

What Influences the Differences between Voters who Vote for Populist Candidates and who do not? An Analysis of Effects of Voting Behavior on the Rise of Populist Communication in Mongolia

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Abstract

Numerous competing theories and approaches have been developed to measure demand and supply sides of populism. However, more studies should be conducted on assessing and interpreting populist attitudes in post-communist countries that have emerged in completely different political and economic settings. This study addresses this gap. We attempted to explore what effects preferences for strong autocratic leadership, direct democracy, and liberal democracy have on populist attitudes in the post-communist Mongolia. To achieve this objective, we developed and conducted survey on populist attitude. We run logistic regression to analyze and interpret data we collected from the survey. This study finds two interesting findings. Those findings suggest that voters who have high preference for strong leaders that can be observed in communist countries like Xi Jinping in China are more likely to vote for populist parties or leaders. Moreover, people who highly support direct democracy in association with failed representative democracy are more likely to vote for populist candidates.

Keywords: Populism, Post-Communist Country, Strong Leader, Direct Democracy, and Demand and Supply sides of Populism

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I. Introduction

Populist parties and leaders have almost doubled in recent decade. Their success has become a serious challenge to both established and unconsolidated democracies. In connection with this challenge, numerous research attempts for describing and conceptualizing populism have been made.¹⁾ Some works have tried to explain what lead to populism rise and success.²⁾ In addition, some recent research projects analyzed the effects of populism on political system, government, and public policy.³⁾

A variety of research strategies compete to measure and assess populist attitude or demand side of populism.⁴⁾ Moreover, various research approaches have been developed to evaluate and define the levels of populism of political parties and leaders.⁵⁾

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- 1) Olivas Osuna, J. J., "From chasing populists to deconstructing populism: a new multidimensional approach to understanding and comparing populism." *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 60, 2021, pp. 829~853; Mudde, C., "The Populist Zeitgeist." *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 39, No. 4, 2004, pp. 1477~7053; Gidron, Noam and Bart Bonikowski, "Varieties of populism: Literature Review and Research Agenda" *Weatherhead Center for International Affairs*, Cambridge: Harvard University, 2013.
 - 2) Mudde, C., *Populist radical right parties in Europ*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007; Mudde, C. and Rovira Kaltwasser C., "Populism and (liberal) democracy: A framework for analysis." *Populism in Europe and the Americas: Threat or Corrective for Democracy?*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp. 1~26.
 - 3) Akkerman, T., "Comparing radical right parties in government: Immigration and integration policies in nine countries (1996-2010)." *West European Politics*, Vol. 35, 2012, pp. 511~529.
 - 4) Elchardus, M. and Bram Spruyt, "Populism, persistent republicanism and declinism: an empirical analysis of populism as a thin ideology." *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 51, 2016, pp. 111~133; Hawkins, K. et al., "Measuring populist attitudes." *Political Concepts Committee on Concepts and Methods Working Paper Series*, Vol. 55, 2012, pp. 1~35; Akkerman, Agnes et al., "How Populist Are the People? Measuring Populist Attitudes in Voters." *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 47, 2014, pp. 1324~1353.
 - 5) Polk, Jonathan et al., "Explaining the salience of anti-elitism and reducing political corruption for political parties in Europe with the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey Data." *Research & Politics*, Volume 4, 2017, p. 19.

Additionally, some recent studies attempted to examine the association between supply side (populist parties) and demand side of populism (populist voters).⁶⁾ Their studies prove that there is strong relationship between populist attitude and populist parties. Some recent analyses indicate that individual personality and ideological views affect their political supports for populist parties.⁷⁾ However, one recent research result shows that such strong relationship does not exist in some countries.⁸⁾ These debates suggest that more various studies about supply and demand sides of populism are really needed.

In this study, we seek to understand what worldview or ideological differences exist between those who vote for populist parties and leaders, and who abstains to vote for them. Throughout this study, we tried to answer several research questions. How can we consistently identify whether a voter votes for a populist candidate or does not vote for him or her in their last election in a valid and reliable way? What effect does belief of voters on autocratic leadership, direct democracy, and liberal democracy have on their attitude towards populism?

To find the most accurate answers to the above-mentioned research questions, we conducted this study through the following sequence. First, we decided to choose who will be the study population and what ideological belief or views of voters will be the independent variables of

6) Akkerman, T. et al., Ibid.

7) Fatke, M., "The personality of populists: how the big five traits relate to populist attitudes." *Personality and Individual Differences*, Vol. 139, 2019, pp. 138~151; Vasilopoulos, P. and John, T. J., "Psychological similarities and dissimilarities between left-wing and right-wing populists: Evidence from a nationally representative survey in France." *Journal of Research in Personality*, Vol. 88, No. 104004, 2020.

