

Sociotropic Perceptions, Immigration, and Immigrants

: East Asian Attitudes toward Immigration and Immigrants*

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논문 요약

한국, 중국, 일본 등 동아시아국가들이 새로운 이민국으로 부상하고 있음에도 불구하고, 동아시아인들의 이민과 이민자에 대한 태도를 비교의 시각에서 분석하는 연구는 많지 않다. 이 연구는 PEW Global Attitudes Project의 2002년과 2007년 여론조사 데이터를 사용해 한국, 중국, 일본 동아시아 3국에서의 이민과 이민자태도를 분석한다. 이 연구는 동아시아인들의 이민과 이민자에 대한 태도가 개인의 경제 이익에 관한 고려가 아닌, 이민과 이민자가 자국의 문화적 정체성 혹은 경제적 이익에 어떤 영향을 미치는가에 관한 사회변화적 관심에 의해 영향을 받는다는 것을 발견했다. 이 분석결과는 사회변화적 인식의 중요성을 강조하는 기존연구들의 결론과 일치하는 것이다. 그러나 더 나아가, 이 연구는 동아시아인들이 이민문제에 대해서는 문화적으로 반응하는 반면, 이민자에 대해서는 경제적으로 반응한다는 흥미로운 발견을 하였다. 즉, 동아시아인들은 이민문제가 자국의 문화적 정체성에 미치는 부정적 효과에 대해 우려하는 동시에, 이민자들이 자국경제에 미치는 긍정적 기여를 기대하는 이중적 태도를 보인다는 것이다. 향후 이민과 이민자태도의 분석적 구분에 대한 이론적 논의와 더불어, 이민과 이민자 태도의 이중성에 대한 보다 심화된 연구가 필요하다.

주제어 : 동아시아, 이민, 사회변화적 인식, 문화적 위협, 노동시장경쟁, 세계화

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I. Introduction

Compared to some traditional immigration destinations such as the United States, Canada, and Australia, the three East Asian countries, Korea, Japan, and China still do not have a considerable proportion of immigrants in their societies. According to the United Nations' report, "Trends in International Migrant Stock: the 2013 Revision", the size of immigrants as a percentage of the total population in Korea, Japan, and China is 2.0%, 1.8%, and 0.1%, respectively.¹⁾ If we consider that the size of immigrant population is 14.2%, 20.5%, and 26.8% in the United States, Canada, and Australia, respectively, we may underestimate the importance of immigration issue in three East Asian countries. However, the phenomenon of growing immigrant populations has recently gained its political and social significance in these three East Asian countries.

In particular, Korea is now a receiving country after the United Nations' official declaration in 2007. The overall size of immigrant population increased significantly from 0.4% of total population in 2000 to 1.9% in 2012 in Korea. The share of foreign workers to total labor force in Korea has been increased from 0.1% in 2000 to 0.3% in 2006, 1.1% in 2007, and 2.2% in 2011. There has been also a rapid growing of international marriage migrant women and their children

1) For the data, see the UN, "Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2013 Revision, Table 3-International migrant stock as a percentage of the total population by sex and by major area, region, country or area, 1990-2013"; In the case of China, the size of immigrant population as a percentage of total population is measured by excluding the sizes of immigrants in Hong Kong and Macao (source: <http://esa.un.org/unmigration>, accessed June 8, 2014).

during a similar period. The share of international marriage was 1.2% of marriage in 1990, but it explosively increased up to 13.6% in 2006 even though after that it slightly decreased to 10.8% in 2009 and then 8.7% in 2013. In fact, among the three East Asian countries, Korea has retained the highest level of international marriages as a percent of all marriages.²⁾ With the rise of multicultural families, therefore, the issue of integrating them into Korean society became one of the most important public policy agendas.

To avoid the negative effects of labor market rigidity in the national economy during the 1990s, domestic manufacturing industries have recruited low-paid and non-regular foreign workers in Japan. They were mostly 'Latin American Nikkeijin', that is, Japanese descents from Latin America. And more than 50% of total foreign workers were mostly concentrated in service sectors utilizing low-skilled workers in 2000.³⁾ This reflects that there was a shift in favor of the unskilled foreign workers that could play as 'a flexible economic cushion' for absorbing a disproportional burden of domestic economic adjustment after the decade-long economic recession in Japan.⁴⁾ Such a shift means a major change in the immigration policy when considering the fact that Japan was the only developed country to have achieved

2) For instance, the size of international marriages among total marriages in 2005 was Korea (14%), China (0.1%), and Japan (5%), respectively. For this point, Jones, Gavin and Hsiu-hua Shen, "International Marriage in East and Southeast Asia: Trends and Research Emphases," *Citizenship Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2008, p. 13 (table 6).

3) Korea had less than 7% of total foreign workers in service sectors in the same period. Athukorala, Prema-Chandra, "International Labour Migration in East Asia: Trends, Patterns, and Policy Issues," *Asian-Pacific Economic Literature*, Vol. 20, No. 2, 2006, p. 25.

4) Iguchi, Yasuchi, "What Role Do Low-Skilled Migrants Play in the Japanese Labor Markets?" *American Behavioral Scientist*, Vol. 56, No. 8, 2012, p. 1037.

its economic development without relying on foreign workers.⁵⁾ Since then the size of foreign workers has been increased from 0.8% in 2000 to 1.1% in 2006 and 1.0% of total labor force in 2012.⁶⁾ The overall size of immigrant population increased from 1.3% of total population in 2000 to 1.6% in 2012 in Japan.

China is still one of the world's migrant sending countries. However, we should note that China has been transforming from a source country to a destination country that is attracting a large number of international immigrants to seek employment and investment in 'the world's factory'. Unlike Korea and Japan which are heavily relied on informal and unskilled foreign workers, the growing flows of immigrant population in China are composed of various immigrant groups: skilled immigrants who are mostly involved in joint ventures and foreign investment sectors from the developed countries such as Europe, North America, Australia, some African traders mainly in retail sectors who are rapidly growing after the establishment of the forum of China–Africa cooperation in 2000, and a huge inflow of international students seeking their degrees in China.⁷⁾ As a consequence, today China is going through a transition period toward a new immigration policy to adjust to the growing demand of relaxing its strict regulations on immigrants in order to attract

5) Kondo, Atsushi, 2013. "Can Japan Turn to Foreign Workers?" <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/05/06/can-japan-turn-to-foreign-workers/print/> (accessed September 3, 2014).

6) For the data of the size of foreign workers in Japan, see "Databook of International Labour Statistics 2014: Population and Labour Force" (The Japan Institute of Labour Policy and Training, http://www.jil.go.jp/kokunai/statistics/databook/2014/02/p084_t2-16.pdf, (accessed June 25, 2014).

7) Skeldon, Ronald, "China: An Emerging Destination for Economic Migration." Migration Policy Institute (2011), p. 2, <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/china-emerging-destination-economic-migration/> (accessed July 18, 2014).

more skilled foreign workers and professionals as well as to control illegal immigrants effectively.⁸⁾

Up to this point we briefly discussed each specific national contexts related to the relative size and composition of immigrant populations in three East Asian Countries. Although many have conceived important changes in the size and pattern of East Asian immigration, there are few studies to provide a comparative and empirical analysis of how East Asian people perceive the issues of immigration and immigrants. Most studies on immigrants and immigration in these three East Asian countries are based on a single case research design. And they usually focus on the analysis of a distinctive national context in which each country responses to the increasing immigrants and struggles to incorporate them by reformulating its immigration policy.⁹⁾ Most of them also show a common analytical approach to focus on the macro level effects of immigrants and immigration in terms of one country's

8) Haimei, Shen, "Inflow of International Immigrants Challenges China's Migration Policy," Brookings Institute (September 8, 2011), <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2011/09/08-china-immigrants-shen>(accessed August 23, 2014).

