두고 한쪽에서는 ‘민주주의의 확대’로, 다른 쪽에서는 ‘민주주의의 위기’로 상반되는 시각이 양존한다. 브라질 국기 한가운데 명시된 슬로건은 ‘질서와 진보’이다. 그런데 브라질 사람들은 정치인들이 잠을 자는 밤에 비로소 ‘진보’한다고 말한다. 국가는 왜 성공하는가, 왜 실패하는가의 문제뿐만 아니라 한 국가 내부에서 격화되는 불평등과 양극화 문제는 미래에 대한 불확실성을 가중시키고 있다. 이 글에서는 브라질에서 15년간 집권한 좌파정권의 몰락이 ‘위기의 민주주의’를 나타내는 것인지, 아니면 우파 집권세력의 주장처럼 좌파 정권의 집권이 ‘민주주의의 위기’를 가져온 것인지를 살펴보고, 현재 극심하게 분열된 사회가 통합의 길을 찾고 그들이 찾고 있는 ‘새로운 질서와 진보’를 전망하는 데 그 목적을 두고 있다.

**주제어:** 브라질, 민주주의 위기, 위기의 민주주의, 신자유주의, 불평등, 포퓰리즘, 질서와 진보, 구별짓기

## I. Introduction

Is democracy at risk today? As Samuel Huntington foretold in his *Third Wave* (2011), democratization after the late 20th century is more complex. Not only in Korea, but also through foreign media, we can witness the scene of traditional representative democracy being influenced by "street politics" or the division of street politics into extremes. There is a contradictory view that interprets this phenomenon as "expansion of democracy" on one side and "crisis of democracy" on the other.

The history of Brazilian democracy is neither as smooth nor long. In conjunction with it, the public's sense of participation in politics and confidence in politicians is also low. According to the *Democracy Index 2018*, published by the Economist Intelligence Unit (E.I.U), Brazil ranks 50th out of 167 countries and is classified as a 'flawed democracy'. Among the detailed indicators, it received the lowest score in "political culture," which was lower than Nicaragua, which was classified as an authoritarian government in South America. As a reflection of this phenomenon, Brazilians say, "*Brazil is **progressive** at night when politicians sleep.*"

Ironically, the phrase *Ordem e Progresso* ("Order and Progress" in English) is in the center of the Brazilian flag. It is rare to see letters on the national flags of the world. Order and progress were adopted on 19 November 1889 and became part of the flag of the Federal Republic of Brazil. This slogan came from the political motto of 19th-century positivism, advocated by Auguste Comte, who extended the concept of science to include what he named sociology: "*Principle is love, fundamental is order, goal is progress.*" (in Portuguese, "O amor como princípio e a ordem como base; o progresso como meta").

Positivism held the view of scientifically looking at a state of disorder at first glance, which spread from Europe to Brazil in the mid-19s. The positivist movement in Brazil was the philosophical reaction to the Catholic doctrine of confession, which at the time held the social climate, and became the ideological foundation of Republicans who advocated monarchy and abolition. In the end, positivist thought, and enlightenment not only influenced the Declaration of the Republic of Brazil in 1889, but positivism had a strong presence in the Brazilian military, and as a result, its ideals were literally embodied in Brazilian flags and governmental crests.

Brazilian National Assembly impeached the president Dilma Rousseff in 2016, and Vice President Michel Temer took power. Temer recalled the positivist slogan "Ordem e Progresso" for national integration, which was divided into two axes created by the impeachment of the president, and a created new slogan "*Ponte para o future*" ("bridge to the future"). He sought to find a solution to the political, economic and social problems facing Brazil, and to encourage people to be optimistic and positive about the future with 'order' and rational attitudes to give them a better future, or "*progress.*"

What is interesting about the above E.I.U findings is the Brazilian people's view of democracy, their political culture. In addition to the E.I.U report, the Latinobarômetro 2018 report, of 18 Latin American countries found that the value of any system to Brazilians depends on whether or not it benefits the country and the household economy. Politics and economy are arguably inseparable and indistinguishable (cf. Chung Woo-sik 1983, 341), but Brazilians tend to give priority to economy over politics. Moreover, in a country where social

and economic inequality is deepened like Brazil, democracy and capitalism are not easy tasks.<sup>1</sup> Only when Brazil entered the democratization era in the mid-1980s were a wide range of economic statistics released that marked it as one of the most unequal countries in the world. Since the publication of *Capital in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, which was based on the massive data accumulated by Thomas Piketty in 2014, new discussions about capital and inequality that built on both Adam Smith and Karl Marx spread worldwide.

However, a trans-cultural and long-term perspective is a prerequisite for a moderate understanding of the mechanisms that have shaped the distribution of income and material wealth that creates inequality. Recently, historian Walter Scheidel (2017) concluded that the only driver that could reduce the problem of inequality in human history was a certain type of violence, a large-scale war. Steven Pinker (2014) argues that human inequality has decreased from ancient times to modern times. If so, has the world flattened by human beings, past the primitive, ancient, medieval, and modern, as Scheidel and Pinker insisted? Alternatively, is the world moving toward polarization, which is increasingly endless from the primitive age to the present?

Many today find a judgment of polarization inescapable. It is the worldview in which Bong Joon-ho's film "*Parasite*"<sup>2</sup>, which satirizes extreme polarization and inequality in Korean society, received a good reputation around the globe. On the other hand, Thomas Friedman (2005) recognizes the world as a place where we compete fairly from a commercial point of view, saying, "*The perceptual transformation that countries, companies and individuals need to stay competitive in a world market where historical and geographic segregation is becoming less meaningful.*" He mentions 10 things that have leveled the stage for global competition, referring to the previous *era of globalization 1.0*, led by countries and governments, *the era of globalization 2.0* attracted by multinational corporations, and *the globalization 3.0* facing the 21<sup>st</sup> century. However, while he agrees with his point that globalization has interconnected the world, it is hard to agree with the claim that this alone has reduced inequality and polarization. Rather, it is more appropriate that the globalization has widened the gap between nations and individuals, making it more rugged, as described by Hong (2016).