8) Jungkunz, S. et al., "How populist attitudes scales fail to capture support for populists in power." *PLOS One*, Vol. 16, No. 12, 2021.

this study. The target population of this study is voters of post-communist Mongolia. Independent variables are their belief on autocratic leadership, direct democracy, and liberal democracy. After that, we made literature review on supply and demand sides of populism to develop the hypotheses and survey questionnaire of this study. Then we conducted logistic regression analysis to test the hypotheses of this research. Finally, we interpreted the results of our statistical analysis and made inference back to the target population of this study.

II. Populist Attitude in Demand and Supply Sides

Generally, many populists and populist political parties are more likely to win in presidential and parliament elections in some established and unconsolidated democracies in the 21st century. Therefore, many scholars have conducted studies about the success of populist parties in connection with demand and supply sides, political crisis, and financial crisis.⁹⁾ There are several explanations describing why they make success in winning majority votes in those democracies. According to the new theory “Cultural Backlash Hypothesis”, less educated and conservative voters who are losers in the era of economic globalization and technological revolution are more likely to support populist parties and politicians.¹⁰⁾ The

9) Rodrik, D., "Is populism necessarily bad economics?" *American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings*, Vol. 108, No. 5, 2018, pp. 196~199; Hopkin, J. and Mark Blyth, "The Global Economics of European Populism: Growth Regimes and Party System Change in Europe (The Government and Opposition/Leonard Schapiro Lecture 2017)." *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 54, No. 2, 2019 pp. 193~225.

10) Norris, Pippa and Ronald Inglehart, *Cultural Backlash: Trump, brexit and the Rise of Authoritarian Populism*, Cambridge University Press, 2018

“cultural backlash hypothesis” may work well to explain why demand-side account for populism is so high in some countries, most especially in European countries where labor markets are largely affected by globalization and immigration. It seems to be different in Mongolia. Evidence in some policy studies suggest that a large number of social welfare programs in Mongolia may discourage low skilled and less educated people to join the labor force, because there is no need for them to find jobs due to the additional income from social support programs.¹¹⁾ This attitude negatively influences low rate of labor force participation in Mongolia (63.4%) compared to other small transition post-communist countries.¹²⁾ The problem of numerous social welfare programs has emerged in association with patronal politics to use state resources to reward poor voters for their electoral support. This study suspects that some voters may perceive that a strong leader can stop such patronal politics and therefore, they may be more likely to support populist discourses. We expected that the suspect could be novel understanding in the literature of populism study. Thus, the first hypothesis of this study was made based on this suspect.

Other explanations suggest that there is association between economic insecurity and populism support.¹³⁾ This study agrees with the hypothesis about the relationship between economic insecurity and populism support. There is enough evidence in prior studies that economic downturns and

11) Shatz, Howard J. et al., *Improving the Mongolian Labor Market and Enhancing Opportunities for Youth*, Santa Monica: RAND, 2015.

12) Shatz, Howard J. et al., *Ibid.*, p.11.

13) Guiso, Luigi et al., “Demand and Supply of Populism.” *EIEF Working Papers Series 1703*, 2017; Margalit, Yotam, “Economic Insecurity and the Causes of Populism, Reconsidered.” *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol. 33, No. 4, 2019, pp. 152~170.

financial crisis cause voters to be more likely to vote for populist candidates.¹⁴⁾ However, this hypothesis of economic insecurity may provide partial explanation to the rise of populism in Mongolia. This study argues that some Mongolian voters may perceive that economic downturns and crisis happen because of failed representative democracy and such perception may influence them to support direct democracy. Their high support for direct democracy may make them more susceptible to people-centric discourses of populism and consequently, it might cause them to vote for populist candidates. The second hypothesis of this study belongs to this assumption. This is also another contribution to the study of populism.

Some studies of populism have aimed to classify political parties and leaders by assessing their level of populism. They are theories for supply side of populism.¹⁵⁾ However, there are insufficient studies that have investigated the level of populism of Mongolian political parties. This study did not focus on the level of populism. Further studies should focus on this research problem. Generally, this literature review examines social and economic factors that lead to voters' supports for populist parties and leaders and assesses the existing ways to measure populist parties and leaders.

14) Golder, M., "Far-right parties in Europe." *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol.19, 2016, pp. 477~497; Rodrik, D., "Is populism necessarily bad economics?." *American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings*, Vol. 108, No. 5, 2018, pp. 196~199; Gozgor, G., "The role of economic uncertainty in the rise of EU populism." *Public Choice*, Vol. 190, 2022 pp. 229~246.

15) Rooduijn, Matthijs and Teun Pauwels, "Measuring Populism: Comparing Two Methods of Content Analysis." *West European Politics*, Vol. 34, 2011, pp. 1272~1283; Bernhard, L. and Hanspeter Kriesi, "Populism in election times: a comparative analysis of 11 countries in Western Europe." *West European Politics*, Vol. 42, 2019, pp. 1188~1208.

