

Interest Groups and Political Parties in Mongolian Democracy

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논문 요약

이 연구는 후견주의(Clientalism) 개념의 적용을 통해 1990년대 이후 체제이행기의 몽고 국내 정치 동향을 분석하고 있다. 후견주의는 근대화 사회의 새로운 이미지와 함께 살아남고 적응하여 등장하였다. 정부의 역할이 국가 경제 속에서 급격히 커짐에 따라 여당은 후견주의적 정치 경쟁 속에서 더 많은 이점을 지녔다. 정치학자들 가운데에서 이와 같은 현상은 후견주의가 더욱 더 인기를 얻음으로 인해 연립정부의 인기 역시 상승한다는 새로운 가설을 제기하였으나 후견주의가 진정으로 연립정부의 인기를 결정하는지에 대하여 논의하기보다 후견주의의 부풀려진 인기가 언제 그리고 어떻게 연립정부로 이끄는지에 대한 질문을 던지는 것이 더욱 생산적이라 할 수 있겠다. 이 논문은 2004년과 2008년의 몽골의 국회의원선거의 사례에 이론적인 기초를 두고 있다. 다음 조사 결과는 후견주의의 인기도의 상승이 연합 정부의 인기를 반드시 견인하는 것은 아니라고 보여준다. 따라서 공공자원 중심적 후견주의의 교류가 정치 경쟁에서 승리자와 패배자를 결정할 수 있다고 볼 수 있다.

주제어: 정당 후견주의, 공공자원, 후견주의의 교류, 연립정부, 투표행태

I. Introduction

Today, adapted and changed new clientelism coexists with traditional clientelism. Traditionally, clientelism describes transactions between politicians and voters in which material benefits are offered in return for political support. According to the traditional understanding, patron—client relationship between politicians and voters are characterized with personal, dyadic, unequal, and hierarchical characters, but in some countries, clientelism has evolved into new type with less hierarchical and personalized characters in which party organizations play dominant role in generating and operating clientelist exchange rather than individual politicians in old clientelism.

As the role of party organizations in clientelism has grown, the exploitation of public resource for clientelist exchange has expanded greatly to satisfy large promises of political parties. Besides the inflated importance of public resource, new types of clientelism such as party clientelism have developed as regular political behavior in some political contexts. For the case of Mongolia, under the effective role of political parties, party clientelism seems to have been becoming more and more powerful. Mongolian experience shows that party clientelism works well in mobilizing large voter groups than small individual clientele due to its public resource centered clientelist goods like money welfare offers. Money welfare offers are good examples how political parties manipulate and channel public resources into clientelist goods.

As a new behaviour of Mongolian political competition, party clientelism emerged and developed in 2004 and 2008 parliamentary elections. Motherland Democratic Coalition (MDC)¹⁾ won a surprise

victory due to its "Child Money" promise in 2004. Initially the promise was criticized as unrealistic welfare policy by other political parties, but later they followed MDC as MDC began succeeding. In that election year, all political parties felt how clientelist public goods are influential and powerful to mobilize female and married young voters who are resource-poor. Consequently, in the next parliament election (2008 election), public goods-centered clientelist mobilization characterized entire competition images of all political parties. The 2008 election presents that party clientelism which relies on public resource had already reached the level of powerful clientelist politics with powerful clientelist goods such as various welfare offers in Mongolia by 2008 parliament election.

Another new phenomenon in Mongolian politics whose development was paralleled with party clientelism is coalition government. Coalition governments have been established after 2004 and 2008 parliamentary elections. Most interesting event occurred in 2008 parliamentary election. At that time, Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP) had full capacity and legitimacy to establish its own single party government. However, it agreed with Democratic Party (DP) to form a coalition government. Some politicians say that they established a coalition government because of violent riot after the initial outcome of 2008 election.²⁾ Some say that MPRP leaders decided to cooperate

1) Three Mongolian political parties including Democratic Party, Motherland Party, and Civic Will Party joined into Motherland Democratic Coalition to successfully attend 2004 Great Khural Election. "State Great Khural Election 2004", *General Election Committee of Mongolia* (online source), 2004, <http://www.gec.gov.mn> (search date: 2011.07.02)