Most scholars, including Piketty, have discussed the issue of inequality with the wealth of the top 1%. Richard Reeves (2017), on the other hand, analyzed the structure of inequality by questioning the responsibility in the top 20% tier, not the "1 to 99%" frame. Reeves sees the power of the upper middle class changing the city form, dominating the education system and transforming the labor market. The position of the main character of the "flat playground" discussed by Friedman is also strongly expressed in the position and perspective of the top 20% of the upper middle class, not the super-high class of 1%.

The search for the history of inequality experienced by humankind from its origins is enormously difficult to conclude. According to *the World Income Inequality Report 2018*

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<sup>1</sup> While the two are based on liberal ideas that emphasize individual freedom, responsibility, competition, participation, and rule of law, it is not easy for capitalism to coexist harmoniously, where democratic decision-making is the maximization of democracy and profit to reconcile interests. When capitalism (economy) is dominant, it is inevitable that democracy (politics) will be transformed into "liberal democracy" or "neoliberalism" in order to maintain its nominal status.

<sup>2</sup> This film is a Korean dark comedy film directed by Bong Joon-Ho in 2019. It made history at the 92<sup>nd</sup> Academy Awards ceremony, becoming the first-non-English language film to win best picture, while adding honors for director Bong, original screenplay and the international feature film category.

(WID), the trend of polarization of rich and poor since the 1980s has become more severe worldwide. The report sees the beginning of deepening polarization as the cause of neo-liberal economic globalization represented by deregulation, market liberalization and the spread of capital market openings. The problem of inequality is not a problem in any one region, but a global problem.

Piketty has studied the excessive bias of wealth and income in emerging countries such as Brazil, India and China after the publication of his earlier work.<sup>3</sup> In 2017, he visited Brazil to diagnose inequality, saying, “*If Brazil does not solve inequality factors such as excessive lower tax rates for high-income and wealthy people, and the extreme income-biasing problem, where the top 10 percent account for more than 55 percent of total income, democratic capacity of Brazil accumulated over decades is difficult to grow continuously.*” Piketty continued, “Brazil needs to reduce inequality so that it continues to grow” (Lee Jaewon 2017).

Therefore, this study will examine what meaningful changes have occurred in addressing inequality when the globalization (1.0; 2.0; 3.0) advocated by neo-liberals like Friedman as a constant, the power of the president of a left-winger, who was one of the biggest changes in Brazilian history, was seen as a variable. We will also look at the difference in position between the “*edge of democracy*” raised with the fall of the leftist progressive regime in 15 years of long term power and the “*crisis of democracy*” raised by left-wing liberals in power.

The aim of this article is to find clues to the question of what new progress and order Brazil may be eliciting in an extremely uncertain internal and external environment.

To achieve this goal, we first look at the distribution of social goods in Brazil's leftist regime in the World Inequality Report 2018. Next, we will check *Text Mining and Sentiment Analysis in Social Media* for the signs of public sentiment revealed during the 2018 presidential election.<sup>4</sup> Finally, ahead of the 2022 Brazilian presidential elections, a simulation analysis conducted by a leading Brazilian polling agency will be used to re-examine the change in public sentiment of Brazilians. These findings will help to identify Brazil's uncertainty and the direction it is heading.

Ruchir Sharma (2012, 10-11) said that in order to get a better understanding of the situation in emerging countries like Brazil, “*It is hard to understand how a country's regime can achieve economic results through the proper politics, only by research of scholars who don't know the field, looking at excel spreadsheets in the lab.*” Therefore, rather than approaching quantitative analysis and case studies with the goal of pursuing a universal theory, this study aims to ‘understand what economic and political forces are operating at this moment in the region, how they contribute to growth, and how fast they grow’. In today's flood of information, to cover up fake information and make it into the right knowledge requires more insight from researchers than data created in the name of

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<sup>3</sup> Recently, “Capital et Idéologie” was published in a call for politics to address the inequality that the human community suffers.


<sup>4</sup> Data mining source technology is *mental mining*. The human mind is the target variables, and data mining is the means. “How can I read the changes in the world?” is a question from the perspective of mental mining (Choi Jung-Muk, 2016).

objectivity and science.

## II. The Result of the Leftist Regime's Efforts to Eliminate Income Inequality

It is often said that during Lula's reign (2003-2010) “conditional cash transfers” became partially resolved for the first time in Brazil's history through extensive social inclusion policies such as *Bola Família* and *Fome Zero*.


Piketty analyzed the top 10% of gross income growth by major countries from 2001 to 2016, a period in Brazil encompassing the presidencies of the Marxist-sociologist-turned-neoliberal Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Lula, and Dilma Rousseff. Over this decade and a half the top 10% of total income rose from 54.3% to 55.3% and the bottom 50% increased from 11.3% to 12.3%, while the middle 40% decreased from 34.4% to 32.4%, as shown in the case of Brazil in Figure 1 below (World Inequality Report 2018, 6).



**Figure 1. Top 10% Income by Country, 1980-2016**

Source: *World Inequality Report 2018* (p.6)

What is notable in Figure 1, and further exemplified in Figure 2, is that during the leftist regime's reign, which was criticized for "spreading populist policies," the proportion of the top 10% of gross income was gradually rising, and the income of the middle class declined. Of course, according to the report, the fruits of economic growth achieved during the long-term reigns of the left-wing regime have returned 18% to the lowest 50%, while 61% of the total growth has been to the top 10%. The Workers' Party (PT) argued that Piketty's findings overlooked the effects of income redistribution and that the figures were not accurately reflected by income reporting from poor people in Brazil, but they could not provide clear evidence.



