

## China's Separatist Movements and Interstate Cooperation Dilemma

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### 논문요약

어떤 이유로 중국 내부서 저항이 심했던 티베트 자치구는 분리 독립 움직임이 완화된 반면, 신장/위구르 자치구는 급진적 저항을 지속하고 있는가? 본 연구는 이런 소수민족 전략 차이에 있어 주변국 국력이란 외부 요소에 집중한다. 먼저 티베트와 위구르인들은 각각 인도, 파키스탄에 분리독립 후원자 조직들이 있다. 중국은 주변국이 이들과 분리주의자들의 연계를 차단하는 것을 유도하기 위해 국가 간 협력을 가속화 한다. 이에 반응해 인도/파키스탄은 실제 후원자 조직들을 통제하려 한다. 먼저 티베트 임시정부는 인도의 압력에 따라 분리독립 대신 지역자치를 추구하는 '중도의 길'을 차선으로 택했다. 반면 '침투'와 '조정' 능력이 부족하고 주권 정당성이 약한 파키스탄의 경우 1) 후원자 조직 자체가 중앙정부의 존재를 부정하고, 2) 무력기관 또한 접경지역을 통제하지 못하기에 기대효과가 발생하지 않았다.

키워드: 신장/위구르 자치구, 티베트 자치구, 분리독립, 국가 간 협력, 실패한 국가

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## I. Introduction

During the 2008 Beijing Olympics, Tibet Autonomous Region(TAR) saw inter-ethnic feuds between Han Chinese and Tibetans causing 200 casualties.<sup>1)</sup> What is worse, in Xinjiang-Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), People's Republic of China(PRC)'s another periphery, Uyghur separatists goaded by East Turkestan Islamic Movement(ETIM) rushed into the crowd by a truck and crushed 16 policemen.<sup>2)</sup> These incidents surely indicate XUAR/TAR are more malcontent to Beijing's sovereignty among PRC's ethnic groups.

In order to quell inter-ethnic tensions of two regions, PRC thus endeavors to provide 'carrots' like the Great Western Development Program (GWDP), or juxtapose law enforcements as 'sticks'. Furthermore, PRC conceded some disputed areas and propel interstate cooperation with neighbors where XUAR/TAR's patrons are situated. Nonetheless, these efforts only seem to work in TAR.

What makes such a difference? In this paper, we contend state strength of PRC's neighboring countries hosting external patrons has a high correlation to ethnic separatism. Specifically, Tibetans' patrons notably as Central Tibetan Administration(CTA) are under direct control of India whose strength is sufficient to prevent these organizations not only evincing radical separatism as political slogans but also supporting affiliated groups of TAR in accordance to interstate cooperation. Regardless of Sino-Pakistan amity in contrast, Pakistan fails to duplicate what India does as

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1) International Tibet Network: (Accessed: 2019.5.6.).

2) Cunningham, Christopher P, "Counterterrorism in Xinjaing: The ETIM, China and the Uyghurs." International Journal on World Peace, Vol. 29, No. 3, 2012, p. 14.

the country is not legitimized by Uyghurs' patrons while poorly maintained security forces can rarely preclude inter-border symbiosis between separatists.

For the operationalization, our paper is dependent on qualitative case studies of India/Pakistan and relations with Tibetans/Uyghurs respectively to see how state strength of each (de)accelerates ethnic separatism. The most important implication of our findings is issues surrounding ethnic separatism will properly be explained by domestic and external factors holistically.

## II. Overview

XUAR, one of PRC's Muslims' autonomous regions was established in 1955 by the People's Liberation Army(PLA).<sup>3)</sup> Geographically, XUAR is located at northwest of PRC bordering Russia, Central Asian states, and Pakistan. Predominant residents are Uyghurs distinct from Han Chinese by race(turkic), religion(Islam), and have own languages. In 2010's census, it was estimated that 20 millions of citizens occupy XUAR and 11 millions are Uyghurs. Moreover, around 150 thousand diaspora populations are spreaded in PRC's neighbors especially in Afghanistan and Pakistan.<sup>4)</sup>

The idea of an independent Uyghur state was originated amidst turmoils when Qing Dynasty was disintegrated in 20th century. First, Uyghur nationalists established short-lived 'East Turkestan Republics' respectively in 1934/1944. However, their state-building projects were dwntrrodden by the PLA and were annexed to PRC.<sup>5)</sup>

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3) Zang, Xiaowei, *Ethnicity in China*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015, p. 142.

4) Cunningham, Christopher P, "Counterterrorism in Xinjiang: The ETIM, China and the Uyghurs," p. 9.

<Figure 1.1 : geographic locations of XUAR/TAR>



Source: The Uyghur American Association (Accessed: 2019.8.1.).

TAR as another autonomous region is situated in XUAR's southeast and is contiguous to India, Nepal, and Bhutan alongside Himalayan mountains. Historically, Qing Dynasty controlled the area as suzerainty till 1913 when 13th Dalai Lama achieved independence. However, Tibet's sovereignty finally ended in 1950 when PLA conquered local militia groups. Consequently, Tibetan elites had to yield their sovereignty to Han Chinese by '17-point Agreement' and TAR was established in 1965.<sup>6)</sup> Demographically Tibetans are 9th largest ethnic groups in PRC(around 6 million) and are devotees of Tibet Buddhism.<sup>7)</sup> When revolts against PRC were broken in 1959 in TAR, 14th Dalai Lama fled to india and established the government-in-exile(Central Tibetan Administration[CTA]) in Dharamsala.<sup>8)</sup>

5) Zang, Xiaowei, *Ethnicity in China*, Ch. 6.

6) Ibid, pp. 137-139.

7) Zang, Xiaowei, *Ethnicity in China*, p. 4; Central Tibetan Administration (Accessed: 2019.5.7.).