9) Lim, Timothy, "Will south Korea Follow the German Experience? Democracy, the Migratory Process, and the Prospects for Permanent Immigration in Korea," *Korean Studies*, Vol. 32, No.1, 2008, pp. 28~55; Kim, Nora Hui-Jung, "Korean Immigration Policy Change and the Political Liberals' Dilemma," *International Migration Review*, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2008, pp. 576~596; Lee, Yoonkyung, "Migration, Migrants, and Contested Ethno-nationalism in Korea," *Critical Asian Studies*, Vol. 41, No. 3, 2009, pp. 363~368; Yoon, In Jin, "Multicultural Minority Groups and Multicultural Coexistence in Korean Society," *Korea Observer*, Vol. 41, No. 4, 2010, pp. 517~557; Watson, Iain, "Paradoxical Multiculturalism in South Korea," *Asian Politics & Policy*, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2012, pp. 233~258; Yamamura, Eiji, "Frequency of Contact with Foreigners in a Homogenous Society: Perceived consequences of Foreigner Increases in Japan," MPRA Paper No. 21105, 2010, pp. 1~10(accessed July 19, 2014); Chung, Erin Aeran, "Workers or Residents? Diverging Patterns of Immigrant Incorporation in Korea and Japan," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 83, No. 4, 2010, pp. 675~696; Green, David and Yoshihiko Kadoya, "English as a Gateway? Immigration and Public Opinion in Japan," Discussion Paper No. 883(The Institute of Social and Economic Research Osaka University, Japan, 2013), pp. 1~21(accessed July 15, 2014).

political, social, economic, and cultural changes. Of course, there are some exceptional studies to conduct a comparative study between more than two East Asian countries.¹⁰⁾ But they also share a strong macro-analytical focuses which try to find political, economic, and socio-cultural determinants of migration patterns and processes in East Asian countries.¹¹⁾

Certainly, the immigration phenomenon shapes migration-receiving countries' political, social, economic, and cultural changes.¹²⁾ At the same time, it is also shaped by migration-receiving countries' distinctive contexts such as national welfare systems, labor market situations, ethno-racial factors, and so on.¹³⁾ More importantly, however, the

10) Lee, Yong Wook and Hyemee Park, "The Politics of Foreign Labor Policy in Korea and Japan." *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol. 35, No. 2, 2005, pp. 143~165; Hiroo, Kamiya and Lee Chul Woo, "International Marriage Migrants to Rural Areas in South Korea and Japan: A Comparative Analysis." *Geographical Review of Japan Series*, Vol. 81, No.1, 2009, pp. 60~67; Chung (2010).

11) For instance, Seol and Skrentny(2009, 611) claims that a regional difference between East Asia and Europe in terms of the size of migrant settlement can be explained by East Asian common 'developmental state culture' to prioritize economic growth over individual rights. Seol, Dong-Hoon and John D. Skrentny, "Why Is There So Little Migrant Settlement in East Asia?" *International Migration Review*, Vol. 43, No. 3, 2009, pp. 578~620.

12) Hawley, George, "Political Threat and Immigration: Party Identification, Demographic Context, and Immigration Policy Preference." *Social Science Quarterly*, Vol. 92, No.2, 2011, pp. 404-422; Dancygier, Rafaela M and Elizabeth N. Saunders, "A New Electorate? Comparing Preferences and Partisanship Between Immigrants and Natives." *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 50, No. 4, 2006, pp. 962~981; Dancygier, Rafaela M, *Immigration and Conflict in Europe*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010.

13) Fachini, Giovanni, and Anna M. Mayda, "Does the Welfare State Affect Individual Attitudes Toward Immigrants? Evidence Across Countries." *Review of Economics & Statistics*, Vol. 91, No. 2, 2009, pp. 295~314; Crepaz, Marcus, M.L, and Regan Damron, "Constructing Tolerance, How the Welfare State, Shapes Attitudes About Immigrants," *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2009, pp. 437~463; Harell, Alison, Stuart Soroka, Shanto Iyengar, and Nicholas Valentino, "The Impact of Economic and Cultural Cues on Support for Immigration in Canada and the United States." *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 45, No. 3, 2012, pp. 499~530; Dustmann, C and Preston I, "Racial and Economic Factors in Attitudes To Immigration." *The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy*, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2007, pp. 1~39.

phenomenon should be understood in people's perceptual contexts for mediating the interactions between the immigration phenomenon and migration-receiving countries' distinctive contexts.¹⁴⁾ Through this interaction process, the immigration phenomenon can in fact reshape multi-dimensional changes within receiving countries. In this regard, it will be necessary to understand people's perceptual contexts of what they feel and perceive about immigrants and immigration within their society when we want to understand the nature of multi-dimensional changes caused by the growing immigrant population and immigration issues.

However, there is very little empirical research of people's perceptual attitudes on immigrants and immigration in East Asia in a comparative perspective beyond a single country case study.¹⁵⁾ Despite increasing scholarly attentions to East Asia as the emerging destination of immigration, the neglect of East Asia in the field of immigration attitudes

14) Hainmueller, Jens and Daniel Hopkins, "Public Attitudes Toward Immigration," *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 17, 2014, p. 226.

15) Song, Yoo-Jin, "A Comparative Analysis of Individual Attitudes toward Immigrants in Korea, Taiwan, and Japan," *Korea Journal of Population Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 2, 2008, pp. 1~20; Of course, there are many single-case studies to analyze the Korean attitudes toward immigration and immigrants even if we cannot mention all of them within a limited space. As one of the most recent studies on Korean attitudes on immigrants, see Min, Tae-Eun, "Korean Attitudes Toward Immigrants: The Product of Symbolic Politics and Economic Interests," *The Korean Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 53, No. 2, 2013, pp. 215~247; For some studies on Japanese attitudes toward immigration and immigrants, see Richey, Sean, "The Impact of Anti-Assimilationist Beliefs on Attitudes toward Immigration," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 54, No. 1, 2010, pp. 197~212 and Green, David and Yoshihiko Kadoya, "English as a Gateway? Immigration and Public Opinion in Japan." Discussion Paper No. 883(The Institute of Social and Economic Research Osaka University, Japan, 2013, pp. 1~21(accessed July 15, 2014); For the latest studies on Chinese attitudes toward immigrants, particularly, African immigrants, see Branigan, T, "China cracks down on African immigrants and traders," *The Guardian*, 6, 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk>(accessed August 13, 2014) and Palash, G, "African immigrants gravitating to China," *International Business Time*, 16, 2010, <http://www.ibtimes.com> (accessed July 25, 2014).

is mostly likely due to the lack of comparative empirical data of immigration attitudes in East Asia. This study attempts to move beyond this analytical limitation by using individual-level public opinion survey data collected by the Pew Global Attitude Project. As a series of multi-country survey project, the Pew Global Attitude Project provides some data sets to indicate directly people's attitudes toward immigration and immigrants, individuals' sociotropic perceptions, and their socio-demographic backgrounds that might influence on the construction of attitudes on immigration and immigrants. Furthermore, the Pew Global Attitude Project makes us to conduct a comparative study of immigration attitudes between two time periods 2002 and 2007 across three East Asian countries.¹⁶⁾

This study is structured as follows. Drawing on the previous studies of immigration attitudes, the second section suggests four testable hypotheses of the key factors explaining immigration attitudes. These four testable hypotheses include both theoretical perspectives that most studies on the immigration attitudes rely on either of them: self-interested concerns vs. sociotropic concerns. In addition, in this section, we specify a new hypothesis to explore the relationship between attitudes on globalization and attitudes toward immigration and immigrants. The third section provides a descriptive overview of attitudes on immigration and immigrants in Korea, Japan, and China, comparing two periods between 2002 and 2007. On the basis of this descriptive overview, the section suggests the analytical need to distinguish two

16) Unfortunately, the time scope of data provided by the Pew Global Attitude Project is currently limited to only two periods (2002 and 2007) for a comparative study across these three East Asian countries.

types of attitudes: immigration and immigrants. The fourth section discusses the determinants of East Asian attitudes on immigration and immigrants, interpreting the results of cross-national survey data analysis. Because of the lack of cross-nationally comparable longitudinal data, we cannot conduct a meaningful analysis of the dynamics of attitude changes over time in three East Asian countries. Instead, this section tries to compare people's attitudes of two periods, 2002 and 2007 in order to sketch the continuity and change in people's attitudes on immigration and immigrants within and across three East Asian countries. The final section of this study summarizes empirical findings and discusses some implications of the findings.