**Figure 2. Share of Top 10% of Total Income (2016).**

Source: *World Inequality Report 2018* (p.5)

Empirical studies by Piketty show that, whether right or left governments are in power, the share of income in the top 10% of Brazilians has either been unchanged or rather increased. On the Piketty way, “in Brazil, inequality in labor income has improved, but gross income inequality has been maintained at a very high level. It is a tie for a fixed percentage of the hierarchy. In other words, in the process of distributing social goods in Brazil, more than 60% of the gross income is tied up by a fixed cost of a certain class. It means that, apart from party ideology, 90% of the people live in 40% of gross income. This is probably because the top 10% have historically had the power and influence to tilt the playing field to the angle they want, which can cause the system to function irregularly for their benefit in political conflict. Yoon (2012, 224) also assessed that social security policies, such as *Bolsa Família*, had a positive effect on reducing income inequality in Brazil but were essentially insignificant (Melo 2008 re-quotation). He pointed out that in 2006, 2.5% of the Brazilian government's budget was set for social security, while 18% was spent on external debt payments and that more taxes are being spent on international financial institutions and domestic wealthy creditor groups than they are still invested in poor people.

When Brazilians were divided into the top 10%, the middle 40%, and the bottom 50% by income level, the largest share of pain and relative loss went to the educated middle class, mostly living in cities under the per-worker regime for 15 years with an unchanged income scale of 10%.

The invisible glass ceiling (top 10%) above the middle class is always blocked, and the presence of the poor (bottom 50%) has made them aware of their middle class position, even if the economy was booming due to good external conditions or the outstanding capacity of their leaders. Income-driven growth through the distribution of left-wing governments led to an increase in incomes for the poor, and the middle class has felt double deprived and alienated as the class rises from the bottom.<sup>5</sup> In the end, the middle class seems to have had no choice but to express anger over the ruling power. At this point, we want to distinguish

<sup>5</sup> In fact, social security policy for the economic underdog, which began with the Cardoso government and was greatly expanded by the Lula government, was the first in Brazil's history. In the case of *Bolsa Família*, a conditional cash transfers, more than one-fourth of Brazil's population was a beneficiary (Yoon Sung-Seok 2012).

the meaning of democracy between “*edge of democracy*”<sup>6</sup> and “*crisis of democracy*.”

In order for the middle class to recognize themselves as middle class, it is necessary to distinguish themselves from the lower class and catch up the upper class. However, when they saw the rise of the lower class, which was distinct from them, they felt relative anxiety. They might feel threatened to fall because they could not go up. This phenomenon can be found not only in Brazil, but also in Korean society. As Korea experiences generational change beyond the developmental era, the keyword “*Gapjil*” (in English, to lay down the law to someone) has become a social hot issue since 2018, as shown in a recent media story reporting that “A security guard confronted a resident on a family trip to Japan, and a few days later, at a meeting of residents, the resident said ‘it is not appropriate for apartment security guards to go on overseas vacations.’” (Park Min-ji 2020)

The incident took place in a space where there is a standardized and dense space called an apartment, representing Fordism in residential structure. As an investment and speculative product, apartments function as a powerful means of “making a distinction” the rank and status of the owner in Korean society (Kang Jun-man 2011, 61). This distinction occurs within the same apartment complex. In addition, distinction necessarily calls for a hierarchy. In the same apartment, the occupants and the security guards are distinguished within the same space, in a social tension not too distant from the Brazilian colonial “master and slave” space. Why did apartment dwellers hate security guards travel abroad and even raised it to the agenda of the residents' association? It is unlikely that a security guard is concerned about the gap in security guard work caused by traveling abroad. There is an alternative workforce. This, too, is a kind of distinction in our daily lives.

Conventionally, an apartment security guard is the epitome of something that can be done without special knowledge or qualifications. It is therefore one of the representative low-wage labors. There is nothing learned, and it is considered a model for a poor job. However, nowadays, apartment security guards are mostly retirees, and if they go home, they are the heads and parents of a family. It is also likely that you are a resident of an apartment. Furthermore, overseas travel is more common today than ever before. Nevertheless, the statement that it is not appropriate for apartment's guards to travel abroad is unreasonable, but the typical distinction discourse inherent in our society is expressed. The distinction equation for '*apartment guard ≠ overseas travel*' is working. These equations work a lot in our society, such as “local college graduates ≠ incompetents”. As such, our country tends to accept the distinction between those who have a lot of money and those who do not. Indeed, as mentioned by Bae (2020), the story of the rich and the poor is often associated with class conflict. It usually reminds us of the factual struggle between the capitalist class and the working class.

As mentioned earlier, the success of the Korean film, *Parasite*, which has resonated worldwide, lies in the universality of the theme. However, in *Parasite*, there is no typical conflict between the rich and the poor. Rather, the conflict of interests between classes that do not have money is maximized. The war between *the original parasite couple* and *the*

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<sup>6</sup> ‘The Edge of democracy’ (in Portuguese: ‘*Democracia em Vertigem*’) is a Brazilian documentary film released in 2019. The film analyzes the political rise and fall of two former presidents in a personal and intimate manner in the context of Lula's first term, leading to the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff. The impeachment and restraint of his predecessors paved the way for a far-right politician named Bolsonaro to be elected president, along with a socio-political crisis and division of civil society. The film was nominated for Best Documentary at the 92nd Academy Awards.

*four-member family parasites* means a war of cockroach in the basement cupboards that is invisible to the host who never knows the existence of the cockroaches (that is, parasites). Probably the director pulls out a class-in-class confrontation through the film, instead of driving the tragedy of polarization into a typical class-to-class confrontation. This cleverly gives warning that to the rich it is just a floor under their feet, which can be broken unknowingly. Regardless of the left and right camps around the world, discussions on “basic income policy” are active because it is a convincing policy for both sides. In other words, such a debate can provide a buffer against the economic turmoil of the poor and make “broken capitalism’ sustainable, protecting the rich from public anger.