1. Major Approaches for Measuring Populist Voters

Several methods have been developed to assess and measure the demand side of populism. Most studies apply an ideational approach characterizing politics as a Manichean struggle between the will of the pure people and the corrupt elite. The ideational approach consists of four major key item groups: Manichean worldview, indivisible people, general will, and people-centrism. The most important one is Manichean struggle that describes moral struggle between good(the people) and bad(the corrupted elite).¹⁶⁾

The second most commonly used instrument to measure the demand side is the Akkerman and his peers' eight-item scale with three broad dimensions: popular sovereignty, anti-elitism, and Manichean view.¹⁷⁾ They developed their eight-item scale based on the study of other scholars.¹⁸⁾ Many recent studies have used, improved, and expanded the eight-item scale instrument of Akkerman and his colleagues.¹⁹⁾ The most important contribution of Akkerman and his colleagues to the study for measuring populist attitude is that they attempted to link populist attitude with party preferences including populist attitudes, pluralist attitudes, and elitist attitudes.

16) Mudde, C., "The Populist Zeitgeist", Ibid, p. 1480; Hawkins, K. A. et al., *Introduction. In: The Ideational Approach to Populism: Concept, Theory, and Analysis*, London: Routledge, 2017.

17) Akkerman, A. et al., "We the people or we the peoples? A comparison of support for the populist radical right and populist radical left in the Netherlands." *Swiss Political Science Review*, Vol. 23, Issue. 4, 2017, pp. 377~403.

18) Hawkins, K. et al., "Measuring populist attitudes." *Political Concepts Committee on Concepts and Methods Working Paper Series*, Vol. 55, 2012, pp. 1~35.

19) Melndez, et al., "Political identities: the missing link in the study of populism." *Party Politics*, Vol. 25, 2019, pp. 520~533; Van Hauwaert, Steven M. et al., "The measurement of populist attitudes: testing cross-national scales using item response theory." *Politics*, Vol. 40, 2020 pp. 321.

The third widely used approaches of populist attitude measurement are the four-item instrument and fifteen-item instrument.²⁰⁾ The unique feature of the third approach is two important concepts: people-centrism and anti-elitism. The anti-elitist approach focuses on two target groups. The two target groups are governmental and political elites.²¹⁾ For example, the third approach argues that many politicians ignore needs and interest of people and they care only about their own interest. Only two target groups are the greatest weakness of the third approach. It ignores other elites such as business leaders, journalists, and so on.

2. Major Approaches for Measuring the Populism Level of Political Parties

Generally, there are four key types of approaches to assess and measure the populism level of political parties or supply side of populism. Most attempts collect qualitative text materials, assess them, and define the level of populism of political parties. The first most popular approach is the three-point holistic grading technique of Hawkins. According to this approaches, coders familiarize the text materials and assess the level populism of parties using three-point scale: 0(“non-populist”), 1(“mixed”), or 2(“populist”).²²⁾ The second widely used approach of supply side uses qualitative content analysis to measure the degree of populism. This

20) Elchardus, M. and Bram Spruyt, Ibid, pp. 111~120.; Schulz, Anne et al., "Measuring populist attitudes on three dimensions." *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, Vol. 302, 2018, pp. 316~326.

21) Jungkuz, S. et al., "How populist attitudes scales fail to capture support for populists in power", Ibid.

22) Hawkins, K. A., "Is Chavez populist? Measuring populist discourse in comparative perspective." *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 42, 2009, pp. 1040~1067.

approach collects and assesses the press releases of political parties to define their degree of populism.²³⁾ It also applies ideational dimensions of populism: people centrism, anti-elitism, and popular sovereignty. The third unique approach of supply side of populism is the computerized quantitative dictionary-based approach.²⁴⁾ According to this quantitative approach, scholars should analyze internally and externally oriented party literature and identify words related to populism such “the homogenous people”, “corrupt elite” and so on. After this pioneer quantitative approach, the most recent case of quantitative study on degree of populism among political parties is the machine learning approach. In this study, the author coded the manifestos of 99 political parties by using machine-learning approach.²⁵⁾ The fourth approach is the expert survey approach to measure the level of populism of political parties. One well-known example is Chapel Hill Expert Survey.²⁶⁾ This approach defines the level of populism of political parties by identifying the occurrences of anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric. There are several other expert surveys such as Populism and Political Parties Expert Survey. Through this approach, authors collected data from 28 European countries and experts analyzed 250 political parties by using instrument with 16 items and five dimensions.²⁷⁾ The five dimensions are “Manichean

23) Bernhard, L. and Hanspeter Kriesi, "Populism in election times: a comparative analysis of 11 countries in Western Europe." *West European Politics*, Vol. 42, 2019, pp. 1188~1208.

24) Pauwels, T., "Measuring populism: a quantitative text analysis of party literature in Belgium." *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, Vol. 21, 2011 pp. 97~119.

