

The Role of Epistemic Community in Some Experiences of Multi-Level Governance – Two Contrasting Cases of Regional Seas Programs, NOWPAP and MAP –

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Key words(중심용어): 다층거버넌스(MLG), 인식공동체(Epistemic Community), 지중해행동계획(MAP), 북서태평양행동계획(NOWPAP), 환경협력(Environmental Cooperation)

국 문 요 약

본 연구는 정치, 문화, 사회적으로 덜 이질적이며 상대적으로 더 성숙한 시민사회를 보유한 유럽연합과 같은 서구국가들에서 지역통합 연구자들이 사용해진 다층거버넌스(MLG)와 인식공동체 개념을 소개한다. 특히 본 논문은 MAP와 NOWPAP이라는 대조적인 결과를 적절히 설명하기 위해 단일한 이론적 분석틀에서 인식공동체와 MLG의 개념을 결합하고자 노력한다. 그렇게 함으로써 본 연구는 MLG이론을 바탕으로 동북아시아에서의 환경협력에 관한 대안적 설명을 찾는 한편 궁극적으로는 동북아시아에서 MLG를 증진할 방안을 모색한다.

MAP에 대한 사례분석 결과는 MAP당사국들이 NOWPAP 당사국들보다는 훨씬 더 역사적으로 복잡한 배경을 지니고 있을 뿐 아니라 정치, 사회, 경제, 문화적으로도 더 뚜렷한 차이를 보이고 있음을 입증하고 있다. 그러므로 문화적 후진성의 극복을 주장하거나 역사적 부채 청산이나 주권

국가의 주도권 회복을 강조하는 것은 무의미한 것이라 할 수 있다. 동북아지역에서의 환경협력의 올바른 방향을 정립하기 위해서는 동북아지역 환경거버넌스체제의 특성과 문제점을 정확히 진단하는 노력이 선행될 필요가 있다.

I. 서론

There is no doubt that environmental pollutions in China directly impact the environmental ecology of its neighboring countries such as South Korea and Japan. For example, 32% of acid rain in Kyushu area in Japan can be explained by sulfur dioxide and Nitrogen oxide from China. Of course, Japan can point out South Korea as another possible source of trans-boundary influx. This chain-like serial impact of each country on the remaining countries invokes a lively debate about environmental cooperation among three Northeast Asian countries. As a result, there was a rush of institutional establishment including Northwest Pacific Action Plan(NOWPAP) initiated by the United Nations Environmental Program(UNEP), Tripartite Environmental Ministerial Meeting(TEMM), Environmental Congress for Asia and Pacific (ECO-Asia), Meeting of Senior Officials on Environmental Cooperation in Northeast Asia (SOMECEA), Framework for the Northeast Asia Sub-regional Programme of Environmental Cooperation(NEASPEC) and Tumen River Area Development Program.

However, despite its unprecedented increase of environmental cooperation such vigorous endeavors for achieving environmental cooperation in the Northeast Asian region cannot be considered exemplary or successful in comparison with environmental collaborations in other areas of the world - in particular, Europe. For instance, NOWPAP, which is one of the thirteen regional seas programs of the UNEP, still remains in a toddling stage while its Mediterranean counterpart, Mediterranean Action Plan(MAP) is evaluated as considerably successful. What produces such a gap in operational performance among the programs? What, in the first place, obstacles environmental cooperation in the Northeast Asian region? These questions have continuously attracted academic concerns and thus produced diverse research outcomes(Kim 2007; Chung 2006; Choo et. al. 2005; Drifte 2003; Kim 2003; Hong 2002; Byun 1999; Zarsky 1995). However, most of these researches mainly focus on finding empirical evidences based upon a simple case study only explaining current status of environmental collaborations or dealing with policy implications.¹⁾ As a consequence,

1) Byun(1999) and Drifte(2003) can be regarded as typical cases of this kind of atheoretical and data-driven study. It is true that nearly 90% of research papers dealing with the issue of environmental protection in the Northeast Asian region mainly focus on empirical case analysis.

researches based upon a statistical or analytical method which mainly attempts to test hypothetical relationship in conjunction with various types of theoretical consideration on environmental cooperation in Northeast Asia.²⁾ In the end, this domestic research trend results in the absence of analytical research in the discipline and thus reproduces short-minded and monolithic research outcomes in which researchers primarily pay attention to political, economic, historical and cultural peculiarity of the Northeast Asian region including diversity of political interest, discrepancy of economic development, historical debts caused by past affairs and immaturity of civil society resulting from authoritarian culture.

To solve such theoretical limitation this study introduces the notion of epistemic community and the concept of multi-level governance(MLG) mostly used by researchers who deal with regional integration in Western countries such as European Union(EU) which remains politically, socially and culturally less heterogeneous and in which their civil societies remain relatively mature. In particular, this paper makes an effort to combine the notion of MLG and epistemic community in a single theoretical framework in order to relevantly explain the contrasting outcomes of MAP and NOWPAP. By doing so, this study challenges to an alternative explanation of environmental cooperation in the Northeast Asian region based upon MLG and ultimately tries to find a way of promoting MLG within the Northeast Asian region.

The notion of epistemic community” and multi-level governance have in nature some theoretical similarity in the sense that both notions are all together attempting to explain a certain phenomenon in which traditional power and authority usually taken by state or government are reduced or transferred to other power-holders such as business enterprises, professionals or civil society actors like non-governmental organizations.

To do so, this paper, first of all, constructs a theoretical framework to explain environmental cooperation in the Northeast Asian region by narrowing down the concept of MLG and its theoretical usage, tuning the traditional notion of epistemic community and

However, there exist a few exceptional researches which make a remarkable effort to view environmental cooperation in the Northeast Asian region through a theoretical or analytical framework. Kim(2007) provides an outstanding example of such a theory-oriented research though I think her framework does not overcome some theoretical imbalance between the interest-based approach at national level and epistemic community theory at supranational level.

- 2) It show striking difference with overseas research trend in the research area of environmental collaboration. For example, Zarsky(1995) attempted to formulate a theoretical framework through the combination of such theoretical concepts as common pool resources(CPRs) and governance. Betsil and Bulkeley(2006) provided another example. They explained the Cities for Climate Protection Program(CCP) by adopting a theoretical perspective of MLG generally used to explain economic and regional policies within EU. Haas(1990) also offered an excellent example of using a theoretical framework by using the concept of epistemic community in his seminal work regarding the Mediterranean Action Plan(MAP).

finally combining both theoretical notions in one specific framework. Next, it provides a simple explanation about the current status of the UNEP regional seas program which covers an upper-level concept of NOWPAP and MAP. And then it analyzes categorical differences between NOWPAP and MAP based upon a comparative case analysis. In conclusion, it discusses problems that NOWPAP and MAP cope with and possible solutions necessary for the further development of NOWPAP and MAP.