### III. Edge of Democracy in Brazil

Today we live in a chaos of languages (local, translated and foreign) that are distributed in the real world before concept. Before any political debate, we need to clear up the confusing languages we are using. Before dealing with the “edge of democracy,” it is necessary to look at what democracy is, what the term defines, and how it has different meaning depending on who interprets and uses it.

For example, how do we distinguish between ‘liberal democracy’ and ‘democracy’? After the Korean War, South Korea's democracy was in opposition to communism. North Korea, however, also has a republic that stands for another form of democracy called “social democracy.” For this reason, South Korea has recognized as a democracy only liberal democracy, which has been distinguished from social democracy since its Constitutional Amendment in 1987. Starting from the controversy over the national published textbooks of the Park Geun-Hye regime, even under the current government, the ideology camp controversy continues from the predecessor of “*freedom*,” and the risk of national dissension is increasing. One side believes that it is necessary to shift perceptions from the opposing Cold War legacy in order to lay the groundwork for a future unified Korea and democracy is enough, while the other side is obsessed with the term “freedom” because democracy with “freedom” removed becomes a communist society. In other words, one argues that true democracy has been suppressed and distorted in the past in the name of freedom, while the other remains in the dichotomous idea that “free democracy” is “communism.” Thus, words are used as part of the division and distinction of the camp regardless of their original meaning, and they have social power. Indeed, *signified* gives priority to *signifier*.

In order to discuss and distinguish between ‘the edge of democracy’ and ‘the crisis of democracy’ mentioned in Section I, it is also necessary to face the linguistic confusion that is occurring and to reflect on the value it contains. In discussions in academic circles, Lee (2019) argued in *the Professor's Newspaper* on April 26, that “the concepts of liberal democracy and social democracy are opposed”. On the contrary, Han (2012) pointed out the illusion of “free” democracy in the history of the establishment of the Republic of Korea, by writing “*Why democracy, not a liberal democracy*”. He criticizes the New-Right Camp for democracy, which sees Korea's independence as a product of the allied power's mandate system. He argues that the democracy represented in the constitutional constitution of Korea is not liberal democracy from the United States, but a democracy with a history that reflects the tradition of the Korean independence movement. However, Lee (2019) also argues that social democracy, which focuses on social problems impeding freedom, improves and complements liberal democracy, not the socialist alternative to replace it. It reveals

contradictions that the two seem to belong to different camps, talking the same thing.

In Korea's academia, there is a position to understand democracy as a contradictory concept. How does the public understand democracy? In the past, knowledge was unidirectionally accepted through various media outlets through averaging education arising from modernization, but today it creates more extreme confusion and confrontation because of the diversity of media and distribution channels, that is, the consumer-centered, not producer-centered world. The conflict helps to create a confrontation between generations, occupations and genders, as well as the rich and the poor. There is disagreement about what democracy defines as a 'crisis' in edge of democracy and what democracy the crisis implies. Some say that the Trump administration's pressure on US defense contributions is confusing whether the democracy we know is for us or for the sustainability of American democracy.

Liberal international order is an international political term used to refer to a US-centered international order that continues after the post-cold war. At the G20 Summit in 2019, however, there was a crack in the concept of "*liberalism*" that the United States has declared as a banner of Western liberalism since the Cold War. The new international order, organized by the emergence of President Trump, is heavily influenced by the unilateral and protectionist lines of "*America First*." In fact, rather than seeing the United States change, it should be said that a change has been made in the international order paradigm in line with US interests. American priority has not suddenly emerged. So, does Trump destroy the liberal international order? Rather, Trump himself believes that his policy line is new for the altered liberal international order. Rather, Trump is a liberal force in terms of breaking the existing order. With the advent of China, a new G2 international order environment is being formed. Therefore, the conservative side is trying to deny the new international order and maintain the liberal international order that the United States has pursued in the past. John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago, who visited in 2018, claimed, "Nationalism and populism, caused by the reckless attempt to spread democracy and extreme globalization of America, became the seed of the Trump phenomenon that undermines the liberal international order."

In Brazil, democracy experiments from 1945 to 1964 were unsuccessful and civil transition was completed in 1985 after 21 years of military dictatorship (1964-1985). However, Brazil has been on a difficult path to democracy for 10 years until the former President Cardoso came to power in 1995. The military dictatorship ended and the first civil President was elected, but he died of illness. Collor, the second president to be elected in 40 years for direct elections, was impeached on suspicion of corruption.

Brazil had a history of replacing the vice president for seven years in 10 years until 1995, after the end of the military dictatorship and the victory of democracy. Former President Rouseff, who was impeached in 2016, was similarly replaced by the vice president for the remainder of her term. In addition, a new constitution was enacted in 1988, a period of political instability to realize Brazil's founding philosophy of "Order and Progress." The direction of the new constitution was flawless, but the problem was the issue of 'obligation' and 'reality'. The gap between "*Value*" and real social reality "*Existence*" was too great. In fact, the institutions that now condemn the right-wing conservatives as populism are based on the new Constitution, which was enacted in 1988, not by Lula and the left, but by a period of weak leadership where most presidents were absent. The constitutional amendment was also made possible by the majority of the parliament, with a handful of elite's historic ruling without referendum and this is the best condition of things to go wrong. The vulnerable

domestic, industrial structure due to the expansion of democracy, the strengthening of the public sector and pension schemes, unrealistic interest rates, and excessive domestic market protection eventually led the Brazilian economy, vulnerable to external influences, to inflation with deficits. The *Real Plan*, which after its introduction in 1994 briefly ended a decade during which annual inflation never fell below 100%, barely escaped from the quake, but the last decade remained a “lost decade” that missed growth opportunities in Brazil. It was during this period that Korea and other East Asian countries grew remarkably. The 90s are recorded as a move to make up for the “lost decade” of the 80s.