2) "Riots, curfew follow Mongolian election results", *Associated Press* (online source), June 01, 2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25480549/ns/world_news-asia_pacific/t/riots-curfew-follow-mongolian-election-results/#.T3BgRt3ibIY (search date: 2011.07.02.). After Mongolian 2008 parliamentary election, MPRP won a majority party in parliament for 45 seats, but DP who won 27 seats and other small parties complained about the election outcome and

with DP in coalition government to smooth parliamentary process for their policy approval. I stress the second opinion. On the one hand, sharing executive power must have been good opportunity for DP to exploit public resource for their clientelist public goods. On the other hand, parliament without powerful control of opposing party must have been powerful incentive for MPRP to realize its clientelist welfare promises smoothly. On the basis of these two arguments, this article makes a hypothesis which claims that the inflated popularity of party clientelism in the behavior of political competition leads to more popularity of coalition governments.

In this paper, we investigate our hypothesis by selecting Mongolian 2004 and 2008 parliamentary elections as the objects of our research. As our research focuses only on the experiences of Mongolia, it can be defined as a case study. We choose party clientelism domination in domestic politics as an independent variable of our hypothesis and select the popularity of coalition governments as a dependent variable. Mostly, we apply the data of public opinion surveys of Sant Maral Foundation and Asia Foundations which were made before those year elections as well as using some additional data which involves election promises and government welfare programs to make unbiased assessment. Generally, our research relies on quantitative approach concerning the availability and reliability of data sources.

The research consists of five chapters including introduction and conclusion. The following chapter II summarizes theoretical debates over clientelism and assesses their arguments. Section III measures clientelism level in Mongolia and evaluates voters' vulnerability to

began to demand re-election. Demonstration against the election result turned violent riot on July 1, 2008.

clientelism. Section IV aims to test whether the inflated popularity of party clientelism in the behavior of political competition leads to more popularity of coalition government. The final section summarizes and discusses the findings of this research.

II. Literature about Clientelism Evolution

As clientelism has adapted to various political, and cultural modernization against the expectations of earlier analyses (Schmidt 1977, Scott 1977, Eisenstate & Lemarchand 1981), clientelism literature has grown and become vast. Early studies focus mostly on describing more direct relationship between politicians and constituents. In other words, those period studies stress the economical power and influence of individual politicians on poor voters. Therefore, their works admit that as political and economical modernization expands, clientelism would disappear eventually.

Recent studies argue that we should update our definitions and knowledge about clientelism as clientelism has adapted to modernization and has been appearing in new image and way. Most recently, the literature was updated by Allen Hicken in 2011.³⁾ He argues that although there are many analyses made in the literature of clientelism, it still needs more analyses for conceptual clarity and consensus. According to his argument, previous definitions are colloquial and there are still no accepted definitions, but most

3) Allen Hicken, "Clientelism." *Annual Review of Political Science*, vol. 14, no. 1, 2011 pp. 289~310.

Allen Hicken suggests at the end of his paper that there are many clientelism-related issues to be explored, especially its effects on other political phenomenons.

definitions emphasize the following as "key elements of clientelist relationships: dyadic relationships, contingency⁴⁾, hierarchy, and iteration." Allen Hicken's argument on key elements matches with clientelism's descriptions of other scholars whose works had been published before Allen Hicken's paper was published in 2011 (Valeria 2001, Piattoni 2001, Wantchekon 2003, Roniger 2004, Hopkin 2001, Hicken 2011).

However, it doesn't mean that scholars description on key elements have been stable throughout all clientelism's history. It must be stated that scholars views on them have changed and expanded in connection with clientelism's evolution. Thus, another important contribution of Allen Hicken suggests that his work claims that clientelism concepts have been changing in association with clientelism development, the changing process will continue further, and therefore, we need to keep observing clientelism changes.