I. A Theoretical Framework

1. The Conceptual Definition and Classification of MLG

Previous researches on environmental collaboration were mainly based upon international regime theory and transnational networks theory.³⁾ However, these two contrasting theories revealed some theoretical limitations in various aspects. International regime theory recognized international environmental cooperation as a consequence of inter-states collaboration regardless of whether it anchors on a realistic or liberalistic perspective. In this aspect, it seems difficult to understand active interactions among state-level, subnational-level, and international-level actors, all of which are highly likely to be found in a new type of environmental cooperation that exceeds a range of state-level governance.

The concept of MLG was introduced to embrace some theoretical considerations of intergovernmentalism while basically accepting the notion of neo-functionalism in the middle of debate between the neo-functionalist school(Haas 1958; Lindberg 1963) and the intergovernmentalism school (Hoffmann 1966) based upon state-centered realism. For the first time, Marks(1992) began to use a term 'multi-level governance' when he presented an evolving process of structural policy in EU. Since then, other scholars have widely applied the term MLG to the explanation of decision-making process of EU and, as a consequence, it has been widely accepted among scholars and policy practitioners.

The concept of MLG helps explain a phenomenon in which the authority of central government is vertically dispersed to "actors at other territorial levels", but horizontally to non-state actors(Bache and Flinders 2004). In a similar vein, the concept of MLG can be easily replaced by such concepts as 'multi-tiered governance', 'polycentric governance', 'multi-perspectival governance', 'functional, overlapping and competing jurisdictions(FOCJ)',

3) Young and Osherenko(1993) provided an remarkable example of regime-based explanation of environmental cooperation while Haas(1992) explained international cooperation with the help of a theoretical concept of epistemic community.

'fragmeration'⁴⁾, 'spheres of authorities (SOAs)'.⁵⁾ However, it is apparent that whichever concept is used, at the core of the concept of MLG, 'dispersion of authority from central government' which means power shift upwardly to supra-national or trans-national groups, horizontally to social movement groups, and downwardly to sub-national groups.⁶⁾ Based upon the policy network approach, Marks(1993) defines MLG as a continuous intergovernmental negotiation system 'nested' in a few regional levels(392). Within a system of MLG governments at various levels such as trans-national, national, regional, and local level are interconnected with a policy network which regionally takes precedence over all other things(Marks 1993, 402-403).

This type of collaboration based upon MLG is in general easily found in EU. Betsill and Bulkeley(2006) mention three following root causes for the adoption of MLG system in EU: 1) sovereign states could not monopolize policy-making process any more since trans-national institutions began to exert independent influences in the policy-making process; 2) sovereign states lost their control power over the policy-making process as needs for collective decision-making over more complex policy problems increased; 3) public arena for political discourses at the trans-national, national, and sub-national level began to be closely connected through policy networks(149). Consequently all these factors contributed to prompting competitions in the policy-making process among actors who operate at different levels of governance structure.

This MLG-based explanation is in fact basically grounded on presupposing retrenchment in the role of state, but it does not necessarily mean the weakening of the role of state. On the contrary, what the MLG perspective argues is that explanations based upon the traditional dichotomous perspective - that is, distinction between domestic and international politics, distinction in accordance with geographical scale at regional, national and global level or distinction between state and non-state actors - are no more valid. With its emphasis on

4) 'Fragmeration' is a compound word by fragmentation and integration. Rosenau used this concept in order to describe a specific situation in which power and authority is redistributed upwardly to supra-national or trans-national groups, horizontally to social movement groups, and downwardly to sub-national groups and thus fragmentation and integration concomitantly occur. For more details, refer to the following internet site(<http://www.institut-governance.org/fr/analyse/fiche-analyse-37.html>). (accessed 1 October, 2009)

5) The notion of 'SOAs' was also introduced by Rosenau. He tried to conceptually explain it through three different concepts such as collectivities, system of rule, the exercise of authority.

6) Researches on MLG summarize, by and large, three following facts as its main characteristics(Hooghe and Marks 2001; Marks et al. 1996; Peters and Pierre 2002). First of all, in MLG decision-making authorities are evenly dispersed among actors who are participating in governance. Secondly, MLG has internally non-hierarchical order as shown in traditional intergovernmental relations. Finally, it has a decision-making structure based upon consensus and non-majoritarianism(Kaiser and Prange 2003, 3).

complexity states possess and reduced capabilities of national-level governmental organizations which control the policy-making process, the MLG perspective calls upon us to turn our concern toward an absolutely new sphere where authority works very well. Most of the existing literature on governance mainly questioned how each level of governance structure is organized and operated, and how interactions among components of governance in such a governance structure at each level are performed. Structural interactions in between governance levels and interactions among actors who operate in different governance level are relatively paid less attention in the scholarly debates of the discipline.

Nevertheless, a few scholars have considered this subject of interaction among different governance levels primarily important and interesting. Dealing with the issue of advocacy coalition in the dimension of international politics beyond a range of an individual sovereign state, Keck and Sikkink(1998) touched governance actors' interactions and linkages among and between governance levels. In addition, there have recently existed theoretical attempts to understand active interactions among various levels of governance structures in EU through a conceptual film of MLG(Pierre and Stoker 2000; Marks 1997; Marks et al. 1996; Scharpf 1994).

However, most of the existing literature on MLG deal with interactions between regional and local governments bypassing sovereign states within EU and other sovereign states, intergovernmental organizations and EU. Accordingly, such an existing research trend slightly differs from the subject this paper wants to deal with - mutual relationship between national-level governance structure and its higher-level governance structures such as regional- and global-level governance.

However, there is no reason why the concept of MLG should be necessarily used as a concept meaning mutual linkages between regional or local governance and global or national governance in a limited sense. Insofar as the concept of MLG means interactions occurring between multiple governance levels, it would be also of use to explaining interactions between national governance and regional governance that this paper aims to explain. As Hooghe and Marks(2001) argue, what the existing literature on MLG shed light on my research is that MLG well explains a general phenomenon in which central government authority in an individual sovereign state are not only being dispersed but also delegated and dispersed to supra-national or sub-national agencies and organizations.⁷⁾

7) Bestill and Bulkeley(2006) explains the reason why the MLG perspective is necessary in the field of environmental cooperation in relation to Green House Gases(GHGs). In case of GHGs, collaborations by local government become very important and necessary since the authority of producing and controlling GHGs is granted to local government. For example, such fields as plans for land use or waste disposal management are controlled within a range that the authority of local government can reach.

