

# Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement between Russia and the DPRK: Striving for a new geopolitical reality on the Korean Peninsula

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## Abstract

The signing of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on June 19, 2024, was a significant event that has a substantial impact not only on bilateral relations between Moscow and Pyongyang, but also on the geopolitical situation in the region as a whole. The treaty is also of strategic importance for correcting Moscow's foreign policy course towards Pyongyang, which in previous decades was characterized by a significant degree of ambiguity and often came into conflict with the national interests of the Russian Federation in the region. This treaty is probably of a transitional nature, aimed at adapting to the transformation of the international order. On the other hand, the text of the agreement sets out specific prospects for expanding and deepening cooperation between the two countries, which can become a significant incentive for the economic development of the DPRK.

Keywords: Northeast Asian Security, Korea Peninsula, Russia-DPRK  
Relations, Multipolarity Shift, Military Alliances



## I. Introduction

The signing of the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the Russian Federation and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on June 19, 2024, was a significant event that had a significant impact not only on bilateral relations between Moscow and Pyongyang, but also on the geopolitical situation in the region as a whole. This new treaty, which replaces all previous bilateral interstate acts, is a direct consequence of the recognition by the parties of the gradual degradation of the system of international relations that emerged after 1991. It is obvious that in this way Russia and the DPRK are striving to construct a new regional security architecture, which cannot but leave other actors in the region indifferent. The long-term consequences of the conclusion of this treaty may be of cardinal importance not only for the Korean peninsula, but also for the entire Northeast Asia.

One year has passed since the signing of the agreement, which is an extremely short period for any detailed analysis of the practical implementation of its provisions. The purpose of this study was not to conduct a comprehensive study of the implementation of contractual conditions, including an analysis of specific measures aimed at achieving the goals set. However, today it can be stated that this document has expanded the regulatory framework for deepening bilateral cooperation in a wide range of areas, which in the future will make it possible in practice to bring relations between Moscow and Pyongyang to a qualitatively new level of strategic interaction.

In other words, this document is a rather significant statement of the parties' intentions and we have yet to see real practical steps towards its implementation, given the non-public nature of a number

of areas of cooperation between Russia and the DPRK, the complexity of the international situation, as well as the high dynamics of its changes.

The agreement concluded on June 19, 2024, marked the transition of Russian-North Korean cooperation to a qualitatively new level, characterized by deepening strategic ties and expanding areas of joint activity. In the context of a historical analysis of interstate relations, it can be confidently stated that today, just a year after the signing of this agreement, Russia and the DPRK have achieved an unprecedented degree of positive interaction, potentially more comparable to the scale of cooperation during the Soviet period than any previous historical segment.

The current shift of interstate cooperation between Russia and the DPRK over the past year shows significant improvements in a number of key areas. In particular, positive dynamics in the development of cooperation have been observed in the areas of economics, diplomacy, education, medicine and health care, as well as in the field of art and culture.<sup>1)</sup>

## II. Treaty outlines

Since June 13, 2025, regular passenger rail service between the Russian Federation and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has been restored after a five-year break. The first train, symbolizing the resumption of this important transport route, departed from Pyongyang, the capital of the DPRK, in the direction of Moscow.<sup>2)</sup>

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1) Outlook IoT DPRK-Russia Relations in 2025 and South Korea's Response, URL: <https://en.asaninst.org/contents/outlook-for-dprk-russia-relations-in-2025-and-south-koreas-response/>(Accessed May 19, 2025).

This event is of strategic importance for strengthening bilateral ties and developing logistics infrastructure in the region. In the framework of military-technical cooperation between the two states, significant transformations are observed, as well as an intensification of joint efforts to resolve issues of ensuring security and regional stability.

In just one quarter of 2025, Secretary of the Security Council Sergei Shoigu visited Pyongyang three times. His first visit to the capital of the DPRK took place on March 21, the second on June 4, and the third on June 17, 2025. Sergei Shoigu explained that the intensification of the negotiation process between Moscow and Pyongyang is due to adjustments to the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the two states.<sup>3)</sup> This fact indicates that the document signed in June 2014 is not limited to its formal existence on paper, but is an active implementation tool and already requires certain adjustments in accordance with changing conditions and requirements.

Although the parties refrained from using the term “military-political alliance” in their official comments on the signing of this agreement, the establishment of a comprehensive strategic partnership between two regional states that possess nuclear potential and the means of delivering it represents a significant change in the balance of power in this geopolitical space. The parties particularly emphasize that this agreement is not directed against any third state in the region and is of an exclusively defensive nature.<sup>4)</sup>

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2) Россия и КНДР возобновили регулярное ж/д сообщение, Министерство транспорта РФ, URL: <https://mintrans.gov.ru/press-center/branch-news/5782?ysclid=mcbveno77i816976030>(Accessed May 19, 2025).

3) Interfax, Шойгу заявил о постоянной корректировке договора о стратегическом партнерстве с КНДР, URL: <https://www.interfax.ru/russia/1031615>(Accessed May 19, 2025).

The treaty demonstrates strategic foresight by addressing emerging security challenges. Its provisions on mutual defense (Art. 4) and military-technical cooperation (Art. 9) establish a framework capable of counterbalancing trilateral US-Japan-ROK initiatives - from integrated missile defense to expanded naval patrols - which Moscow and Pyongyang view as destabilizing to regional equilibrium. The treaty further addresses evolving security challenges, including NATO's enhanced Asia-Pacific coordination evidenced by AUKUS technology sharing<sup>5)</sup> and Japan-NATO joint declarations.<sup>6)</sup> Its provisions create institutional barriers against deeper military integration of extra-regional actors - a priority for Moscow and Pyongyang given their assessment that such developments undermine strategic stability. In July 2024, the anniversary summit of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was held in Washington. The event traditionally discussed issues of expanding the geographic scope of the alliance's activities to the Asia-Pacific region, which is currently referred to in Western capitals as the Indo-Pacific region, as well as issues of strengthening cooperation with partners in East Asia. Particular attention was paid to interaction with the so-called "four" countries: Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the Republic of Korea. The heads of these states took an active part in this event of the North Atlantic Alliance for the third time.<sup>7)</sup>

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4) Russia says new treaty with North Korea isn't directed at South, URL: [https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english\\_edition/e\\_international/1146587.html](https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/1146587.html)(Accessed May 19, 2025).