8) Hoffman, Steven A, "Rethinking the Linkage Between Tibet and the China-India Border Conflict: A Realist Approach," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 8, No 3(2006), p. 182.

### III. Literature Review

There are three competing models for ethnic issues of PRC. Primordialism supposes ethnic conflicts are originated from incompatible cultural/racial differences between ethnic groups which let fundamental conflict resolution being unachievable. Moreover, distinctive ethnic properties are almost unchangeable.<sup>9)</sup> It implies PRC's appeasement to XUAR/TAR it would never overwhelm deeply rooted mutual hatreds. According to primordialism, the reason why XUAR is more eager to separate is Uyghurs are Turkic Sunni Muslims and ethnic difference with Han Chinese are significant. Some highlight Uyghur businessmen are marginalized from *Guanxi*(social networks) because trying porks/alcohols with Han businessmen is proscribed by Koran.<sup>10)</sup> One flaw of primordialism however, is it fails to explain why hardliners and softliners are ramified *inside* ethnic communities. Although Hui peoples' islamic faith are much the same, they are deemed as PRC's loyalists unlike Uyghurs.<sup>11)</sup> Likewise, eastern Tibet<sup>12)</sup> have rarely been infidel to PRC.

To modernists, crises of XUAR/TAR are consequences of modernization projects by Beijing. In order for sovereignty to penetrate into the periphery, political elites of the center carry out top-down 'nationalism campaigns' with economic development.<sup>13)</sup> For these, Beijing implants 'high cultures'

9) Smith, Anthony D. *Ethno-Symbolism and Nationalism: A Cultural Approach*, London & New York: Routledge, 2009, pp. 8-9.

10) Harlan, Tyler, "Fringe Existence: Uyghur Entrepreneurs and Ethnic Relations in Urban Xinjiang," in Hillman, Ben-Tuttle, Ben(eds.), *Ethnic Conflict and Protest in Tibet and Xinjiang*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2016, p. 191.

11) Zang, Xiaowei, *Ethnicity in China*, pp. 128-129.

12) Mortensen, Eric D., "Prosperity, Identity, Intra-Tibetan Violence, and Harmony in Southeast Tibet," in Hillman, Ben-Tuttle, Ben(eds.), *Ethnic Conflict and Protest in Tibet and Xinjiang*.

13) Gellner, Ernest, *Nations and Nationalism*. 2th Edition, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006.

like Mandarin Chinese via education, media, and standardized tests, without considering minorities' indigenous aspects(low cultures).<sup>14)</sup> In processes of modernization, discontents are either caused when minorities feel 1) low cultures are entirely denied, and 2) outpouring majority groups unequally occupy local economies.<sup>15)</sup>

Modernism have been utilized in inter-ethnic relations equally because it recalls 'ruthlessness' of PRC's governance. Factually, XUAR/TAR are not free from deterioration of low cultures. While XUAR's Islamism is monitored by security forces, Tibetans saw kidnapping of their revered leader 'Panchen Lama' by affiliated PRC agents.<sup>16)</sup> In addition, PRC's education policy in two areas forces the young to be 'secularists' fitting in Communist doctrines. For instance, studying teachings from Koran is only permitted in certain state schools that are watched by government officials in XUAR, and Tibetans face with a situation in which their historical monastic schools are abolished and monks are forcibly re-educated<sup>17)</sup>.

Second, few communities of PRC are free from Han migrations related to economic 'colonization' especially due to 'GWDP'<sup>18)</sup>. In case of TAR, numbers of state owned enterprises are stationed and the cutting edge high-elevation railways(Qinghai-Tibet lines) were constructed. Likewise,

14) Smith, Anthony D. *Ethno-Symbolism and Nationalism: A Cultural Approach*, pp. 18-19.

15) Laitin, David D., *Nations, States, and Violence*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

16) Terrone, Antonoi, "Propaganda in the Public Square." in Hillman, Ben-Tuttle, Ben(eds.), *Ethnic Conflict and Protest in Tibet and Xinjiang*, p. 50; Free Tibet: (Accessed: 2019.5.6).

17) Hasmath, Reza, "What Explains the Rise of Majority-Minority Tensions and Conflict in Xinjiang?" *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 38, NO. 1, 2019, p. 47; Teufel Dreyer, June, "Economic Development in Tibet under the People's Republic of China." *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 12, No. 36, 2003, p. 421.

18) Zang, Xiaowei, *Ethnicity in China*, pp. 104-105; Nyima, Yonten-Yeh, Emily T., "Environmental Issues and Conflict in Tibet." in Hillman, Ben-Tuttle, Ben(eds.), *Ethnic Conflict and Protest in Tibet and Xinjiang*, pp. 166-167; Cunningham, Christopher P, "Counterterrorism in Xinjiang: The ETIM, China and the Uyghurs," p. 17.

XUAR's strategic 'Silk Road' location motivated Beijing to complete 12 highways penetrating Pakistan and Russia. Researchers point out that fruitions from these projects have partially been concentrated on Han migrants who occupy 1) urban areas, 2) high-paying occupations thanks to *Guanxi* while most of Tibetans and Uyghurs have been alienated from benefits and that inequality triggers ethnic unrest.<sup>19)</sup>

Paradoxically, what these reveal is that modernism is an insufficient theory. If we presume factors designed for political mobilization have significance in ethnic separatism, why is XUAR an epicenter of radicalism other than TAR though socio-economic backgrounds and PRC's modernization projects are similar?