25) Cocco, Monechi Di and Bernardo Monechi, "How populist are parties? Measuring degrees of populism in party manifestos using supervised machine learning." *Political Analysis*, Vol. 30, 2022, pp. 311~327.

26) Polk, Jonathan et al., "Explaining the salience of anti-elitism and reducing political corruption for political parties in Europe with the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey Data." *Research & Politics* Volume 4, 2017, p. 19.

worldview” , “indivisible people” , “general will” , “people-centrism” and “anti-elitism”

In sum, this literature review suggests that a lot of competing theories and approaches have been developed to measure demand and supply sides of populism. While most of them are based on ideational approach of populism, they diverge in some aspects of populism characteristics and objects of analysis. These diversities suggest that more studies should be conducted to explore differences between voters who vote for populist parties and who abstain from voting for them. Therefore, we conducted this study to answer the following two research questions. “What is the relationship between populism and post-communist countries? What is the difference between populist voters and non-populist voters in the case of post-socialist Mongolia?

3. How can We Measure Populist Attitudes in Post-communist Mongolia?

As it is above-mentioned, many studies on populism have focused on measuring populist attitudes and level of populist political parties and leaders. However, more studies should be conducted on exploring differences between voters who vote for populist parties and who abstain from voting for them in the post-communist countries. This research aims to address this gap. In this study, we are investigating why some Mongolian voters are more susceptible to populist communication and vote for them and why other voters are less susceptible and abstain to vote for

27) Meijers, Maurits J. and Andrej Zaslove, "Measuring populism in political parties: appraisal of a new approach." *Comparative Political Studies*, 2021, pp. 372~407.

them. In connection with this objective, we have the following questions. Is the preference for a strong leader that historically emerged during the communist period still prevalent among Mongolian voters? How does it affect populist demand side? Is there declining trust in the representative democracy in Mongolia? Are there high preferences for the direct democracy in association with it? Is there significant association between the preference for direct democracy and populist attitude? What is the relationship between preference for liberal democracy and populism in the post-communist Mongolia?

III. Mongolia's Journey towards Democratization: From Single-Party System to Multi-Party System, Populism, Clientelism, and Dominant Party

In the late 1980s, communist bloc collapsed in East Europe and the Soviet Union's political dominance and influence in Mongolia greatly declined. Consequently, political pluralism and multi-party system emerged gradually in Mongolia.²⁸⁾ Soon in 1990, Democratic Revolution occurred in Mongolia with hunger strike of Democratic Union(DU). As a further consequence, the Politburo of Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP) resigned in March of that year. Then, the amendment was made to the constitution of that period. With those events, Mongolia's journey toward democratization began.

The first multi-party free general election took place in July 1990. This

28) Batbayar, Tsendendamba, "Mongolian-Russian Relations in the Past Decade." *Asian Survey*, Vol. 43, No. 6, 2003, p. 951.

was the end of single-party system where the MPRP's monopoly of political rule lasted for nearly 70 years. Over that period, only MPRP had designed, developed, and run political and economic institutions in Mongolia. In 1992, Mongolia adopted a new constitution that legitimized political pluralism and representative democracy. It is also known as the first Democratic Constitution of Mongolia.

The hegemony of MPRP lasted until 1996 after the collapse of communism. It began when MPRP won 85% of seats in the Mongolia's first multi-party election that was held in July 1990. After the People's Great Khural adopted the new constitution, the first presidential election of popular vote took place in 1993. Ochirbat Punsalmaa, President of that period, was elected as the first President of Mongolia who was elected by the popular direct vote. He was a member and incumbent of MPRP until the presidential election, but he ran as the candidate of democratic opposition in that election. However, that victory did not end the political dominance of MPRP, which occupies the super majority seats of the People's Great Khural.

In 1996, a significant event occurred in the history of Mongolia's representative democracy. Democratic Union Coalition under the leadership of Elbegdorj Tsakhia, chairman of Democratic Party(DP) won their first historic victory in the election for the State Great Khural in that year. They won 50 out of 76 parliamentary seats.²⁹⁾ It was the first parliament election when MPRP became minority in the State Great Khural. With this victory, the history of two strong opposing political forces began in Mongolia.

29) General Election Commission of Mongolia, "*МОНГОЛ УЛСЫН ИХ ХУРЛЫН СОНГУУ ЛИУДЫН ДҮН 1992-2016.*" *Ulaanbaatar*, 2017.

Populist appeals emerged in Mongolian politics significantly when bidding war for redistributing revenue from mineral resources industry to the people between DP and MPRP in 2008 in their election campaigns. Until 2016 parliament, DP and its allies had been the strongest opposing force against MPRP. The political position of MPRP is center-left. Democratic Party and its allies are center-right. The political platforms of these two parties are completely different. However, their campaign promises have been very similar. Both MPRP and DP often promise to increase social welfare programs significantly to win in elections. For example, these two parties implemented several ineffective social welfare cash handout programs such as child money and money for newly married couples to keep their campaign promises of 2004 and 2008 elections. The government cancelled the one-time welfare program for newly married couples since it caused the increase of fake marriages in 2009.³⁰⁾ These two big parties have influenced campaigns of small political parties. Small parties also use pure populist appeals by promising people-centric social welfare programs to compete with these two big parties.