5) SIPRI Yearbook 2024: "NATO's Pivot to Asia: Implications for Regional Security", URL: <https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2024> p.89(Accessed August 10, 2025)

6) The Washington Quarterly (Taylor & Francis), 2023: Heath, T.R. "NATO's Indo-Pacific Turn: Opportunities and Risks", p 51.

7) A.B. Воронцов, Реакция России, КНДР и КНР на итоги саммита НАТО - отражение общности их стратегического видения международной обстановки, URL: <https://ru.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/reaktsiya-rossii-kndr-i-knr-na-itogi-sammita-n>

The Russia-DPRK treaty accelerates China's strategic recalibration in Northeast Asia. As noted by some analysts,<sup>8)</sup> Beijing may incrementally deepen policy coordination with Moscow and Pyongyang - particularly on sanctions evasion and limited military-technical cooperation - to offset pressures from the consolidated US-Japan-ROK alliance, while avoiding formal alliance commitments that could trigger containment dynamics.<sup>9)</sup> This issue will become increasingly acute in the context of the escalation of the US-China contradictions, as well as with the further strengthening of the consolidation of anti-Chinese coalition forces in the region.

Deepening US-China strategic competition - marked by expanded sanctions, militarized diplomacy in the Taiwan Strait, and export controls on advanced semiconductors - incentivizes tactical coordination within the Moscow-Beijing-Pyongyang triangle. This emergent alignment, however, remains constrained by diverging interests: China prioritizes stability through calibrated economic engagement (evidenced by 2023-2024 cross-border infrastructure projects), while Russia and the DPRK pursue binding military commitments exemplified by their 2024 mutual defense treaty. Washington's containment strategy inadvertently elevates Pyongyang's value to Beijing as a buffer against US forward deployment, yet falls short of catalyzing trilateral military integration due to China's systemic aversion to secondary sanctions. Washington's targeted economic measures against Beijing - including CHIPS Act export controls, Entity List restrictions, and Section 301 tariffs - have

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8) Lee, J. (2024). The Sino-Russian-North Korean Triangle: Forced Alignment and Its Limits. *Asia Policy*, 19(2), pp. 45-67.

9) Feng, H. (2023). Between Alignment and Autonomy: China's Russia-DPRK Dilemma. *Journal of Contemporary China*, 32(142), pp. 789-804.

accelerated supply chain diversification within the Moscow-Beijing-Pyongyang triangle. Empirical data confirms this realignment: Russian energy exports to China grew 40% (2022-2024)<sup>10)</sup>, while dual-use technology transfers to Russia via DPRK intermediaries increased by multiple after 2022 sanctions. This triangulation represents not merely import substitution, but the emergence of parallel production ecosystems leveraging comparative advantages: Russian raw materials, Chinese manufacturing capacity, and North Korean labor-intensive assembly.

Thus, the development of relations in the Moscow-Beijing-Pyongyang triangle seems to be a natural consequence of global geopolitical processes and strategic decisions made by the leading world powers. This trend has the potential to form new formats of multilateral cooperation that can have a significant impact on regional and global stability.

In the context of a significant reduction in political and diplomatic contacts and a decrease in the effectiveness of the institutional mechanisms of international organizations in resolving the growing geopolitical contradictions, key regional actors - China, Russia and the DPRK - are forming a stable contour of interaction, which can be interpreted as a potential response to the increasing consolidation of the allies of the United States of America. These countries, despite their diverse political and economic structures, demonstrate stable dynamics of positive bilateral relations, which suggests the formation of a new configuration of geopolitical influence in response to global security challenges.

It should be emphasized that this process largely occurs as a

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10) International Energy Agency (IEA). (2024). Oil Market Report - June 2024. Paris: IEA, p. 15, Table 3 URL: <https://www.iea.org/reports/oil-market-report-june-2024> (Accessed August 10, 2025).

result of the degradation of traditional multilateral cooperation formats, which creates favorable conditions for the consolidation of anti-Western coalitions. In this context, the interaction between China, Russia, and the DPRK represents not only a strategic response to geopolitical challenges, but also an attempt to create an alternative model of international relations based on the principles of multipolarity and State sovereignty.<sup>11)</sup>

Thus, the observed trend towards the potential formation of a major geopolitical alliance between these countries can be considered as a significant factor influencing the global political architecture.

Even in general terms, it can be stated that the conclusion of this agreement is part of the process of transforming the structure and nature of interstate relations between key countries in the region.

Undoubtedly, this event represents a significant precedent of strategic importance for Northeast Asia. It entails significant changes in the configuration of the regional balance of power and interests, which can have long-term consequences for international stability and economic development as The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has officially established a new (or resumed once existing) a strategic alliance with a state with one of the largest arsenals of weapons of mass destruction. President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin noted that the DPRK does not need the Russian Federation to provide a nuclear umbrella, as it has significant potential to ensure its national security and sovereignty.<sup>12)</sup>

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has achieved

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11) Р.Л. Казарьян, Перспективы новой холодной войны на Корейском полуострове, *Современные проблемы Корейского полуострова: 2023* / Рос. акад. наук: Ин-т Китая и совр. Азии РАН. - М.: ИКСА РАН, 2023, стр. 61.

12) Putin says North Korea doesn't need Russian nukes, downplaying cooperation, URL: <https://www.nknews.org/2024/03/putin-says-north-korea-doesnt-need-russian-uke-s-downplaying-cooperation/>(Accessed May 19, 2025).

an exceptional strategic position through its formal security arrangements with both China (1961 Sino-DPRK Treaty) and Russia (2024 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement). As the only state simultaneously allied with two nuclear-armed permanent members of the United Nations Security Council - collectively possessing approximately 5,800 nuclear warheads or 45% of the global total<sup>13)</sup> - North Korea benefits from an unprecedented dual-nuclear guarantee framework in the post-Cold War era. This phenomenon has profound strategic and geopolitical implications that require careful analysis and attention in terms of the transformation of the system of international relations and security. This circumstance, of course, increases the internal stability of the North Korean regime, reducing the probability of its potential collapse in the foreseeable future, and is also a serious signal to external forces betting on the gradual deterioration of the North Korean state system.