In the wind of globalization opened by the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the Berlin Wall, neo-liberal economic policies were introduced to privatize public enterprises, which were the symbol of the opening of the Brazilian market, monopoly and inefficiency. At this time, gross national income rose, but the conditions of worker life worsened and the class was polarized. The Brazilians elected the first Workers' Party (PT) candidate for the first time in history to escape the evils of neoliberal globalization. Lula, based on the legacy of his predecessor during his reign, contributed greatly to Brazil's rise to the ranks of the 21st century with China's economic growth, international commodity special effects and non-radical flexible pragmatism.

However, since 2014, the domestic economy has stagnated again, and former President Lula has been arrested for alleged corruption. The successor, President Rousseff, was the victim of the coalition's struggle, overturning the allegations of concealing the deficit, and even impeachment. There was a great disappointment in the politics of Brazil's middle class, who lived primarily in big cities, had a certain level of education and critical consciousness.

Former President Lula's corruption allegations and corruption scandals in the ruling party have provoked public outrage. At the same time, the rise of “order democracy”, which reverts to the “order and progress” of the past, calls for a return to the military dictatorship, and the “street politics” method of rejecting the existing representative democratic political system has been expressed.<sup>7</sup> Kim (2013) analyzes this phenomenon as “the failure of the government to fail to meet the high expectations of the newly built and educated middle class is a common theme of protests in countries around the world, including Brazil” and the cause of this demonstration was found in the growth of the global middle class.

On the impeachment system of Brazil, Cho (2016) explained political impeachment and legal impeachment. Rousseff's assessment of impeachment is largely analyzed from two perspectives. The ruling Workers' Party (PT) argues for a “edge of democracy” in which the right-wing conservatives committed a parliamentary coup in the wake of the economic crisis caused by major external factors such as falling raw material prices and a global economic downturn. On the other hand, the position of the right is that the “crisis of democracy” has

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<sup>7</sup> Unlike the civil revolution that created modern democracy, street politics, such as the large-scale civic movement that appears in the state of the democratic system, are often referred to as “populism.” The term is often used in cases where the existing framework is poorly explained, such as the election of President Trump in the United States or the election of President Bolsonaro of Brazil. In fact, populist political figures and political parties divide society into “elite vested interests” who only take good citizens and their own interests, and put forth a public priority. It is easy to be used as an incitement politics to mislead the public. It also calls for direct democracy that directly reflects the voice of citizens, such as the Brexit referendum, and does not value judicial independence or established press freedom.

come because of the failed politics of the left, and they have gone out to save the world.

In fact, from the standpoint of the Brazilian people, both views are just political posturing from the left or right sides. Given the basic political and cultural dispositions of the Brazilian people, as the findings in Section I suggest, democracy is not worth protecting at any cost. The main reason for the impeachment of the president was the economic crisis and political corruption caused by the fiscal deterioration in fiscal soundness caused by the expansion of the fiscal policy that has accumulated since the second Lula government. Historically, Brazil's political crisis has always been accompanied by an economic crisis. The Brazilians already have experience of recovering from the crisis by Itamar Franco, the vice president who succeeded the post after the impeachment of the president Collor, and finance minister Cardoso. The president, who was chosen by direct elections in 2002 by the Brazilian people, who were irritated by conservative elites and corruption, gave priority to addressing inequality and improving living conditions for the poor. This policy is the same as was claimed by the Nobel Laureates in 2019, as well as Piketty's '*21st Century Capital*'. The winners emphasize the need for a sympathetic look at the real conditions and the needs of the poor and a need for consideration when designing the system. However, Lula's government's efforts were not made with 100% of gross income. His efforts were unsuccessful because he did not use 55% of the total income of the top 10%, and it is possible to interpret another '*lost decade*' of the 2000s.

## **V. The emergence of a new right wing in Brazil**

### **V-a. Downfall of the Left of Brazil**

With the election of Lula in 2002, Brazil opened a new horizon for democracy when the leftist regime was elected through direct elections for the first time. Since then, South American societies, including Brazil, have led the "Pink Tide" era for more than a decade. Since 2010, Argentine, Chilean, Paraguay, and Colombia have moved to hard-line power, and Brazil has joined the populist and far-right movement since the 2018 presidential election. This far-right craze is not the only trend in Brazil or South America. Populism and the "Strongman" wave arose in superpowers as if the United States and Russia, and the rise of the extreme right forces triggered by anti-immigration problems in Europe have had a ripple effect on South America. These recently risen right-wing forces have a common ground in their ideology of "*nationalism first*" and cultivating political power based on hate and anger toward the other camp. Like the Brexit crisis in the UK and EU, the tendency to turn away from internationalism and focus on national interests is happening not only in Europe and the United States, but also in Latin America, including Brazil. The South American Union (Unasur), was founded in 2008 to respond politically and economically to the influence of the United States and ultimately to integrate it. However, since 2018, the right-wing regimes, which have taken power in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Paraguay, have left the coalition and have fallen into a nominal organization.

As mentioned earlier in Section II, former Brazilian president, Dilma Rousseff, in 2016, had a history of impeachment in 24 years, following ex-president Collor in 1992. The Brazilian presidency remains an authoritarian legacy with a prominent concentration of power to the president and the administration, in a combination of proportional representation, federalism, multiparty, and bicameral.

Brazil is difficult to prevent if the president vetoes congressional legislative powers, and

the president is strong enough to push most of the legislation through “temporary measures.” On the other hand, the ruling party is usually a minority party because of its highly fragmented party system. Thus, the president of Brazil usually establishes coalitions and gives power to political parties to carry out major policies. Thus, when the popularity of the Brazilian president has plummeted, there is always a risk of being impeached by Congress. Because of this situation, the president of Brazil has a strong tendency to rely on popularity over political and parliamentary support, regardless of left or right wing camps. As Im (2017) argued, “there is a reason why populist politics have always been criticized in Brazil and other Latin American countries, and at the same time an illegal liaison between politicians and illegality and corruption have emerged, and Brazilian politics is not politics based on the system, but politics around the public.”