Hooghe and Marks(2001) divide MLG into two different types as shown in Table 1 according to the characteristics its jurisdictions have. The first type of MLG is likely to be found in federalism or intergovernmental relations and thus its jurisdictions are multi-purpose and mutually exclusive. Also, the number and dimension of its jurisdictions are quite limited and permanent. Whereas the second type of MLG is mainly adopted by neo-classical or rational-choice school and thus its jurisdictions are single-purpose and mixed. The number and dimension of its jurisdictions are not limited and considerably flexible.

<Table 1> Two Types of MLG

classification	Type I	Type II
purposes of jurisdictions	multiple	single
Relationship among jurisdictions	exclusive	mixed
number of jurisdictions	limited	unlimited
Number of dimensions by jurisdictions	limited	unlimited
Continuity of jurisdictions	permanent	flexible

* Source: reformulated from the Table 1 of Hooghe and Marks(2001).

From the structural point of view, when a governance structure is once formulated at each level of governance, it is highly likely that each issue area develops its own problem-solving network. Each governance structure at each level has its own veto players as well as non-veto players within its closed network structure. The problem is that all these activities are done inside each network. However, this paper does not shed light on such a research question as how actors affiliated with different levels of governance networks can participate in the policy-making processes of different levels of governance networks – that is, the microscopic operational mechanism of MLG. It concentrates on theoretical categorization of MLG rather than on such a microscopic operational mechanism of MLG.

MLG does not work in a way that local, national, regional and global level governance structure operate in serial order from higher to lower dimension according to its absolute size of jurisdictional range. Rather it operates in a way that each governance level and actors who work in that level of governance make relations with each other or gain them over its side without any specific direction. Only the nature of issue area can decide the characteristics of relations with other levels of governance. It is possible that a policy network can be easily ignored by other actors inside regional communities. In a few severe cases, any policy network at national level may not be able to be formulated since the issues that the policy network handles is hard to evoke public concerns.

On the contrary, controversial issues that make it difficult to form a policy network in the

dimension of global governance would be likely to do so in the dimension of regional governance. Therefore there exists no such a sequential relation in which regional governance structure inevitably constitutes an environment of national governance structure and then global governance structure functions as an environment of regional governance.

Interactions among national, regional and global governance structure appear to be more complex form in the policy network perspective. According to typological characteristics of policy networks formed by each level of governance there exists, on the one hand, a sequential relation in which local, national, regional and global governance structure are functionally connected in a step-by-step way in some issue areas. On the other hand, there exists no mutual linkage, penetration or subsumption. Otherwise there is a particular interactive relation in which a certain level of governance disregards or bypasses its upper-level governance.

The question is what causes such difference of interaction among various levels of governance structure. As reviewed in the section dealing with the concept of governance, types of governance network distinguished by principal elements composing a policy network itself, interrelations among actors inside the policy network and distributive structure of policy authorities play an important role in creating such differences. Conceptual elements of policy network including 'actors', 'boundary' and 'linkage' are essential components for the relevant explanation of interactions among various levels of governance structure(Jordan and Schubert 1992; Rhodes 1988).

First of all, 'actors' who participate in governance structure can be divided into 'centralized' type of actors and 'decentralized' type of actors depending upon whether or not they possess and exert effective veto power at the cost of government actor's power. Next, 'boundary' that separates inside and outside of governance structure can be separated into 'open' type of boundary and 'closed' type of boundary according to the degree of accessibility by external actors. Finally, 'linkage' that means a frame of interrelation between actors can be divided into 'dependent' type of linkage and 'independent' type of linkage relying upon the degree of interactions among actors who belong to different level of governance structure each other.

The characteristics of policy issue can be considered primarily important in explaining difference of interactions among various levels of governance structure. As demonstrated in various researches about NGOs-Government relations, a pattern of interaction among actors can vary depending upon whether or not the area of issue can induce cooperation between NGOs and government. The more deeply related to distribution or redistribution of scarce resources the area of issue is, the higher the possibility of conflict among actors gets.

In the end, the type of MLG would be determined by the characteristics of components that form each level of governance structure and of issue area. 'Type I MLG' featured by

multi-purpose, mutually exclusive, limited and permanent jurisdictions is highly likely to appear when each level of governance structure consists of ‘centralized’ type of actors, ‘independent’ type of linkage and ‘closed’ type of boundary.

On the other hand, ‘Type II MLG’ which has specific-purpose, mutually overlapping, unlimited and elastic jurisdictions is highly likely to appear when each level of governance structure consists of ‘decentralized’ type of actors, ‘dependent’ type of linkage and ‘open’ type of boundary. Figure 1 well demonstrates substantive differences in both types of MLG based upon types of actors, boundary and linkage.




Figure 1. Two Types of MLG by Combinations of Governance Components

2. MLG and Epistemic Community

With regard to this typological explanation of MLG, a few questions, however, still remain. What makes a given governance structure – regardless of which level of governance is selected – evolve into one of two types of governance? Why some cases of environmental cooperation are to easily develop into ‘Type II MLG’ while other cases do not? What makes actors of ‘Type II MLG’ allowed to easily interact with each other without any restriction imposed by authorities and jurisdictions? What makes boundary of ‘Type II MLG’ softened and blurred so that it may be able to be opened to all actors and any level of governance? What strengthens linkages between each level of governance under ‘Type II MLG’ and thus makes their actors independent of each other?

To answer these questions and make the typological model described above work better, it is necessary to fill a theoretical vacuum between two contrasting types of MLG. To do so, I will adopt a well-known notion of epistemic community. I believe that the notion of epistemic community functions not only as a glue to connect each level of governance

structure through vigorous interactions among actors but also as a softener to make a boundary of each level of governance gradually dissolved. Kibaroglu(2008) provides a well-done summary safeguarding the utility of epistemic community theory in the discipline of international relation study: “Epistemic communities can function very well across national boundaries because the scientific community has transnational traditions. This makes them a good base for conducting negotiations on transnational traditions”(192).

As Peter Haas repeatedly defined, epistemic community is a network of experts who have accumulated knowledge about a particular issue domain.⁸⁾ Members of a particular epistemic community share a certain belief system in common though their vocational origins and professional backgrounds are somewhat omnifarious(Cinquegrani 2002, 779). The stronger consensus they share the more authorities they attain. The power of epistemic community heavily depends upon the degree and strength of consensus among its members. As Haas(1992) argued, the idea of epistemic communities is based upon a condition in which formal actors such as political representatives and ministers cannot solve impending problems any more since the subject they are handling is so obscure and difficult to grasp that it requires any kind of knowledge-based help from outside actors who have a certain level of professional knowledge or expertise so that it may help reduce the risk of uncertainty. Thus, policymakers who do not have enough knowledge and information need to be assisted by experts from groups including experts from academia and business enterprises who possess professional knowledge (Sundstrom 2000, 2; Bernhagen 2000). As a consequence, due to its own internal necessity policymakers should transfer a part of their authorities or jurisdictions to non-governmental and professional experts to solve the problem of uncertainty.