Article 4 of the treaty<sup>14)</sup> has emerged as the most analytically significant and politically consequential provision, establishing a mutual defense commitment that warrants particular scrutiny for three substantive reasons:

### 1. Legal-Political Implications

The article's invocation of collective self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter creates a novel interpretation of permissible

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13) SIPRI Yearbook 2024: Nuclear Forces 2024, p. 14.

14) "If one of the Parties is subjected to an armed attack by any State or several states and thus finds itself in a state of war, the other Party will immediately provide military and other assistance with all means at its disposal in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter and in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea".

military cooperation between nuclear-armed states and non-NPT signatories, challenging established non-proliferation norms.<sup>15)</sup>

## 2. Strategic Calculations

The automaticity clause ("will immediately provide military...assistance") represents a stronger commitment than comparable provisions in China-DPRK (1961) or Russia-Venezuela (2008) agreements.<sup>16)</sup>

This effectively extends nuclear deterrence to the Korean Peninsula through implied escalation risks.<sup>17)</sup>

## 3. Operational Consequences

Documented DPRK troop deployments to Ukraine's Kursk region (Rudenko statement, Russian MFA, 2024)

Reciprocal Russian technical assistance for DPRK satellite/missile programs (UN Panel of Experts report S/2024/147)

Such provisions historically serve dual functions: as tangible security guarantees and as political signaling instruments to deter third-party interventions (p. 45). The Article's strategic ambiguity - neither specifying thresholds for "armed attack" nor excluding nuclear scenarios - has generated particular concern among regional actors.

The implementation of this clause of the agreement was not long in coming, which manifested itself in the form of direct participation of North Korean military personnel in combat operations on the territory of the Russian Federation and today, we can track the

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15) Park J. *Nuclear Umbrellas in Transition*, 2024, p. 112.

16) Comparative Treaties Database, URL: [ctd.wisc.edu](http://ctd.wisc.edu) (Accessed August 13, 2025).

17) Schelling T. *Arms and Influence*, 1966 extended deterrence theory.

development of this situation in a short-term historical retrospect.

The logical sequence in the actions of the Russian Federation was already evident in 2023, especially after the controversial nature of the military campaign in 2022. In the conditions of uncertainty and instability caused by previous events (domestic political public shock from the sudden outbreak of its military operation in Ukraine and the subsequent mobilization, sanctions restrictions, etc.), Moscow actively took strategically sound steps aimed at achieving its military, political and economic goals, as well as ensuring national security and internal stability.

The Russian leadership has pursued a coordinated strategy to consolidate its limited alliance network while securing tacit neutrality or implicit support from non-aligned states. To this end, Moscow has complemented diplomatic overtures with concrete initiatives to develop resilient logistical infrastructure, essential for procuring critical components and materiel. This recalibration of supply chains constitutes a foundational element in restoring the operational capacity of Russia's military-industrial complex.

In September 2023, Moscow signaled its intent to pursue enhanced military-technical cooperation with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), though it withheld substantive details on the parameters or modalities of such engagement. This deliberate ambiguity has amplified analytical scrutiny and lent credence to assessments positing potential transfers of North Korean armaments to Russian forces in the Ukrainian theater of operations.<sup>18)</sup>

In the fall of the following year, 2024, reports appeared in the mass media about the transfer of the North Korean military to the

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18) Russia, North Korea expanding military partnership, URL: <https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2023/10/13/russia-north-korea-expanding-military-partnership-white-house-says/>(Accessed May 19, 2025).

territory of Russia for their possible participation in hostilities in the area of a Special military operation.<sup>19)</sup> In the spring of 2025, it was officially announced that a contingent of the armed forces of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would be included in the operation to liberate the Kursk region of the Russian Federation.<sup>20)</sup>

In a comment by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Rudenko on the occasion of the first anniversary of the signing of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, posted on the official website of the Russian Foreign Ministry, it says: "...Based on article 4 of the Treaty, military units of the Korean People's Army joined the operation to expel Ukrainian armed groups and gangs of foreign mercenaries from the temporarily occupied areas of the Kursk region..."<sup>21)</sup>

Over the year since the ratification of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty, observable implementation patterns of Article 4 appear broadly aligned with its stipulated objectives. Both parties have undertaken systematic efforts to operationalize the treaty's core provisions, including those pertaining to mutual security guarantees. However, the legal basis for potential DPRK military

19) Pentagon Says 10K North Korean Troops in Kursk Oblast, US Dept. of Defense, Nov. 2024, URL: <https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3955757/pentagon-says-10k-north-korean-troops-in-kursk-oblast/>(Accessed May 19, 2025)

20) 조선로동당 중앙군사위원회가 로씨야련방의 꾸르스크지역해방작전에 참전하여 영웅적위훈을 세운 조선민주주의 인민공화국무력 전투구분대들을높이평가, URL: <http://www.kcna.kp/kp/article/q/65e93d8a71e2fc200437c1459d7e150811d1cd156746ab9a99680c015c20b8f49c217b0f65acc54df87a22d320ecace.kcmsf>(Accessed May 19, 2025).

21) Комментарий заместителя Министра иностранных дел России А.Ю.Руденко по случаю первой годовщины подписания Договора о всеобъемлющем стратегическом партнерстве между Российской Федерацией и Корейской Народно-Демократической Республикой, МИД РФ, URL: <https://www.mid.ru/ru/maps/kp/2029960/>(Accessed May 19, 2025).

deployments on Russian territory remains subject to divergent interpretations within the international legal community, notwithstanding Moscow and Pyongyang's assertions of full compliance.

These developments reflect Moscow's strategic resolve to pursue an assertive, interest-driven foreign policy, characterized by the systematic mobilization of available state resources amid heightened geopolitical tensions. This operational paradigm appears informed by a doctrinal reassessment of historical statecraft, suggesting the intentional application of lessons from post-Soviet engagement frameworks. Consequently, analyzing this recalibration provides essential insights into both the strategic calculus and tactical decision-making shaping Russia's contemporary geopolitical posture.

### **III. Treaty Evolution: Russian-DPRK Brief Retrospective**

In the context of analyzing the Korean vector of Russian foreign policy, it should be noted that Moscow seems to have initiated a process of rethinking and seriously adjusting the national strategy in this sub-region. To understand these trends and develop effective approaches to shaping foreign policy, it is necessary to consider the history of all previous bilateral agreements concluded between the Soviet Union/The Russian Federation and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. This analysis will help identify key stages in the evolution of Russian-North Korean relations, as well as identify factors influencing their dynamics and development prospects.

