

‘지역동맹’으로서 한·미동맹의 기원

– 1953~54년 미국의 아시아·태평양 집단 안보정책과
한·미동맹의 형성 –

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휴전 이후 형성된 한·미동맹은 52년째로 접어들고 있다. 동맹관계의 미래 역할에 대해 논의가 현재 진행 중이다. 과연 동맹의 목적은 무엇인가? 한반도에 국한되어 있는가(반도동맹), 아니면 보다 광범위한 지역적 목적(지역동맹)을 위함인가?(혹은 그 이상인가?) 본 논문은 역사를 거슬러 올라가 한·미동맹 형성의 기원을 고찰하면서 그 구상이 본래 지역동맹이었음을 피력한다.

한·미상호안보조약의 체결이 1차적으로 휴전의 대가였음은 의심할 여지가 없다. 미국은 휴전에 대한 한국의 협력을 얻기 위하여 마지못해 한국측의 정식 안보조약 요구에 응했다. 양자간 안보조약의 체결 대가로서, 미국은 UN군사령부가 한국군의 작전통제권을 보유하는 등의 제한 사항들을 제시하여 남한이 일방적인 군사행동을 감행치 못하도록 하였다. 이러한 조건들은 한국이 방위 조약을 위해 지불한 대가로서 오늘날까지 존재한다.

그러나 한·미동맹관계는 단순히 한반도에서 휴전과 평화를 유지할 목적으로 성립된 것이 아니다. 휴전 협력을 얻는다는 단기적 목적 외에도 장기적이고 전략적인 목적이 있었다. 즉 한·미동맹은 미국의 아시아·태평양 지역 집단 안보체제 구축의 일부로서 포함되었다. 이 집단 안보체제는 사

실상 미국을 중심에 둔 동맹체제로, 냉전의 배경에서 커져가는 아시아 공산권 위협의 저지가 목적이었다. 한·미조약은 태평양 연안 열도 국가들(일본, 필리핀, 미국안전보장조약)과의 조약을 뒤따랐지만 아시아 대륙의 분단 국가와 체결한 이 부류의 조약으로는 최초였으며, 동남아시아 집단방위조약 기구(SEATO)와 타이완 조약의 촉진제가 되었다. 1950년대에 미국이 아시아·태평양 국가들과 체결한 대부분의 방위조약들이 그렇듯, 한·미상호방위조약의 서문은 태평양 지역에서 더욱 포괄적인 지역 안보체제가 형성될 때까지의 상호협력을 요구했다. 이 문구는 한·미동맹이 미국이 아시아·태평양 지역에서 구상했던 지역 집단 안보체제의 통합적 요소라는 증거이다.

아이젠하워 정부의 정책을 고찰하면 한·미동맹이 단순한 남한의 국방을 위함이 아니며 보다 넓은 지역안보에 기여하는 지역동맹의 기원에서 시작했음을 알 수 있다. 이런 지역적 측면은 아이젠하워가 뉴 룩(New Look) 정책을 펼치고 동아시아와 인도차이나 위기에 초점을 맞추어 따라 그 필요성이 더욱 강화되었다. 서태평양에서 집단 안보체제를 확립하는 것은 하나의 정책 목표가 되었다. 이 상황에서 한·미동맹의 지역적 지향으로는 두 종류를 식별할 수 있다. 동북아시아(일본과 타이완)와 결합과 동남아시아(SEATO)와의 결합이다. 이 중 후자는 1960년대에 한국의 인도차이나 군사 개입으로 이어졌다. 그러나 지역의 내부적 곤란으로 인하여 미국은 결국 다변적 아시아·태평양 집단 안보체제를 이루는 데에 실패했고, 한·미동맹은 아직껏 아시아·태평양 지역동맹으로서 스스로의 모든 가능성을 시험해보지 못한 상태이다. 따라서 지역동맹으로서 한·미동맹의 역사적 기원이 갖는 의미는 분명히 제한적이지만, 탈냉전 이후의 관계에서도 재조명할 가치가 있는 문제로 남는다.

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The Origins of the U.S.-ROK Alliance as a “Regional Alliance”*

– U.S. Policy on Asia-Pacific Collective Security and
the Formation of the U.S.-ROK Alliance, 1953~54 –

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1. Introduction
2. Signing of the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty, 1953
3. “New Look” and A New Turn: Western Pacific collective security and US-ROK alliance, 1954
4. Conclusion

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1. Introduction

The United States (U.S.)-Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance enters its 52nd year since its formation in the aftermath of the Korean War. Despite the many challenges it faced (and still faces today), the alliance has become one of the major alliances in the East Asia-Pacific region today. The U.S.-ROK alliance, a successful Cold War alliance, has continued into the post-Cold War era to maintain stability and peace on the Korean peninsula by deterring the North Korean threat and preventing another war.

The U.S.-ROK alliance today still serves its purpose on the Korean peninsula, as the armistice and the division of Korea still exist today, but there were debates in the “post-Cold War” era of the 1990’s about the future of the alliance after the North Korean threat is gone. Would there be a need for an alliance beyond the North Korean threat? Those who answered “yes” advocated that the U.S.-ROK alliance should not be limited to a “peninsula alliance” but should progressively develop into a “regional alliance”: an alliance that can be defined as one whose role is not limited to local defense, but also contribute to the security of the region as a whole, beyond Korean borders.¹⁾ Is the U.S.-ROK alliance simply a “local

1) On “regional alliance,” see for example, the study done by Korea Institute for Defense Analyses and RAND Corporation, Jonathan D. Pollack and Young Koo Cha, *A New Alliance for the Next Century: The Future of U.S.-Korean Security Cooperation* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995), especially Chapter 3. For an analysis of post-Cold War and post-9.11 efforts for redefinition of the U.S.-ROK

alliance” limited to the Korean peninsula, or is it a “regional alliance” with roles beyond the Korean peninsula? This issue is one that is still relevant today. This article focuses on the concept of “regional alliance” and goes back to history to argue that the U.S.-ROK alliance was formed as a “regional alliance” at its conception in 1953-54, with its role primarily in Korea, but also beyond.

Past literature on this period focuses on the U.S.-ROK alliance as a “price for armistice”—a political concession that the United States made at the time to insure ROK cooperation with the armistice on the Korean peninsula. This was indeed the primary motive, and one that constrained the relationship since. ROK President Syngman Rhee had opposed the armistice and threatened to “march north” (continue the war to unify Korea), unless there were adequate security guarantees, namely a mutual defense pact with the United States. Since the end of the Second World War, Washington has been reluctant to make a direct military commitment in Korea, and President Dwight D. Eisenhower was also disinclined to sign a bilateral pact (and preferred leaving Korean security under United Nations collective security).²⁾ However, Eisenhower decided to change

alliance, see Yasuyo Sakata, “The U.S.-ROK Alliance in Transition: The Post-Cold War Redefinition and Beyond,” *Asian Cultural Studies* (Tokyo: Institute of Asian Cultural Studies, International Christian University) Special Issue 13(2004), 87-102.

2) See John Barry Kotch, “United States Security Policy toward Korea, 1945-1953: The Origins and Evolution of American Involvement and the Emergence of a National Security Commitment,” Ph.D. Dissertation (Columbia University, January 1976), Masao Okonogi, “The Shifting Strategic Value of Korea, 1942-1950,” *Korean Studies* 3(1979), James I. Matray, *Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in*

his position and concede to ROK demands in early June 1953, upon the condition that ROK forces would be kept under operational control of the UN Command, and that the U.S. would not assist ROK-initiated attacks on the North.³⁾

But there was another objective. If the first motive was the short-term aim, there was the long-term objective of developing the U.S.-ROK alliance as part of a regional collective security system that the U.S. envisaged for the Asia-Pacific, which was still in the embryonic stages.

Prior to the Korean War, the Truman administration was reluctant about becoming involved in a collective security system in the Asia-Pacific region. In 1949, stimulated by the North Atlantic Treaty movement, Philippines, Republic of China (ROC) and South Korea advocated the "Pacific Pact", but the U.S. declined the offer, saying it was too early.⁴⁾ But after the breakout of the Korean War, the

Korea, 1941-1950 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1985), Okonogi Masao, *Chousen Sensou: Beikoku no Kainyuu Katei* (Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha, 1986).

- 3) Kitch(1976), chapters 12-13; Edward Keefer, "President Dwight D. Eisenhower and the End of the Korean War," *Diplomatic History* 10:3(Summer 1986), 267-289; NAKATSUJI Keiji, "Chousen Teisen to Beikan Kankei: Reisen ni Kakureta Betsunaru Tousou," *Shisou*(Tokyo) 791(1990), Lee Jong Won, *Higashi Ajia Reisen to Kanbeinichi Kankei*(Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1996), 41-43, Stephen Jin-woo Kim, *Master of Manipulation: Syngman Rhee and the Seoul-Washington Alliance, 1953-1960*(Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2001), chapter 2.
- 4) Charles M. Dobbs, "The Pact that Never Was: The Pacific Pact of 1949," *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies* 3:4(Winter 1984); Myong-sob Kim, "Declined Invitation by Empire: The Aborted Pacific Pact and the Unresolved Issue of Regional Governance," in Dong-Sung Kim, et.al., *Fifty Years After the Korean War: From Cold War Confrontation to Peaceful Coexistence*(Seoul: The Korean Association of International Studies-Korean Research Institute for Strategy, 2000),

Truman administration, led by State Department efforts, formulated its own version of an Asia-Pacific collective security system, i.e., the “Pacific Pact” proposal in early 1951. This was a response to the Chinese military intervention in the Korean War in late 1950, and a means to re-integrate Japan into the Asia-Pacific along with the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. The U.S. Pacific Pact proposal was limited to the Pacific “offshore island chain”(Japan, Ryukyu islands, Philippines, Australia, New Zealand), and excluded South Korea and Taiwan. The Asia-Pacific “members-to-be”, however, declined to participate in a collective security arrangement, and thus the U.S. Pacific Pact ended up as a U.S.-centered network of bilateral (US-Philippines, US-Japan) and trilateral(ANZUS) treaties in August-September 1951.⁵⁾

ROK was incorporated into the U.S. alliance system after the Korean War in the Eisenhower era. The ROK government expressed interest in participating in the U.S. Pacific Pact idea in 1951,⁶⁾ but John Foster Dulles, special representative for the Japan peace treaty negotiation in the Truman administration, judged it as too early. While noting the difficulties of creating a comprehensive collective

Ito Yuko, “Taiheiyou Jouyaku Kousou no Henyou: Ajia Taiheiyou Chiiki Anpo Tougou e no Ugoki to Philippine Initiative, 1949-1951,” *Kokusai Kankei Kiyou* (Tokyo: Ajia Daigaku) 10:3(2001).

5) KAN Hideki, *Beiso Reisen to Amerika no Ajia Seisaku*(Tokyo: Minerva Shobou, 1992), chapter 5, Hiroyuki Umetsu, “Communist China’s Entry into the Korean Hostilities and a U.S. Proposal for a Collective Security Arrangement in the Pacific Offshore Island Chain,” *The Journal of Northeast Asian Affairs* 15:2 (Summer 1996), 106-114.