Besides populist people-centric social welfare promises, political clientelism and patronage emerged and developed during competitions between the two big parties over the last two decades. A recent research indicates that MPRP and DP candidates rely more on electoral gifts and personal politics during election campaigns.³¹⁾ In 2018, at a press conference, the National Police Agency,³²⁾ stated that “it is investigating a

30) Tseene, D., *Шинэ гэрлэгсдийн мөнгийг нөхөж олгоно 05 08*, <https://news.mn/tr/10679/>(Accessed: 17 May, 2021).

31) Bonilla, Lauren and Tuya Shagdar, "Electoral gifting and personal politics in Mongolia's parliamentary election season." *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 37, No. 3, 2018, pp. 457~474.

32) BTI, *Mongolia Country Report*, Germany : BTI, 2018.

case of a car with a significant amount of cash and election campaign material” was discovered. Many Mongolians say that in Mongolia, it is common for incumbents to appoint their party members, supporters, friends, and relatives to government and public jobs based on voting loyalty. Such political clientelism and patronage issues have become key challenges to Mongolian democratization.

During the last decade, populism has dramatically increased and erupted as a key political communication that significantly caused the election results in Mongolia. In 2017, Democratic Party candidate Khaltmaa Battulga won the presidential election with 50.61% of the vote, defeating Miyegombo Enkhbold from the Mongolian People’s Party(MPP former MPRP). Researchers claim that Democratic Party candidate Khaltmaa Battulga is a politician who greatly utilizes populist discourse.³³⁾ Some scholars argue that populism has two contrasting consequences in Mongolia: “negative one based on unrealistic promise” and “positive one based on the public interest”.³⁴⁾ Their research suggests that “negative populism” influences the misuse of public funding. These research facts show that populism has been developing as a deviant political approach to influence voters for private purpose of winning in an election in Mongolia.

Recently, serious situation has appeared. This is the emergence of dominant political party. It emerged with a landslide victory of the Mongolian People’s Party(MPP former MPRP) in the seventh

33) Munkhtsetseg, Tserenjamts, “Digital Populism and the Social Media Impact on the 2017 Mongolian Presidential Election,” *Political Change*, Ulaanbaatar: KAS, 2019; Myadar, Orhon and Sara Jackson, “Contradictions of Populism and Resource Extraction: Examining the Intersection of Resource Nationalism and Accumulation by Dispossession in Mongolia,” *Annals of the American Association of Geographers*, Vol. 109, No. 2, 2019, pp. 361~370.

34) Erdenebileg, Gerelt-Od et al., “Chapter 7 Populism as a Phenomenon: Signs of Populism in Mongolian Development.” *Populism in Asian Democracies*, 2020, pp. 136~146.

parliamentary election in 2016. MPP won 65 seats of the 76-member parliament. In 2020, the MPP won a super overwhelming victory again by winning 62 seats in the eighth parliamentary election. MPP candidate Khurelsukh Ukhnaa won the presidential election by receiving 68% of the total vote in June 2021. The percent of votes he won is the largest share of votes since Mongolia transitioned to multi-party competitive election system. Experts think that Khurelsukh's victory has given much more power to the MPP's monopoly of rule although he must relinquish his party affiliation according to the relevant law.³⁵⁾ These recent events raise a question whether Mongolia is going toward a dominant party and will gradually transition to a hegemonic party system in the long term. It is still early to make a conclusion. It is also uncertain on what would happen in the future. These sequential landslide victories of MPP suggest that we should investigate how MPP win overwhelming votes and study whether the MPP's victories are associated with populism.

IV. Methods and Analysis

In this study, our primary objective of research was to analyze the relationships between subjective preferences of voters for regime types and support for populist political parties and leaders. To achieve this objective, we had to classify our voters in two or three groups or categories. Besides the need to observe categorical variables, we needed to measure and assess

35) Anand Tumurtogoo and David Stanway, "Ex-Mongolian prime minister Khurelsukh wins presidential election in landslide." *Reuters Asia Pacific*, 2021.06.10., <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/former-mongolian-prime-minister-khurelsukh-wins-presidency-2021-06-09/>(Accessed:2022.07.01).

binary outcomes of voting decisions whether they voted for populist parties or leader or abstained to vote for them in the most recent elections. Since there are needs of analysis of categorical and binary variables, we selected logistic regression model to make our analysis. We collected the data for this analysis through a survey strategy.