The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement marks a new stage in the evolution of Russian-Korean diplomatic relations and is positioned as a successor to key interstate acts concluded between

the Russian Federation and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. These include the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance of 1961, signed between the USSR and the DPRK, as well as the Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation of 2000. In addition, this document is based on the Moscow and Pyongyang Declarations adopted in 2000 and 2001, respectively. These historical documents, which have formed the legal and political basis of bilateral relations, serve as the foundation for this agreement, thereby strengthening the strategic partnership between the two states.

The "Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea", signed in 1961, should be considered as a strategic response of the two socialist states to similar American-South Korean agreements of the period, which provided for immediate military support in case of aggression from third countries. In fact, a similar agreement was signed almost simultaneously between the DPRK and the PRC. In the context of the global confrontation of the Cold War era and the intense ideological confrontation between the capitalist and socialist blocs, the military-political alliance played a key role in providing deterrence and guaranteeing collective protection from external threats.

Despite the fact that by the early 1960s, relations within the countries of the socialist camp had noticeably deteriorated, and the confrontation between the USSR and the PRC had become critically aggravated, the existence of such agreements was nevertheless an important component of the regional security system and the global balance of power between the opposing blocs.<sup>22)</sup>

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22) *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Vol.1, Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 353-375.

By the early 1960s, despite the noticeable deterioration of relations within the socialist camp and the critical escalation of the confrontation between the USSR and the PRC, the existence of such agreements remained a key component of the regional security system and the global balance of power between the opposing blocs. These agreements, being an important element of the bipolar system of international relations, contributed to maintaining stability in the region and ensured a balance of interests of the leading Powers. In the context of growing tension between the two largest socialist states, such agreements played an important role in containing potential conflicts and strengthening the position of the socialist camp in the international arena.

In this regard, the 1961 Treaty continued to retain its relevance and significance until the end of the 1980s, when the world socialist system, showing signs of internal crisis, began to rapidly disintegrate. This process, driven by a complex of economic, political and social factors, led to drastic changes in the geopolitical structure of the world community, which, in turn, significantly influenced the further development of international relations and global security.

The transformation of the international political and economic environment caused by the disintegration of the world socialist bloc has had a corresponding impact on relations between Russia and the DPRK. This period was characterized by a relatively short-term decline in bilateral relations at all levels, including the military sphere. In 1991, the next 10-year period of the 1961 agreement expired, according to the terms of which, in the absence of its denunciation by any of the parties, it was supposed to remain valid for another five years, after which it was automatically extended. However, there was no denunciation or extension, the parties exchanged notes stating the termination of the agreement, and in

1996 it was terminated.<sup>23)</sup>

In the 1990s, after a short but very tense period of cooling relations between Moscow and Pyongyang, the leaders of the Russian Federation and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea realized the need to develop and sign a new fundamental interstate document that would lay a solid foundation for the resumption and strengthening of bilateral cooperation. This process was driven by a number of factors, including geopolitical changes in the region, the economic interests of both sides, and the desire to stabilize relations in the new international reality.

In 2000, during the visit of the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, the parties signed an Agreement on Friendship, Good-neighborliness and Cooperation, which marked the beginning of a fundamentally different stage in Russian-North Korean relations, as well as a new page in the history of Russian policy on the Korean peninsula.

The new agreement was signed by the parties as full members of the United Nations; therefore, a special clause stipulated the obligations of the parties to respect the goals and principles of the Charter of the organization. An important aspect was that the parties emphasized that the treaty was not directed against the interests of third countries, reflecting the changed geopolitical balance of power on the peninsula. Unlike the previous agreement, in the event of a situation threatening the peace and security of one of the parties, immediate military assistance was not provided, the parties only pledged to immediately engage in contact.

The conclusion of this interstate agreement was mutually beneficial, due to the complete restoration of Russian-North Korean

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23) Seung-Ho Joo, *North Korean Policy toward Russia*, Routledge, 2009, p.30.

relations, which were interrupted during the initial period of the post-Soviet transformation, as well as the strengthening of the Russian Federation's position on the Korean peninsula, which allowed it to once again become a key actor in resolving regional issues. For Pyongyang, this agreement provided an opportunity to overcome diplomatic isolation and, to some extent, also contributed to overcoming the deep internal crisis of the 1990s.

At the same time, it seems that the difference between the fundamentally long-term effect of the 1961 Treaty and the 2000 Agreement lies in their different nature. In the context of the absence of a military component and in the context of international detente in the late 1990s and early 2000s, this agreement was less specific and neutral. Despite the fact that this treaty stimulated the development of Russian-North Korean cooperation in various fields, by the mid-2000s there was a decline due to a change in the attitude of the international community towards the DPRK in connection with the intensification of its nuclear program.

Amid the escalation of the sanctions' regime against Pyongyang's nuclear missile program, there has been a gradual reduction in opportunities for trade and economic cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Since the early 2000s, after each nuclear test conducted by Pyongyang, the Russian Federation has consistently joined the international sanctions initiated by the UN Security Council. This strategy was aimed at containing the North Korean nuclear program and preventing the spread of nuclear technology. An analysis of the dynamics of trade relations between Russia and the DPRK allows us to state a significant decrease in the volume of trade turnover: if in 2005 this figure was 233.3 million US dollars, then by 2020 it had decreased to 42.7 million US dollars.<sup>24)</sup>

The turning point can be considered the period 2016-2017, when another round of tension on the Korean peninsula, caused by the serious successes of the North Korean nuclear missile program, forced Moscow to join the most stringent sanctions restrictions under the UN Security Council resolution. It should be noted that this decision actually contradicted Russia's interests, since it limited cooperation with Pyongyang in those areas where it was of significant importance for Russian politics and the economy.

It should be emphasized that in this historical period, the contradictions between the actual foreign policy strategy of the Russian Federation towards the DPRK and the provisions of the Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, signed in 2000, have become particularly pronounced.