Finally, IR/geopolitics materialize on domestic crises to see how these variables affect interstate relations. 'Diversionary War Theory' is one example. The basic assumption is when leaders face instability, they can divert people's discontents and re-mobilize them through patriotism by begetting belligerent interstate relations.<sup>20)</sup> As an authoritarian regime with separatism, PRC is often epitomized as the master of it. According to Bugra Kanat (2012), whenever PRC's political legitimacy is threatened by Han Chinese, Communists elicit people's memories of extremism like '9/11 Attack' by exposing 'war on terror' rhetorics. It is of course to let the majority suspect Uyghurs as potential collaborators of foreign irredentists.<sup>21)</sup>

Others however, set PRC's instability as an independent variable of

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19) Teufel Dreyer, June, "Economic Development in Tibet under the People's Republic of China"; Hasmath, Reza, "What Explains the Rise of Majority-Minority Tensions and Conflict in Xinjiang?"

20) Tir, Jaroslav, "Territorial Diversion: Diversionary Theory of War and Territorial Conflict." *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 72, No. 2, 2010.

21) Bugra Kanat, Kilic, "War on Terror as a Diversionary Strategy: Personifying Minorities as Terrorists in the People's Republic of China." *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Vol. 32, No. 4, 2012.

‘diversionary peace’. That is, cooperative interstate relations are rational ways solving regime insecurity. For example, PRC is able to implement appeasement policies in discontented areas saved from defence expenditures.<sup>22)</sup> However, neither ‘war’ nor ‘peace’ theory seems to have interest in to what extent PRC’s foreign affairs affect dynamics of ethnic conflicts inside borders.

#### IV. Operationalization

##### 1. *Alternative Perspectives*

primordialism, modernism, and IR/geopolitics do not offer convincing explanations. We therefore list theoretical constraints of traditional approaches to supplement these by our hypothesis. First, they suppose the world is comprised of normal nation-states. That is, something ‘international’ is constructed by numerous dyad of a state where *sovereignty* reaches all areas within firm borders, and is legitimized by law-abiding citizens(state building).<sup>23)</sup> Moreover, the idea of common identity is fully developed thanks to shared cultural resources that bound citizens altogether(nation building).<sup>24)</sup>

In addition, because(most of) nation-states are ‘well-ordered’ and their peculiarities are not regarded as variables, traditional approaches focus on strategic behaviors of state-actors whose primal goal is to survive in

22) Fravel, M. Taylor, “Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation: Explaining China’s Compromises in Territorial Disputes.” *International Security*, Vol. 30, No. 2, 2005.

23) Agnew, John, “Still Trapped in Territory?”, *Geopolitics*, Vol. 15, 2010, pp. 779-780.

24) Albert, Mathias-Brock Lothar, “What Keeps Westphalis Together? Normative Differentiation in the Modern System of States.” in Albert, Mathias-Jacobson, David-Lapid, Yosef(eds.), *Identities, Borders, Orders: Rethinking International Relations Theory*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001, pp. 33-36.

anarchic state of world.<sup>25)</sup> Last, they prefer functionalism on border studies. Specifically, security forces are so well-functioning that they are able to selectively prevent foreign inflows by closing borders whenever necessitated. Thus, firm borders of an each state maximize salience of its community from outside.<sup>26)</sup>

However these are too state-centric, functionalistic, and simplistic. That is, assuming any interstate behaviors as consequences of interactions between normal nation-states are not always applicable. Traditional approaches incautiously generalize states as exclusive arbiters overpowering all kinds of non-state actors, who are solely in charge of foreign affairs, while social and ethnic boundaries coincide.<sup>27)</sup> Factually however, contemporaries see multiple types of states as *failed-states* where state-building and nation-building are not concrete.<sup>28)</sup> Therefore, it is not just to exclude 'failed-normal state' or 'failed-failed state' dyad in researches. More importantly, borders have porousness. Some states can not guarantee existing social orders by border controls. Presumably, states would not have enough resources for security forces, or have pan-national communities that are nullifying existing social orders via inter-border exchanges.<sup>29)</sup>

In sum, 1) functional necessities emanated from inter-ethnic tensions will

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25) Kelly, Phil, "A Critique of Critical Geopolitics." *Geopolitics*, Vol. 11, 2006, p. 31; Atkinson, David-Klaus Dodds "Geopolitical Traditions: A Century of Geopolitical Thought." in Skelton, Tracey-Valentine Gill (eds.), *Geopolitical Traditions: A Century of Geopolitical Thought*. London & Network: Routledge, 2000, p. 10.

26) Laine, Jussi P. "A Historical View on the Study of Borders." in Sevastianov Sergei V-Laine, Jussi P-Kireev, Aton A(eds.), *Introduction to Border Studies*. Vladivostok: Dalnauka, 2015.

27) Diener Alexander-Hagen, Joshua, *Borders: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 14.

28) Agnew, John, "Still Trapped in Territory?," pp. 779-782.

29) Albert, Mathias-Brock Lothar, "What Keeps Westphalia Together? Normative Differentiation in the Modern System of States," p. 42.

drive states to consider whether or not to have amity with neighbors hosting patron groups, 2) interstate cooperation of a country alleviates radical separatism unless its partner is a failed state, and 3) severe porousness between borders, and the existence of pan-national identities are impediments of inter ethnic rapprochement.

## 2. Hypothesis

Specifically we analyze interstate aspects PRC's separatism, and state strength of its neighbors hosting external patrons. First, as Fravel(2005) argues, interstate cooperation is an efficacious way of enervating separatism.<sup>30)</sup> If mutual antagonism prevails between PRC and neighbors, host countries would carry out *proxy* wars by overlooking/instigating patrons providing support to separatists inside. Naturally, hardliners' influences and capabilities within minority groups are maximized in 'intra' competitions with softliners and it boosts radicalism.<sup>31)</sup>

In contrast, if PRC achieves feasible cooperation, neighbors are more likely to control external patrons not to botch diplomatic amity. Expectedly, separatists inside/outside will moderate radical strategies such as expanding autonomy of ethnic homelands<sup>32)</sup> as these are *de facto* realistic options considering geographic isolations. Empirically, PRC's tendency is leaning toward alleviating interstate tensions with neighbors in Central/South Asia.