II. Theoretical Arguments and Four Hypotheses

There is a huge amount of literature on immigration attitudes in Western developed countries.¹⁷⁾ Much of the studies on immigration

17) Espenshade, Thomas J. and Charles A. Calhoun, "An igration," *Population Research and Policy Review*, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1993, pp. 189~224; Citrin, Jack, Donald P. Green, Christopher Muste, and Cara Wong, "Public Opinion Toward Immigration Reform: The Role of Economic Motivation," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 59, No. 3, 1997, pp. 858~881; Fetzer, Joel S, *Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the United States, France, and Germany*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000; Analysis of Public Opinion Toward Undocumented ImmMcLaren, Lauren, "Anti-Immigrant Prejudice in Europe: Contact, Threat Perception, and Preferences for Exclusion of Migrants," *Social Focus*, Vol. 81, No. 3, 2003, pp. 909~936; Lahav, Gallya, "Public Opinion Toward Immigration in the European Union: Does It Matter?" *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 37, No.1 0, 2004, pp. 1151~183; Mayda, Anna Maria, "Who Is Against Immigration? A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward Immigrants," *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, Vol. 88, No. 3, 2006, pp. 510~530; Sides, John and Jack Citrin, "European Opinion about Immigration: the Role of Identities, Interests, and Information," *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 37, No. 3, 2007, pp. 477~504; Hopkins, Daniel J, "Politicized Place: Explaining Where and When Immigrants

attitudes have heavily relied on a causal mechanism that links perceptual attitudes to psychological feelings. The emphasis on threat feelings is the best example for this analytical tendency in the literature on immigration attitudes.¹⁸⁾ This causal mechanism suggests that the feelings of threat on immigrants generate negative attitudes toward immigration and immigrants. If we rely on this reasoning, an important question that we would ask is: Under what conditions do people feel to be threatened by immigrant populations?

There have been two competing perspectives on the sources of threat feelings in exploring this question. One perspective is to emphasize people's concern of economic self-interests as the source of threat feelings, usually assuming that the inflow of immigrants into a society has the distributional impacts on natives' economic interests, in particular, in terms of the labor market competition.¹⁹⁾ The other perspective

Provoke Opposition?" *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 104, No. 1, 2010, pp. 40~60; Hainmueller, Jens and Michael Hiscox, "Attitudes toward Highly Skilled and Low-Skilled Immigration: Evidence from a Survey Experiment," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 104, No. 1, 2010, pp. 61~84; Ceobanu, Alin M. and Xavier Escandell, "Comparative Analysis of Public Attitudes Toward Immigrants and Immigration Using Multinational Survey Data: A Review of Theories and Research," *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 36, 2010, pp. 309~328; For an extensive literature review on immigration attitudes, see Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014).

- 18) McLaren, Lauren, "Anti-Immigrant Prejudice in Europe: Contact, Threat Perception, and Preferences for Exclusion of Migrants," *Social Focus*, Vol. 81, No. 3, 2003, pp. 909~936; Miller, Joanne M., and Jon A. Krosnick, "Threat as a Motivator of Political Activism: A Field Experiment," *Political Psychology*, Vol. 25, No. 4, 2004, pp. 507~23; Schneider, Silke, "Anti-Immigrant Attitudes in Europe: Out-groups Size and Perceived Ethnic Threat," *European Sociological Review*, Vol. 24, No. 1, 2008, pp. 53~67; Brader, Ted, Nicholas A. Valentino, and Elizabeth Suhay, "What Triggers Public Opposition to Immigration? Anxiety, Group Cues, and Immigration Threat," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 52, No. 4, 2008, pp. 959~978.
- 19) Scheve, Kenneth F. and Matthew J. Slaughter, "Labor Market Competition and Individual Preferences over Immigration Policy," *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, Vol. 83, No. 1, 2001, pp. 133~145

argues that sociotropic concerns defined as “cultural and symbolic concerns of their own nation as a whole,” shape natives’ threat feelings on immigration and immigrants.²⁰⁾ Sociotropic concerns refer to collective, especially national, concerns based on collective judgments on the impacts of a given phenomenon on the nation as a whole. They are mainly driven by moral and ideological views of what is good for their own nation.²¹⁾

According to the first perspective, immigration attitudes depend on people’s egotropic concerns of the effects of immigration issues and immigrants on their personal incomes and job securities. In other words, people may perceive immigrants as their potential competitors in the labor markets.²²⁾ Therefore people who feel more insecure in the labor markets are more likely to feel threatened by immigrants. More specifically, low skilled natives are more likely to show their negative attitudes toward foreign workers. Most foreign workers are concentrated

20) Malchow-Møller, Nikolaj, Jakob Roland Munch, Sanne Schroll, and Jan Ross Skaksen, “Attitudes Toward Immigration—Does Economic Self-interest Matter?” Centre for Economic and Business Research, Discussion Paper 11, 2006 (accessed August 20, 2014); Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014, p. 227.

21) This concept was originally developed in the field of American voting behaviors. For a more detailed discussion on sociotropic concerns, see Kinder, Donald and D. Rodrick Kiewiet, “Economic Discontent and Political Behavior: the Role of Personal Grievances and Collective Economic Judgments in Congressional Voting.” *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 23, No. 3, 1979, pp. 495~527; Kinder, Donald and D. Rodrick Kiewiet, “Sociotropic Politics: the American Case,” *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1981, pp. 129~161.

22) Quillian, L., “Prejudice as a Response to Perceived Threat: Population Composition and Anti-Immigrant and Racial Prejudice in Europe,” *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 60, No. 4, 1995, pp. 586~611; Espenshade, Thomas, J. and K. Hempstead, “Contemporary American Attitudes Toward U.S. Immigration,” *International Migration Review*, Vol. 30, No. 2, 1996, pp. 535~570; Dustmann, Christian, “Temporary Migration and Economic Assimilation,” *Swedish Economy Policy Review*, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2000, pp. 213~244; O’Rourke, K. and R. Sinnott, “The Determinants of Individual Attitudes toward Immigration,” *European Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 22, No. 4, 2006, pp. 838~861.

in some industrial sectors such as manufacture, agriculture, and service to employ low-skilled workers. Hence the growing inflow of low-skilled foreign workers increases the supply of low-skilled workers in the labor markets and decrease job opportunities and wages for low-skilled native workers.

Scheve and Slaughter (2001) provides the empirical evidences supporting this hypothesis, finding a strong positive correlation between people's skill levels measured by years of education and their support for immigration in the United States in the 1990s. Mayda (2006) also provides a very similar analysis to present a positive association between the skill levels and pro-immigration opinions, using cross-national survey data collected in the mid of 1990s by the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and the World Values Survey (WVS).

Although many studies have tried to show the empirical validity of economic competition hypothesis, however, they could find no clear evidence to confirm that native low skilled workers are more likely to perceive immigrants negatively. Rather, some more recent studies claim that we cannot be certain that the effects of skill levels on immigration attitudes cannot be explained by the logic of economic competition in the labor markets even though we found that skill levels measured with education data may have an important influence on natives' immigration attitudes. This reason is that education levels as the proxy of skill levels contain more complex information on individuals' cultural and sociotropic orientations, not simply on their personal economic statuses in the labor markets.²³⁾

23) Hainmueller, Jens and M. J. Hiscox and Y.M. Margalit, "Do Concerns about Labour Market

On the other hand, as another version of economic competition threat, Meulemann, Davidov, and Billiet (2009) find that the size of out-group, in other words, the size of immigrant population influences on the evolution of anti-immigration attitudes over time within society.²⁴⁾ According to their finding, the increase in the size of immigrant population might enhance the degrees of economic competitions for job opportunities and resources distributions between natives and immigrants in the situation of the increased labor market flexibility and thereby deepen more natives' threat feelings.

However, Schneider (2008) contends that a positive relationship between the size of out-group and anti-immigration attitudes is challenged by the possibility of an inverse relationship between two variables.²⁵⁾ The size of immigrants as out-group may have a negative effect on anti-immigration attitudes under the condition that people are in relieving anxiety when people interact more with immigrants and become more familiar with them. The point is that contact opportunities and familiarity with immigrants will be increased as the size of the immigrant population increases within a society. Our prejudice against a group of people is a mental schema shaped by our ignorance and non-experience of a group of people. Therefore, when we have more experiences of a particular group of people through more frequent contacts, we become

Competition Shape Attitudes toward Immigration? New Evidence." MIT Political Science Department Research Paper, 2013 (accessed September 5, 2014).