Some early analyses claim that clientelist exchange exist under dyadic and hierarchical relationship (Scott 1972, Einsenstadt and Roniger 1984). However, Hopkin (2006) noted that the roles of some key elements which exists strongly between individual politicians and individual voters have weakened in new clientelism. Some scholars claim that "dyadic relationship" is not a required character for clientelism (Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007). Moreover, many scholars state that as world countries develop politically and economically, hierarchy and face-to-face clientelist relationships between politicians and voters have declined to a greater degree among many countries. They explain their arguments in connection with increased party role in domestic politics. According to their theory, today, political parties

4) Allen Hicken, *ibid*, p. 291.

and their leaders generate and operate clientelism through broker chain, network, and patronage mobilization (Kitschelt 2000, Krishna 2007, Wilkinson 2007). Hopkin (2006) defines it as a new version of clientelism where political parties play important role. He explains the emergence of new clientelism as a result of socioeconomic modernization, higher growth of education, urbanization, greater geographical mobility, emergence of industrial employment, and relatively bureaucratized party organization.

In brief, the common view of new clientelism's representative scholars is that they highlight the leadership expansion of political parties in domestic politics and national economy to explain the development of new clientelism. Therefore, sometimes, new clientelism is called as a party clientelism.

Hopkin (2006) argues that rapid growing role of political parties in clientelism has been increasing political parties' desire to hold executive power. According to his assumption, as a result of increased government role in national economy, ruling party has had more opportunity to exploit public resources for their clientelist purposes through various government programs and financial regulations such as "welfare policies, public services, public employment, particular sectors' subsidies, public housing," and so on.

Some literature argue that above advantage of being incumbency seems to make greater influence on coalition politics in countries where political competition is characterized by clientelism. This is also one of major research trends on the political effects of new generation clientelism. Indridi H. Indridason (2005) claims that clientelism influences coalition by inflating importance of executive power. According to his theory, holding executive power provides

political parties to access various public resources and this creates powerful incentive for them to become a part of governing coalition. The interesting part of his work is to present causal relationship between clientelism and coalition politics, but his work lacks clarity to describe how clientelism affect coalition politics. The credibility advantage of executive power over public resource is not only important for clientelist politicians, but programmatic politicians also compete for the authority of executive power to realize their chosen policy on the basis of public resource. I argue that instead, we need to investigate which type of clientelism and what conditions generate effective clientelist context which leads to more popularity of coalition government. In this paper, I investigate the question by selecting the story of Mongolian party clientelism as a case study and investigate when and under what condition, party clientelism leads to more higher popularity of coalition government.

Before I investigate whether the party clientelism in Mongolia leads to greater prevalence of coalition government, I would like to describe the level of clientelism in Mongolia and assess voters' vulnerability to collective clientelism in the following section.

III. Party Clientelism and Voting Behavior Vulnerability in Mongolia

This section focuses on measuring clientelism level in Mongolian politics. It is comprised of two goals. First one is to assess whether clientelism reached dominant level which characterizes the behavior

of political competition. Second one is to assess how Mongolian voting behavior is vulnerable to the clientelist mobilization of political parties. For measuring clientelism level, this article applies three data sources concerning their reliability. They are candidates' campaign programs, Asia Foundation's Voter Education Survey (2008)⁵⁾, and Sant Maral Foundation's surveys.⁶⁾

This article assesses candidates' campaign programs during Mongolian 2004 and 2008 parliament elections to determine whether politicians or political parties make clientelist promises to capture voters' political support. Those elections' data suggest that money promises were common campaign image among candidates and political parties in 2004 and 2008. Most politicians promised to increase family income of their constituency on the basis of their private economic capacity and public resource in return for voters' political support. However, those money promises were unrealistic and inefficient which relied on voters' economic vulnerability and political weakness in order to capture their votes.

For instance, in 2008 parliament election, DP candidate Batbayar Davaa (Kyokushuzan Batbayar) promised to send 20,000 people to Japan as a contract worker due to his contact in Japan and he stated that 10,000 of them would be selected from his constituency. He said that due to the international employment program, one-fourth of his constituency in Songinokhairkhan district would earn \$1500–2500 per month (24tsag.mn, 2012)⁷⁾. MPRP candidate D. Zagdjav offered

5) "Mongolia Voter Education Survey: Research Report", *Asia Foundation, Mongolia* (online source), 2009, <http://asiafoundation.org/country/overview/mongolia> (search date: 2011.07.11.).