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30) Fravel, M. Taylor, "Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation: Explaining China's Compromises in Territorial Disputes."

31) Han, Enze-Mylonas, Harris, "Interstate Relations, Perceptions and Power Balance: Explaining China's Policies Toward Ethnic Groups, 1949-1965." *Security Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 1, 2014, pp. 155-156; Laitin, David D, *Nations, States, and Violence*, p. 5.

32) Latin, David D, *Ibid*, p. 49.

For instance Beijing conceded areas under disputes with Central Asia, and Pakistan where Islamic fundamentalism is still prevalent.<sup>33)</sup>

For interstate cooperation, PRC organizes multilateralism. Beijing has developed Shanghai Cooperation Organization(SCO) designed for dialogues on border issues into broader regional integrations.<sup>34)</sup> What is more, the President Xi Jinping's ambitious 'One Belt One Road(OBOR)' project embraces states of PRC's nearby.

Nonetheless, radical separatism seems to disappear only in TAR. For example, 14th Dalai Lama and CTA are no longer claiming independence. Instead, he urges PRC ameliorates human rights, and guarantees regional autonomy.<sup>35)</sup> What about XUAR? It is evident that PRC's Muslim neighbors are not antagonistic and are eager participants of PRC's multilateralism. This dilemma necessitates to observe strength of these countries. To do it, we discern 'strong states' from 'weak(failed) states'. *Strong states* are normal nation-states. In this category, any state 1) must maintain legitimized sovereignty 2) in almost all areas within territory, and 3) security forces are well-organized enough to control borders. By contrast, *weak states* are characterized as 1) state actors palpably weaker than certain non-state actors, and 2) the former can barely prevent the latter from doing something undesirable for statecraft.<sup>36)</sup>

Two are vital properties of state strength. *Penetration* means any central

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33) Fravel, M. Taylor, "Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation: Explaining China's Compromises in Territorial Disputes," pp. 56-57.

34) Injoo, Sohn, "After Renaissance: China's Multilateral Offensive in the Developing World," *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 18, No. 1, 2011, pp. 90-91; Shanghai Cooperation Organization: (Access: 2019.5.4.); Note that Pakistan and India are official members.

35) Robin, Francois, "Discussing Rights and Human Rights in Tibet." in Hillman, Ben-Tuttle, Gray(eds.), *Ethnic Conflict and Protest in Tibet and Xinjiang*, pp. 71-72.

36) Buzan, Barry-Waever Ole, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 64.

governments should be able to exert influences on population directly. To be penetrative, there must not be any non-state intermediaries surrogating social controls. Second, coordination indicates whether or not state actors elicit meaningful compliances of non-state actors whenever necessary.<sup>37)</sup>

Then how do weak states hosting patrons accelerate ethnic separatism in their neighbors? We mentioned if interstate relations are under 'hard times', host states might intentionally overlook patron organization supporting radical separatists beyond borders. In states having weak power by contrast, it also happens without regard to interstate amity/enmity. First, patrons are almost out of center's control. Second, there are few ways enabling these groups to comply in accordance to diplomatic aims. Third, patrons interact with clients rather freely owing to poor border controls. These surroundings eventually escalate radical separatism by maximizing influences of hardliners equipped with material and symbolic support from host states.

Last, we conceptualize *radical separatism* as 1) movements of ethnic groups for complete separation of communities from majority groups with violent means. By contrast, *moderate strategy* refers to the idea that 2) ethnic groups should be guaranteed viable regional autonomy and status improvement from the center in exchange for giving up radical separatism. In a nutshell, the hypothesis is as follows:

Hypothesis: States hosting external patrons with poor penetration and coordination powers are less likely to dissect them from clients regardless of interstate cooperation. Although regimes are

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37) Weiss, Linda·Hobson John M, *State and Economic Development: A Comparative Historical Analysis*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995, pp. 5-7.

encouraged to do, sovereignty rarely reaches at areas where patrons are situated. It is unlikely that these groups comply. What is worse, central governments have few measures to cope with inter-border interactions between two. Consequently, ethnic groups backed by patrons are more inclined to embark on radical separatism inside (and vice versa).

### 3. Methodology

We set penetration/coordination of PRC's neighboring states in relation to external patrons as external factors correlated to radical separatism in XUAR/TAR. In particular, 1) patrons' compliance with central governments, 2) their affiliations with radical separatists inside PRC, and 3) porousness of borders of host states will be studied.

Our analysis will be confined to Pakistan and India. There are four considerations. First, 1) both are the most influential regional powers; 2) keep stabilizing interstate relations with PRC; 3) host external patrons; 4) however Pakistan's weak strength persists unlike India.

Methodologically, we employ qualitative case studies. We limit cases to XUAR/TAR among PRC's multiple ethnic groups when applying *The Most Similar System* in order to control third variables. Because there are numbers of 'uncontrollable' variables when other ethnic groups are included. For example, Koreans and Zhuangs' homelands are closer to Beijing and it might demoralize separatism. In addition, PRC grants five autonomous regions (Inner Mongolia, Guangxi/Zhuang, TAR, Ningxia/Hui, XUAR) among 56 official minorities.<sup>38)</sup> Unsettling of autonomous regions would indicate groups are too widely dispersed.

38) PRC's State Council: (Access: 2019.5.5.); Zang, Xiaowei, *Ethnicity in China*, pp. 4-5.

<Table 1 : The Most Similar System of XUAR and TAR>

Variable	Category	XUAR	TAR
Control	administration	an autonomous region	
	geography	situated in PRC's periphery	
	external factors	have external patrons	
	cultural similarities between host states and each region	similar XUAR: sharing Sunni Islam with Pakistan TAR: encircled by Buddhist legacy	
	ethnicity	distinct from Han Chinese	
	demographic composition	concentrated in ethnic homelands	
	interstate relations	cooperative	
Independent	strength of host states	a weak(failed) state (Pakistan)	patrons are controlled (India)
Result	strategy	radical	moderate

Source: Zang Xiaowei, 2015; Han, Enze; Mylonas, Harris, 2014.