1. Questionnaire

We developed a questionnaire with 14 questions to collect the data. To assess the degree of populism of political parties or candidate in the research, we developed a questionnaire including 5 statements for measuring populist discourse that are shown in the table 4. The first section of the questionnaire asks participants to say how frequently the candidates whom they voted in the last election use populist discourses. The second section of the questionnaire measure participants' satisfaction on political institutions and preferences for regime types. The items are listed in the table 4. After developing the initial draft of questionnaire, we conducted a pilot test to improve the validity and reliability of the questionnaire. Totally, 40 respondents participated in the pilot test. We assessed the reliability and validity of the initial set of questionnaire items by making analysis of internal consistency and factor analysis. After that pilot test, we improved the questionnaire. Finally, in our actual survey, totally 240 respondents completed the questionnaire.

2. Internal Consistency and Factor Analysis

As it is shown in the table 1, the internal consistency of 5 items for assessing the level of populism of political parties or candidates is very high with 0.942 score of Cronbach alpha. The table 1 shows that internal consistency is high among three items for measuring the level of voter's satisfaction on the performance of political institutions and government. Their Cronbach's alpha is 0.709.

<Table 1> Internal Consistency of Items for Measuring Populist Discourses Cronbach's Alpha

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
.942	.942	5

<Table 2> Internal Consistency of Items for Measuring Voters' Satisfaction with Performance of Political Institutions

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
.709	.709	3

After the internal consistency analysis, factor analysis was performed for examining the validity of questionnaire items. Based on the result of factor analysis, we assessed the validity of 5 items for measuring the level of populism and 3 items for measuring voter satisfaction on performances of political institutions. The result of the Table 3 indicates that there are two components with eigenvalues that are higher than 1. This output indicates that there are two latent factors or two groups of questions.

As it is shown in the Table 4, the first latent or component affects the

questions from 1 to 5 most. They have the highest factor loading to the component 1. Their loading ranges from 0.880 to 0.929. Therefore, the items from 1 to 5 should be clustered into the first latent factor. It is labeled as “populist discourses”. The items 6–8 are highly correlated to the second latent factor. Their loading to the second factor ranges from 0.731 to 0.840. Thus, they must be clustered into the second latent variable or second component. In this research, the second component is labeled as “voter’s satisfaction”. The outputs of factor analysis indicate that the validity of questionnaire items of this research is very high.

<Table 3> Factor Analysis Eigenvalue Results

Total Variance Explained									
Component	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings			Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
	4.073	50.907	50.907	4.073	50.907	50.907	4.069	50.860	50.860
	1.916	23.945	74.852	1.916	23.945	74.852	1.919	23.992	74.852
	.662	8.271	83.123						
	.460	5.753	88.876						
	.413	5.157	94.003						
	.217	2.712	96.745						
	.162	2.031	98.776						
	.098	1.224	100.000						

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

〈Table 4〉 Two Groups of Items: (1) Populist Discourses and (2) Voter Satisfaction

Component	1	2
The people suffer from economic inequality because of a few interest groups.	.929	
I and our party will fight roughly against the corrupt elites for the interest of the people	.912	
121The power of a few special families prevents our country from making progress	.900	
I and parliament members in the State Great Khural need to follow the will of the people	.883	
The people should win	.880	
Government		.840
Political Parties		.810
State Great Khural		.731

The findings of Cronbach's alpha and factor analysis show that the variables for measuring populist discourse have very high reliable internal consistency and have high accuracy, so that they are able to measure the frequency of populist discourses and voter satisfaction as a set of underlying variables. Due to this output, I managed to reduce individual items into a manageable and understandable single dimension or factor that can be called "populist communication". It allowed us to smoothly measure and identify whether a given politician or party is a populist or is not a populist.

3. Sampling

We selected the group that we actually collected data from for our research via the convenience sampling technique from a conveniently available pool of respondents. We collected the data online using a google form. We invited our survey respondents via emails and online platforms.

This study conducted a pilot test to improve or ensure that the sampling is truly representative. The pilot test included 77 participants. Based on the

information of the pilot test, we confirmed our study target populations, sampling size, and age groups that would help our research. The sampling size of this study is 240 participants including four age categories. Most importantly, this study made the following three important improvements to control uncertainty and bias using the result of pilot test:

- o Cross-validation: This study made cross-validation by comparing one half of the results to the other half to reduce the bias of the data analysis.
- o Multiple methods for recruiting participants: This study used different ways in engaging various age groups of voters including sending emails, distributing QR code, and hiring survey volunteer staff with tablets. We used emails and distributed QR codes to engage younger and middle age voters in the online survey. This study used QR code and hired volunteer staff with tablets to help older voters to complete the survey in the google form.
- o Diverse age groups: This study consists of four age groups. We attempted to recruit age groups in a way that would be more balanced in the term of balanced distribution of age groups. The share of voters who is under age 29 is 27.9%. Nearly quarter of voters (24.6%) are ages 30–39. The voters who are 40–49 are 24.2%. The voters who are 50 and older make up 22.9%.