6) "Mongolia's Politbarometer 2004", *Sant Maral Foundation*(online source), March 04–12, 2004, http://www.forum.mn/res_mat/SMPBE04.3_santmaral.pdf (search date: 2011.07.09.).

"Mongolia's Politbarometer 2008", *Sant Maral Foundation* (online source), May 02–12, 2008, <http://www.bcmongolia.org/file/pdf/SMPBE08.May%20Ext.pdf> (search date: 2011.07.09.).

to provide 3000 people of his constituency with jobs through Morin Nuur Complex's construction project at \$2000–5000 wage per month (24tsag.mn, 2012)⁸). These two politicians won a victory in that year election. Their victories are good evidences how money clientelist offers are powerful and influential in Mongolian election.

While gathering clientelism-related data, we found an interesting evidence which involves with the public resource access of politicians for their clientelist purpose. This is electoral district money. Every year this money was allocated to parliament members. They decide themselves how to use their allocated money in their respective electoral districts. We emphasize the rise of the money to measure the strength of the politicians' interest on public resource access for clientelist exchange. The money amount has gradually increased from 10 million MNT (\$7300) to 1 billion MNT (\$730.000). Initially, each parliament member used to take 10 million MNT from a state budget. Later it rose to 100 million, 150 million, 250 million MNT. In 2010, it raised to one billion MNT.

Logically, exploitation of public resource in electoral districts is not parliament members' duty. This is executive power duty. Instead, parliament members should represent their constituency interests and voice actively in national level in parliament hall. According to the

7) "Ам асууяа?: Кёкүшюзан Д.Батбаярын Японд "явуулсан" 20,000 хүн", *24tsag.mn* (online source), February 07, 2012, <http://www.24tsag.mn/mail/content/7693.shtml> (search date: 2012.02.08.).

8) "Ам асууяа?: Д.Загджав үй лдвэрүүдий н үүдий г цэлий тэл нээж чадсан уу?", *24tsag.mn* (online source), April 14, 2012, <http://www.24tsag.mn/print/content/8447.shtml> (search date: 2012.03.02.).

The website "24tsag.mn" has a section which criticize the implementations of unrealistic promises of parliament members. The statement "Ам асууяа" could be translated as the statement "Let's Question the Implementations of Unrealistic Promises of Parliament Members?"

logic, parliament members should have denied approving the frequent rises of electoral district money or should have stopped it, but most interestingly, the rises of electoral district money have often gotten majority supports from parliament members. The advantage of electoral district money as one of public resources which can be channeled into clientelist goods sounds reasonable to interpret the majority support in parliament hall. In other words, parliament members' approval on the issue suggest that they like applying public resources as their clientelist goods for constituency.

For checking the validity of above interpretations, we selected some data from Asia Foundation's Voter Education Survey (2008) and Mongolia's politbarometer surveys by Sant Maral Foundation⁹⁾. The reason of the selection is that these surveys are the most useful sources to understand the behavior of political competitions in Mongolia from 2004 and 2008 parliament elections to present accurately as they were made in 2008–2011. According to the Voter Education Survey(2008), "more than third of all voters heard about gift–giving in their area during Municipal Elections with 44% respondents reporting politically motivated gift–giving and 36% outright vote–buying." These facts show that the distributions of personal clientelist goods exist in Mongolia together with the practice of public resource access for clientelist purpose. Most importantly, candidate promise data and Voter Education Survey suggest that the public resource access for clientelist exchange is more important for Mongolian politicians than

9) "Blitz Poll survey–2011", *Sant Maral Foundation* (online source), August 12–17, 2011, <http://www.bcmongolia.org/reports> (search date: 2012.03.15.). 1000 respondents of Ulaanbaatar, Dornogovi, Bulgan, Selenge, and Tuv aimags participated in the Blitz Poll survey.

the access of their private resource for distributing clientelist goods.