In general, this transfer of authorities or jurisdictions matches well with what the notion of MLG calls horizontal delegation of power and authority. Therefore it is quite apparent that the idea of epistemic communities is already embedded in the notion of MLG. As many scholars supporting the notion of epistemic community, epistemic community is to play an important role as “new avenues of influence”(Sundstrom 2000) and “a principal channel through which consensual knowledge about causal connections is applied to policy formation and policy coordination”(Haas 2004, 11579) in the policy-making process. And its power becomes stronger and stronger with growing internationalization and as government actors have more difficulties in dealing with complexity and uncertainty of information.

According to Haas(1992), epistemic communities promote cooperation by decreasing, or occasionally by thoroughly eradicating the uncertainty factor that obstacles cooperation over

8) Haas defined the concept of ‘epistemic community’ as a “network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area”(Haas 1992, 349).

international resources. By spreading knowledge and facilitating learning process, epistemic communities encourage government officials to reconsider their preference (13). To account for different performance between epistemic communities, he proposed four components of an epistemic community: “a shared set of normative and principled beliefs”, “shared notions of validity”, “shared causal beliefs” and “common policy enterprises”(1). From Haas’s definition of epistemic communities, Sundstrom(2000) well refined four variables including issue–areas, information complexity, community cohesion and link to policy–makers as determinants of epistemic community power. Based upon Sundstrom’s refinement, I created dichotomous variation of each variable as presented in Table 2. Power of a given epistemic community gets stronger as issue–areas it deals with reside in traditional issues rather than in esoteric ones, information they provide to governmental practitioners become more complex, its organizational cohesiveness gets stronger and its link to policy–makers gets tighter.

One of the most important pre–conditions for the presence of epistemic community is its independence from any type of authority or power. In particular, the most important thing that makes epistemic community possibly sustain is the degree of freedom from governmental influence in a specific policy area. The early failure of the Columbia Basin Inter–Agency Committee created by President Franklin Roosevelt provides an outstanding example of how a skillfully–designed top–down attempt of forming an epistemic community can be easily broken away. Thomas(1997) well points out that “committees imposed from the top may be less likely to promote coordination than to provide agency officials with a means to enhance their autonomy”(225).

<Table 2> Determinants of Epistemic Community Power

Variables	Measurement	
Issue–areas	traditional	esoteric
Information complexity	complex	simple
Community cohesion	strong	weak
Link to policy–makers	tight	loose

This paper will demonstrate how both types of MLG come true in real world through a comparative case analysis of two contrasting cases of UNEP’s Regional Seas Program. The comparison will provide us with an outstanding example of some combination of typology of MLG and power of epistemic community in the sense that UNEP’s Regional Seas Program has been often regarded as a typical case of environmental cooperation in the world.

III. MAP and NOWPAP under UNEP Regional Seas Program

1. UNEP Regional Seas Program

UNEP launched its Regional Seas Program in 1974 after two years of United Nations Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm in 1972. This program has been evaluated as one of the most successful programs that UNEP has undertaken so far. UNEP's Regional Seas Program is a program that aims to prevent environmental deteriorations of not only ocean but also costal areas through the sustainable management of ocean and coastal environments and encourages concerned countries to voluntarily participate in the protection of marine environment, set out rules and regulations for environmental management, and finally implement them in full scale. Now 13 regional seas programs⁹⁾ are in action and 140 countries are participating in those programs.

UNEP Regional Seas Program turned out to be successful because it operates under action plans which carried strong legal binding force in forms of regional conventions or related protocols. Most of UNEP Regional Seas Programs adopted similar approaches and thus recommended governments of the concerned parties, environmental institutions and organizations to voluntarily participate in the program. Most affairs of UNEP Regional Seas Program are coordinated by the regional headquarter of UNEP Regional Seas Program in Nairobi and each program area has its own Regional Coordination Center(RCUs). RCUs mainly undertake such duties marine emergencies, information management and pollution monitoring.¹⁰⁾

9) 13 regional seas programs cover Black Sea, Wider Caribbean, East Asian Seas, Eastern Africa Seas, South Asian Seas, ROPME Sea Area, Mediterranean, North-East Pacific, North-West Pacific, Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, South-East Pacific, Western Africa. Among them, programs for Caribbean Region, East Asian Seas, Eastern Africa Region, Mediterranean Region, North-West Pacific Region and Western Africa Region are directly managed by UNEP programs including Black Sea Region, North-East Pacific Region, Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, ROPME Sea Area, South Asian Seas, South-East Pacific Region and Pacific Region are not directly controlled by UNEP and thus each program relies upon independent Trust Funds. However, regional activities in those non-UNEP administered programs are operated under the close collaboration of UNEP Regional Seas Program. The remaining 5 programs covering Arctic Region, Antarctic Region, Baltic Sea, Caspian Sea, North-East Atlantic Region are organizationally and financially independent and most of their activities are separately undertaken. However their relations with UNEP Regional Seas Program are quite intimate in the aspect that their officials often participate in the meetings of UNEP Regional Seas Program or they share related data, information and policy ideas with UNEP Regional Seas Program.

10) For more details, refer to the following website. <http://www.unep.org/regionalseas/about/default.asp>. (accessed 7 January, 2010)

2. MAP

Among the thirteen UNEP Regional Seas Programs, MAP is regarded as the most successful program. UNEP Regional Seas Program was established in 1974 and a year later, for the first time in the history of UNEP Regional Seas Program, MAP was launched in 1975 for the protection of marine environment. Sixteen countries around the Mediterranean Sea joined the program when it started. From its starting point, MAP intended to help the Mediterranean countries to analyze and control marine pollutions, to make related policies, to develop their capabilities to find out better alternatives, and further to optimize their choices for the distribution of resources.¹¹⁾

Therefore, at the early stage of MAP, most concerns were given to reducing marine pollution. However the concerned parties of MAP began to recognize that main sources of marine pollution came from land-based pollution sources rather than from shipping activities on the sea. Consequently they changed their directions toward analyses of land-based pollution sources including coastal areas. This conversion of MAP activities became more apparent with the help of the amendment of the Barcelona Convention. Therefore, they began to distinguish 'MAP Phase I' before the amendment and 'MAP Phase II' after the amendment.

The Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution – that is, the so-called Barcelona Convention was signed in 1976 and took effect in 1978. Since then, it was amended as the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of the Mediterranean in October 1995. The Barcelona Convention was amended in order to improve the problems of 'MAP Phase I' which simply paid attention to marine pollutions and to reflect possible environmental changes in the Mediterranean Sea region for the two decades after the Barcelona Convention.

The amended version of the Barcelona Convention in 1995 finally took effect in July 2004. The concerned parties of the convention were in total 22 countries¹²⁾ including France, EC, Greece and Italy. The coordination Unit of MAP placed its headquarter in Athens, Greece. Table 3 presents the status of approval for the convention by the concerned parties as of September 2009. As shown in Table 2, though near most of the concerned parties finished ratification process in any form before 1992, most of the new-born states such as Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia-Montenegro, Slovenia decided to directly join the

11) For more details about the early developing stage of MAP, refer to the following website. <http://www.unepmap.org/index.php?module=content2&catid=001001002>. (accessed 15 December, 2009)

12) The 22 participating countries are as follows: Albania, Algeria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, Egypt, EC(EU), France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Libya, Malta, Monaco, Morocco, Serbia-Montenegro, Slovenia, Spain, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey.

convention without going through the signatory process since the 1990's. The types of ratification are also as diverse as 'accession' or 'succession'.

<Table 3> Signature and Ratification Status of Barcelona Convention

Concerned Party	Date of signature	Date of ratification	type	Date of approval
Albania	–	1990/05/30	accession	2001/07/26
Algeria	–	1981/02/16	accession	2004/06/09
Bosnia–Herzegovina	–	1992/03/01	succession	–
Croatia	–	1991/10/08	succession	1999/05/03
Cyprus	1976/02/16	1979/11/19	ratification	2003/07/18
Egypt	1976/02/16	1978/08/24	approval	2000/02/11
EC(EU)	1976/09/13	1978/03/16	approval	1999/11/12
France	1976/02/16	1978/03/11	approval	2001/04/16
Greece	1976/02/16	1979/01/03	ratification	2003/03/10
Israel	1976/02/16	1978/03/03	ratification	–
Italy	1976/02/16	1979/02/03	ratification	1999/09/07
Lebanon	1976/02/16	1977/11/08	accession	–
Libya	1977/01/31	1979/01/31	ratification	–
Malta	1976/02/16	1977/12/30	ratification	1999/10/28
Monaco	1976/02/16	1977/09/20	ratification	1997/04/11
Moroco	1976/02/16	1980/01/15	ratification	–
Serbia–Montenegro	–	2002/07/16	succession	–
Slovenia	–	1994/03/15	accession	2003/01/08
Spain	1976/02/16	1976/12/17	ratification	1999/02/17
Syria	–	1994/03/15	accession	2003/01/08
Tunisia	1976/05/25	1977/07/30	ratification	1998/06/01
Turkey	1976/02/16	1981/06/04	ratification	2002/09/18

Source: the official website of UNEP Regional Seas Program. <http://www.unep.org/regionalseas/programmes/unpro/mediterranean/instruments/default.asp> (accessed 15 December, 2009).

The active engagement of UNEP is often regarded as one of the most important factor for the success of MAP. According to Article 13 of the Barcelona Convention, UNEP shall function as a main general–affairs office for MAP. Prior to the establishment of Trust Fund in 1979, Map had been entirely operated by UNEP. ¹³⁾ For example, approximately 7.2% of

UNEP Trust Fund had been consumed for solving environmental problems in the Mediterranean Sea region between 1973 and 1975(Skaersth 2001, 323). Though the participating countries began to promise their commitment to financial support after the establishment of Trust Fund, financial supports by UNEP and other UN agencies totaled almost US 14.4 million dollars from the launch of MAP to 1986 while the participating countries financed only US 13.3 million dollars for the same period of time(Haas 1990).

Another reason for MAP's formulating a successful regime was also very economic. Not only UNEP but also a variety of international and regional institutions such as European Community, World Bank and European Investment Bank willingly provided financial supports for MAP. ¹⁴⁾ In the end, many of the less-developing countries who participated in MAP were motivated by these financial inducements from international and regional institutions. However, UNEP's contribution to MAP was not limited to the provision of financial inducements. Although, in the early stage of MAP, it focused on providing financial supports, it began to exert continuous leadership after the establishment of Trust Fund by coordinating difference of viewpoints, urging the fulfillment of the convention¹⁵⁾ or suggesting politically implementable solutions through an aggressive involvement when serious conflicts of opinions among the participating countries came out within MAP or the participating countries were reluctant to fulfill a series of related protocols.

3. NOWPAP

An initial idea for Northwest Pacific Action Plan(NOWPAP) was for the first time discussed in 1991 and finally came true in 1994 – spearheaded by UNEP. When first adopted, the plan also included three supporting resolutions including 5 priority projects. It was one of four regional ocean preservation programs UNEP has led and invited five countries(China, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, Russia) as members. NOWPAP is mainly interested in the preservation of marine environment in Yellow Sea, East China Sea and East Sea.

In the initial stage of NOWPAP there existed several problems with the marking of East

13) It is undeniable that France, in a certain aspect, contributed to financing MAP.

14) For example, European Community invested 2.2 million dollars up to 1986 after the foundation of MAP, World Bank invested 2.35 billion dollars through 37 loan programs for various kinds of environmental projects, and European Development Bank also had put 3 billion ECU into the Mediterranean Sea region since 1980(Skaersth 2001, 323).

15) For example, in the address that Mostafa Tolba made at the 7th meetings of concerned parties held in Cairo in 1991, UNEP strongly criticized the participating countries' reluctance of fulfilling Barcelona convention and other succeeding protocols(Skaersth 2001, 325).

Sea¹⁶⁾ between Japan and South and North Korea, China's contention for the off-limit of Gulf of Bo Hai – in other words, Gulf of Zhili – with a security reason, North Korea's restricted participation by financial problems, UNEP's demand for legal binding force, establishment of general-affairs office and realization of independent budgeting¹⁷⁾ and so on, all of which were likely to be an obstacle for maritime environmental cooperation. However, despite such initial problems NOWPAP has been overcoming them step by step. Now NOWPAP is operating four regional research centers in China, Japan, South Korea and Russia, each of which has mutually different mission.