6) Ben C. Limb, “The Pacific Pact: Looking Forward or Backward,” *Foreign Affairs* 29:4(July 1951), 539-549.

security pact in the Pacific, Dulles said with regard to Korea:

The future of Korea, as an independent, united and free nation, is obscure, and there is need for further United Nations action before Korea could be brought into a regional security pact.⁷⁾

Dulles thought that South Korea's status should be considered after the end of the Korean War. Indeed, after the Korean War armistice, Dulles, as Secretary of State in the Eisenhower administration, signed the mutual defense pact with South Korea in October 1953.

Compared to the Truman administration, the Eisenhower administration (since January 1953) was more assertive in building a global anti-communist alliance network. John Foster Dulles, dubbed "Pactomania," lead the effort, in the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, to develop a "collective security system" in the form of a global network of alliances to counter the Soviet/Chinese Communist threat at the height of the Cold War.⁸⁾ The Truman

7) John Foster Dulles, "Security in the Pacific," *Foreign Affairs* 30:2(January 1952), 175-187.

8) The concept of "collective security" in a narrow sense, differs from "alliance" and "collective defense," but in broader terms, it is used synonymously. Thus "collective security" here can be defined as "an arrangement in which nations commit themselves to act in unison for their mutual security …… a term used to refer to either of two mutual security systems: an international body of all or most states, exemplified by United Nations, established to keep the peace among its members; or a regional security alliance, such as NATO, organized to provide for collective defense against outside aggression." Stephen A. Flanders, Carl A. Flanders, *Dictionary of American Foreign Affairs*(New York, NY: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1993), 120.

Administration signed formal alliances with over 40 countries through the Rio Treaty (1947), the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) (1949), and the ANZUS Treaty (with Australia and New Zealand) (1951) and the Philippines and Japanese treaties in 1951. The Eisenhower Administration built on it and concluded a mutual defense pact with the ROK in 1953, SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization), Republic of China respectively in 1954.⁹⁾

Although the Pacific Pact was not realized, it was maintained as a goal. The preamble of the U.S.-Philippines and ANZUS treaties call for the parties to strengthen “efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security, *pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area*(italics added).”¹⁰⁾ The U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty contains the same phrase in the preamble,¹¹⁾ which is evidence that the

9) Matsuoka Kan, “1950 nendai Amerika no Doumei Saihen Senryaku: Togo no Mosaku,” *Kokusai Seiji*(Tokyo: Kokusai Seiji Gakkai)(January 1994), 80-93.

10) SEATO and US-ROC treaties also contained the same phrase, but the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was an exception and avoided reference to regional collective security. For the texts of the U.S.-Philippine(August 30, 1951), ANZUS(September 1, 1951), U.S.-Japan(September 8, 1951)(revised in 1960, as the US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security), SEATO(September 8, 1954) and US-ROC(December 2, 1954) treaties, see “The World and Japan” Database Project, Database of Postwar Japanese Politics and International Relations, Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo, <http://www.avatoli-u.tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/docs>. For citations from these treaties hereafter, refer to this footnote.

11) The Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America, October 1, 1953, The War History Compilation Committee, ed., *The Treaties of National Defense, Volume 1*(1945-1980)(Seoul: ROK Ministry of Defense, 1981), 154-57. For citations from this treaty hereafter, refer to this footnote.

U.S.-ROK alliance was conceived as an integral element in the regional collective security system that the U.S. envisaged for the Asia-Pacific.

This argument is not novel in itself. Past studies have noted this “regional” aspect of the alliance, but it has not been thoroughly addressed from a historical perspective.¹²⁾ Diplomatic history studies on U.S. policy toward Korea have noted, however, the “strategic shift” in 1953-54, that elevated South Korea’s value as an ally. In the concluding sections of the study on the U.S.-Korea security relationship, John Kotch wrote:

With the coming of the armistice, an important new element was added to the security equation, one which would thrust Korea into the center of a developing United States Far Eastern security system with its linchpin in Japan. This was the perceived need for a “forward defense area” against the new “Chinese menace” which was to become the central element in post-Korean war strategic thinking in Northeast Asia. While *implicit* since Chinese intervention in late 1950, this factor was given *explicit* recognition in the general consideration accompanying the statement of policy issued on the eve of the armistice agreement by the National Security Council (NSC 154/1, July 7, 1953). The thrust of these considerations was that “an armistice in Korea would not indicate that Communist China had abandoned its basic objectives or its willingness to seek

12) See for example, Yong-kyun Kim, “The Mutual Defense Treaty of 1953 with the United States: With an Appraisal on the Possibility of a Pacific NATO,” *The Journal of East Asian Affairs* 2:2(Fall/Winter 1982), Hyun-Dong Kim, *Korea and the United States: The Evolving Transpacific Alliance in the 1960s*(Seoul: Research Center for Peace and Unification of Korea, 1990).

these objectives by armed force (and therefore) it is important to our national security that political and economic pressures against China be developed and maintained during the immediate post-armistice period.” With the Cold War at its zenith, Korea had become, via a Chinese connection, a “vital security interest” for the United States.¹³⁾(italics added)

The signing of the U.S.-ROK mutual defense pact was a formalization of America’s first commitment to the Asian mainland, which constituted not only a policy change toward Korea, but also Asia in general. With the security pact with ROK, and with SEATO and the Republic of China that followed in 1954, America’s defense perimeter which was limited to the offshore island chain in the West Pacific, connecting Japan and the Philippines, was expanded to include part of the Asia mainland. Although “caution” was still prevalent, the Eisenhower Administration placed more importance on collective security, and more attention to Asia. The presence of “Asia-Firsters” (such as Admiral Arthur Radford, the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington), elevated the strategic value of South Korea as an ally to counter the growing “China threat” perceived in the post-armistice period.¹⁴⁾

In light of these past studies, this paper will examine how Korea

13) Kotch(1976), 476-477. Lee Jong Won, in his study on the Eisenhower administration’s policy toward Korea, also pointed out the significance of the years following the armistice, 1953-54 as a turning point. Lee(1996), 43.

14) See Lee(1996), chapter 2; Marc Gallichio, “The Best Defense Is a Good Offense: The Evolution of American Strategy in East Asia, 1953-1960,” Warren I. Cohen and Akira Iriye, eds., *The Great Powers in East Asia, 1953-1960* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1990), 63-85.

was integrated into the U.S. policy on Asia-Pacific regional collective security in the 1950's, with a focus on the Eisenhower administration's policy in 1953-54, in order to understand the origins of the U.S.-ROK alliance as a "regional alliance."

2. Signing of the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty, 1953

(1) The decision to sign a mutual defense pact

A security pact with Korea, as part of the Pacific collective security system was not considered by the United States until June 1953, at the end of the Korean War. The decision was made by President Eisenhower, but even after the decision was made, ambivalence lingered within the administration during 1953.

The Eisenhower administration continued the basic tenets of the Truman administration's policy toward Korea, which was based on military withdrawal from Korea, a focus on political and diplomatic means and a multilateral approach based on the United Nations, not a bilateral security pact.¹⁵⁾ NSC 48/5 in May 1951, noted that the "ultimate objective" in Korea was to "continue to seek by political, as distinguished from military means, a solution to the Korean problem which would provide for a united, independent and democratic

15) Lee(1996), 41.

Korea.” This was the U.S. objective in Korea, which failed to unify Korea militarily after the Chinese Communist intervention in late 1950. For “current objectives,” those such as seeking to end the war through armistice, a phased withdrawal of foreign forces were stipulated, but policy on post-armistice security of Korea was not clarified.¹⁶⁾ In December 1951, NSC 118/2 recommended issuance of a “joint statement” by the UN nations participating in the war, to call upon the Communist forces for the strict observance of the armistice terms, and a warning that military action “without geographic limitation” (which meant expanding the war to China) will be taken to meet the renewal of aggression.¹⁷⁾ The Eisenhower Administration followed this line and on the same day that the armistice was signed on July 27, 1953, the Sixteen Nation Declaration on Korea (the “Greater Sanctions Statement”) was announced.¹⁸⁾

President Eisenhower revised policy and made the historic decision to sign a defense pact with South Korea at the last minute prior to armistice.¹⁹⁾ From April to May in 1953, as armistice negotiations

16) Memorandum Containing the Sections Dealing with Korea from NSC 48/5(United States Objectives, Policies, and Course of Action in Asia), dated May 17, 1951, U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States*(hereafter, *FR*) 1951, VII, Korea and China(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 439-442.

17) Memorandum by Lay to NSC, NSC 118/2, “United States Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea,” December 20, 1951, *FR* 1951, VII, 1385.

18) The statement text read: “The consequences of such breach of the armistice would be so grave that, in all probability, it would not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea.” Department of State, *Department of State Bulletin*(hereafter *DSB*), August 24, 1953, 247.

19) Kitch noted that the “uncertain commitment of 1948-50(on the part of the United States and the United Nations) was replaced by a “dual security commitment”

resumed, ROK tried to prevent an armistice based on United Nations Command (UNC) terms. President Rhee increased pressure upon the United States to conclude a mutual defense pact and implied unilateral action to disrupt the armistice if his demands were not met. Both State and Defense were opposed to committing to a bilateral defense pact, but UNC Commander Mark Clark and U.S. Ambassador to Korea Ellis Briggs, believed that ROK may actually take unilateral action, and strongly urged Washington to agree to a security pact to gain ROK cooperation. Washington decided to accede to ROK demands for a mutual security pact on May 30, conditioned on ROK cooperation with armistice, and keeping ROK forces under UNC control. On June 6, Eisenhower sent an open letter to Rhee saying that the U.S. is “prepared *promptly after* the conclusion and acceptance of an armistice to negotiate a mutual defense treaty.”²⁰⁾

Eisenhower had made the decision to *negotiate* a defense pact with ROK, but this was to be implemented after the armistice. Rhee was frustrated with the U.S. position. In his reply on June 17, Rhee emphasized the need for a defense pact *before* the armistice, and the next day, unilaterally ordered the release of “anti-communist” Korean POWs held by ROK troops—contravening UNC operational control.²¹⁾ This caused a major diplomatic crisis, and eventually

based on UN collective security(Greater Sanctions Statement) and the U.S-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty. Kotch(1976), 469.

20) *DSB*, June 15, 1953, 836.

21) On June 17, Rhee handed Ambassador Briggs a letter of reply to President Eisenhower’s June 6 letter. In it, Rhee emphasized the need for a pact *before the armistice*, by noting that “Korea needs (a) defense pact *today* for protection against Communists, but also added that it “may need (the pact for) …… tomorrow for protection against Japan.”(italics added). *FR* 1952-54, XV, Korea,

accelerated the U.S. timetable to negotiate the security pact prior to the signing of the armistice. On June 25, Assistant Secretary Walter Robertson was sent to Seoul to for talks with Rhee, and agreement was made to sign a mutual defense pact after the armistice. Rhee conveyed to President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles, on July 11, that he had “decided not to obstruct in any manner the implementation of the terms” of the armistice.²²⁾ After obtaining ROK cooperation, the Armistice Agreement was signed between the UNC and the Communist forces on July 27, 1953.²³⁾

Stephen Jin-woo Kim noted that “(it) could be argued that Rhee threatened the structure of the armistice but that the U.S. had merely carried out what was intended all along. But the U.S. showed little enthusiasm to tie South Korea into the American security system in East Asia until it realized that ROK’s intransigence might undermine the prospect of a cease-fire agreement.”²⁴⁾ This observation is certainly true, and evidence shows, as Kim speculated that the “U.S. had merely carried out what was intended all along.” As previously mentioned, Dulles stated in the *Foreign Affairs* article in 1952, the possibility of Korea’s participation in the U.S. security system, but that there was need for “*further United Nations action*”(italics added) before Korea joins.²⁵⁾

part 2(USGPO, 1984), 1192-93; DSB, July 6, 1953, 13-14.