Another surveys of Sant Maral Foundation and Asia Foundation obviously present that Mongolian voter behavior is vulnerable to clientelist mobilization by politicians and political parties. According to the 2011 politbarometer survey of Sant Maral Foundation, the biggest one among socio-political or economic problems is unemployment (39.5%), living standard (16.8%), and law enforcement (7.5) and so on. Like Sant Maral Foundation survey, the Voter Education Survey(2008) also shows that economic problems are considered by voters as the most serious problem in Mongolia with "36% citing poverty or unemployment as the primary problems facing the country". These two facts suggest that public resource centered clientelist goods and public employment have higher credibility to affect Mongolian resource-poor voting behavior effectively.

The level of basic political education is another useful determinant to measure the vulnerability of voting behavior to clientelist mobilization. Surveys suggest that the domination of voters with weak ideology and low political education in Mongolian voting behavior allows political parties to operate clientelist mobilization effectively rather than rely on programmatic competition. Sant Maral Foundation's Blitz Poll survey (2011) shows that swing voters dominate among Mongolian voters. According to the survey, in Ulaanbaatar, 43.3% of respondents answered that personality of candidate is the most important for their voting decision. 15.9% reported that party is the most important one, and 40.8% stated that both of personality and party are important. The survey in rural area presents similar result to survey in Ulaanbaatar, 49.0% of respondents answered that candidate personality is the most important criterion for them to make

voting decision, 21% party, and 30% both of them are important. The fact in the Voter Education Survey by Asia Foundation also matches the survey finding of Sant Maral Foundation. The Voter Education Survey (2008) present that 77% of respondents see no significant differences between political parties in parliament, cannot articulate a difference, and see differences only in number of members elected, or don't know. Only 22% of them said they see differences based on record, policies, or ideology. The answers of urban and rural respondents show similar result.

The results of above two surveys provide evidence that Mongolian voters lack strong ideology to support the effective programmatic competition among political parties as well as lacking proper knowledge to make good voting decision and build immune system against clientelist mobilization. Thus, we can understand that according to resource criterion and political education level, Mongolian voters are greatly vulnerable and too weak against public resource centered effective clientelist mobilization.

IV. Party Clientelism and Coalition Government

This section assesses the behavioral change of Mongolian political parties during 2004 and 2008 parliament elections to determine whether there is causal relationship between clientelist behavioral change and government type (coalition government). In those year elections, money welfare allocation emerged as dominant clientelist exchange to mobilize voters. It was the emergence of party clientelism which characterizes the current behavior of political competition among Mongolian political

parties. I argue that the growing dominance and growing reliability of party clientelism in political competition lead to the higher popularity of coalition government among political parties.

In 2004 parliament election, Mongolian political parties perceived the powerful effect of party clientelism on resource-poor voting behavior. Their new experience involves the big surprise which occurred in 2004 parliament election in association with the success of Motherland-Democratic Coalition (MDC)'s promise to increase child benefit. Pre-election surveys had presented that MDC had no chance to win the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP) in 2004 parliament election. According to the pre-election survey of Sant Maral Foundation (2004), 49% of respondents answered to vote for candidates of MPRP, 29% for MDC, 15% for others, and 7% undecided. The survey of International Republican Institute (2004) matched the survey of Sant Maral Foundation.¹⁰⁾ Contrary to the expectation of those surveys, 2004 election result shocked experts. MDC won an unexpected victory when election outcome came out. Initially, MPRP won 36 seats, MDC 36 seats, independent 3, and the Republican Party 1 seat.