## V. Case Studies

### 1. Tibetans' 'Middle Way' Approach and India

<Table 2 : Timeline of PRC's Major Inter-Ethnic Clashes>

Year	Major Inter-Ethnic Clashes			
	XUAR/Conflict Type		TAR/Conflict Type	
1959	N/A		Lhasa Uprising	armed conflict
1969			Nyemo Ani Incident	
1987-9	unrest in Urumqi	violent protests	Tibetan Unrest in Sichuan, TAR, Qinghai	violent protests
1992	Urumqi bombings	terrorism	N/A	
1993	N/A		protest in Lhasa for independence	mass violent protests
1995			police shootings during protests	
1996			terrorism	
1997	Urumqi bombings	Tibetan riots		
2008	Kashgar attack			

Year	Major Inter-Ethnic Clashes			
	XUAR/Conflict Type		TAR/Conflict Type	
				protests
2009	Urumqi riots	mass violent protests	N/A	
2010	Aksu bombings	terrorism	students' protests	mass protests
2011	Hotan/Kashgar Attack		self-immolations of monks	individual-level protests
2012	Yecheng attack Failed Hijack of Tianjin Airlines		self-immolations of monks	
2013	Bachu unrest	violent protests	N/A	
	Shanshan attack Tinanmen Square attack	terrorism		
2014	Kunming attack	terrorism		
	Urumqi attack			
	Shache attacks			

Source: Zang, Xiaowei, 2015; Goldstein, Melvyn C; Jiao Ben-Lhundup Tanzen, 2008; Timeline of Tibetan Protest; PBS Front Line; Free Tibet; University of Arkansas Political Science Database: (All Accessed: 2019.5.7.).

As <Table 2> contrasts, PRC's interstate cooperation for alleviating ethnic unrest works fairly in TAR than XUAR. Although Tibetans' discontents to Beijing is not negligible, ways of expressing them are mainly confined to 1) mass protests, and 2) self-immolation of monks. How could India coordinate Tibetans' external patrons? To answer this question, Sino-India relations from 20th century to current and their impacts on

TAR will firstly be analyzed. There were issues surrounding demarcation of Sino-Indian borders in 1950s. Sino-Indian disputes were originated by ‘Simla Talks’ from 1913 to 1914. British India in accordance with Chinese president Yuan Shikai, and 13th Dalami Lama agreed on bordering by the ‘McMahon Line’.<sup>39)</sup> According to the line, British India—with its imperialism—was granted eastern parts of Tibet(Arunachal Pradesh) and also the Aksai Chin of the west.<sup>40)</sup>

When two became independent, border issues reemerged. At first, when PRC forcibly annexed Tibet(with Aksai Chin), prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru admitted its takeover and completed ‘the Agreement on Trade and Intercourse’ in 1954.<sup>41)</sup> However both had controversies over existing borders. First, India could not condone PRC’s penetration to Aksai Chin, while Beijing deemed the ‘McMahon Line’ which India succeeded as unequal symbolizing ‘colonial humiliation’.<sup>42)</sup> Second, PRC believed Tibet is its integral territory due to Qing’s suzerainty.<sup>43)</sup> Moreover, India never seemed to hand over Arunachal Pradesh as it settled the North-East Frontier Agency.<sup>44)</sup>

Sino-Indian relations was aggravated by 14th Dalai Lama’s exodus to India and the establishment of CTA in 1959. In the same vein, escalated border disputes eventually transformed into armed conflicts in 1962. The

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39) Hoffman, Steven A., “Rethinking the Linkage Between Tibet and the China-India Border Conflict: A Realist Approach.”

40) Malone, David M. Mukherjee, Rohan, “India and China: Conflict and Cooperation.” *Survival*, Vol. 52, No. 1, 2010, p. 140.

41) Sikri, Rajiv, “The Tibet Factor in India-China Relations.” *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 64, No. 2, p. 60.

42) Hoffman, Steven A., “Rethinking the Linkage Between Tibet and the China-India Border Conflict: A Realist Approach.”

43) Zang, Xiaowei, *Ethnicity in China*, p. 137.

44) Sikri, Rajiv, “The Tibet Factor in India-China Relations,” p. 59.

war lasted for a month was unilaterally ceased by PRC with its military dominance and reaffirmation of Aksai Chin by the Line of Actual Control(LAC). Moreover, India was besieged by Pakistan as PRC bolstered Sino-Pakistan friendship by ceding west of the Karakoram Pass.<sup>45)</sup> To cope with diplomatic fiasco, India began to back Tibetan patrons. First, India de facto acknowledged CTA as Tibetans' government-in-exile. Second, land distributions were offered to Tibetan refugees by preferential treatments. Last, India overlooked US operations brokering CTA to TAR for separatist movements.<sup>46)</sup>

<Table 3: List of Major Anti-PRC Tibetan Diaspora Groups>

Name	Location	Strategy
Central Tibetan Administration	Dharamsala	regional autonomy
Tibetan Youth Congress <sup>47)</sup>		complete independence
Chushi Gangdruk (disintegrated)	TAR	guerilla forces
Tibetan Women's Association	Dharamsala	human rights issues
National Democratic Party of Tibet		CTA support group
Guchusum Movement of Tibet		political prisoner issues

Source: Deepak, B, R(2011):Tibetan Youth Congress; National Democratic Party of Tibet;Tibetan Women's Association; Guchusum Movement of Tibet; Canada Chushi Gangdruk Society(All Accessed: 2019.5.11.).