22) DSB, July 20, 1953, 72-73; FR 1952-54, XV, 1368-70.

23) Kim(2001), 106, Donald Stone Macdonald, *U.S.-Korean Relations from Liberation to Self-Reliance: The Twenty Year Record*(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 51.

24) Kim(2001), 107.

25) Dulles(1952), 183.

In a conversation between Secretary Dulles and ROK Ambassador to U.S. Yang You Chan on April 8, 1953, prior to Eisenhower's decision to sign a pact, Dulles stressed that the "principal difficulty" for the U.S. to sign a pact with ROK was "the question of what is the territory the Republic of Korea, since Pacific security treaties are to be brought into effect when the territory of a signatory is attacked." He continued that "as the ROK claims all of Korea as its territory, a mutual security treaty now might obligate the United States to use force to drive the enemy entirely out of Korea, and that we cannot undertake to do. On the other hand, if such a treaty covered only the present territory south of the battleline, it might give legal effect to the current division of Korea, which we do not wish to ratify. The dilemma for the United States in both the case of Korea and China is that it is hard to give formal guarantees to governments which claim territory they do not control and which desire treaties with United States that might obligate it to go apply force against Communists in both areas." Dulles also noted that Congress might not approve such pacts "now" and concluded that, "the question of President Rhee's interest in a pact with the United States is *whether or not this should be considered today or later, when the situation is stabilized*. It was better from the United States point of view to give considerations to such a pact *after the* political conference has worked out a peaceful settlement for Korea"(italics added).²⁶⁾

26) *FR* 1952-54, XV, 898-899.

(2) Post-Armistice Korea: Neutral or Ally?

Thus for the United States, from a diplomatic point of view, if a mutual defense pact were to be considered, it was preferred to be done *after* the political conference. Thus even after the decision in June 1953 to negotiate a security pact, discussions continued over whether Korea should be a military ally or become neutral in the post-armistice period.

In early July, NSC 154/1 laid out the interim courses of action immediately following an armistice in Korea, among which was a security commitment to the ROK “similar to those undertaken by the U.S. under the treaties with the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand.”²⁷⁾ But at the same time, NSC 157/1, approved by the National Security Council on July 2, 1953, endorsed “unified and neutral Korea” as a policy objective, in light of the political conference to be held after the armistice.²⁸⁾

It was Dulles at the State Department who advocated neutralization of Korea. A State position paper on June 16, 1953, approved by Dulles, concluded that it is in the interest of the United States

27) This included the possibility of UN military presence. NSC 154/1, “United States Tactics Immediately Following an Armistice in Korea,” July 7, 1953,” *FR* 1952-54, XV, 1343.

28) NSC 157/1, “U.S. Objective with Respect to Korea following an Armistice,” July 2, 1953, *FR* 1952-54, XV, 1344-1346; Macdonald(1992), 17. Article IV(Recommendation to the Governments concerned on Both Sides) of the Korean Armistice Agreement stipulated that, within 3 months after the Armistice agreement is signed, a political conference of higher level of both sides be convened to settle the questions of withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc. War History Compilation Committee(1981), 149.

and should be the U.S. objective, to secure *a unified and neutralized Korea*. The State paper estimated two feasible alternatives for post-armistice Korea: a “Korea divided for an indefinite period on the present demarcation line with the ROK tied into the U.S. security system and developed as an ally” or a “unified, neutralized Korea under a substantially unchanged Republic of Korea.”²⁹⁾ Of the two alternatives, Dulles supported neutralization as the “most realistic method” of working out a *modus vivendi* with the Communists, and to remove Korea as a political and military problem to reduce U.S. commitments without damage to the strategic and political position of the United States.

But the Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly opposed. JCS emphasized that the “United States should not have as its stated and primary objective the neutralization of Korea” because it is “an objective which if implemented would almost surely lead to a fatal impairment of the ability of the ROK Government to provide for its own defense

29) The State position paper added that such an objective would entail Communist agreement to a unified Korea with a U.S. political orientation in exchange for U.S. agreement to remove U.S. forces and bases from Korea and not to conclude a mutual security pact with Korea. This objective should also involve guarantees for the territorial and political integrity of a unified Korea under the ROK and its admission to the UN and possibly would involve limitations on the level and character of the ROK defense forces. Macdonald(1992), 16. On the neutralization issue, see also In Kwan Hwang, “The 1953 U.S. Initiative for Korean Neutralization,” *Korea and World Affairs* 10:4(Winter 1986), Hwang, *The United States and Neutral Reunited Korea: Search for a New Basis of American Strategy*(Lanham: University Press of America, 1990). The 1953 proposal was foreshadowed in NSC 81/1, September 1950, in the plans for unification of Korea. See Yasuyo Sakata, “U.S. Concept for Neutralization of Unified Korea in NSC 81/1, July–November 1950,” *Kanda Gaigo Digaku Kiyou*(*Journal of Kanda University of International Studies*) 11(March 1999).

or would deny the ROK that capability entirely,” and stated that it would be a “strategic disadvantage” to U.S. interests vis-à-vis the Communist threat in Asia. Thus, JCS recommended that the basic U.S. objective with respect to Korea would best be achieved by the “attainment of a unified, independent and non-Communist Korea,” but “until this objective is realized, the United States should maintain a strong military posture in the Far East, thus enabling timely and effective support to the Republic of Korea,” and that “this posture should include retention and support of adequate ROK armed forces.”³⁰⁾ Although the final policy paper, NSC 157/1, approved by the NSC, kept unified and neutral Korea as a “policy objective”, it was qualified to strengthen provisions for ROK forces, replacing the original phrase “possibly would involve limitations on the level and character of the ROK defense forces” with “ROK military forces sufficient for internal security and capable of defending Korean territory short of an attack by a major power.”³¹⁾

After the first attempts for convening a political conference failed by the end of 1953, the objective of unified neutral Korea took a back seat, and a divided Korea and ROK as a military ally came to be accepted as the reality. NSC revised the overall Korea policy paper and submitted NSC 170/1, approved by the Council on November 19, and the President the next day. NSC 170/1 stipulated as the “long-term objective” in Korea to “bring about the unification of Korea… under a free, independent and representative government,

30) Memorandum by JCS to Secretary of Defense, June 30, 1953, *FR* 1952-54, XV, 1288-91.

31) NSC 157/1, *FR* 1952-54, XV, 1344-1346; Macdonald(1992), 17.

friendly toward the United States, with its political and territorial integrity assured by international agreement and with armed forces sufficient for internal security and capable of defending Korean territory short of an attack by a major power,” and pending achievement of “long-range objectives,” the “current objective” in Korea was “to maintain a position of strength in Korea” which meant South Korea as an ally.³²⁾

There were still debates between State and JCS over the goal of neutralization of Korea, but in NSC 170/1, reference to neutralization as a long-term objective was deleted, and relegated to a “course of action” with regard to “seeking to obtain satisfactory agreements from the Communists.” The document stipulated that the U.S. should “continue to seek by political negotiations between the Communists and the UN (with Republic of Korea associated with the latter), *a unified and neutral Korea* under an independent and representative government.” To this end, the U.S. should be prepared to accept, 1) a unified Korea friendly to the United States, without U.S. or other foreign forces or bases in Korea, 2) U.S. and Communist assurances of the territorial and political integrity of Korea under the ROK, *but foregoing all rights granted to the United States under a U.S.-Korea mutual assistance pact*, and 3) a level of Korean armed forces sufficient for internal security and capable of defending Korean territory short of an attack by a major power. But, upon JCS insistence, the “foregoing would not preclude the provision by the United States of economic and military assistance to

32) Report by Lay to the NSC, November 20, 1953, NSC 170/1, “U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea,” *FR* 1952-54, XV, 1620-1626.

Korea” was added, to insure the development of ROK forces, as a minimum necessary condition. But the real focus was on “achieving a position of strength in Korea” in which the U.S. should observe the armistice, accept a divided Korea, and “*tie the Republic of Korea into the U.S. security system and develop it as a military ally*” (italics added). This would be “conditioned upon the satisfactory cooperation of the ROK.” To this end, it recommended that the U.S. should “ratify the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of Korea.”³³⁾ NSC 170/1 became the basic policy document for Korea for the post-armistice period to be superseded by NSC 5514 in 1955.

The goal of a neutral unified Korea oriented toward the West, “lost all current relevance almost as soon as it was approved” as former State Department official, Donald MacDonald noted, because the negotiation of a mutual security treaty with the ROK was one of the U.S. concessions for gaining President Rhee’s acquiescence in the armistice agreement. Rhee also rejected the idea. Thus, neutralization was “given diminishing respect as a long term goal of American policy.”³⁴⁾

33) *FR* 1952-54, XV, 1623.

34) Macdonald(1992), 17. Dulles raised the neutralization idea in his talks with Rhee, but the idea was rejected. Memorandum of Conversation(Young) on the 2nd Dulles-Rhee meeting, August 7, 1953, *FR* 1952-54, XV, 1481. Foreign Minister Pyun Yun Tai also opposed the idea in his talks with Dulles in Washington. Memorandum of Conversation(Robertson), October, 2, 1953, *FR* 1952-54, XV, 1515-19.

(3) Two Values of the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty

While post-armistice U.S. policy toward Korea was being debated, reality took its course as deliberations for the mutual defense treaty proceeded. Despite the policy considerations over neutralization, South Korea was gradually incorporated into the developing Pacific collective security system as a U.S. military ally. The treaty was negotiated, initialed and signed by October 1953, and sent to the Senate for ratification in January 1954.

Eisenhower and Dulles emphasized two objectives of the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty: the treaty as a deterrent to war in Korea, which was the primary objective, and as a complementary value, its function as part of collective security in the Asia-Pacific. Korea was the fifth treaty partner in the Asia-Pacific, following, the “offshore island chain” nations, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand and Japan. It was to be the first formal treaty partner on the Asian mainland.