As political parties noticed the powerful impact of party clientelism, their competition behavior began to change. The first change happened to the behavior of MPRP during campaign period of 2004 election in association with the succeeding result of MDC "Child Money". Initially, MPRP criticized the MDC program as unrealistic and harmful for Mongolia's stabilizing economy. The criticism was economically

10) "Mongolia 2004 Election Analysis", *Open Society Forum*, (online source), 2005, http://www.forum.mn/res_mat/res_mat-29.pdf (search date: 2011.08.18.). The survey result of International Republican Institute showed that the MPRP had a rating of 48% and the Motherland-Democracy coalition 38% in April 2004.

true. In the beginning of 2000s, some good signs had been just appearing in Mongolian economy after long time economic stagnation since 1990. Due to high copper price and gold production growth, GDP growth rose from 2002 at 4% to 2003 at 5% and the government expected it would reach 10.6% in 2004. However, Mongolian economy was still vulnerable to carry out too generous money welfare policy as a country which greatly depends on world raw material price and the economies of its two powerful neighbors: Russia and China. Instead, the government needed to invest more money in national projects which would secure further economic growth and increase workplace. Although MPRP knew that their criticism was reasonable, it didn't maintain its criticism until the end of 2004 election in connection with rapidly growing voters' support for MDC "Child Money" promise. The initial program of MPRP changed. Money welfare promises came out in MPRP program: "Newly Married Couple Money" (one-time 500.000MNT), and "Newborn Child Money" (one-time 100.000 MNT).

After 2004 election, the MPRP and MDC coalition government¹¹⁾ was established and the parties began to distribute money welfare benefit as their election promises. It was the beginning of behavior change of Mongolian political parties and it was also beginning of story of genuine public resource centered party clientelism with real contingency¹²⁾ character. MDC Child Money Program started since 2005. According to the program, every month, 3000MNT allowance used to be allocated to all children aged 0–18 for several years until

11) "Mongolia–Politics–Mongolia", *GlobalSecurity.org* (online source), 2004, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/mongolia/politics-1.htm>, (search date: 2011.10.05.).

12) Allen Hicken, *ibid.*, pp. 291–292. According to Hicken, the contingency or reciprocal nature of the patron–client exchange is the quid pro quo nature of the exchange that distinguishes it from other forms of political particularism.

the program was closed because of budget problem. MPRP First Time Married Couple Money realized since 2007. The annual report 2008 by the Ministry of Social Welfare and Labor shows that 32.8 billion MNT was spent for "Child Money" program and 34.9 thousand couples received their money for First Time Married Couple.

Heavy pressure on state budgets in 2004–2009 suggests that MPRP and MDC desired to continue their money welfare programs at all costs to retain the political supports of voters for their money promises. This shows that genuine public resource centered clientelist exchange with contingency and reliability characters had been developing in those years. When the Newly Married Couple Money Program started, the rate of average marriage unexpectedly increased almost fourfold in 2007–2009 until the program stopped by 2010. According to the data in Mongolian Statistical Yearbook 2010, the average marriage rate had been 40 965 in 2007, 32 982 in 2008, 34 071 in 2009, and in 2010, the artificial growth declined to its normal rate 9 349. In connection with the unexpected growth of marriage rate, the program name changed from "Newly Married Couple Money" to "First time Married Couple Money". Both Child Money Program and First Time Marriage Couple programs stopped within 1–2 years after 2008 parliament election because of budget deficiency, but they were replaced with other money welfare programs which were promised in 2008 parliament election.¹³⁾

13) In 2009, the Great Khural of Mongolia approved the combinations of MPRP and DP promises. This is the Law on Human Development Fund, Mongolia's Sovereign Wealth Fund to pool in revenue from strategic deposits. It combines both MPP and DP election promises including MPP's Motherland's Bounty and DP's Share of Treasure.

"Law on Human Development Fund, Mongolia's Sovereign Wealth Fund to Pool in All Revenues from Mineral Resources including OT and TT Has Been Approved ", *Dale Choi's Blog* (online source), November 18, 2009, <http://uclalum.blogspot.com/2009/11/law-on-human-development-fund-mongolias.html>, (search date: 2011.09.04.).