24) Meuleman, Burt, E. Davidov and J. Billiet, "Changing Attitudes toward Immigration in Europe, 2002–2007: A Dynamic Group Conflict Theory Approach," *Social Science Research*, Vol. 38, No. 2, 2009, pp. 352~365.

25) Schneider, Silke, "Anti-Immigrant Attitudes in Europe: Out-groups Size and Perceived Ethnic Threat," *European Sociological Review*, Vol. 24, No. 1, 2008, pp. 53~67.

more familiar with them and thus develop more complicated ideas about them without exclusively relying on cognitive short-cuts such as prejudice and stereotype.

Yet, there is a more complicated story of threat against immigrants beyond the simple logic of contact opportunity. According to a study to analyze American attitudes toward immigrants since 9/11, American people are more likely to have strong anti-immigration attitudes when they are politically conservative.²⁶⁾ The reason is that conservative people tend to show habitually upholding values of in-group loyalty compared to liberals who are more concerned with moral considerations of individual rights and justice rather than emotional reactions based on in-group loyalty. This point suggests that feelings of threat are not simply emotional individual responses to immigrants. They have some moral and ideological foundations which activate people's cultural and symbolic concerns, that is, sociotropic concerns and help people construct their perceptions on immigration and immigrants. This point is very important because it implies that to project people's threat feelings against immigrants does not simply depend on situational factors such as contact opportunities and familiarity with immigrants in terms of individual personal experiences. Rather, moral and ideological factors to construct sociotropic concerns might lead to reduced threat perceptions and more positive attitudes toward immigrants and immigration issues.

Probably rooted in such reasoning, therefore the second perspective on immigration attitudes emphasizes sociotropic concerns beyond

26) Ergun, Damla, "Nationalism and Attitudes Towards Immigrants: Emotional and Moral Predictors," Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISPP 32nd Annual Scientific Meeting, Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland, July 14, 2009(accessed July 3, 2014).

personal experiences and self-interested concerns as the main sources to construct immigration attitudes. That is, the main source of threat feelings is not economic competitions and conflicts between natives and immigrants, but natives' sociotropic concerns of the impacts of immigration and immigrants on their own nation as a whole. Sociotropic perceptions emphasize the idea of collectivity as the source of human motivation. In this regard, it is essentially different from economic competition threat hypothesis based on the individualistic view of human motivation.

But we should note that the second perspective on immigration attitudes does not interpret people's sociotropic concerns only in terms of non-economic motivations such as the preservation of national identity and cultural protectionism because it still recognizes that economic interests are one of the main sources of human motivation.²⁷⁾ People are concerned about economic interests, but they are not preoccupied with economic 'self' interests. Rather, they are concerned more about economic collective interests such as national prosperity and well-being. Hence, threat perceptions of immigration and immigrants depend on people's sociotropic perceptions of how they evaluate the cultural and economic impacts of immigrants and immigration on national conditions rather than their own personal economic conditions.²⁸⁾

If so, under what conditions do people perceive the negative impacts of immigration and immigrants on the nation as a whole? Some studies

27) Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014, p. 230.

28) Citrin, Jack, Donald P. Green, Christopher Muste and Cara Wong, "Public Opinion Toward Immigration Reform: The Role of Economic Motivation," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 59, No. 3, 1997, pp. 858-881.

to analyze the national and temporal variations in anti-immigration attitudes find that people tend to show their negative sentiments toward immigration and immigrants particularly during a time of worsening national economic conditions indicated by low GDP growth, high inflation, and high unemployment rates.²⁹⁾ Their finding implies that people's negative perceptions of immigration and immigrants are shaped through their pessimistic perceptions of national economic situation. Although this point is widely discussed, however, its causal mechanism is remained unspecified. Why are the negative perceptions of national economic situation related to negative perceptions of immigration and immigrants?

Most studies have endorsed the validity of threat perception hypothesis for this question, assuming that people tend to link national economic hardship with the scapegoating of out-groups within their own society. However, the perceptions of national economic hardship are likely to vary among people, reflecting different biases of people as a consequence of their different sociotropic perceptions about what is the cause and solution of economic crisis.³⁰⁾ If people consider the cause of economic crisis in terms of structural problems in national economy such as labor market rigidities and labor force shortage caused by demographic shifts in a society, then they might see the increase in immigration as a way to ease the current economic crisis and thus recognize its beneficial effects on improving national economic conditions. Hence we need to test that the negative perceptions on national economic conditions may predict negative attitudes toward immigration and

29) Castles and Miller, 2003; Feld, 2005; Meuleman, Davidov and Billiet, 2009.

30) Dancygier and Donnelly, 2013.

immigrants rather than presume it.

As a related question, who are more likely to perceive that immigrants contribute positively to their own nation? This question has not been fully explored in the literature on the immigration attitudes. This study suggests a new hypothesis to emphasize the correlation between attitude on globalization and attitudes toward immigration and immigrants. We can conceive immigration as one of many aspects of globalization.³¹⁾ Globalization enhances cross-border connectivity by expediting the flows of goods, services, capital, and people across countries. Therefore, if people see the growing population of immigrants as a part of globalization, their perceptions on immigration and immigrants will be directly driven by their perceptions on globalization. Those who perceive globalization as a natural, inevitable, evolutionary development of world order and expect benefits from globalization are more likely to show more positive perceptions on immigration and immigrants. In contrast, those who perceive globalization as a threat to national identity and sovereignty as well as a process of disrupting the domestic economic stability are more likely to respond negatively to the growing population of immigrants and to support a more restrictive border control policy to regulate international migration.

Based on all theoretical discussions above, the following testable hypotheses can be specified:

Hypothesis 1: Labor Market Competition Hypothesis

Economically disadvantaged people (low education, low income, unemployed) are likely to have negative attitudes toward immigration and

31) Tsutsui, 2008, p. 3.

immigrants because they tend to perceive competition and anxiety from the growing population of immigration.

Hypothesis 2: Cultural Threat Hypothesis

People who support to protect their cultural identity from foreign influences are likely to have negative attitudes toward immigration and immigrants because they tend to perceive anxiety about cultural changes associated with the growing population of immigration.

Hypothesis 3: National Economic Situation Hypothesis

People who perceive negatively the national economic situation are likely to have negative attitudes toward immigration and immigrants because they tend to blame immigration and immigrants as the cause of national economic hardship.

People who perceive negatively the national economic situation are likely to have positive attitudes toward immigration and immigrants because they tend to perceive immigration and immigrants as a solution for improving national economic situations.

Hypothesis 4: Globalization Hypothesis

People who perceive negatively globalization in general are likely to show their negative attitudes toward immigration and immigrants.

III. Different Attitudes toward Immigration and Immigrants

A unique advantage of the survey conducted by the Pew Global Attitudes Project is that it includes survey questions to distinguish between attitudes on immigration and attitudes on immigrants:

Attitudes toward Immigration

Q: please tell me if you think immigration is a very big problem (1), a moderately big problem (2), a small problem (3) or not at all (4).

Attitudes toward Immigrants

Q: please tell me what kind of influence immigrants are having on the way things are going in our country. Is the influence of immigrants very good (1), somewhat good (2), somewhat bad (3) or very bad (4) in our country.

We need first to consider that two questions are framed differently. For codifying attitudes toward immigration, the question is framed by a negative meaning of immigration by asking the degree of “problems” that people imagine whenever they are considering of the immigration issue. On the other hand, in the case of attitudes on immigrants, the question is framed by more neutral words, namely, “what kind of influence immigrants are having on the way things are going in our country.” An important point is that whenever people are asked in those questions, their imagined images of immigration and immigrants would determine people’s attitudes on immigration and immigrants. However, we cannot know the specific contents of people’s imagined images of immigration and immigrants and maybe, people themselves do not realize their own images of immigration and immigrants before they are confronted with those questions. Therefore, to analyze people’s responses to those questions could be a possible way of identifying their imagined images of immigration and immigrants and inferring some factors to have constructed people’s images.