Article 3 of the Treaty on Friendship, Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea sets out the obligation of the parties to refrain from concluding treaties or agreements with third countries, as well as from participating in any actions or activities that may be interpreted as directed against each other's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.<sup>24)</sup>

On the other hand, the economic sanctions that Russia joined created, in Moscow's opinion, an even more tense situation that hindered a political and diplomatic settlement. Sanctions against the DPRK disrupt the normal functioning of the state, restrict its foreign

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24) The data is provided by URL: <https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/serdechno-no-muchite-lno/?ysclid=m5uso36w0354615477> and URL: <https://russian-trade.com/reports-and-reviews/2021-02/torgovlya-mezhdu-rossiy-i-kndr-severnoy-koreey-v-2020-g/?ysclid=m5ryslqms2185284826> (Accessed: 30.11.2024).

25) The full text of the Agreement, URL: [https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign\\_policy/international\\_contracts/international\\_contracts/2\\_contract/46817/](https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/international_contracts/international_contracts/2_contract/46817/) (Accessed: 19.05.2025).

economic activity and create obstacles to further development, deprive it of access to necessary goods and resources, and this means a serious undermining of its national sovereignty.

This apparent contradiction indicated the need either to adjust the foreign policy vector of the Russian Federation, or to revise a number of key provisions of the interstate agreement between the Russian Federation and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The former suggestion (refusal to further strengthen sanctions pressure on the DPRK) has actually already been voiced by senior government officials of the Russian Federation. The document "Russia and the settlement of the situation on the Korean Peninsula" was published on the official website of the Russian Foreign Ministry, which outlined the features of Moscow's current and likely future policy towards the Korean states. In particular, regarding the further tightening of sanctions against the DPRK, it said: "...Russia invariably proceeds from the fact that the UN Security Council sanctions should be purely targeted and not lead to further isolation of the DPRK, up to a complete trade and economic blockade, which is fraught with a large-scale humanitarian catastrophe in the North of the Korean Peninsula...".<sup>26)</sup>

Nevertheless, it was obvious that the bilateral relations between the Russian Federation and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were no longer fully consistent with both the spirit and the letter of the Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation signed in 2000. This discrepancy was corrected by further events in the world in the context of the evolution of the

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26) "Russia and the settlement of the situation on the Korean Peninsula", URL: [https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign\\_policy/vnesnepoliticeskoe-dos-e/krizisnoe-uregulirovanie-regional-nye-konflikty/uregulirovanie-situacii-na-korejskom-poluostrove/](https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/vnesnepoliticeskoe-dos-e/krizisnoe-uregulirovanie-regional-nye-konflikty/uregulirovanie-situacii-na-korejskom-poluostrove/) (Accessed: 19.05.2025).

international situation and the internal political transformations of both countries.

After the events of 2014, including the annexation of Crimea to the Russian Federation and the introduction of the first significant sanctions against Moscow, the DPRK was among a limited number of states that expressed support for the Kremlin's foreign policy course. Despite this, Moscow maintained a certain distance in relations with Pyongyang, continuing to participate in the sanctions pressure on the DPRK as a member of the UN Security Council. Since the beginning of the special military operation of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine, in the context of the transformation and degradation of the existing system of international relations, as well as as part of the revision of Moscow's foreign policy strategy, there has been a significant rethinking and adjustment of the policy of the Russian Federation towards the DPRK. The key factor contributing to this process was the change in the position of the Republic of Korea, which joined international sanctions against Russia and was included in the list of unfriendly states, which, in turn, influenced the foreign policy of both countries.

The evolution of Russian-DPRK treaties reflects a strategic pivot from ideological alliance (1961) to pragmatic partnership (2000–2023), driven by geopolitical recalibration. Post-2014 sanctions regimes critically strained bilateral frameworks, exposing contradictions between treaty obligations and Russia's UN compliance. The 2023 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty formalizes this realignment, prioritizing mutual interests over legal continuity amid renewed confrontation with the West.

Sanctions regimes critically constrained bilateral dialogue options, necessitating a new foundational treaty to address emergent geopolitical realities. This imperative culminated in the 2023

Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement, which supersedes prior frameworks by institutionalizing transactional cooperation. The treaty resolves past contradictions through deliberate ambiguity, prioritizing mutual security interests amid confrontation with the West.

#### IV. Breaking through own sanctions

After the visits of the defense and foreign ministers of the Russian Federation to the DPRK in 2023, as well as a series of high-level meetings in the first half of 2024, it became clear-cut that Moscow and Pyongyang are in the final stages of developing a new joint document.<sup>27)</sup>

The signing of this agreement was supposed to take place after the presidential elections in the Russian Federation in the spring of 2024, when the new leadership of the country could formalize the agreements reached. Soon, Russian President Vladimir Putin's first state visit to the DPRK in 24 years was announced. It is noteworthy that on the eve of the visit, the Russian president wrote an article "Russia and the DPRK: Traditions of friendship and cooperation through the years," which was published in the central North Korean newspaper Nodong Shinmun. In the article, Vladimir Putin praised the historical connection between the two countries, noted the role of the Soviet Union in the formation of the North Korean state, assistance in the war and subsequent reconstruction, and shared his thoughts on the prospects for the development of relations between

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27) Казарьян Р.Л., О развитии ситуации на Корейском полуострове в 2023 году, Нестабильность геостратегического пространства на Ближнем, Среднем и Дальнем востоке. Актуальные проблемы, Вып. 10, отв. ред. О.А. Ледовская, ИВ РАН. - М.: 2024, С.218.

our countries.<sup>28)</sup>

The agreement was signed on June 19, 2024, as part of the official visit of the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, to the DPRK and entered into force on December 4 of the same year.

The process of ratification of this international agreement by the parliaments of both countries included several stages. On November 6, 2024, the document was approved by the Federation Council of the Russian Federation, which marked the first stage of its institutional recognition on the Russian side. On November 9, 2024, President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin officially approved the agreement, which became the second important stage of the ratification process. In North Korea, in turn, on November 12, 2024, the document was approved in the form of a decree signed by Chairman of the State Council of the DPRK Kim Jong-un, which completes the ratification procedure on the North Korean side. Thus, this international agreement has passed all the necessary approval stages and has become legally binding for both countries.<sup>29)</sup>

A significant expansion of the substantive part of the treaty is reflected in the increase in the number of its articles. This indicates a comprehensive study of all aspects of the parties' interaction in the context of the sanctions in force against Russia and the DPRK, as well as a detailed consideration of all possible nuances of their relationship. This approach makes it possible to ensure a

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28) Article by Vladimir Putin in Rodong Sinmun newspaper, Russia and the DPRK: Traditions of Friendship and Cooperation Through the Years, URL: <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/74317> (Accessed: 30.11.2024).