In 2008 parliament election, party clientelism reached its mature stage, so that it characterizes the entire behavior of Mongolian party politics or election competition. In 2008 parliamentary election, all Mongolian political parties including big and small parties repeated 2004 election welfare-centered competitions between MPRP and MDC again. For MPRP, it began to promise welfare benefits from the beginning of its campaign which was different than its 2004 election campaign which was initially criticizing money welfare promise. During the campaign of 2008 election, MPRP stated to allocate one-time 300000MNT to third newborn child and Motherland's Bounty which would distribute 1500000MNT in cash to every citizen as a share of mining sector revenue as well as continuing its previous money welfare programs such as "First Time Married Couple Money" and "New Born Child Money". Democratic Party (DP)¹⁴⁾ stated to start the project called "Share of Treasure" which would distribute 1000000MNT in cash to every citizen as a share of mining sector revenue as well as keep running its Child Money Program. Other small parties also imitated the 2004 election money welfare promises of MPRP and DP in 2008 election. The National New Party promised to increase the allowance of "Child Money" program from 10000MNT to 20000MNT as well as change school snack program to school lunch program. Civic Will Party

According to the annual report 2010 by Ministry of Social Welfare and Labor, as the initial step of the law, 70.000 MNT was allocated to every Mongolian citizen and 98.1 percent of total population had received the money by the end of 2010. Now, every month citizens receive 21000 MNT allowance under the law.

"Social Welfare and Labour Sector 2010", *Ministry of Social Welfare and Labour of Mongolia* (online source), 2010, www.mswl.gov.mn/files/NHHY_annual_report_2010_07-06.pdf (search date: 2011.10.05.).

14) In 2008, Democratic Party participated in election without coalition with other parties.

"State Great Khural Election 2008", *General Election Committee of Mongolia* (online source), 2008, http://www.gec.gov.mn/parliamentary_election/10 (search date: 2011.06.26.).

offered to provide employed young families with 30 year housing loans with less than 6 percent interest without any prepayment. All above evidences suggest that party centered clientelist competition based on public resource had already developed as the new competition behavior of all Mongolian political parties by 2008 election.

The political effect of new clientelist behavior of Mongolian political parties first appeared as a real phenomenon after 2008 parliament election. The political outcome involves the inflated importance of public resource and executive power among Mongolian political parties in association with expensive public resource centered clientelist exchange which relies on public goods which cover voter groups with larger clientele than individual voters in traditional clientelism. I think that the effect of the behavior change of political parties affected MPRP and DP decision on coalition government as a main agent, so that they reached agreement easily to work with their ideologically adversary counterpart in coalition government. MPRP and DP leaders stated that they decided to work in a coalition government for national interest in association with the political crisis¹⁵⁾ after 2008 election result, but I argue that anti-MPRP protestors' violent riot, the state of emergency, and DP boycott for new parliament were not the main agents for the coalition government. They just served as conditions which revealed the inflated desire of political parties who can cooperate even with its adversary counterpart in coalition government for having executive power to operate their public resource centered clientelist exchange which is made up of expensive promises like child welfare benefit and first time married couple money.

15) "Fatal clashes in Mongolian capital", *BBC News*, (online source), July 02, 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7484632.stm>, (search date: 2011.07.05.).

The anti-MPRP protestors' violent riot didn't influence MPRP decision to offer DP to work in coalition government. In fact, at least MPRP didn't accept the demand of protestors to meet MPRP leaders. The refusal worsened the situation. The demonstration turned violent, but the riot didn't cover the whole capital and country. The violence occurred near MPRP headquarters and Cultural Palace. The protestors set the building of MPRP headquarters and some part of Cultural Palace on fire. The demonstration stopped completely around midnight due to the four-day state of emergency declared by the President Nambaryn Enkhbayar. The small area riot, one-day end, and disorganized characters of July 1 incident show that although the demonstration turned violent riot, it wasn't wide, influential, and well-organized enough to affect MPRP action to offer DP to work in coalition government.

For the DP boycott, DP stopped to boycott the parliament and decided to work in coalition government with MPRP by ignoring the realization of its boycott demands after MPRP offered DP to establish coalition government. Before MPRP offered coalition government, DP had stated that its parliament representatives would boycott the parliament until the government realizes DP demands including the release of 200 protestors from detention center, but most of DP representatives stopped boycotting and began to attend parliament since August 28, 2008 and MPRP and DP established a coalition government. DP demand didn't include coalition government, but DP stopped boycotting when most of 200 protestors were still in detention center. Therefore, DP quick response to MPRP doesn't mean that DP boycotting strategy succeeded to force MPRP to offer DP to establish coalition government. In fact, on the contrary, MPRP realized its goal to prevent re-election,

and ensure the recognition of its election victory by establishing its cabinet with DP under DP support in parliament instead of effective DP boycott in parliament.