In so doing, however, we can expect an important analytical issue on the distinction between immigration and immigrants. Although those survey questions above distinguish them by using different questionnaire, it is not certain that people distinguish between immigration and immigrants and response to them separately. Thus this study will pay a serious attention to this issue. In fact, most previous studies assume that “immigration attitudes are closely linked with immigrant attitudes.”³²⁾ In their critical review of literature on immigration attitudes, Ceobanu and Escandell (2010), however, are raising a very interesting point of the distinction between attitudes toward immigration and attitudes toward immigrants. According to their distinction, attitudes toward immigration are defined as “reactions about the phenomenon of immigration” in general, while attitudes toward immigrants are “reactions toward people” such as ethnic and racial minority groups.³³⁾ If their conceptual distinction between two types of attitudes has some empirical implications, we will find that two types of attitudes are driven by different factors. This issue is also another analytical focus in this study.

32) Hainmuller and Hopkins, 2014, p. 234.

33) Ceobanu, Alin M, and Xavier Escandell, “Comparative Analysis of Public Attitudes Toward Immigrants and Immigration Using Multinational Survey Data: A Review of Theories and Research.” *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 36, 2010, p. 313.

〈 Table 1 〉 Attitudes toward Immigration and Immigrants (2002 and 2007)

Q1: Immigration	South Korea		Japan		China	
	2002	2007	2002	2007	2002	2007
1. very big problem	69 (9.60%)	172 (17.20%)	162 (23.08%)	199 (28.43%)	277 (9.23%)	136 (4.33%)
2. moderately big problem	203 (28.23%)	260 (26%)	266 (37.89%)	218 (31.44%)	657 (21.90%)	585 (18.62%)
3. small problem	298 (41.45%)	340 (34%)	134 (16.09%)	216 (30.86%)	1025 (34.17%)	1295 (41.22%)
4. not a problem at all	105 (14.60%)	135 (13.50%)	103 (14.67%)	67 (9.57%)	678 (22.60%)	828 (26.35%)
5. don't know	44 (6.12%)	93 (9.3%)	37 (5.27%)	0 (0%)	363 (12.10%)	284 (9.04%)
Total	719	1000	702	700	3000	3142
Q2: Immigrants	South Korea		Japan		China	
	2002	2007	2002	2007	2002	2007
1. very good	16 (2.23%)	260 (26%)	12 (1.71%)	50 (7.14%)	140 (4.67%)	160 (5.09%)
2. somewhat good	271 (37.69%)	305 (30.50%)	192 (27.35%)	305 (43.57%)	1122 (37.42%)	1067 (33.96%)
3. somewhat bad	250 (34.77%)	252 (25.20%)	352 (50.14%)	211 (30.14%)	807 (26.92%)	1138 (36.22%)
4. very bad	26 (2.62%)	169 (16.90%)	38 (5.41%)	132 (18.86%)	223 (7.44%)	150 (4.77%)
5. don't know	156 (21.70%)	14 (1.4%)	108 (15.35%)	2 (0.29%)	706 (23.55%)	627 (19.69%)
Total	719	1000	702	700	3000	3142

Data source : <http://www.pewglobal.org/category/datasets/>

Based on the raw data collected by the Pew Global Attitudes Project, Table 1 gives a rough indication of the national variation in attitudes toward immigration and immigrants in Korea, Japan, and China. The Korean people show more positive attitudes toward immigration (56%) than toward immigrants (39.9%) in 2002. However, their positive attitudes toward immigration were significantly reduced by up to 42.1%

in 2007. Instead, the Korean people displayed more positive attitudes toward immigrants (43.2%) in 2007. This is a very interesting observation to show that immigration attitudes are not linked with immigrant attitudes.

In the case of China, people showed consistently the highest level of positive attitudes toward immigration in both years (56.8% and 67.5%) among the three East Asian countries. However, this fact does not imply that the Chinese people also show the highest level of positive attitude on immigrants. The Chinese people showed that their positive immigrant attitudes declined in 2007, whereas their positive attitudes toward immigration became much stronger in the same year. Thus the case of China also indicates that there might be inconsistency between attitudes on immigration and attitudes toward immigrants. In contrast to China, Japan showed the highest level of negative attitudes on immigration in both years among the three East Asian countries. In 2007, however, the Japanese people's negative attitudes on immigrants were reduced very significantly, showing the highest level of positive attitudes toward immigrants (50.7%) among the three East Asian countries. All of these empirical observations strongly suggest that we need to take the inconsistency between immigration attitudes and immigrant attitudes seriously.

IV. Data Analysis

1. Variables and Methods

As noted above, this study has two dependent variables in order to examine whether two types of attitudes should be explained by different sets of variables. The two dependent variables, attitudes toward immigration and immigrants, are originally measured using ordinal variables from 1 to 4 to indicate the strength of attitudes. This study also modified the original four point ordinal variables with binary variables to have two values of either 0 or 1 for employing a probit regression method when conducting a statistical analysis.

On the other hand, there are four independent variables to specify for each hypothesis. This study attempts to test these four hypotheses simultaneously. First, for labor market competition hypothesis, this study specifies education as the independent variable as most studies usually use education as a proxy variable for measuring individuals' skill levels.³⁴⁾ The Pew Global Attitudes Project provides the data for respondents' education levels in the form of categorical variables. However, different numbers of categories are used for respondents in each country.³⁵⁾ To make the data of education levels more comparable across three East Asian countries, this study recoded them by a unified scheme that assigns 0 for respondents with primary level of education, 1 for respondents with middle and high school education, and 2 for respondents with higher levels than university or college education.

34) Of course, there are some critics to argue that education does not directly measure the effects of skill levels on immigration attitudes because it contains various meanings related to people' cultural values and beliefs on ethnocentrism and cultural diversity, not simply their economic vulnerability in the labor markets. For this point, see Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014, p. 228. Unfortunately, however, there is no alternative measure to replace education in the current dataset for this study.

35) For instance, Korean respondents' education levels are measured by nine categories, while Japanese respondents' education levels are measured by twelve categories.

Second, for testing cultural threat hypothesis, we need a variable to measure directly the degree to what extent individuals feel threatened culturally by immigration and immigrants. This study uses a proxy variable to indicate peoples' attitudes on cultural protectionism. The Pew Global Attitudes Project includes a survey question related to cultural protectionism: Please tell me whether you completely agree (1), mostly agree (2), mostly disagree (3) or completely disagree (4) with the statement that our way of life needs to be protected against foreign influence. The third hypothesis is about the relationship between sociotropic perceptions of national economic situation and attitudes toward immigration and immigrants. People's perceptions of economic situation are indicated by responses to the following question: Now think about our economic situation. How would describe the current economic situation in (survey country)—is it very good (1), somewhat good (2), somewhat bad (3) or very bad (4)? In fact, we do not yet have a clearly specified causal mechanism to explain under what national economic conditions people may perceive the impacts of immigration and immigrants either positively or negatively. Therefore we will examine in a non-deterministic manner how sociotropic concerns about national economic situations are related to their attitudes on immigration and immigrants.

Fourth, we need a variable to indicate people's perception of globalization in order to test the relationship between effects of attitudes on globalization and attitudes toward immigration and immigrants. In this study, people's perceptions of globalization are measured by people's responses to the following question: What do

you think about the growing trade and business between (survey country) and other countries—do you think it is a very good thing (1), somewhat good (2), somewhat bad (3) or a very bad (4) thing for our country? This question defines the concept of globalization as economic globalization to refer the increased transnational activities and economic interdependence across national borders. This question is also asking how people perceive the effects of economic globalization on their own country as a whole rather than on their own individual interests. Finally, this study elucidates some effects of individual socio-demographic and economic situational variables on attitudes toward immigration and immigrants. The Pew Global Attitude Project provides the respondent's information for socio-demographic and individual economic situational variables such as gender, age, income, employment.

2. Results and Discussion

Two data analyses have been conducted in this study. The first analysis examines whether different sets of independent variables determine attitudes toward immigration and immigrants by analyzing each of three East Asian countries separately. In the first analysis, we also compare two statistical models with different estimation procedures. Model1 refers to an ordered probit model with the original ordinal dependent variable (1–4), while Model2 refers to a simple probit model with the data re-codified into binary dependent variables (either 0 or 1). The second part of analysis investigates some common factors to influence on attitudes toward immigration and immigrants across

three East Asian countries, controlling unspecified country-specific effects by including country dummies.³⁶⁾ The second part also aims to examine which hypothesis is valid empirically in explain individual variations of attitudes toward immigration and immigrants across three East Asian countries, comparing the two time periods between 2002 and 2007.