The regional aspect of the treaty was emphasized. In the letter of June 6, 1953, President Eisenhower responded to Rhee that the U.S. is prepared to negotiate a mutual defense treaty, “along the lines of the treaties heretofore made between the United States and the Republic of Philippines, Australia and New Zealand.” Eisenhower made special reference to the fact that these treaties spoke of “the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific area” and that a security pact between the U.S. and ROK would be “a further step in that direction.”³⁵⁾

The preliminary draft of the treaty was negotiated during the

Robertson-Rhee talks in June 25-July 11. After the armistice was signed, Secretary of State Dulles made a visit to Seoul, and the treaty draft was finalized and initialed on August 8 in Seoul, and signed on October 1 in Washington.³⁵⁾ Dulles later admitted that, “[I] would have much preferred not to negotiate such a treaty, but we had accepted it as one of the prices that we thought we were justified in paying in order to get the armistice,” but treaty or no treaty, he said the U.S. would prevent the ROK from being overrun by the Communists. But the defense treaty, he said, “went further than any other [treaty] up to that time, in the sense that it pledged America to intervene directly on the mainland of East Asia.”³⁷⁾ Rhee on the other hand, lamented that “If only we had such a pact with the U.S. before, we would not have suffered [the Korean War].”³⁸⁾

Taking in Rhee’s sentiments, Dulles pointed out, in a speech before the American Legion that this treaty was necessary to “prevent any recurrence of enemy miscalculation of 1950 which brought about the Korean war.”³⁹⁾ Upon the formal signing of the treaty on October 1, Dulles repeated the deterrent function of the treaty: “This treaty is a treaty firmly dedicated to peace. Its purpose is to deter aggression. We have no aggressive intentions toward any

35) *DSB*, June 15, 1953, 836.

36) *DSB*, August 17, 1953, 203-04, October 12, 1953, 484-86. *FR* 1952-54, XV, 1515.

37) Richard Good-Adams, *The Time of Power: A Reappraisal of John Foster Dulles*(London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1962), 107 quoted in Kim(2001), 112.

38) Yi Han-u, *Yi Sung-man 90-nyon* [Syngman Rhee: 90 Years](Seoul: Choson Ilbo-sa,1995), 144, quoted in Kim(2001), 107.

39) “Korean Problems,” Address by Secretary Dulles before the American Legion, St. Louis, MO, September 2, 1953, *DSB*, September 14, 1953, 340.

nation, but we must recognize that in a world where the forces of aggression still constitute a threat, constant preparedness and constant vigilance are the price of our freedom. Bitter experience has taught us that weakness invites aggression; that the requirement of peace and security is the maintenance of our strength.”⁴⁰⁾

But he also reiterated the “other” aspect of the treaty. In the same speech before the American Legion, Dulles emphasized that the “proposed treaty [between the U.S. and ROK] is another step in the development of a Pacific security system. The treaty would complement the earlier treaties which I negotiated in 1951 with the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan.”⁴¹⁾ On the day of the signing of the treaty, Dulles emphasized that: the U.S.-ROK treaty, like other Pacific treaties, “affirms our belief that the security of an individual nation in the free world depends upon the security of its partners and constitutes another link in the collective security of the free nations of the Pacific.”⁴²⁾

On January 11, 1954, when the U.S. Senate reconvened for the session, the text of U.S.-ROK mutual defense treaty was submitted for ratification, the same themes were repeated. In a White House statement, Eisenhower noted that the treaty “is designed to deter aggression by giving evidence of our common determination to meet the common danger” and repeated the “other” aspect of the treaty, collective security in the Pacific. He noted that “(it) thus reaffirms

40) *DSB*, October 12, 1953, 485.

41) *DSB*, September 14, 1953, 340.

42) *DSB*, October 12, 1953, 485.

our belief that the security of an individual nation in the free world depend upon the security of its partners, and constitutes another link in the collective security of the free nations of the Pacific.”⁴³⁾

Dulles followed up in a statement he made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 13, 1954, that the value of the U.S.-ROK treaty lies in the following aspects. He noted that the treaty is a “logical outgrowth” of the Korean War: “a successful joint effort of both sides, with approval and support of the United Nations to repel the Communist invasion of the Republic of Korea.” Then he went on to elaborate on the two values of the treaty. The “*primary value*” (italics added) of the treaty, he said, “consist in giving the Communists notice, beyond any possibility of misinterpretation, that the United States would not be indifferent to any new Communist aggression in Korea. It is our hope that this reaffirmation will, in combination with other measures which we are taking in the Far East, disabuse the Communists of any ideas of launching another aggression in Korea.” Furthermore, Dulles emphasized that, “(b) *eyond this primary consideration* (italics added),” the treaty has “significance as another step in the development of a Pacific security system.” The treaty adds to “the treaties which have already been concluded by the United States with Australia and New Zealand, the Philippines, and Japan” and “(l)ike these other security treaties, the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and ROK affirms the belief of the United States that the greatest measure of security is found in collective community measures. As such, the treaty is evidence of our desire for peace and our conviction that to maintain

43) *DSB*, January 25, 1954, 132.

peace it is essential to demonstrate, in concert with other free nations, our firm and clear resolve to react to aggression.”⁴⁴⁾

(4) Features of the US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty

Reflecting these two objectives, the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty followed the model of other Asia-Pacific treaties, but tailored to the Korean situation. Unlike the offshore Pacific island countries, Korea was in a “quasi-war” status (an “armistice” which meant the end of hostilities, but not “peace”) and remained a divided state. The armistice itself was in a precarious state, since the Rhee, while agreeing to cooperate with the armistice, refused to sign the armistice, and continued to advocate “march north” or unification of Korea by force, if the armistice or the political conference failed. Unification by force was in contradiction with U.S. policy, thus the U.S. sought to restrain ROK unilateral military action, through the defense treaty (and in the Agreed Minutes of November 1954⁴⁵⁾).

Comparison of U.S. and ROK treaty drafts show that the U.S. desired the Philippine model, and the ROK desired an amalgamation of the NATO, Japan and the Philippine/ANZUS treaties. The final

44) *DSB*, January 25, 1954, 133-134.

45) In the Agreed Minutes signed on November 17, 1954, the ROK undertook to “cooperate with the United States in its efforts to unify Korea”(which meant by peaceful means), and agreed to retain its forces “under the operational control of the United Nations Command while the command has responsibility for the defense of Korea.” Second Progress Report by Operations Coordinating Board to the NSC on NSC 170/1, December 29, 1953, *FR* 1952-54, XV, 1948. Kim(2001), chapter 4.

version basically resembled the U.S. draft, or the Philippine model with some revisions, reflecting the special conditions of Korea.⁴⁶⁾

The final version of the U.S.-ROK treaty consisted of a preamble and five articles. The preamble is based on the U.S. draft and basically resembled the Philippine and ANZUS treaties.⁴⁷⁾ It shared key identical phrases with regard to Pacific collective defense and security: that the Parties share the desire “to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific area” and “to declare publicly and formally their common determination to defend themselves against external attack so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone in the Pacific area,” and desire “further to strengthen their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive and effective system of regional security in the Pacific area.”

Article I of the final text states compliance with UN principles

46) The U.S. draft(July 6) included a preamble and 5 articles, and the ROK draft(July 9) consisted of a preamble and 9 articles. Secretary of State to the Embassy of Korea, July 6, 1953(Washington), *FR* 1952-54, XV, 1339-1340; Republic of Korea Draft of Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea, Seoul, July 9, 1953, *FR* 1952-54, XV, 1359-61. U.S. and ROK drafts here refer to the July 6 and July 9 versions. The final draft text initialed in August was published in the Department of State Bulletin. *DSB*, August 17, 1953, 204. Refer to this footnote for the U.S.-ROK treaty drafts and the final draft hereafter. For final texts of the US-ROK, Philippines and ANZUS treaties, see footnotes 11 and 12.

47) The ROK draft(July 9)’s preamble had references to the U.S.-Korea “Amity Treaty of 1882” and to “the common bond of sympathy and mutual ideals to fight side by side against Communist aggression in Korea,” and tried to emphasize the “special relationship” between the two countries, but this was deleted.

whereby the parties agree to refrain from the threat or use of force in a manner consistent with the purpose of the United Nations. This follows the example of previous treaties, including the Philippines and ANZUS, to attest that the alliance is defensive in nature. The U.S. and ROK drafts are identical in this sense. But in the final text, an additional clause was inserted, whereby the parties are to refrain from use of force with respect to “obligations assumed by any Party toward the United Nations.”⁴⁸⁾ This implied ROK obligations with UNC and the armistice, a U.S. effort to deter unilateral action by ROK.

Article II, like the NATO and U.S.-Philippines treaties, confirmed the principle of “self-help” and mutual aid, and stipulated “consultation” whenever the parties are threatened by external attack. It confirms the principle established by the Vandenberg resolution (U.S. Senate Resolution 239) which calls for “self-help and mutual aid” by all parties to security arrangements joined in by the United States.⁴⁹⁾ The ROK draft acknowledged the principle of self-help and mutual aid, but on consultation, it called for creation of formal consultation mechanisms similar to the Philippines and ANZUS treaties: “the parties, through their Foreign Ministers or their deputies will consult together from time to time regarding” not just in cases of external attack, but on “the implementation of the treaty.” But this was not provided for in the final text.⁵⁰⁾

48) Secretary Dulles made special reference to this clause. *DSB*, January 25, 1954, 132.

49) Dulles report, December 30, 1953, *DSB*, January 25, 1954, 132.

50) Consultation mechanisms especially for cases other than external armed attack would eventually become necessary, as the ROK forces became involved in the

Article III is the “heart of the treaty” as Dulles described. It defined collective defense based on the U.S.’s Monroe Doctrine formula used in the Philippine and ANZUS treaties, instead of the NATO model that the ROK desired.⁵¹⁾ Another feature was the treaty area. The ANZUS and Philippine treaties refer to armed attack on “the Parties,” its “territory,” and its “armed forces, vessels or aircraft in the Pacific” as the treaty area.⁵²⁾ But the ROK treaty, reflecting the divided state of Korea, specifically confined the treaty area to territory “now” under the Parties’ respective “administrative control” or that “hereafter” recognized by one of the Parties as such. This was based on the U.S. draft which defined the treaty area as “territories now, or hereafter brought peacefully under their respective administrative control.”

This was a contentious point since the ROK draft was more expansive on territories. As ROK territory, it called for “recognition of the fact that lawful jurisdiction of ROK extends throughout traditional area of Korea and specifically northward to Yalu and Tumen Rivers.” The ROK draft was identical to the Philippines and

Vietnam war in the 1960s. The annual Security Consultative Meeting established in 1968, now serves as the consultative mechanism for defense officials.

51) The NATO Doctrine provides that in the event of an external armed attack, the members will take necessary action to restore and maintain the security, while the Monroe Doctrine (which uses expressions from the U.S. President James Monroe’s speech in 1823) provides that in such event the members will act to meet the common danger *in accordance with their constitutional processes*. Kim(1982), 326-28.

52) “Armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific” was interpreted as U.S. forces stationed in the Philippines, Ryukyus and the main islands of Japan. Thus, the ANZUS, Philippines and Japan treaties were linked together for defense of the Northwest Pacific. Umetsu(2004), 190-191.

ANZUS treaties regarding treaty area: “Armed attack” stipulated in the articles for “consultation” was defined as an armed attack to include those on “metropolitan territory” or on “island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific” or on “armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific” of the parties. If this kind of clause was established, ROK would have assumed responsibilities for protecting for example, U.S. forces in the Pacific, beyond its borders.