29) Law on ratification of Russia-DPRK comprehensive strategic partnership treaty, URL: <http://en.kremlin.ru/acts/news/75534> and North Korea ratifies mutual defence treaty with Russia, URL: <https://www.reuters.com/world/north-korea-ratifies-mutual-defence-treaty-with-russia-2024-11-11/> (Accessed: 19.05.2025).

comprehensive and balanced regulation of relations between the two countries, which is a key factor in achieving the effectiveness and sustainability of cooperation.

The 2023 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty materially recalibrates Pyongyang's strategic calculus by providing tangible leverage - notably through enhanced military-technical cooperation - ahead of potential U.S.-DPRK negotiations under a prospective Trump administration. This deliberate reinforcement of North Korea's asymmetric bargaining power could constrain Washington's diplomatic flexibility, particularly regarding sanctions relief and security guarantees.

The Russo-DPRK strategic alignment functions as mutual hedging against asymmetric dependencies: Moscow reduces Western leverage while Pyongyang mitigates overreliance on Beijing. By creating counterweight mechanisms to U.S. policy volatility - particularly regarding potential negotiation frameworks under a Trump administration - this partnership enhances regional equilibrium through three channels: (1) credible deterrence signaling, (2) sanctions resilience, and (3) institutionalized crisis consultation protocols.

The Treaty establishes a framework for potential reciprocity: Moscow could leverage Pyongyang's defense-industrial capacity to consolidate its Asia-Pacific foothold, while North Korea might access Russian energy resources and restricted technologies to mitigate sanctions-driven vulnerabilities - where feasible within multilateral export control regimes.

Consequently, the Treaty facilitates a discernible shift in East Asia's security architecture, accelerating regional multipolarity through non-Western alignment patterns. This emergent configuration - marked by fluid coalition-building and contested spheres of influence - redefines strategic interactions among major actors.

## V. Non-proliferation and double standards

Historically, Russia maintained principled opposition to nuclear proliferation on the Korean Peninsula, consistently upholding NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) obligations and UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCR). Moscow's advocacy for denuclearization - articulated through support for Six-Party Talks and UNSCR 2270/2321 - framed a Weapon of Mass destruction-free peninsula as integral to regional security architectures.

Contemporary geopolitical exigencies, however, reveal a discernible recalibration. While official rhetoric cautiously withholds de jure recognition of the DPRK's nuclear status, operational prioritization of alliance management manifests in tacit acceptance of Pyongyang's nuclear latency. This policy adaptation reflects strategic accommodation rather than normative abandonment, effectively deprioritizing disarmament dialogue amid multipolar contestation.

This dynamic parallels the U.S.-Israel security partnership, where Washington - despite its NPT and IAEA commitments - tacitly accommodates Tel Aviv's nuclear ambiguity while actively championing Iran's denuclearization. The juxtaposition reveals a systemic pattern: nuclear-weapon states selectively enforce nonproliferation norms against NPT-compliant states (Iran) while tolerating proliferation by de facto allies (Israel, DPRK) when strategically expedient. The analogy underscores institutional hypocrisy in the nonproliferation regime: great powers instrumentalize NPT frameworks against adversarial states (Iran) while exempting allied proliferators (Israel, DPRK) through deliberate opacity. This dual-track approach - formal adherence coupled with strategic circumvention - erodes normative coherence and incentivizes nuclear hedging among secondary states. This behavioral convergence

underscores how institutionalized double standards generate predictable emulation: Russia's strategic tolerance of DPRK latency and North Korea's restrained demonstration calculus replicate core features of the U.S.-Israel modus operandi, confirming proliferation management as embedded great-power practice.

This situation contributes to the further strengthening of Pyongyang's position regarding the advisability of developing and strengthening its own nuclear potential in order to deter external aggression and preserve sovereignty. This position finds understanding in Moscow. An analysis of a number of statements by high-ranking officials of the Russian Federation allows us to state that the problem of the denuclearization of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) does not occupy a central place on the current agenda.

According to Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation: under these conditions, even the term "denuclearization" in relation to the DPRK has lost all meaning. This issue is closed for us: "...applying the term 'denuclearisation' to DPRK no longer makes any sense. For us, this is off the table...".<sup>30)</sup>

The question of the nature and consequences of the current comprehensive strategic partnership and cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the context of the sanctions regime imposed by the UN Security Council, of which Russia is a member, remains open.

Empirical analysis suggests Russo-DPRK nuclear coordination constitutes strategic mirroring—a rational response to systemic normalization of security exceptionalism by dominant powers. This behavioral pattern emerges from documented instances of unilateral

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30) Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's answer to a question from Rossiya Segodnya news agency, New York, September 26, 2024, URL: [https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign\\_policy/news/1971804/?lang=en](https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1971804/?lang=en)(Accessed: 19.05.2025).

interventionism (Yugoslavia, Iraq, Libya) and normative circumvention (Gaza), which collectively eroded:

- a) The fundamental norm that treaties must be binding,
- b) Trust in international institutions' ability to mediate conflicts

Consequently, Moscow and Pyongyang exploit fragmenting international governance architectures to advance reciprocal interests, transforming nonproliferation from shared imperative into contested bargaining domain. This reconfiguration exemplifies secondary powers' adaptation to diminished returns on institutional compliance.

At the same time, the issue of applying sanctions is a mutually significant problem between Moscow and Pyongyang, which is reflected both in the provisions of the treaty (article 16) and in official statements by the top leadership of the state: "We will continue to counteract the very practice of sanctions strangulation as a tool that the West is accustomed to using in order to preserve its hegemony."<sup>31)</sup>

Moscow and Pyongyang's coordinated actions demonstrate adaptive pragmatism—a responsive, flexible, yet strategically grounded approach to advancing national interests within fragmenting normative structures. This represents reactive statecraft, not normative entrepreneurship: their policies emerge as calibrated countermeasures to systemic unraveling initiated and sustained by established powers through repeated violations of multilateral frameworks. Thus, observed Russian-DPRK cooperation manifests neither revisionist ambition nor ideological solidarity, but emergent pragmatism—a fluid, interest-based adaptation to degraded institutional environments. This reactive posture, while objectively reinforcing normative

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31) В.В. Путин, Известия, 19.06.2024, URL: <https://iz.ru/1714751/dmitrii-laru/miru-posyl-chto-oznachaet-dogovor-o-vseobemliushchem-partnerstve-rf-i-kndr> (Accessed: 19.05.2025).

fragmentation, remains contingent on prior erosion of rules-based order by traditional power centers.