< Table 2 > Data Analysis I: Country-specific Regression

2002	Korea		China		Japan	
	Model1	Model2	Model1	Model2	Model1	Model2
Immigration						
Cultural threat	0.15(0.07)**	0.13(0.08)	0.08(0.02)***	0.09(0.03)***	0.07(0.06)	0.06(0.07)
Globalization	-0.15(0.08)	-0.20(0.09)**	-0.13(0.04)***	-0.13(0.05)**	-0.22(0.08)***	-0.16(0.10)
Economic Situation	-0.10(0.10)	-0.10(0.11)	-0.03(0.03)	-0.06(0.04)	-0.00(0.08)	0.03(0.09)
MarketCompetition	-0.00(0.03)	0.00(0.04)	0.04(0.02)	0.05(0.03)	-0.00(0.02)	0.00(0.03)
Gender	-0.00(0.10)	0.11(0.12)	-0.07(0.04)	-0.06(0.06)	-0.16(0.12)	-0.23(0.14)
Age	-0.00(0.01)	0.00(0.01)	0.00(0.00)	0.00(0.00)	-0.00(0.00)	0.00(0.00)
Income	0.00(0.02)	0.00(0.02)	0.00(0.01)	-0.00(0.01)	0.04(0.02)	0.00(0.03)
Employment	0.03(0.02)	0.03(0.02)	-0.01(0.01)	-0.02(0.01)	0.00(0.01)	-0.00(0.02)
Constant		0.20(0.60)		0.39(0.27)		0.64(0.59)
N	473	473	2011	2011	433	433
Log likelihood	14.74	12.04	35.44	26.59	18.71	11.90
Pseudo- R2	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02
Immigrants	Korea		China		Japan	

36) We may consider including several macro-level variables for controlling country-specific factors such as democracy, economic openness, GDP growth rates, national income levels, unemployment rates, and the size of net migration. However, when we conduct a data analysis with those macro-level variables, they are dropped due to the collinearity problems. This is understandable if we remind that all national specific macro-level variables do not have any variations among different observations within a country.

Cultural threat	0.15(0.07)**	0.09(0.08)	0.05(0.02)	0.02(0.03)	-0.04(0.06)	0.01(0.07)
Globalization	-0.15(0.08)	0.25(0.09)***	0.20(0.04)***	0.20(0.05)***	0.10(0.09)	0.13(0.10)
Economic Situation	-0.10(0.10)	0.16(0.11)	0.14(0.03)***	0.15(0.04)***	0.01(0.08)	0.06(0.09)
MarketCompetition	-0.00(0.03)	-0.00(0.04)	0.01(0.02)	0.02(0.03)	-0.01(0.02)	-0.00(0.03)
Gender	-0.00(0.10)	-0.18(0.12)	-0.03(0.05)	0.01(0.05)	0.02(0.12)	0.03(0.14)
Age	-0.00(0.00)	-0.00(0.00)	0.00(0.00)	0.03(0.03)	0.00(0.00)	0.00(0.00)
Income	0.00(0.02)	0.03(0.03)	-0.01(0.01)	-0.01(0.01)	-0.03(0.03)	-0.04(0.03)
Employment	0.03(0.01)	0.01(0.02)	0.01(0.01)	0.01(0.01)	0.02(0.01)	0.04(0.02)**
Constant		-0.56(0.60)		-1.13(0.27)***		-0.17(0.58)
N	473	473	2011	2011	433	433
Log likelihood	11.87	13.77	57.99	41.74	9.76	11.84
Pseudo- R2	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02
2007	Korea		China		Japan	
	Model1	Model2	Model1	Model2	Model1	Model2
Immigration						
Cultural threat	-0.00(0.04)	0.02(0.05)	0.10(0.03)***	0.06(0.03)	0.19(0.04)***	0.20(0.05)***
Globalization	0.31(0.04)***	0.30(0.05)***	-0.06(0.03)	-0.12(0.05)**	-0.05(0.06)	-0.06(0.08)
Economic Situation	0.07(0.04)	0.16(0.11)***	-0.04(0.03)	-0.01(0.04)	0.03(0.04)	0.01(0.05)
MarketCompetition	0.05(0.01)***	0.06(0.02)***	0.01(0.02)	-0.00(0.03)	0.01(0.01)	0.02(0.02)
Gender	-0.16(0.11)	-0.39(0.13)***	-0.07(0.04)	-0.08(0.05)	-0.05(0.09)	-0.06(0.11)
Age	0.00(0.00)	0.00(0.00)	-0.00(0.00)	0.00(0.00)	0.00(0.00)	-0.00(0.00)
Income	-0.00(0.01)	0.01(0.01)	-0.04(0.01)***	-0.03(0.01)**	0.01(0.03)	-0.01(0.03)
Employment	-0.01(0.01)	0.03(0.02)	0.00(0.00)	0.01(0.01)	0.01(0.01)	0.01(0.02)
Constant		-1.39(0.33)***		0.87(0.25)***		-0.52(0.35)
N	791	791	2204	2204	694	694
Log likelihood	81.26	78.02	34.59	19.80	19.93	17.18
Pseudo- R2	0.01	0.07	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02
Immigrants	Korea		China		Japan	

Cultural threat	0.02(0,04)	-0,00(0,05)	0.16(0,03)***	0.12(0,03)***	0.04(0,04)	0.05(0,05)
Globalization	0.06(0,04)	0,00(0,02)	0.08(0,04)**	0.10(0,04)**	0.00(0,06)	0.02(0,08)
Economic Situation	0.10(0,04)**	0.16(0,11)**	0.16(0,03)***	0.20(0,04)***	0.03(0,04)	0.02(0,05)
MarketCompetition	0.01(0,01)	0.01(0,02)	0.08(0,02)***	0.06(0,02)**	0.00(0,01)	-0.01(0,02)
Gender	-0.04(0,11)	-0.06(0,13)	-0.04(0,04)	-0.07(0,05)	0.01(0,09)	-0.05(0,10)
Age	0.00(0,00)	-0.00(0,00)	0.00(0,00)**	0.00(0,00)	0.00(0,00)	0.00(0,00)
Income	0.01(0,01)	-0.02(0,01)	-0.00(0,01)	-0.02(0,01)	-0.03(0,03)	-0.03(0,03)
Employment	0.00(0,01)	0.01(0,01)	-0.01(0,00)	-0.01(0,00)	0.01(0,01)	0.01(0,01)
Constant		-0.12(0,32)				-0.16(0,35)
N	791	791	-0.93(0,24)***		694	694
Log likelihood	14,91	8,24	2204	2204	3,18	5,33
Pseudo- R2	0.03	0.01	84,54	62,22	0.00	0.00
			0.02	0.02		

Data source: <http://www.pewglobal.org/category/datasets/>
 significance at 0,05, *significance at 0,01

The results of the first analysis are shown in Table 2. First, we identify the national differences in the determinants on attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. For Korea, cultural threat and globalization show very large values of the estimated coefficients in terms of both immigration and immigrants in 2002. But they do not retain a consistent statistical significance, implying those relationship are not clear. In contrast, in 2007, we can identify more clear relationships among variables. While globalization and labor market competition are statistically significant for immigration with its expected sign, national economic situation shows its significance for immigrants. For China, the results clearly show that attitudes on immigration are driven by cultural threat and globalization, while attitudes on immigrants

are driven by globalization and national economic situation in 2002. However, the effect of globalization on attitudes toward immigration lost its significance in 2007, replaced by the variable, income. And very interestingly, all four hypotheses seem to be significant for Chinese attitudes toward immigrants in 2007. Curiously, however, the specified models do not fit overall in the case of Japan, although cultural threat shows its significance for attitudes toward immigrants in 2007.