V. Discussion: Relationship between Voters' Preference for Regime Type and Populist Attitude

1. Preference for Autocratic Leadership and Populist Attitude

What effect does the preference for a Strong Leader have on the populist attitude?

According to our research, we assumed that it is very feasible that voters who prefer a strong leader in the government are more susceptible to the populist discourses than voters who evaluate education background and support promises that are more realistic.


Hypothesis 1: Voters who prefer to vote a strong leader in the government are more likely to vote for a populist politician or party than voters who evaluate education background and campaign promise quality of candidates.

We conducted logistic regression to test the above-mentioned hypothesis. Before making the analysis of logistic regression, we examined the distribution of preference for a strong leader among Mongolian voters by using skewness analysis. According to that analysis that is shown in figure 1, the distribution of preference for a strong leader is higher and negatively skewed. Skewness scale is -0.4491464 (moderately skewed). This output tells that many Mongolian voters prefer a government with a strong leader. It matches the output of Sant Maral Foundation's survey.³⁶⁾ The data of

36) Maral, Sant, *Politobarometer*, Ulaanbaatar, 2022.

Sant Maral survey shows that “68.9% of respondents supports a strong leader who does not have to bother with the Parliament and elections”. Julian Dierkes made an interesting explanation about that high support for a strong leader by using an evidence from the IRI poll.³⁷⁾ According to his explanation, numerous Mongolians think that prosperity should come before individual rights and democracy that is nearly identical to Chinese government’s argument about prosperity and democracy.³⁸⁾ These facts suggest that many Mongolian voters support a strong autocratic leadership or a strong hand that exist in communist countries like Xi Jinping in China.

<Figure 1> Distribution of Preference for a Strong Leader



37) IRI, *Mongolian Public Opinion*, 2017.02.05., https://www.iri.org/wpcontent/uploads/legacy/iri.org/2017-3-22_iri_mongolia_poll_-_march_2017.pdf(Accessed: 2021.05.18.).

38) Dierkes, Julian, "What are Voters Looking For?" *Mongolia Focus*, 2017.05.17., <https://blogs.ubc.ca/mongolia/2017/election-electorate-mood/>(Accessed: 2021.05.15).

After completing the assessment on the distribution of preference for a strong leader among Mongolian voters, we performed the analysis of logistic regression by using R software. Our preliminary analysis of the logistic regression that is shown in the table 5 suggests that voters who have higher preference for a strong leader are more likely to vote for populist political parties or candidate than voters who do not support autocratic leadership that are observed in communist countries. The p-value of that analysis is 0.000115. It shows that there is statistically significant association between the preference for a strong leader and populist attitude at 0.01 confidence level.


<Table 5> Preference for a Strong Leader and Populist Attitude

Coefficients	Estimate Std	Error z	value	Pr(> z)
Intercept	-4.11535	1.27182	-3.236	0.001213 **
Strong leader	0.60876	0.15784	3.857	0.000115 ***

2. Preference for Direct Democracy and Populist Attitude

What effects does voters' preference for direct democracy have on the populist attitude? To answer this second research question, we assessed the distribution of preference for direct democracy. As it shown in the figure 2, most of respondents agree that having a direct democracy where the people, not politicians make the most important national decisions via referendum is good to the economic growth of Mongolia and promote justice.

〈Figure 2〉 Distribution of Support for Direct Democracy



The above-mentioned increasing support for direct democracy may be result of declining trust in the representative democracy among respondents. According to the Sant Maral Survey in 2022, 17.7% of respondents believe that “parliamentarian form of government is more suitable for Mongolia”. These facts show that there is negative correlation between support for direct democracy and parliamentary form of state.

Based on the above-mentioned second research question, we have made the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis 2: Voters who highly support practices of direct democracy are more likely to vote for populist political parties or candidate than voters who view direct democracy practices as an unreliable and wrong way in choosing the best policy alternatives.

We also conducted logistic regression analysis to test the second hypothesis. As it is shown in the table 6, voters who supports for direct democracy are more likely to vote for a populist political party or candidate. The p-value is 3.81e-09. It proves that there is statistically significant relationship between the preference between the preference for direct democracy and populist attitude.


<Table 6> Association between the Preference for Direct Democracy and Populist Attitude

Coefficients	Estimate Std	Error z	value	Pr(> z)
Intercept	-4.11535	1.27182	-3.236	0.001213 **
Strong leader	1.31803	0.22369	5.892	3.91e-09 ***

3. Trust in Liberal Democracy and Populist Attitude

Is there relationship between support for liberal democracy and populist attitude? To answer this third question, we also assessed the distribution of support for liberal democracy. We analyzed the distribution density of the support for liberal democracy among respondents. As it is shown below in the figure 3, most of respondents support liberal democracy.