## VI. Designating further direction

In the framework of this paper, this issue is considered exclusively through the prism of a scientific research approach, excluding any legal or value assessments. The purpose of any scientific work, in our opinion, is not to endorse or condemn specific approaches, ideologies, or individual facts in terms of existing rules, agreements, or norms. The author sets himself the task of objectively analyzing and recording current processes, as well as assessing the direction of development of the situation in relations between the two countries and their potential consequences for the region as a whole. In this context, the emphasis is on methodological neutrality and academic rigor, which allows for a high degree of reliability and relevance of the results obtained.

The new interstate agreement between the Russian Federation and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is a conceptually verified document defining the strategic contours of further development of bilateral relations. A review of the practical steps taken by both sides within the framework of this agreement since its signing allows us to conclude that Moscow and Pyongyang are highly committed to the principles of constructive cooperation aimed at achieving both common and national goals.

This document, being the result of many years of diplomatic efforts and strategic planning, reflects an integrated approach to strengthening mutually beneficial partnership. Its provisions cover a wide range of areas of cooperation, including trade and economic

cooperation, scientific and technical cooperation, as well as security and humanitarian cooperation.

The implemented measures demonstrate the consistent implementation of the principles laid down in the agreement. In particular, the intensification of economic cooperation is noted, which is manifested in an increase in the volume of bilateral trade and attracting investments. In the field of science and technology, there is an intensification of joint projects aimed at developing high technologies and innovative solutions.

Special attention is paid to security issues, where cooperation between Russia and the DPRK is aimed at ensuring regional stability and countering external threats. This includes joint efforts to strengthen the defense capabilities of both countries, as well as coordination within international organizations.

Thus, an analysis of the current state and prospects for the development of Russian-North Korean relations allows us to state that the new treaty is an important element of the geopolitical strategy of both countries aimed at strengthening their positions in the international arena and ensuring sustainable development.

In the context of the gradual crisis of the system of international relations that emerged after the collapse of the USSR and the collapse of the world socialist system, Russia and the DPRK demonstrate a desire to consistently implement a pragmatic course aimed at comprehensively strengthening bilateral cooperation. This approach allows both countries to adapt to new geopolitical realities and minimize the negative consequences of the global transformation of the international arena.

This agreement marks a de facto departure from Russia's long-standing policy towards the Korean peninsula, which was characterized by a desire for a balanced approach towards both

states - the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Although in reality this balance has not always been possible to achieve due to a number of objective factors, Moscow has made consistent efforts to build equal relations with Seoul and Pyongyang. However, the new agreement between Russia and the DPRK clearly shifts Moscow's foreign policy priorities in favor of Pyongyang, which indicates a significant change in the strategic positioning of the Russian Federation in the Korean direction.

It should be noted that this change in Russia's foreign policy is involuntary and responsive due to the position taken by both Korean states towards Russia after the escalation of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. This development has forced Moscow to reconsider its priorities and adjust its foreign policy strategy aimed at strengthening cooperation with the DPRK in the face of increasing geopolitical pressure and sanctions. Thus, this treaty can be considered as a strategic response to the challenges faced by Russia in the East Asian region and as an attempt to adapt its foreign policy to the new realities of the international situation.

## VII. China factor

The signing of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has caused considerable concern among the leadership of the People's Republic of China.<sup>32)</sup> Beijing, which has traditionally acted as Pyongyang's only trade and economic

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32) China unnerved by Russia's growing ties with North Korea, claims US official, URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/nov/24/china-unnerved-russia-growing-ties-north-korea-claims-us-official>(Accessed: 30.11.2024).

partner, perceives Pyongyang's accelerated rapprochement with Moscow with neutral caution. In historical retrospect, the DPRK has demonstrated a high degree of diplomatic flexibility, skillfully maneuvering between its two major northern neighbors and adhering to an independent line in foreign policy.

The signing of the new agreement provides Pyongyang with an opportunity to significantly reduce its economic dependence on Chinese aid and continue developing its own industrial complex, primarily in the interests of the military-industrial complex. China is undoubtedly also concerned about the DPRK's space ambitions, in which cooperation with Moscow has significant potential.

Thus, this agreement can be considered as a strategic step by Pyongyang aimed at diversifying foreign economic relations and strengthening national security. In the context of global geopolitical processes, this development represents an important element of regional dynamics aimed at forming a significant bloc of countries opposing the USA-Japan-South Korea triangle.

As noted above, in the future, the creation of a military-political alliance between the Russian Federation and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the Northeast Asian region, which aims to counter the expansion of the American presence, may raise the issue of including the People's Republic of China in this alliance.

It is important to emphasize that this assumption is based solely on an analysis of the current situation and its development. In the modern world and international relations, there is no tendency to return to the previous state of conditional equilibrium. Significant changes are taking place, and the structure of the world as we knew it before 2020 is undergoing significant transformations, which can already be seen in general terms.

The current geopolitical dynamics is characterized by increasing

contradictions between the leading world powers, and economic sanctions pressure is becoming systemic and even institutionalized. As a result, the actual economic wars unleashed by some groups of the largest States inevitably lead to an escalation of tension and push the world community towards a potential global conflict.

There is an obvious trend towards the transformation of a single international space, including political, economic, cultural and informational components, into a block structure. This process is characterized by increased fragmentation of the global system of international relations and the creation of more clearly differentiated regional entities.

In this regard, the importance of international organizations and negotiation platforms designed to ensure a peaceful settlement of contradictions is steadily decreasing. This is due both to their inability to adequately respond to new challenges and to increased geopolitical competition, which undermines confidence in existing mechanisms of international cooperation.

In response to these trends, there has been a widespread increase in defense budgets, the buildup of military contingents, and the improvement of modern weapons, including weapons of mass destruction. In addition, there has been an increase in the number of local conflicts and the reactivation of frozen ones, which indicates a shift from political and diplomatic dispute resolution methods to more aggressive forms of interaction.