Second, as shown in Table 2, all variables related to individual socio-economic conditions (education, income, employment, age, and gender) do not display their statistical significance with very small values of coefficients. This result implies that attitudes toward immigration and immigrants are not driven by individual socio-economic conditions in three East Asian countries. Between two competing perspectives discussed above, thereby this result supports the second perspective to emphasize people's sociotropic concerns in explaining immigration and immigrant attitudes. However, the labor market competition hypothesis (skill levels measured by education levels) works well in Korea in 2007, suggesting that Korean attitudes on immigration seem to have been newly driven by self-interested concerns about labor market competition. Also, it gains its significance in explaining the Chinese attitudes toward immigrants in 2007. If these results entirely rely on country-specific effects that we did not specify in our model, they may disappear when we control country-specific effects by including country dummies for each country. Therefore we need to examine further what happens when we control country-specific effects.

The second part of the data analysis focuses on this question. The

results presented in Table 3 suggest several interesting points. First, when we control the effects of country-specific factors by including country dummies, we find that labor market competition hypothesis has a time-specific effect on attitudes toward immigration. Whereas it did not show its significance in 2002, it is significant in 2007. This result may indicate that most people in three East Asian countries came to perceive the immigration issue as an issue related to their self-interested concerns about wage and job security in labor markets over time. Nevertheless, there is an important reason why we should be cautious when accepting such an interpretation. As discussed above, the labor market competition hypothesis employed education as an empirical indicator to measure survey respondents' skill levels. This means that we could not separate purely the effect of skill levels from the multi-dimensional effects of education on attitudes toward immigration.

< Table 3 > Data Analysis II: Time-specific Regression (Controlling Country Effects)

	2002		2007	
	Model1	Model2	Model1	Model2
Immigration				
Cultural threat	0.09(0.02)***	0.09(0.02)***	0.09(0.02)***	0.08(0.02)***
Globalization	-0.15(0.03)***	-0.14(0.04)***	0.08(0.02)***	0.05(0.03)
Economic Situation	-0.03(0.03)	-0.06(0.03)	0.02(0.02)	0.06(0.02)**
Market Competition	0.01(0.01)	0.01(0.01)	0.03(0.01)***	0.03(0.01)***
Gender	-0.08(0.04)**	-0.05(0.05)	-0.09(0.03)**	-0.13(0.04)***
Age	-0.00(0.00)	-0.00(0.00)	0.00(0.00)	0.00(0.00)
Income	0.01(0.00)	-0.00(0.01)	-0.03(0.00)***	-0.02(0.01)**
Employment	0.00(0.00)	-0.00(0.01)	0.00(0.00)	0.01(0.00)
China	0.46(0.08)***	0.61(0.10)***	0.93(0.05)***	0.97(0.07)***

Korea	0.27(0.07)***	0.46(0.09)***	0.08(0.06)	0.06(0.07)
Constant		0.01(0.27)		-0.68(0.17)***
N	2917	2917	3689	3689
Log likelihood	-3776.6982	-1918.5725	-4567.8043	-2277.529
Pseudo R2	0.02	0.03	0.05	0.08
Immigrants				
Cultural threat	0.03(0.02)	0.00(0.02)	0.09(0.02)***	0.07(0.02)***
Globalization	0.17(0.03)***	0.19(0.04)***	0.06(0.02)**	0.06(0.03)
Economic Situation	0.12(0.03)***	0.14(0.03)***	0.11(0.02)***	0.12(0.02)***
Market Competition	0.00(0.01)	0.01(0.01)	0.02(0.01)**	0.01(0.01)
Gender	-0.06(0.04)	-0.02(0.04)	-0.01(0.03)	-0.05(0.04)
Age	0.00(0.00)	0.00(0.00)	0.00(0.00)	0.00(0.00)
Income	-0.01(0.00)	-0.01(0.00)	-0.02(0.00)***	-0.01(0.00)
Employment	0.01(0.00)	0.01(0.00)**	-0.00(0.00)	-0.01(0.00)
China	-0.05(0.08)	-0.29(0.09)**	-0.05(0.05)	0.13(0.06)**
Korea	-0.11(0.08)	-0.29(0.09)***	-0.16(0.06)**	0.11(0.07)
constant		-0.70(0.27)***		-0.52(0.16)***
N	2917	2917	3689	3689
Log likelihood	-3108.0903	-1958.0923	-4329.5703	-2531.6363
Pseudo R2	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.01

Data source : <http://www.pewglobal.org/category/datasets/>
 significance at 0.05, *significance at 0.01

In fact, some recent studies have tried to investigate whether people's attitudes on the immigration issue are really driven by economic fears about labor market competition through improving their measures of respondents' skill levels, labor market position, and economic vulnerability.³⁷⁾ They found that there is no linear relationship between natives' skill levels and their attitudes on immigration. Rather, most natives show their more positive attitudes toward high-skilled immigrants than low-skilled immigrants regardless of their own skill levels.³⁸⁾ Or, people's attitudes are influenced by sociotropic evaluations about

37) Hainmueller et al, 2013; Malhotra et al, 2013; Dancygier and Donnelly, 2013.

38) Hainmueller et al, 2013.

the distributional impact of immigration policy on specific industrial sectors and workplaces where they are employed.³⁹⁾ These points suggest that the impact of economic threat feelings on attitudes toward immigration is rooted in group identity and prejudice rather than solely individual self-interested concerns about the labor market competition.

If so, how can we interpret the result that the effect of education became significant in 2007? A better way of interpretation is to emphasize that education has a cultural dimension. The positive relationship between education and pro-immigration attitudes has been widely discussed in the literature on immigration attitudes with the consideration of the effects of education to reduce ethnocentrism and enhance cultural and political tolerance.⁴⁰⁾ The result shown in Table 3 is also consistent to the existing literature. That is, more educated people show more pro-immigration attitudes. The problem, however, is that we have no idea on under what conditions education influences on attitudes toward immigration. Why are the effects of education time-specific? As discussed above, if attitudes on immigration are rooted in group identity and prejudice and if education has important cultural effects on reducing ethnocentrism and prejudice against out-groups, the time-specific effect of education means that people across three East Asian countries got to respond more culturally to the immigration issue in 2007 than in 2002. The point is that the effect of education on attitudes toward immigration would be expected

39) Dancygier and Donnelly, 2013, p. 31.

40) Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007.

to operate more strongly under the condition that people respond to immigration issues more culturally. This interpretation would be reinforced by the following arguments.

Second, as another variable to show a time-specific effect, globalization is strongly significant in 2002 in explaining individual variations in attitudes toward both immigration and immigrants. But it lost its significance in 2007. In this study, the globalization hypothesis is explained by a different causal mechanism from the threat feelings. It does not directly link the attitudes on immigration and immigrants to the psychological anxiety of out-groups. It links people's attitudes to collective judgments based on their sociotropic perceptions of how globalization has affected the nation as a whole. However, when people lost their confidence on globalization, they might start to link the effects of globalization to the psychological anxiety of out-groups in terms either cultural or economic threats.

People in three East Asian countries might first perceive the issues of immigration and immigrants as a general phenomenon of globalization rather than either cultural or economic problems to influence directly on their life. More importantly, they seem to have overall positive perceptions on globalization in 2002. Thus people who have more positive perceptions on globalization also generally perceive both immigration and immigrants positively. However, this situation seems to have changed in 2007. In other words, they have been beginning to decouple the phenomenon of immigration and immigrants from their ideas of globalization over time. As a result, attitudes on immigration and immigrants are not directly driven by attitudes on globalization in

2007.

Moreover, we find that while it had its theoretically expected sign in 2002, the effect of globalization on immigration shows its reversed sign in 2007. This means that people perceive immigration negatively while they perceive globalization positively. Table 4 helps to make this point more concrete. When we examine the raw data, we can confirm that the size of respondents to show strong negative perceptions on immigration among people who perceive globalization positively, significantly increased from 9.4% in 2002 to 14.9% in 2007. At the same time, the reversed cases, that is, the combination between strong positive perceptions on immigration and negative perceptions on globalization also increased from 0.3% in 2002 to 1.1% in 2007. All of these facts imply that attitudes on globalization are not a reliable predictor of attitudes on immigration. People are increasingly decoupling their attitudes on immigration from their attitudes on globalization in three East Asian countries.