The final text of Article III basically limited the treaty area to protecting ROK territory south of the armistice line from external armed attack. Dulles noted that, this provision recognized the fact that ROK presently has effective control over only part of Korea, and thereby, it was understood that if either contracting state should initiate an armed attack against any territory not under its administrative control when the treaty was signed or thereafter recognized by the other as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the first, the treaty will not apply. This was assurance to the Senate, that the U.S. is not obligated to assist in ROK-initiated attacks on North Korea. It was also understood that the treaty could continue to be applicable in event that a political settlement unifying Korea is reached at a political conference.⁵³⁾

Article IV, in the final text, refers to stationing of U.S. forces, which stipulated that the “ROK grants, and the United States of America accepts, the right to dispose land, air and sea forces in and about the territory of Korea as determined by mutual agreement.” This was not in the U.S. draft, but was included upon ROK

53) *DSB*, January 25, 1954, 132-133.

insistence. The ROK draft, originally included a provision for stationing U.S. forces: “If the U.S. should find it desirable to station its land, sea or air forces in or about Korea, arrangements for this purpose can be readily effected.” The Philippines and ANZUS treaties do not contain this type of clause, and the ROK eventually proposed using Article I of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.⁵⁴⁾ The ROK treaty is identical in this sense, but it does not specify the purposes of the U.S. forces as in the Japan treaty. The Article I of the Japan treaty stipulated that “such” U.S. forces “may be utilized to *contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East* (italics added) and to the security of Japan against armed attack from without (this included large-scale internal riots and disturbances)···,” but the ROK treaty simply stated that the U.S. forces are deployed “as determined by mutual agreement.”

One of the reasons for U.S. reluctance on such a clause is that the State Department wanted to keep a free hand diplomatically, pending results of the political conference. Dulles explained in his report to the Senate that Article IV in the ROK treaty does not require the U.S. to station forces, and if agreed peace arrangements

54) Article I of the 1951 U.S.-Japan Treaty states: “Japan grants, and the United States accepts, the right ···· to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about Japan.” Rhee suggested to Assistant Secretary of State Robertson that if drafting a new defense pact is too time-consuming, the ROK treaty should be fashioned on the ready-made pattern of security pact between US and Japan, including clause for permitting US forces “in and around Japan.” Rhee said that if this idea is accepted, all that is needed is to replace the word “Japan” with “Korea.” Robertson interpreted that Rhee meant only Article I in the US-Japan treaty, and asked for State’s response about adding a new article. *FR* 1952-54, XV, 1339-40, 1340-41.

call for withdrawal of all foreign forces, this could be done consistently with the treaty.⁵⁵⁾ The U.S. military planned to redeploy U.S. forces out of Korea after the war, and if forces are necessary, it could do so through the United Nations framework. Furthermore, unlike the forces in Japan which had a broader regional role (not limited to defense of Japan, but for Far East security, including Korea and Taiwan), a flexible role for U.S. forces in Korea was not envisaged at the time. The task at hand was deterrence of war on the Korean peninsula. Thus, the U.S. Army presence in Korea, reduced to a 2 division-posture for the post-armistice period in Korea was limited to defense of Korea.⁵⁶⁾

There were also differences over Article VI on the duration and termination of the treaty. ROK desired the Japan model. The ROK draft resembled Article IV of the U.S.-Japan security treaty, changing only the country name from Japan to ROK. The ROK draft stated that the treaty “shall expire whenever in the opinion of the Government of ROK and the USA there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements or such alternative individual or collective security dispositions as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance by UN or otherwise of international peace and security in the Korean area.” But the Japan treaty was the exception, rather than the norm for Asia-Pacific treaties. The 1951 Japan treaty was

55) DSB, January 25, 1954, 134.

56) At the end of the Korean War, there were 7 Army divisions in Korea, and 1 division in Japan, which constituted almost half of the 20 division U.S. Army. Robert Watson, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Volume V: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1953-54*(Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1986), 229-232; Lee(1996), 58-78.

of a temporary nature, and one that would be revised later in 1960. The U.S. draft, instead, incorporated Article VIII of the Philippine treaty, which stated: “This treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either Party may terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other Party.” The ANZUS treaty also takes this format (with some different wording). Dulles, in his talks with Rhee in August 1953, strongly insisted that ROK take the Philippine model.⁵⁷⁾ Rhee agreed and the formula was incorporated into the final text of the treaty.

Article V in the final text stipulates ratification by both sides necessary for the treaty to become effective. There was no difference over this point in the U.S. and ROK drafts. The question was whether the treaty will be successfully ratified, without delay. President Rhee was most worrisome on this point. Thus, Secretary Dulles re-assured Rhee on one hand, and urged to the Senate that in view of the importance of this treaty as a deterrent to aggression and thus to the maintenance of peace and security in the Pacific area, it is hoped that it will be given early and favorable consideration.⁵⁸⁾ After approval in the ROK National Assembly on January 14, and the U.S. Senate conducted hearings and ratified the treaty on January 26, 1954 with a vote of 81-6, with a reservation attached.⁵⁹⁾

57) *FR* 1952-54, XV, 1488.

58) *DSB*, January 25, 1954, 132-134.

59) The reservation clarified conditions for U.S. military assistance, and emphasized that neither party is obligated, under Article III to come to the aid of the other except in case of an external armed attack against such party.

3. “New Look” and A New Turn: Western Pacific collective security and US-ROK alliance, 1954

(1) “New Look” Strategy and Collective Security

The value of the U.S.-ROK alliance took on a new turn since 1954, in the context of the Eisenhower administration’s New Look strategy and East Asia security policy, amidst the growing crisis in Indochina. Of the two values of the U.S.-ROK mutual defense treaty, one for deterrence and defense in Korea, and the other as part of Asia-Pacific collective security, the latter increased its importance.

The Eisenhower administration’s New Look strategy focused not only on nuclear deterrence, but also on allies and collective security as a means to respond to the growing Communist threat. Allies and collective security was important not only as part of diplomatic strategy, but also as military strategy.⁶⁰⁾

New Look manifested itself in the Eisenhower administration’s first statement of national security policy, NSC 153/1 (June 9, 1953). It stipulated as a general objective: “To strengthen the will and ability of other nations of the free world, individually and collectively, to deter or oppose communist aggression and achieve internal stability.”⁶¹⁾

60) Robert Watson, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Volume V: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1953-54*(Washington, D.C. Historical Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1986), chapter 1; Matsuoka(1994); Akagi Kanji, *Vetnamu Sensou no Kigen*(Tokyo: Keio Tsushin, 1991), chapters 1-2.

The post-Korean War policy directive, NSC 162/2 (October 30, 1953), approved by the President, also emphasized the need for allies. NSC 162/2 asserted that U.S. forces were overextended, but admitted that major force withdrawals from Europe or the Far East would imply lessening of U.S. interest in those areas, thus U.S. diplomacy should seek to convince allied nations that their best defense rests upon their own efforts, coupled with a commitment by the U.S. to strike back against aggression with its mobile forces. This was the concept proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and supported by the Administration.⁶²⁾

State also supported this approach. Secretary Dulles, in his *Foreign Affairs* article of April 1954, listed “community defense” as the first item, even before nuclear deterrence as an integral component of the Eisenhower Administration’s New Look policy.⁶³⁾ Dulles said, “The cornerstone of security for the free nations must be a collective system of defense” and the “Security for the free world depends, upon the development of collective security and community power rather than upon purely national potentials.” A good example

61) Watson(1986), 10.

62) NSC 162/2 also advocated “warnings” to deter aggression. An attack on any of the following areas (basically treaty allies) would automatically involve U.S. in war with the aggressor. Those areas are the NATO countries, West Germany, Berlin, Japan, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, the American Republics, and the Republic of Korea. Certain other regions (e.g. Indochina and Taiwan) were deemed to be so important strategically that an attack on them would probably compel the U.S. to react by military force either locally at the point of attack, or generally against the military power of the aggressor. Watson(1986), 24-25.

63) John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*(New York: Oxford University Press,1982), 152.

he noted was the Rio Treaty and NATO, and mentioned the Asia-Pacific, as an “evolving” area: “While NATO best exemplifies this collective security concept, there are other areas where the same concept is evolving, although as yet in a more rudimentary form. An example is the Western Pacific, where the United States has a series of collective security treaties which now embrace Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Japan and Korea.”⁶⁴⁾

Although both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations promoted alliances and collective security, diplomatic historian, John Lewis Gaddis also noted the differences, especially in its objectives. The Truman administration, under Secretary of State Acheson, organized coalitions primarily as “war-fighting instruments”: they were restricted to nations whose geographical positions made them vital to the defense of the United States, and who could be expected to render significant assistance if a major war came. Eisenhower and Dulles placed more emphasis on the “deterrent” power of alliances: Dulles’s aspiration was to encircle the Soviet Union and China with a ring of states aligned with the United States either by treaty or unilateral declaration—SEATO, CENTO (in the Middle East), bilateral security pacts with South Korea and Taiwan, Congressional resolutions on Taiwan and the Middle East—not with any expectation that the countries involved could contribute directly to the defense of the United States, but rather with the hope that an American security “umbrella” over them would discourage Russian or Chinese attacks. For Eisenhower and Dulles, alignments were also

64) John Foster Dulles, “Policy for Security and Peace,” *Foreign Affairs* 32:2(April 1954), 355-56.

helpful since they could provide “manpower” that the U.S. itself could not afford to commit to deal with local aggression. Thus, Dulles, in his 1954 *Foreign Affairs* article, stressed the need to develop “sufficient forces” in non-communist countries.⁶⁵⁾

Collective security was also embraced more strongly by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, under the new Chairman Admiral Arthur W. Radford. Radford who became Chairman of JCS in August 1953, was known as an “Asia-Firster” (Radford was formerly CINCPAC, Commander in Chief, Pacific), and had strong interest in building a collective security system in Asia to resist the China threat.⁶⁶⁾ The fall of Dienbienphu in spring of 1954 re-enforced the importance of allied contribution of ground forces, and precipitated a reexamination of policy. An interim policy revision was made as NSC 5422/2(August 7, 1954), in which the need for allies was reaffirmed, but at the same time it was admitted that the attainment of decisive collective action was growing more difficult, as evidenced in the Indochina crisis. It recommended, based on JCS views, that while not neglecting Western Europe, the U.S. should create a “position of strength” in Asia which was “highly vulnerable to creeping expansion of communism.”⁶⁷⁾ Policy debate continued and was finalized in the new security policy directive, NSC 5501, approved by the President on January 7, 1955, in which the importance of the strength and cohesion of the free world was stressed.⁶⁸⁾

65) Gaddis(1982), 152-53.

66) Gallicchio(1990), 63-64; Stephen Jurika, Jr., ed., *From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam: The Memoirs of Admiral Arthur W. Radford*(Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1980), chapters 12, 20, 23, 29.

67) Watson(1986), 48.

(2) Strengthening Collective Security in the Asia-Pacific:
WESTPAC

The new emphasis on collective security and the focus on Southeast Asia became evident in U.S. policy toward Asia. The target in Asia was the perceived expansion of the Chinese communist threat. It was thought that with the armistice in Korea, the Chinese would shift its attention to Indochina and Taiwan. After some deliberation over China policy, especially on the defense of Formosa (Taiwan), NSC asked the Defense Department to review the missions envisioned for the Nationalist Chinese forces, and at the same time called on the Department to suggest ways of developing a position of military strength in the Far East. The request was passed to the JCS who replied on April 9, 1954, with the memorandum, "United States Strategy for Developing a Position of Military Strength in the Far East." This was submitted as NSC 5416 to NSC for consideration.⁶⁹⁾

In the memorandum, JCS pointed out that consolidating a strong position required the formulation of a comprehensive policy that would view the "non-communist Far East" as a single strategic entity. Though the overall threat is Soviet and Chinese communism,

68) Watson(1986), 51-54.