However, the Workers' Party (PT) and Lula's regime triggered several scandals that made the people angry. Eventually, the barrel of this anger was passed to Lula's political successors. The deterioration of the internal and external economic environment, corruption, and ruler's incompetence resulted in the Workers' Party finally ending the era, leaving a record of 13 years and 132 days in power, the longest democratically elected party in Brazil's history. In fact, the origin of the chaos caused by Brazil's presidential impeachment should be found in a more fundamental place not in the conflict between conservatives and progress, and between the right and left. Now both the left and right of Brazil are not free from the swamps of corruption and the public's awareness. Nevertheless, Brazil found “order and security” in “lost time,” because civil consciousness, citizenship, which resisted the tacit class and corruption that continued since independence in 1822 and tried to establish a missing national sovereignty, sublimated into politics and demanded social change. In the future, there will also be challenges on how political democracy, represented by “*one vote of one citizen*,” should fight market liberalism with “*one vote of one dollar*.”

#### **V-b. The 2018 Presidential Election Based on Social Media Text Mining**

Today, great changes are taking place in the form of news consumption. In the past, the production of news was important and therefore the authority of producers was high. Now, with the advent of social media, it is time for everyone to produce news as well as to distribute it. Of course, the overproduction of news causes problems with reliability and truthfulness, as well as side effects such as the spread of fake or inaccurate news.


This increase in data generated and disseminated in social media calls for new research approaches to diverse research, analysis and knowledge generation. In this sense, social networks are useful as one of the most accessible channels of public opinion to collect rich data about candidates or political parties.

First, as of the first year of the new government's ruling in January 2018, a total of 14,348 articles were extracted by searching 'Brazil' in the 54 media outlets (Central, Economic magazines, Regional newspapers, Broadcasters, and Professional magazines) in seven regions. Because of extracting the analysis of the related words among the searched articles in the Word Cloud, it can be seen that the name of President Jair Bolsonaro was overwhelmingly shown in Figure 3 below. Therefore, we could confirm that domestic interest in Brazil is focused on the new president more than anything else.



**Figure 3. Analysis Results of Korean Journal Articles Related to Brazil between 2019 and 2020**

Brazil is one of the countries with the most internet users in the world. Figure 4 below is a graph that directly generates the increase in the number of high-speed Internet subscribers in Korea and Brazil from 2001 to 2017 using the *E-STAT system*<sup>8</sup>. The number of subscribers in blue in Korea is already saturated, and the number of high-speed Internet subscribers in Brazil is growing exponentially.



**Figure 4. Korea and Brazil Broadband Subscriber Growth between 2002 and 2017**

According to a report in *Digital in 2018: The Americas*, about 62% of Brazilians use social media. The most used social media are YouTube (60%), Facebook (59%), WhatsApp (56%), and Instagram (40%). In addition, daily use of social media on PCs and mobile devices is reported to be 3 hours and 39 minutes per day.

Vaz, Cassiano, Kátia and Cordeiro (2019: 22) used the hashtag “# eleições 2018” (# 2018 election) to extract 89,323 tweets from the Twitter API that were registered with the Election Commission for data extraction. After filtering, retweets were removed, and 26,189 tweets were finally extracted for analysis to derive Figure 5 and Figure 6 below.

<sup>8</sup> Free statistical analysis software developed by Professor Lee Jeong-jin of Sungsil University. The multilingual version is also available, so you can also analyze Portuguese data.



useful to grasp the whole context and trend.

### **V-c. Lula's Release and Its Influence on the 2022 Presidential Election**

Lula was imprisoned on April 7 for 9 years and 6 months in a July 2017 trial and 12 years and 1 month in a second trial in January 2018 on charges of bribery and money laundering. In October 2018, he was unable to register as a candidate under the *Ficha Limpa* (Clean Record Law), which prevented a politician sentenced to serve two years for corruption from running for office again for eight years. But even while in jail, Lula continued by interviewing major domestic and foreign media, arguing that he could run for the next presidential election if he was acquitted in a formal trial or if the charges were canceled.

In an interview with the Portuguese television broadcast RTP, he insisted that "Bolsonaro is destroying democracy in Brazil," and in an interview with France 24, a French television broadcast, he innocently denied allegations of corruption surrounding him. Brazil's leading weekly magazines, *Veja* and *The Intercept Brasil*<sup>9</sup>, exposed the call history and telegram messages exchanged with Lava-Jato<sup>10</sup> prosecutors in June 2019 when the current Minister of Justice, Moro served as a federal judge through their media. There is growing interest in the final ruling against Lula. In particular, in an interview with Moro and Deltan Dallagnol, general commander of Operation "Lava Jato," it was revealed that Moro, the former federal judge accepted the Minister of Justice of the Bolsonaro government and received illegal assistance from the prosecution service in prosecuting Lula. The article uncovered that Moro gave a guilty conviction to Lula, the former president, and an investigation guide that would lead to imprisonment in the second trial. Indeed, Lula was frustrated by this result of the trial. Lula's victory was expected, according to the mock voting results. After that, the Supreme Court held a hearing to determine whether it was unconstitutional at the time of the second trial to carry out the imprisonment. Although he is taking political action outside the regime, he is unlikely to run in 2022 because his election has not been released.