Thus, the current international situation is characterized not only by increased sanctions pressure and economic confrontation, but also by deepening militaristic tendencies, which creates prerequisites for a further increase in global instability.

In this context, the actions of the Russian Federation, including the radical transformation of foreign policy relations with the

Democratic People's Republic of Korea, represent an objective reflection of current geopolitical processes and an attempt to adapt to the emerging international reality.

## VIII. Conclusion

Undoubtedly, the conclusion of a new treaty between the Russian Federation and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will not have a significant impact on the geopolitical situation in the region in the short term. Moscow's economic cooperation with other East Asian states continues to significantly exceed the capabilities of the North Korean economy, which highlights the disparity in economic potential between the parties to this agreement.

It can be assumed that this treaty is of a transitional nature, aimed at adapting to the transformation of the international order. On the other hand, the text of the agreement sets out specific prospects for expanding and deepening cooperation between the two countries, which can become a significant incentive for the economic development of the DPRK.

In the coming years, the degree of viability of the provisions of the new treaty, their practical implementation and the ability to unlock their potential will have to be assessed. This will allow us to draw conclusions about the impact of this agreement on the geopolitical dynamics of the region and determine its long-term consequences for both sides.

In the context of the increasing turbulence of international relations and the gradual disintegration of the established system of global interaction, the need for strict adherence to objective facts and a sensitive response to evolving trends seems urgent. This

requires ensuring adequate interaction with all actors who share common interests and views on key issues of our time. In this context, the signing of a new treaty between the Russian Federation and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is of particular importance, as it is intended to legally consolidate the transformational processes taking place on the Korean peninsula over the past years.

The treaty is also of strategic importance for correcting Moscow's foreign policy course towards Pyongyang, which in previous decades was characterized by a significant degree of ambiguity and often came into conflict with the national interests of the Russian Federation in the region. The signing of this agreement is aimed at significantly strengthening Moscow's geopolitical positions in the region, ensuring a balanced regional architecture and preventing further escalation of conflict situations.

While the Russo-DPRK treaty intensifies Seoul's strategic anxieties—particularly regarding enhanced military-technical coordination and sanctions evasion—ROK countermeasures will likely prioritize calibrated deterrence over escalation. Ultimately, South Korea's response trajectory hinges upon its broader foreign policy alignment calculus: whether to reinforce U.S.-led containment frameworks or pursue limited autonomy through dialogue channels with Moscow and Beijing.

Moscow contends that the downturn in bilateral relations originated with Seoul's 2022 decision to join Western-led sanctions regimes against Russia. The Kremlin frames this as a pivotal breach of previously balanced engagement, compelling reactive countermeasures under its doctrine of reciprocity in foreign affairs. Russia's official narrative attributes the relationship degradation to ROK's unilateral adoption of extraterritorial sanctions in 2022—a

move interpreted as violating the spirit of the 1992 Basic Treaty's non-interference clause<sup>33)</sup> and mutual commitments to "constructive impartiality" (2000 Joint Declaration). This is positioned not as accusation but as factual causation in diplomatic correspondence.

Notwithstanding bilateral tensions precipitated by Seoul's sanctions alignment, Moscow acknowledges ROK's deliberate avoidance of critical escalation thresholds in the Ukraine context—characterized in Russian diplomatic parlance as "the friendliest of unfriendly states." The Kremlin signals conditional openness to reciprocal de-escalation, framing relationship restoration as a mutual interest contingent on Seoul's demonstrated restraint regarding lethal aid transfers to Kyiv.

One of the priorities of the new leadership of South Korea is the restoration of diplomatic relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which were interrupted by the previous administration of the country.<sup>34)</sup> In this context, Moscow has the potential to exert significant influence on the implementation of these initiatives, taking into account Pyongyang's current distanced position towards the Republic of Korea.

Seoul's future strategic calculus will hinge on its assessment of evolving regional dynamics—particularly the convergent interests among Moscow, Pyongyang, and Beijing. A comprehensive understanding of these actors' trajectories remains essential for formulating ROK's responsive foreign policy framework that aligns with its core national security imperatives.

In the late 1980s, President Roh Tae-woo demonstrated significant

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33) Текст Договора об основах отношений Российской Федерации и Республики Корея, URL: <https://docs.cntd.ru/document/901839752>(Accessed August 14, 2025).

34) South Korea's new President Lee vows to pursue talks with North and bolster ties with US and Japan, URL: <https://apnews.com/article/south-korea-president-lee-a754f6c7fe8f44d15e2898b59b9a5f3c>(Accessed: 19.05.2025).

achievements as part of his northern strategy aimed at improving relations with Moscow. The key instrument of this policy was the political and diplomatic approach, which contrasted with the previously applied practices of non-recognition and boycott. This approach involved active interaction and dialogue between the parties, which was conditioned by a mutual desire for a constructive resolution of the conflict. In the context of modern international relations, the prospects for dialogue between Moscow and Seoul seem very encouraging. This is due not only to geopolitical changes, but also to the mutual interest in strengthening regional stability and security. In the current situation, the resumption of dialogue between these key players may contribute to the formation of a new paradigm of interaction in the Asia-Pacific region.

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러시아와 조선민주주의인민공화국 간의 포괄적 전략적 협력 협정: 한반도의  
새로운 지정학적 현실을 위한 분투

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논문요약

2024년 6월 19일 러시아 연방과 조선민주주의인민공화국 간의〈포괄적전략적동반자관계협정〉 체결은 모스크바와 평양의 양자 관계뿐만 아니라 이 지역 전체의 지정학적 상황에도 상당한 영향을 미치는 중요한 사건이었다. 이 조약은 또한 지난 수십년 동안 상당한 모호성을 특징으로 했고, 이 지역에서 러시아 연방의 국가 이익과 종종 충돌했던 모스크바의 대북 외교정책을 수정하는 데 전략적으로 중요하다. 이 조약은 국제 질서의 변화에 적응하기 위한 과도기적 성격을 가질 가능성이 높다. 한편, 이 조약의 내용은 양국 간 협력 확대 및 심화에 대한 구체적인 전망을 제시하고 있으며, 이는 조선민주주의인민공화국의 경제발전에 중요한 인센티브가 될 수 있다.

주제어: 동북아 안보, 한반도, 러시아-북한 관계, 다극화 전환, 군사 동맹

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