69) Watson(1986), 249; Memorandum by Wilson to Lay, *FR* 1952-54, XII, East Asia and the Pacific, part 1(USGPO, 1984), 411-421. JCS described the "Far East area," for the purpose of the paper, as including the following countries: Communist China, Korea, Hong Kong, Indochina, Indonesia, the Offshore Island Chain(Japan, Ryukyus, Formosa, Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand), Malaya, Thailand, and Burma. *FR* 1952-54, XII, 412, footnote in source text.

the “primary and immediate threat” to the non-communist countries in the Far East is the “aggressive attitude and the growing military power of Communist China.” To contain the Chinese communist threat, without “ever-increasing demands” upon U.S. resources, JCS recommended: 1) Development of the local military forces: purpose and capability of the non-communist countries of the Far East to act collectively and effectively, including the development, organization, and effective application of the combined military potential of the non-Communist countries in the region. 2) *Development of a regional security arrangement, as a long-range goal.* That is, establishment of a “*comprehensive regional security arrangement (regional security pact)*” among the non-communist countries of the Far East, with which the United States and possibly other major Western Powers (United Kingdom, and possibly France) would be associated. This would entail an “integrated military structure” of indigenous armed forces, supplemented and complimented by the mobile forces of the United States and other associated nations. 3) Until such an organization could be established, foster *alternative, bilateral and multilateral defense treaties* among countries of the area, with the *United States acting as the “integrator”* among the treaty nations. In this structure, Japan was key. Rehabilitation of Japanese military forces, not only to provide for its own national defense, but also, in time, to contribute to the collective defense of the Far East was recommended.(italics added)⁷⁰⁾ South Korea and

70) JCS also recommended that the U.S. should seek to reduce friction and solve differences within the region that constitute a “major obstacle” to a collective security arrangement in the Far East. One of which was a “rearmed Japan.” It

Taiwan (Nationalist China) military forces were also important to this structure. JCS recommended that assistance and support should be provided to the forces of ROK and Nationalist China not only for internal security, but also as “*prospective contributors to the community defense effort in the Far East*”(italics added).⁷¹⁾

Upon JCS recommendation (NSC 5416), NSC began to consider a new comprehensive Asia policy, but only after the Indochina crisis ended in July 1954. The French lost its foothold in Southeast Asia after Dienbienphu, and in a radical change of circumstances, NSC conducted a re-examination of policy and re-visited the issue of a collective security in Asia. NSC called on the Planning Board in July to report on the subject, and the Planning Board circulated NSC 5429, “Review of U.S. Policy in the Far East”(dated August 4,1954).⁷²⁾

Noting Communist successes in Indochina which culminated in the agreement reached at the Geneva conference (dividing Vietnam at the 17th parallel), NSC 5429 recommended that the U.S. must maintain the security of the Pacific off-shore island chain (Japan, Ryukyus, Formosa, Philippines, Australia and New Zealand), as an essential element to U.S. security. To this end, increasing the military

recommended that the U.S. seek to promote its acceptance as an “important element” in the common defense of the area. JCS recognized that certain risks are attendant with a military revival of Japan, but noted that there are economic and political factors imposed upon by Japan that would limit the risks. It was also believed that so long as the U.S. furnished the principal offensive air and naval elements of the combined military forces in the Far East, adequate safeguards against the recrudescence of Japanese military power as an aggressive force would be provided. *FR* 1952-54, XII, 417-19.

71) *FR* 1952-54, XII, 412-21.

72) Watson(1986), 250-251; *FR* 1952-54, XII, 696-703.

strength of Japan, Philippines, and improving the effectiveness of the ROK and Formosa forces, and formation of a regional collective defense arrangement was recommended:

“Encourage [the conditions which will make possible] the formation of, and be prepared to participate in, a Western Pacific collective defense arrangement, including the Philippines, Japan, the Republic of China, and the Republic of Korea, eventually linked with the Southeast Asia security structure and ANZUS.”⁷³⁾

Thus JCS recommendations were incorporated. The JCS, however, criticized NSC 5429 for not constituting a comprehensive policy, and not embracing the Far East as a strategic entity.⁷⁴⁾ The Council nevertheless adopted it with some changes, including those from the State Department, as NSC 5429/2 (August 20, 1954).⁷⁵⁾ State was more cautious on U.S. involvement in Asian collective security arrangements and worked to tone down the language.⁷⁶⁾

73) *FR* 1952-54, XII, 696-700.

74) *FR* 1952-54, XII, 720.

75) *FR* 1952-54, XII, 769-776.

76) Acting Director of the Office the Northeast Asian Affairs, Robert J.G. McClurkin sent Ambassador John M. Allison (in Japan) a memo on September 16, 1954, and criticized the hastiness of the NSC Planning Board in the language regarding collective security. The July 20 State draft read: “Encourage these countries (ROC, Japan, ROK and Philippines) to consult with one another and with us with respect to the formation of a Western Pacific collective defense arrangement to parallel or perhaps eventually be linked with the Southeast Asia defense arrangement.” But on August 3, NSC Planning Board, “improved” upon it, McClurkin commented, as though “[the State draft] were not realistic enough.” It stated: “Encourage (with State proposing the insertion of ‘as feasible’) the formation and be prepared to participate in a Western Pacific collective defense

In the meantime, General James A. Van Fleet (Army) had completed a survey mission to the Far East on U.S. military assistance programs, and submitted conclusions regarding the general Far Eastern area.⁷⁷⁾ His views endorsed JCS recommendations for a comprehensive security pact in Asia, and went further. He recommended that the two commands responsible for Asia, CINCFE and CINCPAC be merged into a single command, and a unified regional organization comparable to that in the NATO framework (a central office analogous to the U.S. mission to NATO to provide liaison with the proposed Asian alliance) be created. Furthermore, he advocated that local forces should be trained not only for homeland defense, but also for “task force operations in other Asian countries.” In East Asia, he said, the U.S. should equip and prepare the Nationalist Chinese and ROK armies for offensive operations, and that these countries be “integrated” under U.S. leadership, with Japan and the Philippines.⁷⁸⁾

arrangement, including the Philippines, Japan, the ROC, and the ROK, eventually linked with the Southeast Asia security treaty and ANZUS.” According to McClurkin, the final language (in NSC 5429/2) represents “more realistic policy” and “one which represents a considerable victory for us in NA (Office of Northeast Asian Affairs).” The text read: “encourage the conditions which will make possible the formation of, and be prepared to participate in, a Western Pacific collective defense arrangement, including the Philippines, Japan, the ROC, and the ROK, eventually linked with the Southeast Asia security treaty and ANZUS.” *FR* 1952-54, XII, 911-12.

77) Van Fleet visited Korea, Japan, Formosa, Philippines, from April 28 to July 13, 1954. Watson(1986), 236, 241, Lee(1996), 86.

78) Memorandum by Robertson to Dulles on the report of the Van Fleet mission(summary), October 25, 1954, *FR* 1952-54, XII, pt.1, 953-55; Watson(1986), 250.

NSC reviewed Van Fleet’s report on October 28, but apparently gave little consideration. The Council instead supported Secretary Dulles’s recommendation, that U.S. policy in Asia be guided by a desire to avoid provocation to Communist China, and sign a mutual defense treaty with ROC but avoid encouraging Chiang Kai-shek to attack the mainland. This approach was opposed by JCS, but nevertheless was accepted in the NSC.⁷⁹⁾

The final version of U.S. statement of policy toward Asia, NSC 5429/5, “Current U.S. Policy toward the Far East,” was approved by the Council on December 22. It took a cautious approach of “pressure” toward China, as Secretary Dulles recommended, but also endorsed the idea for a collective regional security arrangement in Asia: “Encourage the conditions necessary to form as soon as possible and then participate in, a Western Pacific collective defense arrangement including the Philippines, Japan, the Republic of China, and the Republic of Korea, eventually linked with the Manila Pact (SEATO) and ANZUS.”⁸⁰⁾

Thus, as part of not only political, but also military strategy, consolidating regional collective security became a policy goal, a long-term policy goal. The U.S. envisaged a “Western Pacific collective defense arrangement” of Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, the Northeast Asian countries linked to SEATO and ANZUS. But the difficulties of realizing that objective were understood not only by the JCS, but more so by the State Department.

79) Watson(1986), 250-51. On China policy deliberations, see also Watson(1986), 256-66, Gallichio(1990), 73-75.

80) *FR* 1952-54, XII, 1062-72.

(3) Linking SEATO with NEATO?

In order to promote a Western Pacific collective security arrangement, the first tasks were to encourage the “conditions” necessary. As the JCS engaged in the development of local Asian military forces,⁸¹⁾ State worked to expand alliance networks in Asia. Secretary Dulles engaged in a new round of mutual treaty negotiations, first with Southeast Asia. A Southeast Asia pact was being discussed with allies since April 1954, and culminated into the Manila Treaty (Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty) signed on September 8, 1954, by eight nations.⁸²⁾

SEATO was the most comprehensive multilateral regional security pact in the area. With SEATO, ANZUS and Southeast Asia was connected, but the U.S. hoped to further link Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) to consolidate the Western Pacific collective security network.

During negotiations for SEATO with United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, Dulles and State explored the idea of the Northeast Asian countries, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan participating in

81) Watson(1986), chapters 11, 12.

82) SEATO treaty was signed by the U.S., UK, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand and France. South Vietnam (territory south of the 17th parallel under jurisdiction of the State of Vietnam), Cambodia and Laos were covered by SEATO as a protocol country. The “treaty area” was confined to the general area of Southeast Asia, including the entire territories of the Asian Parties, and the general area of the Southwest Pacific not including the Pacific area north of 21 degrees 30 minutes north latitude. The Pacific Charter, proposed by the Philippines was also signed by the signatories to the Manila Treaty. *DSB*, September 20, 1954, 393-95.

SEATO. The U.S. had ideas for expanding the Southeast Asia treaty into a Western Pacific pact, but UK and others preferred that it be limited to Southeast Asia. Thus the UK-US joint study report of July 18 concluded that initial membership should be limited to the Southeast Asia and concerned countries, but possibilities were left open for invitations to other states that wished to accede or associate themselves with the treaty.⁸³⁾ Other countries also disfavored participation of the three Northeast Asian countries. New Zealand did not favor inclusion of South Korea, Formosa, and was not likely to consider Japan in the near future. It was thought that if cooperation becomes necessary between SEATO and Japan, South Korea, it could be ensured through the U.S. as member of SEATO, and a partner in bilateral security treaties with those countries.⁸⁴⁾

There were also ideas for creating a separate Northeast Asia grouping, including Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. At a news conference on August 3, Secretary Dulles acknowledged that Washington was considering a security pact linking the U.S., Japan, South

83) UK and Australia wanted to limit the treaty to Southeast Asia, and perhaps include South Asia (India). In a meeting with UK officials on July 9, Secretary Dulles considered that including the phrase “Western Pacific” may be disadvantageous now, but it might provide the opportunity within 5 years, for example, to bring in Japan, the ROK, Formosa and of course all the countries on the South Asian littoral. July 17 Report of the Joint UK-US Study group on Southeast Asia recommended limiting initial membership to the eight signatories, and other Southeast Asian states’(Burma, Indonesia) if willing, Cambodia, Laos, and non-communist Vietnam, if Geneva permits. Also, after entry into force, “invitations to other states to accede to treaty or associate themselves” could be issued upon unanimous agreement.” *FR* 1952-54, XII, 597, 607, 611, 614, 633, 643.