Table 4 presents the list of NOWPAP Regional Activity Centers(RACs). Korean RAC called Marine Environmental Emergency Preparedness and Response Regional Activity Centre(MERRAC) is located in Daejeon, South Korea and responsible for the marine pollution prevention and response in the respective NOWPAP member states. Pollution Monitoring Regional Activity Center (POMRAC) of UNEP Action Plan was formed by NOWPAP Fourth Intergovernmental Meeting (Beijing, China, April 6-7, 1999) and is hosted and implemented by the Pacific Geographical Institute of the Far Eastern Branch of Russian Academy of Sciences (Vladivostok, Russian Federation). POMRAC is engaged in, inter alia, the development of a regional monitoring programme, development and implementation of monitoring data, quality and analytical control methods, training courses relevant to monitoring methodologies and data and analytical control. The Data and Information Network Regional Activity Center(DINRAC) is envisioned as a primary source of environmental data and information for the NOWPAP region and also as a 'switchboard' to provide links to resources available in NOWPAP member countries, with the ultimate goal to serve as 'NOWPAP Clearing House' to provide DATA and INFORMATION on marine environment quality in the NOWPAP region. Hosted by the Northwest Pacific Region Environmental Cooperation Center (NPEC), CEARAC was established in April 1999 in Toyama, Japan, under auspices of the Ministry of the Environment. Finalization of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with UNEP was made in July 2002, which provides the overall framework for cooperation between UNEP and NPEC. CEARAC is responsible for coordination of regional activities for assessment of the state of the marine, coastal and associated freshwater environments, including assessment of pollutants input for the

16) South and North Korea have jointly and continuously complained of Japanese marking of 'Sea of Japan'. As a result, three parties came to the conclusion that instead of using any of the existing markings used by Japan or two Koreas they would mark the concerned area as an area between 121° E longitude and 143° E and 33° N and 52° N latitude.

17) As aforementioned, NOWPAP heavily relied upon financial support of UNEP at the early stage of its development. However then after it strove for financial independence and thus recently succeeded to establish a firm ground for independent budgeting by mutual budget sharing(25% from Japan, 20% from South Korea, 10% from Russia and 8% from China) (Choi 2002, 142).

purpose of comparison with the monitoring results.

NOWPAP might be evaluated as considerably successful among environmental collaborations having been undertaken in the Northeast Asian region. In its initial stage of development, UNEP Regional Seas Coordinating Office had temporarily handled NOWPAP from 1994 to 2004 and finally transferred its authority to NOWPAP Regional Coordinating Units(NOWPAP RCUs) which were established at the same time both in South Korea and in Japan in November 2004. Owing to the foundation of NOWPAP RCUs, it became possible for NOWPAP member states to independently control NOWPAP by themselves. However, RCU neither in South Korea nor in Japan can never function as a normal type of general-affairs office and thus there exist some limitations in their activities. Although NOWPAP RCUs do not have a normal type of general-affairs office and South Korea and Japan share the responsibility for the operation of NOWPAP, the presence of RCUs as a central administrative office must be highly appreciated in the sense that in a short period of time NOWPAP succeeded to establish a permanent office.

<Table 4> NOWPAP Regional Activity Centers

Acronym	Official Name	Place	Website	Missions
CEARAC	the Special Monitoring and Coastal Environmental Assessment RAC	Toyama Japan	cearac.nowpap.org	Land-based sources, Environmental monitoring and assessment, global chemical conventions
DINRAC	the Data and Information Network RAC	Beijing China	dinrac.nowpap.org	Biodiversity conventions, ecosystem-based management, biodiversity data management
MERRAC	the Marine Environmental Emergency Preparedness and Response RAC	Daejeon South Korea	merrac.nowpap.org	Marine-based pollution, oil and chemical emergency, marine and coastal litter, liability & compensation
POMRAC	the Pollution Monitoring RAC	Bladivostok, Russia	pomrac.nowpap.org	Integrated coastal area management, integrated coastal and river basin management, global atmosphere conventions

Source: Recomposed with the reference to the NOWPAP-related website on the website for UNEP Regional Seas Program. <http://www.unep.org/regionalseas/programmes/unpro/nwpacific/default.asp>. (accessed 23 October, 2009) : Choo et al. (2005), p. 26, Table 2-8.

IV. Comparative Case Analysis of NOWPAP and MAP¹⁸⁾

It is commonly believed among scholars in the discipline of international environmental cooperation that there exists a large gap in the size and power of epistemic communities in regional environmental cooperation between Europe and Northeast Asia (Kim 2007). Overall the amount of influence that epistemic communities can produce depends upon not only the degree of their independence from governmental authorities but also their abilities to solve the problems of information complexity and uncertainty policy-makers cope with. That is, the intensity of consensus building among scientific experts determines the degree of policy practitioners' dependence on epistemic communities.

Although NOWPAP has been evaluated as a successful attempt for environmental collaboration, it would be very hard to conclude that it is quite successful in comparison with other UNEP Regional Seas Programs. Especially it seems to be almost impossible to directly compare the degree of success between MAP and NOWPAP. As mentioned above, NOWPAP has been incapable of initiating a convention that would play an important role as a legal framework for the action plan over 14 years after it started in 1994 while MAP easily reached the convention in 1976 immediately a year later from its beginning. NOWPAP would be considered successful in some sense insofar as it is taken into account that it succeeded to establish two RCUs in South Korea and Japan and to finalize the ratio and amount of Trust Fund rendering NOWPAP financially independent from UNEP. Considering any aspect of both action programs, there seems to be no reason to regard them as similar. Rather both programs turn out to be quite contrasting in the sense that MAP can be classified as a typical case of success while NOWPAP as exactly the opposite case.

What, if so, contributes to obtaining such contrasting outcomes between both programs? In a general view of point, comparing the degree of severity of environmental pollution that both programs encountered, we can simply guess that it would be much easier for MAP to

18) The reason why this paper selects only two cases of NOWPAP and MAP among existing 13 cases of UNEP Regional Seas Program is somewhat complicated. First, the two cases are chosen since I think that existing case studies have failed to control differences in conditional elements such as politics, economy, history, society and culture of related regions and thus the most important factor deciding the success and failure of this type of research heavily relies upon such differences in conditional elements. In addition, it is commonly believed that the field of marine pollution is a highly recommended research area suitable for applying the conceptual framework of MLG because environmental protection in the field of marine pollution is unlikely to be undertaken without close collaborations among not only related governments but also local self-governing bodies, NGOs, environmental experts and business enterprises.

reach agreement than NOWPAP. The severity of environmental problems in the Mediterranean Sea region is much more serious than that of environmental problems in the Northwest Pacific region. In case of the Mediterranean Sea, as revealed above, the primary concern at the initial stage of MAP establishment was mainly given to such marine pollution as maritime oil spillage. However, as scientific studies on the environmental pollution of the Mediterranean Sea has been accumulated, it revealed that 80% of environmental pollutions in the Mediterranean Sea derived from land-based sources of pollution such as influx of pollutants produced in inland and coastal areas into the Mediterranean Sea rather than marine pollution itself. In spite of the partial opposition of the advanced countries within the region like France and Italy, the fact that the MAP member states rapidly created a consensus on the seriousness of land-based sources of pollutions provided a helpful momentum and powerful driving force in the developmental process of MAP. All these considerations offer us contrasting features of pre-conditions for epistemic community explained through Table 2. MAP was given a relatively good condition for the development of epistemic community(very traditional issue-areas and strong cohesion) while NOWPAP was faced with the worst condition(basically traditional but somewhat esoteric issue-areas and very weak cohesion).