Nonetheless, PRC and India have realized necessities of a rapprochement since 1970s. Economically, both are net importer/exporters of huge natural

45) Malone, David M.;Mukherjee, Rohan, "India and China: Conflict and Cooperation." pp. 139-142; Dault Singh, Zorawar, "After the Hiatus: India-China Border Diplomacy since the 1970s." *China Report*, Vol. 47, No. 2, p. 86.

46) Sikri, Rajiv, "The Tibet Factor in India-China Relations." p. 62; Deepak, B, R., "India, China and Tibet: Fundamental Perceptions from Dharamsala, Beijing and New Delhi." *Asian Ethnicity*, Vol. 12, No. 3, 2011, pp. 308-309.

47) PRC believes that it trains 'combatants' and dispatch to TAR; Deepak, B, R., "India, China and Tibet: Fundamental Perceptions from Dharamsala, Beijing and New Delhi," p. 305.

resources while skyrocketed economic development of each has deepened trades. Most significantly, PRC had to put up with India's continuous back up of CTA while redoubling Sino-Pakistan amity strangled India.<sup>48)</sup> Although controversies surrounding Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin have not ended, there have been progresses.

In 1979, PRC with Indian foreign minister Vajpayee promulgated '3-Point Agreement' clarifying each will capitalize on peaceful measures. Second, two proceeded 8 more 'round talks' from 1981 to 2003 and 14 Joint Working Group meetings to derive compromises about the LAC.<sup>49)</sup> Thanks to these, India reaffirmed PRC's sovereignty in TAR while New Delhi saw Beijing's *de facto* compliance with India's Arunachal Pradesh governance.<sup>50)</sup>

In line with diplomatic efforts, New Delhi began to coordinate/enforce Tibetan patrons not to evoke PRC's unnecessary suspicions. In 2012, when Hu Jintao visited New Delhi, Jampa Yeshe, an independence campaigner accused PRC by self-immolation. In response, Indian government incarcerated 'would be' protestors for Tibetan independence.<sup>51)</sup> Likewise, existing preferential treatments for Tibetans from PRC was abolished.<sup>52)</sup> Most of all, India could coordinate CTA to alter 14th Dalai Lama's radicalism to *moderate* ideas in 1997. This gradualism is called the 'Middle Way'. It aims,

48) Malone, David M. Mukherjee, Rohan, "India and China: Conflict and Cooperation," p. 140.

49) Daulet Singh, Zorawar, "After the Hiatus: India-China Border Diplomacy since the 1970s."

50) Sikri, Rajiv, "The Tibet Factor in India-China Relations," p. 63.

51) John Harnett, Stephen, "Tibet is Burning: Competing Rhetorics of Liberation, Occupation, Resistance, and Paralysis on the Roof of the World." *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, Vol. 99, No. 3, 2013, p. 284.

52) Deepak, B, R., "India, China and Tibet: Fundamental Perceptions from Dharmasala, Beijing and New Delhi," pp. 308-309.

*"Without seeking independence for Tibet, the CTA strives for the creation of a political entity comprising the three traditional provinces of Tibet; Such an entity should enjoy a status of genuine national regional autonomy;...As soon as the above status is agreed upon by the Chinese government, Tibet would not seek separation."*<sup>53)</sup>

According to the Middle Way, 14th Dalai Lama and CTA seek neither complete independence from PRC nor submission to PRC's current ethnic policies. Rather it emphasizes co-existence with PRC, and gradual reform of TAR are feasible. In contrast to the Middle Way, 14th Dalai Lama's stance during 1970s toward PRC was radical as it stands. He said, "I urge you[Tibetans] that everyone should struggle continuously for our common interest...The whole Tibetan people have one common goal, 'the independence of Tibet.'<sup>54)</sup> This fundamental alteration is caused by amicable relations between India and CTA. Expectedly, 14th Dalai Lama shows gratitude to India for offering shelters. CTA clarifies,

*"Dalai Lama today expressed his profound gratitude to India for extending its moral and material generosity to the Tibetan people in India during the last 50 years...Tibet's unique cultural heritage in the last 5 decades under the generous support from both the government and people of India."*<sup>55)</sup>

The statement signifies whenever India is necessitated to tone radicalism down, coordination processes are not demanding. 14th Dalai Lama recognizes that their existence is contingent upon India's 'generosity' and

53) Central Tibetan Administration: (Accessed: 2019.5.11.).

54) Deepak, B, R., "India, China and Tibet: Fundamental Perceptions from Dharmasala, Beijing and New Delhi," pp. 302-303(as cited by 14th Dalai Lama's speech).

55) Central Tibetan Administration: (Accessed: 2019.5.11.).

owing to its strength, defying its directions is impossible. They thus argue, “the Middle Way Approach will pave the way for the restoration of *strategic trust between India and China*.”<sup>56)</sup>

Not being at odds with Sino-Indian relations, 14th Dalai Lama further negotiated with PRC. There were China-Dharamsala negotiations from 2002 to 2007. During talks, both reassured that to be legitimate, TAR should be autonomous enough to guarantee well-being of Tibetans.<sup>57)</sup> Regardless of the Middle Way’s efficacy, it does demoralize radical separatism of TAR. For example, some express ambivalent opinions toward CTA as, “The Middle Way Approach is a laid-back one...There is nothing much we can achieve...He[14th Dalai Lama] has done everything on his part...I don’t think he should step down.”<sup>58)</sup>

## 2. *Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region’s Radical Separatism*

India’s penetration and coordination capabilities let Tibetan patrons to alter separatism to expansion of regional autonomy. It is curious how radical separatism of XUAR is burgeoning regardless of PRC’s interstate cooperation. To what extent state strength of Pakistan stimulates Uyghur hardliners who even resort to violent terrorism?

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56) White Paper of CTA (2015): (Accessed: 2019.5.11.).

57) Le, Lin, “China’s Perception of External Threats and Its Current Tibet Policy.” *The China Journal*, No. 76, 2016, p. 119; Sikri, Rajiv, “*The Tibet Factor in India-China Relations*,” p. 63.