How can we explain the DP action to work in a coalition government with MPRP? Did it happen as MPRP accepted DP demands? Such argument doesn't sound realistic. Before coalition government, DP stated not to accept election outcome, alleged that the election had been rigged, and demanded re-election, but DP recognized the election result and decided to join coalition government after MPRP offered.

Did DP decide to join coalition to prevent possible public chaos and violent uprising? This argument also doesn't make sense. The July 1 violent riot stopped completely after the state of emergency. There were no any serious signs which were indicating that the riot would develop into mass uprising or public chaos. MPRP and DP agreed to establish coalition government in two months after July 1 incident. The riot of July 1 wasn't dangerous and violent mass uprising, so that MPRP and DP reached cooperation on coalition government to prevent mass chaos and violent conflict.

How can we find answer to the DP action if DP demand and July 1 incident can't explain the reason of DP action? What is the correct answer? It seems to me that we can find correct answer by assessing the inflated interest of Mongolian political parties on executive power under the effect of public resource centered party clientelism.

First, there is no doubt that the offer of coalition government was efficient decision for MPRP. The party managed to build its cabinet in cooperation with DP and ensured the recognition of its election victory by starting the regular sessions of new parliament which was blocked by DP boycott. Besides solving parliament crisis, coalition

government allowed MPRP to realize its money welfare promises freely without the effective pressure of DP in parliament.

Second, sharing executive power must have been realistic and useful opportunity for DP to ensure its success in the next election by realizing its money welfare promises which would be important conditions to increase the political support of voters for the party. It was unclear for DP whether the party would be able to win majority votes in re-election. Obviously, instead of re-election, sharing office in coalition government must have been more realistic for DP.

Considering these two arguments, I argue that the inflated interest of political parties for executive power in association with public resource centered clientelist exchange affected MPRP and DP quick agreement on the establishment of coalition government.

V. Conclusion

This paper has concentrated on the basic objective to show when and how the clientelist behavioral change of political competition leads to higher popularity of coalition government in young representative democracy. For reaching the basic objective, this research aimed to explore under what conditions inflated popularity of clientelism lead to more popularity of coalition government.

Our research findings suggest that the occurrence of higher popularity of coalition government under the effect of inflated popularity of clientelism is conditional depending on what type of clientelist exchange dominates in clientelist representative democracy.

For the Mongolian case, the phenomenon has occurred after the last two parliament elections due to the success of public resource-centered clientelist exchange which characterizes the entire behavior of Mongolian political competition by determining winner and loser. The winner-loser effect exaggerates political parties' desires to obtain executive power at all costs to capture or to retain political support of resource-poor voters in such risky political competition. The 2004 and 2008 Mongolia's Great Khural elections show that political parties can cooperate even with its adversary counterpart in coalition government to operate their expensive public resource centered clientelist mobilization, so that they can survive in domestic political competition.

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ABSTRACT

Interest Groups and Political Parties in Mongolian Democracy

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Clientelism has survived, adapted, and emerged with new image in modernizing world. As government role has greatly increased in national economy, ruling party has had more advantage in clientelist political competition. Among politics scholars, such new condition has raised a hypothesis which argues more popularity of clientelism leads to more popularity of coalition government, but rather than debating whether clientelism really determines the popularity of coalition, it is more fruitful and interesting to question when and how inflated popularity of clientelism leads to coalition government. This article tries to explain this issue theoretically based on the case of 2004 and 2008 Mongolia's State Great Khural elections(Mongolia's parliamentary election). The finding of this research suggests that whether higher popularity of clientelism leads to more popularity of coalition government is conditional. It could occur when public resource centered clientelist exchange determines winner and loser in political competition.

Keywords: Party Clientelism, Public Resource, Clientelist Exchange,
Coalition Government, Voting Behavior

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