<Figure 3> Support for the Liberal Democracy



After the assessment on the distribution for liberal democracy, we performed logistical regression analysis to examine the relationship between support for liberal democracy and populist attitude. As it is shown below in the table 7, null hypothesis is accepted. The p value is 0.714605. It is greater than 0.05. It proves that there is no significant association between the support for liberal democracy and populist attitude. These evidences suggest that voters who support for liberal democracy are more likely to abstain to vote for populist political parties and leaders.

<Table 7> Support for Liberal Democracy and Populist Attitude

Coefficients	Estimate Std	Error z	value	Pr(> z)
Intercept	-4.11535	1.27182	-3.236	0.001213 **
Strong leader	0.08277	0.22634	0.366	0.714605

VI. Conclusion

In the most recent decade, many studies have focused on measuring populist attitudes and degree of populism. However, more studies still need to be conducted on exploring differences between voters who vote for populist parties and who abstain from voting for them. In this study, we assessed what effects the preference for autocratic leadership, direct democracy, and liberal democracy in a post-communist country has on the populist attitude that highly supports populist parties and leaders. At the end of our research, we found two significant findings that can be observed in a post-communist country.

First, while testing the first hypothesis, we explored that numerous populist voters highly support strong autocratic leadership. This fact is raising several interesting questions. Do they like strong hands that can be observed in communist countries like China and North Korea? Is economic prosperity more important for them rather than democracy and human rights? The facts we observed during this study suggest that they support populist political parties or candidates, because they believe that strong autocratic leaders like leader Xi Jinping in China can create a sustained economic prosperity.

Second, interesting finding from this study is significant relationship between support for direct democracy and populist attitude. Such a relationship could be observed in both democracies and post-communist countries. However, the findings from our study prove that this relationship between support for direct democracy and populist attitude that can be observed in post-communist countries is unique. This unique

relationship has emerged in post-communist countries in association with negative effects of deviant democracies that have appeared during the democratization process and transition from command economy to free market economy. Voters in most of post-communist countries have experienced many wicked problems of failed representative democracy such as clientelism, political corruption, crony capitalism, and economic crisis. According to the Sant Maral survey in 2022, 51.4% of respondents claim that they are not satisfied or not rather satisfied by the Democracy and present political system, 47.6% of them are satisfied and rather satisfied by the Democracy and present political system.

In sum, during this study, we found that more studies are really needed to study populist attitudes in post-communist countries. We argue that they are unique, because the populist attitudes have been developed by completely different historical and experiential contexts in comparison with other countries that have no communist experience. In connection with time and financial constraints, we made our observations only on the democratization case of Mongolia. We invite other scholars to conduct cross-country and comparative studies on the populist attitudes in post-countries that include numerous post-communist country cases.

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논문요약

포퓰리즘 후보에게 투표하는 유권자와 그렇지 않은 유권자가 발생하는 것에 영향을 미치는 요인은 무엇인가? 몽골의 투표행위가 포퓰리즘 커뮤니케이션의 부상에 미치는 영향에 관한 연구

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포퓰리즘 후보에게 투표하는 유권자와 그렇지 않은 유권자가 발생하는 것에 영향을 미치는 요인은 무엇인가? 몽골의 투표행위가 포퓰리즘 커뮤니케이션의 부상에 미치는 영향에 관한 연구이다. 포퓰리즘의 수요와 공급 측면을 가늠하려는 다양한 경쟁 이론과 접근법이 등장했다. 그러나 구 공산국가들의 경우, 기존과는 다른 정치적, 경제적 맥락에서 등장했기 때문에 이들의 포퓰리즘 경향을 설명하고 평가하기 위해서는 더 많은 연구가 필요함에 따라 아직까지 많이 다뤄지지 않았던 이 주제에 대한 연구를 진행했다. 이 연구의 목적은 강력한 독재 리더십 및 직접민주주의 혹은 자유민주주의가 구 공산국가인 몽골의 포퓰리즘에 대한 유권자들의 태도에 미치는 영향을 조사하는 것으로, 연구를 수행하기 위해 포퓰리즘 태도를 조사하기 위한 질문지 조사를 설계했으며, 수집된 데이터를 분석하기 위해 로지스틱 회귀분석법을 사용하였다. 이 연구를 통해 두 가지 주요 결론에 도달했다. 조사 결과에 따르면 중국의 시진핑(習近平)과 같은 공산주의 국가의 강력한 지도자를 선호하는 유권자 포퓰리즘 정당과 포퓰리즘 지도자를 선택할 가능성이 더 높으며, 대의민주주의 실패로 인해 직접민주주의를 지지하게 된 사람들은 포퓰리즘 후보를 지지하고 투표할 가능성이 더 높은 것으로 나타났다.

주제어: 포퓰리즘, 구 공산국가, 강력한 지도자, 직접민주주의, 포퓰리즘의 수요와 공급

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