On the contrary, NOWPAP has had substantive difficulties in creating a consensus on primary sources of marine pollution among its member states though NOWPAP enjoyed better conditions in terms of the number of the concerned parties than MAP. In general, emphasizing dissimilarities of the policy implementation process between NOWPAP and MAP, scholars argue that MAP possessed better conditions guaranteeing institutional success than NOWPAP. However, there is a doubt about whether policy-making environments surrounding MAP are that much different from current conditions that NOWPAP faces with.

It seems apparent that in the mid of 1970's when MAP was under construction less developed countries(LDCs) and developed countries(DCs) coexisted in the coastal area of the Mediterranean Sea region. The former group of countries covered France, Italy, Spain and Greece while the latter group of countries included Turkey and small countries of the North African coastal area. Thus this dissimilarity of the degree of economic development among the MAP member states was no less severe than that of economic development among the NOWPAP member states. Judging from political and diplomatic situations, it is hard to say that MAP enjoyed more favorable and stable conditions than NOWPAP. In the 1970's the Mediterranean Sea region was politically unstable. Long-lasting antagonistic relationship between Greece and Turkey was not as serious as historical animosities among three Northeast Asian countries. In 1995 when the Barcelona Conference was convened, preliminary meetings held to settle the long-lasting confrontation between Greece and Turkey went round and round in circles and did not make any progress due to each party's stiff-necked

attitude(Skaersth 2001).

In socio-cultural aspect, the MAP member states were ethnically, socially and culturally as diverse as the NOWPAP member states. In order to precisely compare differences of performance between MAP and NOWPAP and to rightly understand the root cause of such difference, it is important to investigate organizational differences between NOWPAP and MAP in detail. First of all, there exist the 22 contracting parties who signed and ratified the Barcelona Convention at the core of the organizational structure of MAP. The contracting parties made decisions associated with various strategies, budgets and programs for common goals in ministerial meetings having been convened once every two years. They also appointed major persons in charge in order to supervise the implemental status of recommendations to MAP and to monitor the progress of projects. General-affairs office comprised of six representatives from the contracting parties was assigned a mission to lead and advise the secretary of MAP during the interim period between MAP meetings biannually held.

The MAP Coordinating Unit(MEDU) that played an important role in the internal organizational structure of MAP was placed in Athens, Greece in accordance with Host Country Agreement between Greece and UNEP in 1982. Greek government not only provided financial and logistic support with MAP but also granted the secretary of MAP a status of diplomat. MEDU played a primary role as a general-affairs office of MAP, supervised important organizations under the auspice of MAP such as regional activity centers, further performed a role as a medium for political and diplomatic communications and organizes crucial meetings and programs. Though most of the MAP activities were financed by contributions that the contracting parties provided for the Mediterranean Trust Fund, special projects or missions were sometimes undertaken under the financial support of voluntary contributions from EU, UN agencies and international organizations like Global Environment Facility (GEF).

Apart from the organizations mentioned above, primary organizations of MAP include Mediterranean Commission on Sustainable Development (MCSD), Programme for the Assessment and Control of Marine Pollution in the Mediterranean Region (MED POL) and six MAP Regional Activity Centers (RACs). MCSD plays an important role as a unique advisory institution in which governments of the contracting parties, local self-governing bodies, business enterprises, and NGO representatives are participating on equal footing. MCSD provides a discussion forum for the sustainable development of the Mediterranean Sea region and at the same time plays an important role as a think-tank for strategic issues. As a principal partner of Mediterranean Strategy on Sustainable Development (MSSD), MCSD plays an important role of supporting and monitoring MSSD's activities in regional or

national dimension.

MED POL is a research organization that treat scientific and technical matters of MAP and responsible for implementing protocols for land-based sources of pollution, dumping and hazardous wastes. It assists the formulation and implementation of pollution monitoring programs undertaken by the Mediterranean countries, including action plans and pollution control measures for the elimination of land-based pollution. Six RACs provide professional knowledge about environment and development required in the process of implementing MAP activities.¹⁹⁾

As mentioned above, the organizational structure of MAP has been divided into various types of internal organizations including MEDU, MCSD and MED POL and its jurisdiction has been also disseminated and then vertically and horizontally dispersed according to their working areas. Judging from the aforementioned classification of MLG, the governance type of MAP demonstrates the dispersibility of jurisdictions(or authorities) that actors who play in 'Type II MLG' are likely to show.

Contrarily, in case of NOWPAP attitudes of the related international organization such as UNEP and ESCAP are much more pessimistic than in case of MAP. This pessimism of the related international organizations eventually allowed governments of the concerned parties to control the organizational structure of NOWPAP in an easier way and as a result, hindered divisions into various types of actor groups and dispersions of jurisdictions as observed in MAP. Therefore, the organizational structure of NOWPAP was constructed in a way that central government as a national-level governance actor monopolized all the jurisdictions. As a consequence, the boundary of each governance level in a system of MLG became more hardened and closed. At the same time linkages between each level of governance take on an independent nature rather than on an interdependent one and thus the governance structure of NOWPAP could not achieve any synergy effect from the interdependence between each level of governance. It means that the governance structure of NOWPAP was overwhelmed by 'Type I MLG' in which the intergovernmental meeting as a highest level of authority within NOWPAP vertically control RCUs and RCAs in sequential order. It is typically a government-minded decision-making organization and thus by nature excludes any possibility of evolving from 'Type I MLG' into 'Type II MLG'.

Why did NOWPAP take a different route toward 'Type I MLG' while MAP directly evolved into 'Type II MLG'? To answer this question, it is necessary to understand the

19) For more details about organizational structure of MAP, refer to the following website. http://www.unepmap.org/index.php?module=content2&catid=001017&ocat_id=001017.(accessed 6 January, 2001); Skaereth(2001).

particularity hidden in the history of bureaucracy in the Northeast Asian countries. Compared to the MAP member states (especially a few leading European countries like France, Spain and Italy), the NOWPAP members states have a historically strong background for authoritative bureaucracy. Some political economy literatures that account for East Asian economic miracle well demonstrate that while developing their economies, the bureaucracies of those countries played an important role as a facilitator of modernization and industrialization. Kim(2007) and Wilkening(2004) tried to find the reason why the environmental regime in the field of acid rain deposition was unable to be well established in the Northeast Asian region. In conclusion, they found a clue from the tradition of ‘vertical structuring’ in the Northeast Asian countries meaning that “a scientist’s lines of communication are strongest vertically with his or her home bureaucracy but weaker horizontally across bureaucracies”(Kim 2007, 455). This historical peculiarity of Northeast Asian bureaucracy consequently resulted in higher degree of epistemic communities’ dependence on bureaucracy rather than vice versa in the MAP case.