84) *FR* 1952-54, XII, 710-711.

Korea and Nationalist China, but that no decision was made.⁸⁵⁾ The question asked was in relation to a defense pact with Formosa, to which Dulles replied, that although the U.S. does not have formal treaty ties, “thought has been given to the possibility of such a treaty (with ROC) or possibly even of tying together in a single association, Korea, Japan and Free China. But those are all in the area of preliminary investigation and examination. No decisions in that respect have been taken in any quarter, as far as I am aware.”⁸⁶⁾ Dulles explained his comments, in a message to Ambassador Allison in Tokyo, on August 5. Dulles said that he does not have any present plans for promoting a security pact including Japan, ROK, Formosa and U.S., and perhaps Philippines. But at the moment, “the important business is to create in the area a sense of interdependence.” In this context, President Eisenhower and himself “have made effort to impress Rhee and his advisers that it is imperative to have good relations between Japan and Korea.” Thus, he explained that “(it) is because of this aspect of the matter that I did not want to give a totally negative reply to the question which I got at my press conference.”⁸⁷⁾

The idea of interlocking Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia treaties was explored with allies. In a July 21 meeting with officers from the British, New Zealand, Australia Embassies in Washington, Robert McClurkin, Deputy Director of Office of Northeast Asian Affairs inquired about including ROK and Japan into the Southeast Asia

85) “New Asian Line-up Studied by Dulles,” *The New York Times*, August 4, 1954.

86) *FR* 1952-54, XII, 694, footnote 1.

87) *FR* 1952-54, XII, 711-712.

Treaty, if Japan-ROK relations were normalized. McClurkin pointed out that rearmament of Japan may be carried out advantageously within an Asian pact, and if Japan is included, it would be necessary to include Korea, which has the largest non-Communist Army in Asia. He also suggested that it might be profitable to explore the “possibility of Northeast Asian and Southeast Asian security organizations which would be interlocking.”⁸⁸⁾ The other three parties did not welcome including the three Northeast Asian nations in the Southeast Asia treaty, but was positive to the potential of interlocking the Southeast Asia treaty with a “North Pacific Treaty Organization.”⁸⁹⁾

88) McClurkin noted that he raised the possibility of interlocking pacts in general terms with Ambassador Iguchi of Japan and that the Ambassador had indicated that Japan would not be unwilling to think about it. In a memorandum of a conversation held on July 23, it was recorded, at the request of Shigenobu Shima (Minister, Japanese Embassy), that Shima raised the issue of possible participation by Japan and ROK in a treaty organization. U.S. hoped for establishment of normal relations between the two countries, and their immediate participation in a collective defense organization is not being considered at present. Shima observed that Japan would not be able to participate in a collective defense organization since Article 9 of the Japanese constitution is generally interpreted to prohibit sending Japanese forces abroad. But he also noted that some legal experts in Japan believe Article 9 would not prohibit Japan's placing forces under a joint command in response to a UN resolution for collective action. *FR* 1952-54, XII, 649.

89) The British official was interested in including India, but if Japan and Korea join, Formosa would have to be included, and that in turn would preclude inclusion of India. Nevertheless a “North Pacific Treaty Organization” was welcomed, since it may give ROK strength to negotiate peaceful unification with North Korea, but the possibility of ROK unilateral military action against North Korea was also of concern. McClurkin said that a collective pact may actually diminish ROK inclination to resort to unilateral action. *FR* 1952-54, XII, 648-649.

In a news conference in August, Under Secretary Walter Bedell Smith was asked whether U.S. defense treaties with Asia-Pacific countries (at the time) can be put into “one alliance.” Smith answered: that urgency in Southeast Asia calls for a pact that is realistically possible, but did not deny the possibility of expansion in the future. “Whether this pact should eventually be expanded to include say Japan or Korea is of course, a matter for much longer range consideration, and there are many problems involved.” He reminded the press about the difficulties already faced: “You have to bear in mind that membership in a pact like this must be acceptable to the other participants. The process of drawing the countries in East Asia together is a very, very difficult process. When Secretary Dulles went out into the Pacific to work out some specific security treaties in 1951, for example, he had in mind the possibility of having a rather broad pact. However, the political differences, the conflicts of interests, certain lack of common tradition among many of the countries made it impossible at that time to bring this broader concept into being.⁹⁰⁾

In the end, there was no expansion of SEATO or a linkage of Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. A separate treaty was signed with the Republic of China on December 2, 1954. Dulles emphasized that the U.S.-Republic of China mutual defense pact “will follow general pattern of other security pacts which the U.S. concluded in the Western Pacific” and that it “will forge another link in the system of collective security established by the various collective

90) “America’s Primary Interests in Asia,” by Under Secretary Smith, CBS television program, “Crossroads Asia,” August 1, 1954, *DSB*, August 9, 1954, 192-93.

defense treaties already concluded between US and other countries in the Pacific area.” The preamble of the treaty used similar language regarding collective defense in the Pacific, and stated the goal of “development of a more comprehensive system of regional security” though it was specified to “West Pacific area” in light of the security thinking then. The treaty area is limited to the “Taiwan, Pescadores,” and the “Western Pacific Islands under the jurisdiction of United States,” and provide for inclusion of “other territories” as determined by mutual agreement. On the treaty area, Article III in the ROK treaty was the model for Article VI in the ROC treaty. Dulles noted, “Where there is a country which we recognize and which claims rightful sovereignty over more territory than it actually controls, there we adopted the practice of providing by the treaty that it can be extended to other territory” and in the ROK treaty, “we provide that initially it only covers the area which is south of the armistice line but that it can be extended to other territory at a later date.”⁹¹⁾

In a news conference on December 1, in Washington, Dulles was asked again whether consideration was given to tying all Pacific pacts into one overall Asia pact, now that the treaty with Taiwan was concluded. Dulles expressed his hopes, but noted the difficulties: “I have often expressed the hope that these treaties could develop in a more comprehensive manner,” but he noted that “there are great difficulties in the way of accomplishing that.” He said “(the) biggest step forward was taken at Manila by the Southeast Asia treaty where a group of eight countries came

91) *DSB*, December 13, 1954, 895-99.

together. Otherwise, it has seemed impractical to operate, except on bilateral basis, except in the case of Australia and New Zealand, which is on a trilateral basis. But the differences between different areas are so considerable, and the lack of homogeneity is such that it is not easy to bring them together. We can bring them together with us, but it is much harder to bring them together as between themselves. There are very considerable differences as you know, which exists between Korea and Japan, and between certain other countries that we have treaty relations with and the Republic of China, so that it is hard to tie it all together at the present time. All I can say is that we have that as a goal and I think we are going steadily in that direction.”⁹²⁾

As Acting Director of Northeast Asian Affairs, McClurkin noted in a memo to Ambassador Allison in Tokyo, the objective of a regional collective security pact was then still unrealistic, and wrought with difficulties. Even the final language of NSC 5429, he notes “is to be interpreted with moderation.” There is no question that the conditions making possible the formation of a “Northeast Asian pact (or perhaps better, a “horizontal” Western Pacific pact) require a “greater sense of interdependence” in the area that presently exists. He elaborated on the difficulties: “Until the Japanese are themselves ready to engage in such a pact, until Japan-Korea relations are placed on a more constructive foundation and until the reparations problem is settled between Japan and the Philippines, it is impossible to foresee any real sense of interdependence or to think of a security organization in the area.” But he goes on to say, “The

92) *DSB*, December 13, 1954, 898.

long-term objective simply highlights the necessity of solving there immediate problems” not denying the future of a regional security organization.⁹³⁾

(4) New Korea Policy and Implications for the US-ROK Alliance

In 1954, Korea was paving its way for the post-Korean War era. The Geneva conference on Korea from April to June 1954, as foreseen, ended with no agreement on unification. The Indochina crisis further exacerbated the situation in Asia. In the meantime, the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty was finally effectuated on November 17, 1954, with the exchange of the Agreed Minutes. The U.S.-ROK alliance formally began.

It is within this context, that a new policy for Korea was devised and the direction of the U.S.-ROK alliance took on a new dimension. The new Asia policy, NSC 5429/5 emphasized regional integration, and the concept was incorporated into Korea policy.⁹⁴⁾ A policy review was recommended by Assistant Secretary of State

93) *FR* 1952-54, XII, 912.

94) A progress report on NSC 170/1, dated December 30, 1954, noted “efforts to further tie the ROK into the U.S. security system through the Western Pacific security arrangement, called for in NSC 5429/2 have been started by emphasizing to the ROK the need for satisfactory working relationships between the ROK and Japan.” Wary of ROK’s heightened public criticisms of U.S. security policies and “propaganda attacks” on Japan, it recommended that the U.S., nevertheless, “should continue efforts to formalize broad security arrangements with the ROK,” but also noted that “it may prove impossible, particularly with respect to arrangements involving Japan, to do so in the short range.” *FR* 1952-54, XV, 1953.

Robertson, and a new Korea policy was approved as NSC 5514 in February 1955.⁹⁵⁾ NSC 5514 continued the general line of NSC 170/1, with some revisions. The new policy put more emphasis on ROK as an ally (and dropped reference to neutralization of Korea), and stated as the “current objective”: a) assist the ROK in order to enable it to make a substantial contribution to free world strength in the Pacific area, b) prevent more of Korea from coming under Communist domination either by subversion or aggression, and c) develop ROK armed forces sufficient for internal security and capable of defending ROK territory short of attack by a major power.”⁹⁶⁾

The recommendation in NSC 5429/5 for a regional collective security arrangement was also included. As measures to “achieve a position of strength,” NSC 5514 stated:

Encourage the development of cooperative relations, mutual respect and participation in multilateral activities between the ROK and the other free nations of Asia as a means of lessening the dependence of the ROK upon the U.S. for political and moral support; *endeavor to develop a community of interest between the ROK and Japan, and also with the Philippines and the Republic of China through the offer of U.S. good offices* to help resolve outstanding problems and by encouragement of joint cooperation; and *encourage the conditions necessary to form as soon as possible, and then participate in, a*

95) NSC 5514, Note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council on U.S. Objectives and Course of Action in Korea, Washington, February 25, 1955, *FR* 1955-57, XXIII, part 2, Korea(USGPO, 1993), 42-48.

96) Macdonald(1992), 22.