58) Deepak, B, R., “India, China and Tibet: Fundamental Perceptions from Dharamsala, Beijing and New Delhi,” p. 305.

<Table 4: Identified XUAR's Separatist Groups and External Patrons>

Radical Separatist Groups of XUAR	
Name	Strategy
East Turkestan Islamic Movement(ETIM)	terrorism, pan-Islamism, radical separation from PRC
Islamic Holy Warriors	
Hazret's East Turkestan Liberation	
East Turkestan International Committee	
Shock Brigade	
East Turkestan Islamic Party	
East Turkestan Opposition Party	
East Turkestan Islamic Party of Allah	
Uyghur Liberation Organization	
Major External Patrons	
Name	Location/Strategy
World Uyghur Congress	Germany/radical separation
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant(ISIL)	dispersed/terrorism, pan-Islamism
Islamic Movement of Turkestan	Central Asia/terrorism, pan-Islamism
Islamic Jihad Union	dispersed(including Pakistan)/terrorism, pan-Islamism
Al Qaeda	
Taliban(Afghanistan/Pakistan[TTP])	

Source: Soloshcheva(2017); Bhattacharya(2003); Sadia(2012)

Notably Pakistan is PRC's one of the most trustworthy partners. Interstate relations between two have had high amity from the beginning. It is because 1) PRC is required to restrain growing regional power of India. Likewise, 2) Pakistan experiences territorial disputes with India surrounding Jammu & Kashmir and state strength cannot keep abreast of New Delhi.<sup>59)</sup> In other words, both had to cling together to counteract India.

To fortify interstate cooperation, PRC opened the Karakoram Highway in 1982 connecting Kashgar to Islamabad and it led accelerated economic integration.<sup>60)</sup> Alongside the highway PRC launched the China-Pakistan

59) Buzan, Barry-Waever Ole, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, Ch. 4.

Economic Corridor(CPEC) in 2013. The aim of it is to modernize dilapidated transport system of Pakistan by Chinese capital.<sup>61)</sup> Moreover, PRC urges Pakistan to eradicate external patrons. In response, Pakistan implemented counterterrorism measures such as National Counter Terrorism Authority(NCTA)<sup>62)</sup>. For instance, Pakistan Army killed Hassan Mahsum, one of ETIM's major cadres.<sup>63)</sup> Likewise, Pakistan reported to PRC that almost all ETIM militants were extirpated in the Zarb-e-Azb Operation.<sup>64)</sup> More drastically, the government closed down Uyghur diaspora communities (Kashgarabad & Hotanabad) and repatriated detainees to PRC.<sup>65)</sup> Finally, Madrasas(Islamic seminaries) being suspicious of separatism are now under regulations of NCTA.<sup>66)</sup>

By the way, Pakistan is still struggling with domestic instability. According to Jan(2010), the country has two crucial drawbacks for statecraft. First, though Pakistan is an Islamic Republic promulgating 'safe heaven' of Muslims, multiple ethnic groups have resisted over sovereignty due to poor nation-building.<sup>67)</sup> Second, unending civil war of Afghanistan distracts Pakistan's border control. When USSR invaded Kabul to protect the puppet government from Mujahideens in 1980s, Pakistan was turned into the outpost of anti-Soviet frontier. The US and PRC clandestinely provided

60) Haider, Ziad, "Sino-Pakistan Relations and Xinjiang's Uighurs: Politics, Trade and Islam along the Karakoram Highway." *Asian Survey*, Vol. 45, No. 4, 2005.

61) Rippa, Alessandro, "Cross-Border Trade and the Market Between Xinjiang(China) and Pakistan." *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol. 29, No. 2, p. 258.

62) NCTA designates ETIM as a 'proscribed organization'; NCTA: (Access: 2019.5.13.).

63) Mackerras, Colin, "Xinjiang in China's Foreign Relations: Part of a New Silk Road or Central Asian Zone of Conflict?" *East Asia*, Vol. 32, No. 25, p. 34.

64) Reuters: (Access: 2019.5.13.).

65) Haider, Ziad, "Sino-Pakistan Relations and Xinjiang's Uighurs: Politics, Trade and Islam along the Karakoram Highway," p. 535.

66) NCTA: (Access: 2019.5.13.).

67) Jan, Farah, "Pakistan: A Struggling Nation-State." *Democracy and Security*, Vol. 6, No. 3, 2010.

logistics to Mujahideens via Pakistan.<sup>68)</sup> Moreover, as Pashtuns dominating Afghanistan were also dwelling on Pakistan, both had explicit ethnic ties. It eventually led Islamabad to accept refugees and trained more than 20,000 young militants.<sup>69)</sup>

Things have dramatically changed when the US conversely invaded Afghanistan to root out Taliban since 2000s. Because Pakistan again sided with the US and allowed areas for military operations, ousted Taliban and Pashtun militants jointly assaulted Islamabad. It is because 1) borders of Pak-Afghan are hilly and inhospitable enough for unconventional warfares, 2) had numerous sympathizers of Taliban among Pashtuns, 3) they viewed Pakistan as an 'infidel' of Islam.<sup>70)</sup>

Pakistani Taliban typically show dramatic animosity. They assert, "We will target security forces, government installations, political leaders and police...Pakistan is a slave of America!"<sup>71)</sup> Although Pakistan needs compliance of those Uyghurs' patrons to beef up cooperation with PRC, it would certainly be unrealistic as to these, Pakistan is a country that must be collapsed. Therefore they utilize Uyghur separatists to anti-Pakistan campaigns. In 2014 for instance, Islamic Movement of Turkestan claimed it was its warriors who carried out suicide attacks to the Karachi Airport.<sup>72)</sup>

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68) Fayaz, Sadia, "China's Xinjiang Problem and Pakistan." *The Dialogue*, Vol. 7, No. 3, 2012, p. 243.