However, according to a survey that predicted the second-round of 2022 presidential elections conducted between October 11 and 14, 2019, before Lula was released, by *Veja/FSB*, respectively Brazil's leading magazine and survey organization, it would be difficult for Lula to run for election. In this survey, President Bolsonaro is ahead of other candidates in almost every scenario. Despite various crises, including Amazon wildfires, illegal logging, international disputes, ruling Social Democratic Party (PSL) internal disputes, and debates involving his son, the Bolsonaro government is said to be well-managed (33%). Support for the way it operates (43%) predicted that the expected support for the end of the ruling party would be below 43%. Furthermore, Bolsonaro has a strong political capital and moral superiority as a "corrupt politician", who has already defeated the Workers' Party (PT),

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<sup>9</sup> The media released in February 2014 with the aim of creating a public media free from capital and power by the founder of eBay. A strategic partnership with *Veja*, Brazil's leading weekly magazine, provides a probe into socially sensitive issues.

<sup>10</sup> The anti-corruption campaign began in 2014 when Justice Moro was a federal judge. In the 1990s, Italy's anti-corruption investigation "*mani pulite*" (clean hands) was modeled after a role. The independence of the judiciary, which took place during Lula's leftist regime, has increased the popularity of the people against Judge Anzil due to the unstoppable rhetoric, but ironically, the corruption of the ruling leftist regime has become a major source of investigation, and the judiciary is strongly opposed to the corruption of the judiciary. I doubt. The Brazilian documentary film '*Democracia em Vertigem*' has been nominated for an Academy Award in 2020, attracting new international attention.

which had been in power for 15 years in the 2018 presidential elections, as a target of a red-and-opposition party.


In other words, Lula's re-run can be a good opportunity for Bolsonaro to unite allies. Two other strong candidates include ministry Moro and broadcaster Luciano Huck. The report uses the strategy of President Bolsonaro to dismantle the midway forces by promoting bipolar split invariably even after the presidential election. The report states that President Bolsonaro continues to use a strategy of dismantling the moderate forces by promoting bipolar division steadily after the presidential election. For this reason, analysts say that if the two men, who are independent but have high public support, attract moderate power, the odds will be higher. The possibility of electing Attorney General Moro, who sparked the impeachment of former President Rousseff, has been quite high. Moro was predicted to win by 38% to 34% with Bolsonaro, 49% to 32% with Haddad, the Worker's Party (PT) candidate, and 50% to 37% against Lula.

As the right wing moves toward preliminary reelection, the Workers' Party (PT) is also taking action. The Workers' Party does not publicly mention the possibility of Lula's release and running for presidential election as it may face public opinion and political backlash against the final ruling. The Workers' Party is still officially proposing Haddad, former Mayor of Sao Paulo, as a candidate for president. According to Veja, based on TSE data, 2,631 members of the Workers' Party (PT) transferred their party membership to the Social Democratic Party (PSL) to which Bolsonaro belonged. While this is not small, political experts skeptically look at the loyalty of these voters. Thus, the Workers' Party is considering how to bring public sentiment turned against itself. Lula said the most troublesome part of his imprisonment was his understanding of Protestant voters.

In the future, the strongest competitors in President Bolsonaro's next presidential election will be recession and unemployment. The case of Argentina, which was ruled by a right-wing government like Brazil, but lost its position in the 2019 presidential election due to the economic crisis, and Chile, whose civil anger exploded due to deep polarization during the right-to-right presidential election, gives the Worker's Party in Brazil alarm. It should also be cautioned that the "politics through division rather than unity" from the early days of power lost its status as a new alternative and that the balloon effect would nourish the ghosts of the past. As Castro (2002) stressed, "Brazil is not a country for amateurs."

The results of the presidential election simulation conducted by Veja/FSB on December 6, 2019, after Lula's release show a slight difference from the pre-release survey. As shown in Figure 7, President Bolsonaro is expected to be nearly equal to the former president Lula in the first round of votes. Whether it is Bolsonaro or Moro, it is expected that Lula will make a technical tie. In a survey previously conducted by the same agency in October 2019, Lula showed intimidating support despite being arrested (Bolsonaro 46% vs Lula 38%).

First Voting Result Scenario	Second Voting Result Scenario 1
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
**Figure 7. 2022 Presidential Candidates Support Scenario**

#### IV-d. Achievements and Challenges for the Bolsonaro Government' First Year

It has been a year since the right-wing president, Jair Bolsonaro, was elected in Brazil, where the leftist regime has been in power for 15 years. Through his inauguration, he made a pledge of anti-corruption, stability of security and national fiscal reform. Although a meaningful evaluation of the 1-year-old term is still premature, it is well worth the assessment because Brazil is in a transitional period. Notable achievements include approval by the National Assembly of pension reform, which is projected to save \$195 billion over the next decade; a 22% reduction in crime rates; the creation of 760,000 jobs; a free trade agreement between the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) and the European Union (EU); and US support for joining the OECD. Mercosur, which includes Brazil, is attempting to add to its success with the European Union a comparable FTA with the United States.

The Bolsonaro government, which considers public spending transparency as its main task, has been in conflict with the education sector, demanding transparency in the way of managing education expenses in addition to supporting educational expenses. In particular, it is expected that there will be a continuing conflict between the president, who wants to correct the lax financial management of public education, which is operated on a full tax basis, and the education sector, which interprets this as a budget cut. As the regime was born out of corruption, there has been no direct involvement in corruption, but controversy over the conduct of the sons continues.


Although President Bolsonaro was elected by a strong majority of 55%, he has faced internal problems such as difficulty in discussing the issue of state administration with opposition lawmakers in the ruling Social Liberal Party (PSL). Recently, Bolsonaro asked the party's representatives to disclose the party's use of funds due to suspicions about the use of funds surrounding a federal election. When this request was denied, he formally announced his intention to leave the party on January 12. The Social Liberal Party (PSL), with 53 members of the House of Representatives, accounts for only 10% of the total 513 seats of the House of Representatives. Since Brazil's parliament has been reorganized into the upper and lower parliamentary elections, it consists of as many as 30 political parties, which left him free politically to leave the ruling party.