The relative weakness of epistemic communities in the Northeast Asian countries affected all kinds of activity areas under the auspice of NOWPAP. For the institutional success of NOWPAP efficient activities by RACs are considered primary since RACs are representing working organizations for NOWPAP. However, each center seems not to be free from a sponsoring government’s influence because without a sponsoring government’s extra support for finance and human resources, there would be almost no possibility that any of four RACs could maintain its organization or complete its missions. In case of MERRAC, Korean government and the Korea Ocean Research and Development Institute(KORDI)²⁰) has been sponsoring research funds and human resources for MERRAC(Chung 2006, 127). Taking all the cases of NOWPAP RACs into consideration, there seems to be no exceptional case at all. Under these circumstances, it seems almost impossible that dispersions or delegations of authorities or jurisdictions occur in the horizontal direction.

In addition, the role of leadership also plays important role in determining the possible route of governance evolution. Playing a leadership role for the establishment of MAP, France and UNEP demonstrated different styles of leadership. At the beginning stage of MAP, the leadership role France willingly took in pursuit of its own national interest served as a foundation for the further development of MAP. France played an important role as a hegemon, thereby functioned as centripetal force for bonding of member states.

20) KORDI is a government-sponsored semi-public research institute established in 1973. Its main mission is to perform basic and applied research to promote the efficient use of coastal and ocean resources. For more details about KORDI, refer to the following website. <http://www.kordi.re.kr/english/bin/main.asp>. (accessed 20 January, 2010)

France's scientific research tradition also contributed to developing epistemic communities within MAP by UNEP. Having been exerted until UNEP took over its leadership in 1976, French leadership mostly relied upon a series of political arrangements as hegemons usually did in order to maintain international regimes. For example, France pursued its political interests through its economic, financial and scientific capabilities rather than reinforcing epistemic community power (Chung 1999, 368–369). By contrast, UNEP's leadership was considerably different from France's in the sense that it introduced the notion of 'ecological region' that enabled politically different states into a unitary scheme, developed its own epistemic community and provided side-payments to the member states – in particular LDCs – in order to promote their participation (Chung 1999, 376).

V. Concluding Remarks

As the existing literature on European and Northeast Asian environmental collaborations have repeatedly argued, it is true that difficulties in achieving effective environmental cooperation in the Northeast Asian region cannot be fully explained by such factors as historical peculiarities, complicatedness of political and diplomatic relations, and striking differences in economic power among the Northeast Asian countries including South Korea, Japan and China. The result of a case analysis for MAP well demonstrates that the MAP concerned parties experienced more complicated historical background and remarkable diversities in politics, society, economy and culture than the NOWPAP concerned parties did. Therefore, emphasizing such solutions as overcoming cultural underdevelopment, clearing historical debts and restoring initiatives of sovereign states are all meaningless. In order to set up a right direction of environmental cooperation in the Northeast Asian region, it is primarily necessary to make a precise diagnosis of fundamental features and problems of environmental governance structure in the Northeast Asian region.

As revealed throughout the previous sections, environmental governance structure of the Northeast Asian region cannot be classified as 'Type II MLG' in which actors in various levels of governance vigorously interact with each other under the circumstances of dispersed structure of authority distribution, opened boundary and interconnected linkage. Instead, it shows the characteristics of 'Type I MLG' in which centralized structure of authority distribution, closed boundary and independent pattern of linkage. Under this closed type of MLG, interactions between levels of governance and among governance actors of each level might not occur in full scale and thus they could interact with each other only within a limited extent not interfering government jurisdictions.

In Northeast Asian regional governance in which ‘Type I MLG’ has ruled, it would be difficult to anticipate voluntary solidarity among internal actors of national governance structure such as local governments, local or domestic civil society and business enterprises only with an exception of central government actor. Therefore, central government’s effort to disperse or delegate its authorities, open up boundaries and promote interdependent linkages among non-governmental actors so that ‘Type I MLG’ can naturally evolve into ‘Type II MLG’. As appeared in MAP which displays a typical nature of ‘Type II MLG’, a purposive effort to activate a special governance mechanism as ‘Agenda 21’ supported by UN may help internal governance actors by themselves to become main agents for environmental cooperation.

As observed in case of MAP, the role of epistemic communities and leadership exerted by France and UNEP played an important role in achieving effective control over land-based pollution sources. Learning from MAP’s experiences, it is required to build up a strong leadership as soon as possible regardless of whether one of three major countries takes a leadership position or UNEP take the lead as in the MAP case. Other international organizations such as ESCAP, UNFCCC and APEC need to give their concern on providing relevant support for NOWPAP.

In addition, NOWPAP needs to realize horizontal dispersion of authority and solidarity with actors in other levels of governance by reinforcing relationship with local governance actors. If NOWPAP continuously makes an effort to achieve vertical dispersion of authority and horizontal sharing which has been delayed under ‘Type I MLG’, it would, in near future, become possible to contract regional maritime conventions as MAP did.

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Abstract

The Role of Epistemic Community in Some Experiences of Multi-Level Governance: – Two Contrasting Cases of Regional Seas Programs, NOWPAP and MAP –

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This study introduces the notion of epistemic community and the concept of multi-level governance(MLG) mostly used by researchers who deal with regional integration in Western countries such as European Union(EU) which remains politically, socially and culturally less heterogeneous and in which their civil societies remain relatively mature. In particular, this paper makes an effort to combine the notion of MLG and epistemic community in a single theoretical framework in order to relevantly explain the contrasting outcomes of MAP and NOWPAP. By doing so, this study challenges to an alternative explanation of environmental cooperation in the Northeast Asian region based upon MLG and ultimately tries to find a way of promoting MLG within the Northeast Asian region.

The result of a case analysis for MAP well demonstrates that the MAP concerned parties experienced more complicated historical background and remarkable diversities in politics, society, economy and culture than the NOWPAP concerned parties did. Therefore, emphasizing such solutions as overcoming cultural underdevelopment, clearing historical debts and restoring initiatives of sovereign states are all meaningless. In order to set up a right direction of environmental cooperation in the Northeast Asian region, it is primarily necessary to make a precise diagnosis of fundamental features and problems of environmental governance structure in the Northeast Asian region.

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