< Table 4 > East Asian Attitudes on Immigration and Globalization (% of total respondents)

2002					2007					
immigration	globalization				immigration	globalization				
		strong positive	positive	negative	strong negative		strong positive	positive	negative	strong negative
strong negative		2.8	6.6	10.4	7.0	strong negative	5.9	9.0	15.7	8.5
negative		6.3	15.2	19.9	11.5	negative	5.0	11.7	16.6	10.5
positive		1.6	1.9	1.2	0.7	positive	1.0	1.4	2.9	1.5
strong positive		0.3	0.3	0.1	0.2	strong positive	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.6

Data source: <http://www.pewglobal.org/category/datasets/>

Third, we also find that the hypothesis of cultural threats shows its consistent significance in explaining the variations in attitudes toward immigration in both 2002 and 2007. On the other hand, the hypothesis of national economic situations is consistently significant in explaining the variations in attitudes on immigrants in both 2002 and 2007. That is, people who agree with the need for cultural protection for preserving their national identity from foreign influences are more likely to perceive that immigration is a big problem in their own society. On the other hand, people perceive that immigrants have a good influence on their society when they evaluate the national economic conditions positively. These findings suggest a very important point that people are responding to the issue of immigration more culturally, whereas they are responding to immigrants more with economic concerns. Why do people across three East Asian countries perceive immigration and immigrants separately?

It is very certain that East Asian people perceive immigration and immigrants with sociotropic concerns of either cultural national identity or economic national conditions. Therefore those results provided by this study are consistent with the conclusion provided by many recent studies that emphasize the importance of sociotropic concerns, but a limited role of self-interested concerns in explaining immigration attitudes. Nevertheless, the emphasis on sociotropic concerns does not fully explain why people respond to the issue of immigration culturally, whereas they respond to immigrants with economic concerns. There is no previous study to distinguish attitudes on immigration and attitudes on immigrants separately. But this study found that East Asian people's

attitudes on immigration do not determine their attitudes toward immigrants. Rather, it is possible that East Asian people have ambivalent attitudes between immigration and immigrants. Put differently, people may be concerned about the cultural effects of immigration on their own nation, but they also desire to exploit the positive effects of immigrants on improving their national economic situation.

This point is very important when we try to understand the dynamics and nature of immigration policy in these three East Asian countries from a comparative perspective. All three countries have attempted to develop an immigration policy that maximizes economic effects, but minimizes cultural effects of immigrant populations within their societies. For instance, in Japan, the Prime Minister Shinzo Abe openly expressed his negative view of integrating immigrants into Japanese society, emphasizing the possibility of “a lot of friction” that might be caused by incorporating immigrants into Japanese society in a recent interview with a television.⁴¹⁾ His negative view of immigrants represents Japanese people’s overall support for tight controls on immigration and reflects their concerns of the negative effects of immigrants on national identity. However, at the same time, Japan has attempted to recruit selectively some targeted groups of immigrants such as highly skilled foreign workers, in particular, with English conversation ability for vitalizing the national economy.⁴²⁾ China has also attempted to attract high skilled immigrants. It recently revised its immigration policy on the purpose for solving the “a talent deficit” exemplified

41) Johathan Sobie, “Japan stands by immigration controls despite shrinking population.” *Financial Times* (June 2, 2014).

42) Green and Kadoya, 2013.

the fact that more than 148,000 Chinese gained overseas citizenship in 2012, while in the same year only 1,202 foreigners were granted their permanent resident status (i.e., a green card) in China.⁴³⁾ Under this situation, China's basic immigration policy has been continuously challenged by the demand of relaxing regulations to grant foreigners permanent residency since its green card policy started in 2004. As a consequence, in 2014, the central government of China expressed publically its willingness to relax immigration laws of granting permanent resident status for foreigners.⁴⁴⁾

In some ways, Korea is very distinctive when compared to two other East Asian countries because it has attempted to accomplish the same purpose of immigration policy in a more active and somewhat radical manner. Korea has expanded the scope of its nationality to some targeted groups of immigrants by promoting the naturalization process and allowing dual citizenship in 2010. This point implies that unlike Japan and China, to adopt an immigration policy to set the permanent resident as the final status of immigrants, Korea is trying to minimize the negative cultural effects of immigrants on the preservation of national identity by incorporating more actively the selected part of immigrants into the Korean society through the legal process of naturalization. If we understand this distinctive context of immigration policy in Korea, then it is not surprising that Korea is the first East Asian country that allowed a naturalized foreign female immigrant to be elected as a member of the National Assembly in 2012.

43) He Dan and Cao Yin, "Global hunt for top skills accelerates" *China Daily* (January 24–26, 2014) http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-01/24/content_17254913.htm,

44) BBC News, "China media: Immigration laws." (June 3, 2014).

V. Conclusion

This study investigated some factors shaping people's attitudes on immigration and immigrants in three East Asian countries, using two survey data sets provided by the Pew Global Attitude Project in 2002 and 2007. Conventional wisdom, mainly constructed from previous studies on immigration attitudes in Western societies, suggests that immigration attitudes are driven by the feelings of economic and cultural threats. This study examined if this conventional wisdom can work in the East Asian context. Also, this study investigated which theoretical perspective has more significance in explaining East Asian attitudes between two competing perspectives (self-interested concerns vs. sociotropic concerns) on immigration attitudes. On the other hand, unlike many previous studies of immigration attitudes, this study attempted to differentiate more clearly between three different sociotropic perceptions such as cultural protectionism, perceptions of national economic condition, and perceptions on globalization. Furthermore, this study newly attempted to examine whether immigration attitudes determine immigrants attitudes, using some data of respondents' responses on two different survey questions to distinguish between attitudes on immigration and attitudes on immigrants.

This study has not found any strong evidences to support the labor market competition hypothesis based on the emphasis of self-interested concerns as the main factor to construct immigration attitudes. Instead, an important finding of this study is that sociotropic concerns specified by the perceptions of cultural threat, globalization, and national

economic situation are all significant in explaining variations in attitudes on immigration and immigrants. This finding generally supports the sociotropic perspective as the growing literature on immigration attitudes has confirmed it.

In particular, this study found that attitudes toward immigration and immigrants might be driven by attitudes on globalization in the East Asian context. However, we also found there is a significant difference between two periods of 2002 and 2007 in terms of the relationship between attitudes on globalization and attitudes on immigration. The effects of globalization attitudes on immigration attitudes are very time-specific, so that they were losing their significances in 2007. This finding suggests that East Asian people are increasingly decoupling the issues of immigration and immigrants from the idea of globalization over time.

Also, when we distinguish between immigration attitudes and immigrant attitudes by using different survey questions, this study has found that while immigration attitudes are mainly driven by cultural concerns, immigrant attitudes are driven by economic concerns of national economic conditions. This finding suggests that we need to understand East Asian people's ambivalent attitudes between cultural anxiety about the immigration issue and economic necessity of immigrant populations. A further study should develop a more precise conceptualization on the analytical distinction between two types of attitudes and investigate empirically the puzzle of East Asian ambivalent attitudes toward immigration and immigrants.

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ABSTRACT

Sociotropic Perceptions, Immigration, and Immigrants
: East Asian Attitudes toward Immigration and Immigrants

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There are little studies to analyze public attitudes on immigration attitudes in East Asia from a comparative perspective despite the fact that East Asia has been an emerging immigration destination. This study provides a comparative analysis of immigration attitudes in three East Asian countries including Korea, China, and Japan, using cross-national survey data collected by the Pew Global Attitude Project in 2002 and 2007. This study finds that people's attitudes on immigration and immigrants in three East Asian countries have been driven by their sociotropic concerns of either cultural or economic impacts of immigration and immigrants on their nations as a whole. This finding is consistent with sociotropic explanations of immigration attitudes. Furthermore, this study finds that while East Asian people perceive the immigration issue in terms of cultural threats, they perceive immigrants in terms of economic benefits of immigrants. This finding suggests that people might have ambivalent attitudes between their cultural concerns about immigration and their expectations of immigrants' economic contributions to their nations. This finding challenges a pervasive assumption that immigration attitudes are closely linked to immigrants attitudes. Therefore, a further study needs to investigate such ambivalent attitudes toward immigration and immigrants, developing a more refined analytical distinction between immigration attitudes and immigrants attitudes.

Keywords : immigration attitudes, immigrants, sociotropic concerns, cultural threats, labor market competitions, globalization, East Asia

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