**Figure 8. First-year National Administration Evaluation of Recent Brazil Presidents**

Source: Exame (2019)

Figure 8 shows that Bolsonaro's average support rate for government administration during his first year is lower than his predecessors. In addition, 65% of the support at the beginning of his term was cut in half. However, support ratings surveyed at three-month intervals remained flat, despite large issues such as national protests caused by cuts in education budgets in May and the internationally controversial Amazon wildfires in August.



**Figure 9. Evaluation of the State Administration of President Bolsonaro in 2019**

Source: Exame (2019)

In Figure 9, green is positive, red is neutral, yellow is negative or strongly negative, and blue is unknown. While positive opinions are on the decline and negative opinions are on the rise, there is no big gap yet. Most supporters of Bolsonaro have something in common: rich, white, male, and protestant. After 30 years of active politics, but little presence, he was elected president because the people were disappointed and disillusioned with established politics. It was taken for granted that all the politicians, both left and right, were corrupt, because of the arrest of former Lula, who was trusted and fully supported. However, many domestic and international scholars argued that President Bolsonaro was exempt from the ranks of established and corrupted politicians because he was relatively anonymous. Thus, emphasizing the difference between established politics and “transparency issues” and “corruption” are the objects that Bolsonaro must fear and be alert to. There is current speculation that his disagreement with Minister Moro, an icon of Brazil’s anti-corruption campaign, will hurt the president.

A more troublesome scenario is that that the regime will declare a new politics that denies established politics and to walk on previously untrodden paths. This is the crises we are wary of through this article. Bolsonaro and the hard-line right-wing conservative faction are said to have brought down the leftist regime in the ‘crisis of democracy’<sup>11</sup>, while the leftist faction spearheaded by Lula has divided the rise of the far-right faction and President

<sup>11</sup> It means that we can rely on the power of a strong militant hegemony group, such as Samuel Huntington's basic logic, to protect liberal values and the safety of the world.

Bolsonaro's policies into “the edge of democracy.” In this sense, we have the “Two Brazils” in the title, an observation that other observers such as Reichard (1966) and Kenneth (1999) have felt compelled to make.

## VI. Conclusion and Suggestion

Former president Lula, an icon of leftist leaders around the world, and the most famous and most popular president in the world, was sentenced for corruption for his power. His political successor was controversial enough to require a historical reinterpretation, but with impeachment, the order and progress of Brazil entered a new phase. In response, Bolsonaro, a far-right military officer who had little strong presence and political support in the 2018 presidential election, was elected president and the turmoil in Brazilian society is still ongoing. Most scholars agree that the movement for a new rise in the Brazilian right wing after the ruling Workers' Party, began in 2010. However, this right wing camp is distinct from the traditional right wing that has existed in the past. There are three main reasons for the rise of the right wing in Brazil.

First, the Brazilian people have already experienced prosperity and frustration for 13 years under the first peaceful and democratically elected regime in the Constitution. Both the left succeeded in power in 2002, and the right wing elected in 2019 have the character of judging the established political sphere. In other words, it can be interpreted that alternative politicians who have been on the edge for a long time to replace the mainstream forces that cannot solve the economic polarization and general social dissatisfaction both internally and externally.

Second, but at the same time, the disappointment of established politics has turned into indifference, and it is also necessary to interpret that the minority opinion of extremist propensity is excessively projected in the institutional politics in both the left and the right, not the public majority of the people. If you are trapped in the camp logic without a clear self-judgment or self-confidence, you will be swept away from the frame covered by the outside and caught up in the dichotomous confrontation. Moreover, confrontation, which is difficult to cure, persists as hate and anger-based language of hate spreads between camps, universal reason disappears and becomes a matter of emotion.

The Korean society has also been divided into “*pro Cho Kuk*” and “*anti-Cho Kuk*” waves for several months, and the public has suffered this Cho Kuk case, threatened with everyday human and family relationships. From the point of view of the consumer of information, the general public suffers from 'cognitive dissonance' as they are confused in the face of floods of information. The greater the uncertainty of the information they have, the stronger their assertion is and the one side is chosen to escape the inconvenience caused by cognitive dissonance. The polarization of thought and camp begins like this.

Third, it is also necessary to consider the defensive mechanism to cope with the dynamics of international politics in which the globalization and neoliberal flows led by the great powers were transformed into nationalism and neo-mercantilism with national priority and strongman. Korea also is having a difficult time caused by changes in international political dynamics such as the revival of nationalism in neighboring countries.

The economic globalization based on neoliberalism is a form of “neo-mercantilism”

centered in developed countries that actually protect their own industries while discussing free trade. In this system, the field of competition is deliberate and thoroughly unequally structured, creating a gap between the rich and the poor in rich Western societies, and the gap is also creating between countries around the world.

We must recognize that our view of Brazil as a global partner is not a matter of supply and demand, as discussed in economics. As Friedman insists, the world is flat, and humans can always solve economic problems with supply and demand on the premise that they always make rational and best choices. However, as Duflo and Banerjee (2012) argued, “the reality of our human beings is always that it is rational and does not make the best choice.” As evidenced by this, the 2019 Nobel Prize in Economics went to three scholars who worked hard to tackle poverty. Duflo and Banerjee, both criticizing the left and right confrontations over free welfare, stressed the need for consideration for institutions for the poor, and Kramer criticized the automation that prioritized productivity over human labor (Na, Yun-seok, 2019). They said, *"If it is possible to relieve poverty through free aid, why hasn't it been solved yet?"*, *"It is a matter of corruption, a failure of policy,"* and *"Why the poor must endure what they want to do."* *"We need to have a sympathetic look at the realistic conditions and their needs, and care must be taken when designing the system."*(ibid.).

The same is true of Brazil. The problem solving at hand is not a theory that works by looking at the right value, but an object to find an alternative by looking at the concrete reality with real value.

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