69) Idil Oztig, Lacin, "Pakistan's Border Policies and Security Dynamics along the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border," 2018, p. 5.

70) Ibid.

71) Dawn: (Access: 2019.5.13.).

72) Dawn: (Access:: 2019.5.13.).

<Figure 2: Presence of Anti-Pakistan Insurgent Groups in Pakistan>



Source: Indian Defense Review (Access: 2019.8.1.)

As mentioned, PRC during the Cold War patronized Afghan Mujahideens expecting they will enervate the Soviet Union. The point is PRC secretly dispatched young Uyghurs to Pakistan/Afghanistan as militants via the Karakoram Highway. When survivors returned to XUAR, they 1) experienced how Jihad works, 2) absorbed pan-Islamism, and 3) acquired human networks via Madrasas.<sup>73)</sup> When the Taliban regime was disintegrated, remnants were dispersed areas of Central/South Asia near PRC's borders and have carried out terrorism/guerilla tactics.<sup>74)</sup> In addition, Pakistan's poor border controls made recruiting Uyghur separatists by TTP and militant groups easier.

Second, the Karakoram Highway is perceived by locals as very porous.

73) Haider, Ziad, "Sino-Pakistan Relations and Xinjiang's Uighurs: Politics, Trade and Islam along the Karakoram Highway," pp. 529-530.

74) Bhattacharya, Abanti, "Conceptualizing Uyghur Separatism in Chinese Nationalism." *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 27, No. 3, 2003.

The route has been widely used by separatists for supplying weapons and proscribed materials to XUAR.<sup>75)</sup> Syed Fazl-e-Haider, a Pakistani analyst points out PRC's 'Karakoram Dilemma'. He says, "If the highway is already facilitating the flow of arms, Islamist militants and extremist ideology from Pakistan, China fears that more connectivity through road and rail projects could make the situation worse."<sup>76)</sup>

These circumstances in turn provide symbolic/material support for XUAR's separatism. Regardless of Pakistan's denial, PRC announced security forces detained 16 separatists trained in Pakistan in 1999, while some suspected even Al-Qaeda intervened in the training.<sup>77)</sup> Likewise, US army captured 22 Uyghur militants alongside Afghanistan/Pakistan borders. Recently, Pakistan's insurgent groups released a video tape showing the training of Uyghur diaspora as child soldiers. It was also reported some are fighting against secularists in Arabian Peninsular under direction of ISIL.<sup>78)</sup> Similarly in Badakhshan, Afghanistan's northernmost region contiguous to Pakistan/PRC, the US reported on ETIM's presence as, "ETIM enjoys support from the Taliban in the mountains of Badakhshan, so hitting these Taliban training facilities and squeezing the Taliban's support networks degrades ETIM capabilities."<sup>79)</sup>

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75) Rippa, Alessandro, "Cross-Border Trade and the Market Between Xinjiang(China) and Pakistan," p. 260.

76) The National: (Access: 2019.5.13.).

77) Haider, Ziad, "Sino-Pakistan Relations and Xinjiang's Uighurs: Politics, Trade and Islam along the Karakoram Highway," pp. 532-533.

78) Soloshcheva, Maria A., "The Uyghur Terrorism: Phenomenon and Genesis." *Iran and the Caucasus*, Vol. 21, 2017.

79) Radio Free Europe: (Access: 2019.5.13.).

## VI. Conclusion

Previous studies tend to disregard how particularistic state strength is on ethnic studies. Consequently, IR/geopolitics with brilliant perspectives fail to offer explanations why PRC's interstate cooperation have different effects on separatism of Tibetans and Uyghurs. Similarly, neither primordialism nor modernism does not contemplate on external factors. Our hypothesis supplements existing paradigms by assuming 1) states do not always fit in Westphalian nation-states as there are multifarious types, 2) borders might be porous enough for foreign influences to permeate. Finally 3) sub-state actors do not always comply with statecraft of the center.

We argue these ideas provide compelling explanations for different survival strategies of Tibetans and Uyghurs. First, PRC simultaneously implements interstate cooperation with India/Pakistan to get rid of separatism. In India, because there is no legitimacy crisis and the central government has penetrative power, Tibetan external patrons had no choice but to comply with the request to be moderate. In contrast, Pakistan neither has penetrative power making coordination and border control feasible nor political legitimacy. Thus, patrons of Uyghur separatists are unfettered from any constraints.

By the way, this paper has two caveats. First, we do not insist our hypothesis is generalized in all PRC's ethnic issues. It is almost impossible to apply it in cases having without external support. Second, it is absurd to assert that external factors only have causal relations to separatism. The point of our research is researchers should consider external factors on analyzing ethnic issues even if these are seemingly related to domestic factors.

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Abstract

China's Separatist Movements and Interstate Cooperation Dilemma

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How has China(PCR) alleviated ethnic unrest of Tibet Autonomous Region(TAR) but in Xinjiang/Uyghur Autonomous Region(XUAR)? About the difference, this research focuses on external factors of China. First, TAR/XUAR have patrons supporting separatism respectively in India/Pakistan. By expecting two neighboring states preclude patrons interacting with radical separatists inside, PCR bolsters interstate cooperation. In response, central governments of India/Pakistan endeavor to control patrons. In reality, due to India's pressure and formidable influence, Tibetans' government-in-exile eventually gave up pursuing radical separation. By contrast in Pakistan, having without legitimized sovereignty, insufficient power of a central government, 1) patrons of Uyghur separatists refuse government's directions while 2) security forces are unable to control borders. Consequently Pakistan's weak strength escalates separatism of XUAR.

Key Words: Xinjiang/Uyghur Autonomous Region, Tibet Autonomous Region, Separatism, Interstate Cooperation, Failed States

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