Western Pacific collective defense arrangement, including the Philippines, Japan, the Republic of China, and the ROK, eventually linked with the Manila Pact and ANZUS”(italics added).⁹⁷⁾

Reflecting the long-term goal of Western Pacific collective defense arrangement, NSC 5514 emphasized the need for developing ROK relations with other nations in Asia. Among them, relations with Japan would be the most important for U.S. policy, in terms of security and economy, but this was one of the most difficult obstacles to overcome. Thus, the document recommended, offering “U.S. good offices to resolve outstanding problems” in light of the impasse of Japan-ROK normalization talks at the time.⁹⁸⁾ Eisenhower and Dulles often stressed to Rhee and the ROK government, the need to build cooperative relations with Japan.⁹⁹⁾

97) *FR* 1955-57, XXIII, 47.

98) Japan-ROK normalization talks had been suspended since 1953, with the “Kubota statement.” Chong-Sik Lee, *Japan and Korea: The Political Dimension*(Stanford University, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1985), chapter 2.

99) In August 1953, when Dulles visited Seoul for negotiations on the mutual security pact, Rhee expressed concern about a militant Japan and U.S. East Asia policy centered on Japan. Dulles tried to assuage those fears. He replied that “the (U.S.-ROK) treaty has the advantage of protecting ROK against Japan as well as the Soviet Union” and stressed that the “U.S. does not want Japan to become a dominant power any more than the Koreans do.” But he also stressed that it was necessary for the safety of the Western Pacific to have a close and cooperative relationship between Korea and Japan. He pointed to the U.S. position on Okinawa, relationship with Philippines, Australia, New Zealand and concern with Indochina. “If Southeast Asia fell to the communists, he said, the effect on Japan would be serious,” and warned Rhee that “communists could cause great trouble by coming through the back door.” Thus he emphasized “the importance of holding solid the two peninsular positions of Korea and Indo-china, and the island group in between.” As assurance to Korea, he noted

In the context of discussion about a regional collective security in the Asia-Pacific, two directions can be discerned for the development of regional linkages between ROK and the nations in Asia. This also becomes the regional direction for the U.S.-ROK alliance. One is the Northeast Asia or the North Pacific linkage, which includes ROK, Japan and Republic of China. The origins of U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral security relations can be discerned here.¹⁰⁰⁾ Korea-Japan normalization was key in this context, but it was at an impasse in the 1950's, and was not realized until 1965. The other is the ROK linkage with Southeast Asia or SEATO. This would eventually lead to the ROK troop deployments to Indochina and Vietnam.

(5) Offer of ROK Troops to Indochina

In fact, the ROK government made their first offer of deploying troops to Indochina in 1954. The ROK offer was made for many

that the U.S. is not building up Japan, U.S. will have bases in Japan and U.S. will have a treaty with the ROK. So for these reasons, he stressed that Korea should be able to cooperate with Japan without too much fear." *FR* 1952-54, XV, 1473.

100) There is evidence that President Rhee suggested a tripartite treaty between Japan, Korea and the United States to President Eisenhower. Eisenhower stated in a letter to Rhee: "I am very glad to be assured that you share our interest in the restoration of genuine harmony and friendship between Japan and Korea. In this connection, the suggestion you make for a tripartite treaty between Japan, Korea and the United States seems to me to be well worth further exploration. I am asking Ambassador Briggs to discuss this matter with you so that we may have a fuller explanation of your ideas about such a treaty." Letter from President Eisenhower to President Rhee, Washington, January 31, 1955, *FR* 1955-57, XXIII, 12.

reasons, such as to gain favorable treatment as an ally and to obtain more U.S. military aid in order to build up its military forces.¹⁰¹⁾ To the U.S., the ROK offer suited the JCS proposal for regional collective security, and the use of local forces for regional defense. Thus, the U.S. in principle welcomed the offer, but declined due to political constraints. ROK as a regional ally had its limits since Korea was a divided state with an immediate security threat. The ROK had to focus on its own defense, and priority was given to lessening its dependence on U.S. forces in Korea.

The first ROK offer was made in January - February 1954. On January 28, President Rhee conveyed to CINCPAC General Charles E. Hull that the ROK can send one division of troops to Laos.¹⁰²⁾ State Department analyzed the political aspects, and commented that Rhee's political intentions behind this offer were, to emphasize the strategic value of Korean forces, add a boost to its demands for increasing force levels for ROK forces, and to stimulate the debate for a Western Pacific collective security arrangement. The Defense Department reported on the military aspects. There were differences of opinion within the JCS. JCS Chairman Admiral Radford welcomed the idea, but the majority of the Chiefs of Staff were not in favor, pointing out the possibility of provoking Chinese intervention if ROK troops intervened in Indochina.¹⁰³⁾ Since the matter was not urgent,

101) Lee(1996), 94-98.

102) Lee(1996), 94; *FR* 1952-54, XV, 1755; *FR* 1952-54, XIII, Indochina, part 1(USGPO, 1982), 1012-13.

103) The Joint Strategic Survey Committee(JSSC) considered the matter and sent its comments to JCS on February 17. They basically welcomed the offer, and judged that there would be no problem in implementing the offer from a

Radford decided to go along with others and decline the offer, but recommended that it be done in a way that would leave open the possibility of future acceptance.¹⁰⁴⁾ NSC considered the matter on March 4, and President Eisenhower offered another reason, a domestic reason against ROK troop deployment.¹⁰⁵⁾ Thus, NSC decided to decline the offer, but took Radford's recommendation to do so with

military standpoint, and noted that it would not induce Chinese Communist military intervention immediately. However, one division was not of much military value to France, thus, the problem was mainly political and psychological. The ROK offer was in U.S. interests, but if France and other major allies object, JSSC recommended that the U.S. should not demand it. Admiral Radford supported the JSSC position. But, Army Chief of Staff Matthew Ridgway and Chief of Naval Operations Robert Carney were critical. They thought that ROK troop deployment could actually induce Chinese intervention, and the U.S. to follow. CIA also did not support the ROK offer. Lee(1996), 94.

104) Radford said that the ROK offer has considerable merit from both the military and psychological point of view. Militarily, addition of 15,000 well-trained, combat-tested, fighting men, particularly Asiatics, could be of great assistance to France. The aid of another Asiatic country also has "salutary" effect in the movement to develop and mobilize indigenous forces. He thought that there was a "small likelihood" of overt intervention by Chinese communists considering its military capabilities, but also noted that "risks" also must be taken, in order to improve the situation in Indochina and Far East. Thus, he suggested that the U.S. should not reject the offer categorically since Rhee's offer, he believed, was made with sincere desire. Furthermore, "there might come a time in the future when we would welcome a contribution" of Korean forces to Indochina. Thus, he suggested the President should reply to Rhee that the offer does not serve the best interests of ROK and allies, "at this time." no title, February 26, [1954], RG218, Radford File, box 12, National Archives, U.S.A.

105) Eisenhower thought public opinion in the U.S. would not support "the removal of ROK division for adventures in other parts of the world, while the U.S. itself was still obliged in Korea. " He said that he would "certainly hate to have to explain such a situation to the mothers of American soldiers." *FR* 1952-54, XV, 1757.

utmost consideration (on March 9).¹⁰⁶⁾ In April 1954, State Department informed Ambassador Yang that the U.S. had been discussing with UK, Australia, New Zealand and Southeast Asian countries about organizing a “united front” contemplating not only political but also military action in Southeast Asia. Although U.S. had no plans for ROK, Taiwan, Japanese participation at the time, Yang commented that the offer for a division to Laos was still good.¹⁰⁷⁾

The second offer was made in June and July of 1954. As the French position deteriorated, after the fall of Dienbienphu, Rhee proposed in June to General Van Fleet that ROK could send three Army divisions to Laos.¹⁰⁸⁾ Ambassador Yang You Chan in Washington made the same offer. On July 12, Rhee renewed his offer to send troops to Indochina to Ambassador Briggs in Seoul. Rhee said that “two or three ROK divisions can be sent to Indochina at once.” Rhee emphasized that the French in Asia “are finished” and the “only solution” is Van Fleet’s plan of utilizing Asian manpower willing to fight for freedom plus U.S. air and naval power.” U.S. considered the offer, but decided to decline, mainly due to French refusal.¹⁰⁹⁾ Troop offers were also made in 1958 (to Indonesia) and 1959 (to Laos), and as the strategic and political importance of SEATO increased for South Korea, the need for ROK

106) *FR* 1952-54, XV, 1757.

107) *FR* 1952-54, XII, 406-07.

108) In addition to Rhee’s offer, Van Fleet proposed sending U.S. military officers, Nationalist Chinese forces, one-to-two divisions, and a symbolic force from the Philippines. Furthermore, if the battle turns sour, he proposed sending U.S. troops to Haiphon. Lee(1996), 96.

109) *FR* 1952-54, XV, 1835-36; Macdonald(1992), 108-109.

Navy and Air Force visits to Southeast Asia were proposed within the ROK government.¹¹⁰⁾

4. Conclusion

Examination of U.S. policy and the “origins” of the U.S.-ROK alliance show that the alliance was considered a “regional alliance” at its conception, one that was intended not only for Korea defense, but also to serve broader regional security, as part of the Asia-Pacific collective security system. Within the Asia-Pacific, the U.S.-ROK alliance had two regional orientations, the Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia linkage. The former became the base for ROK security ties with Japan and Taiwan, and the latter for ROK-SEATO ties and participation in the Vietnam War.

The significance of these origins, however, must be qualified in the sense that: 1) The regional collective security idea, neither the Pacific Pact, nor WESTPAC, was never fully realized, due to intra-regional difficulties. WESTPAC continued as a policy goal throughout the Eisenhower era,¹¹¹⁾ but the alternative of U.S.-led “hubs and spokes” network became the reality. 2) The Pacific Pact proposal and the WESTPAC idea was a product of the Cold War. The collective security system in Asia was in reality an anti-

110) In February 1958, when U.S. and ROC sent military aid to Indonesia to put down a military insurgency in Sumatra, Rhee offered troop support. Lee(1996), 97-98, 103(footnote 44).

111) Lee(1996), 57(footnote 26).

Communist China alliance structure led by the United States. Thus, as a concept, it has its inherent limits, if cooperative relations are to be pursued with China in the post-Cold War context. 3) There was always ambivalence in U.S.-ROK relations, as to what “regional alliance” meant. What does “Pacific defense” in the Mutual Defense Treaty mean? The balance between Korea defense and of other areas has always been problematic. Korea defense still remains the primary objective. But how about defense cooperation in other areas? Southeast Asia was one area that was explored (with SEATO allies in the Vietnam war). Northeast Asia alliance cooperation still is focused on Korea, based on U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral cooperation. Taiwan is another sensitive issue. What about other areas in the Asia-Pacific? These are issues that the U.S. and ROK still struggle with today, but must be worked out in order for the alliance to develop as a “regional alliance” that it intended to be.

“What is past is prologue” as Shakespeare says. History has its limits, but also offers many ideas. The U.S.-ROK alliance has yet to test its full potential as an Asia-Pacific alliance. And if “origins” are still relevant, the alliance has the historical responsibility to cooperate in “the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific area” as the Mutual Defense Treaty states, adapting to the post-Cold War context.

Key Words : Regional Alliance, U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty, New Look, Collective Security, U.S.-ROK Alliance