

# Psychological Aspects of Patriotism and Territorial Disputes in Northeast Asia\*

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현재 한중일 삼국 사이에 진행되고 있는 역사 분쟁 또는 논쟁의 근본적이고 본질적인 이유는 역사인식의 바탕이 되고 있는 국가주의가 그 근간을 이루고 있다. 이는 결국 현실에서 영토영유권 문제라는 현실문제의 갈등으로 표면화되고 있다. 다시 말해 현재 동북아시아지역 국가들 사이에서 진행되고 있는 역사분쟁과 영토분쟁은 하나의 카테고리, 즉 근대 이후에 형성된

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국가주의를 근간으로 하는 애국주의의 적극적인 표현으로 설명되어야 할 것이다. 이에 본 논문은 동북아 삼국 사이에서 벌어지고 있는 영유권 분쟁의 해결 방안을 예측하기 위하여 한중일 삼국 일반 국민들의 영유권 해결방안에 대한 인식을 비교 분석해 보았다. 본 논문은 국민의 애국심 정도와 심리적 기저에 대해 계량적으로 분석하고 있다. 세 나라 국민들의 유교적 가치에 내재된 충(忠)이라는 인식구조를 과학적인 여론 조사를 통하여 비교 분석함으로써 향후 삼국 사이의 영토 분쟁 해결에 있어서 어느 나라가 좀 더 군사적(hard power) 해결을 평화적 해결(soft power)보다 우선하게 될 것인지를 예측하는 데 본 논문의 목적이 있다. 구조적 등식 분석 모델을 분석해 본 결과 가까운 미래에 만약 영유권 분쟁이 심각해질 경우 중일관계가 한일 관계보다 평화적 해결이 어려울 것으로 예측되었다. 독도를 중심으로 한 한일 관계 악화는 중일 관계에 비추어 보면 부정적인 측면이 그보다는 적게 나타나고 있다는 것을 제시하고 있다.

▪ 주제어: 민족주의, 유교의 충(忠), 동북아시아, 영토 분쟁, 평화

## I . Introduction

It is not a surprising issue that Japan has been embroiled in heated disputes with South Korea, China, and Russia. Four states of Northeast Asia - Japan, China, Russia, and South Korea - have been involved in the world's most vexing territorial disputes over small islands and rocks located from the Northern East Sea (Sea of Japan) through the East China Seas. Nationalist feelings based on historical grievances and the economic beneficiary expectations that the disputed areas contain are the fundamental reasons behind these disputes. Animistic feelings against each other, in particular, between South Korea and Japan, has never been banished or alleviated. At present, antagonistic feelings between Japanese and Chinese people tend to reach to the level of military conflict due to the territorial

dispute of Senkaku/Daiyou island. With no doubt, strong nationalistic feelings with unresolved historical legacies among three countries (S. Korea, Japan, and China) have fueled the conflict situations of these territorial disputes since the end of World-War II. For instance, Japanese Prime Minister Abe's visit to Yasukuni war shrine added tensions on Northeast Asian region in the end of 2013(Harlan, 2013).

Although all states in the disputed areas clearly recognize their feelings of antagonism related on the territorial disputes, they acknowledge the urgent necessity of collaboration to develop not only their domestic economy within the boundary of territorial sovereignty but also accomplish political stability and order in Northeast Asia region. This is an irony for all states in the region that they have to eat cake and have it at the same time. Because most states in the world are involved in multilayered relations with other states, it is not so strange a story that they occasionally face the difficult process of decision-making to find the optimum-point of unbalanced relations with other states. Moreover, because the multilayered relations contain two or more agents and their diverse purposes of exchanges in different levels, it becomes very difficult to predict how the relations between two or more states would be changed and what factors would play an important role in driving the relations.

Based on the basic proposition of international relations field - domestic politics (in particular, public opinion or feelings) influence the relationships with other states outside by directly impacting on the foreign policy making process. This study tries to answer the following question: what kinds of the psychological aspect of the public's patriotism tend to drive Northeast Asian states into the chicken-run game track dealing with their territorial disputes?

In terms of the public opinion about territorial disputes in Northeast Asia region, most studies have been considering the concept of

nationalism or patriotism and its impact on foreign policy decision-making process(Rozman 2011; Kim 2005). In this study, the authors try to show that there is another psychological aspect related to the public's lovely feeling about their own country, so called, "Confucian Loyalty", which has been a unique cultural heritage of Northeast Asian countries, in particular, China and S. Korea. Unlike the contractual relationship between individual and the state in Western society, the relationships between their own countries and the people in Northeast Asia are considered as the relationships of parents and children. The authors argue that it is impossible for countries with territorial disputes in Northeast Asia have an opportunity to resolve their territorial disputes in terms of peaceful and reciprocal compromising ways because the peoples in this region tend to regard the relationship toward their country as the same as one toward their parents from the bottom of their hearts. Moreover, this study tries to show how the different psychological motif (feeling) of loving for their own countries in Northeast Asian countries, such as China, S. Korea, and Japan, impact their relationships with each other in the 21st century?

The rest of the paper consists of five sections except for an introductory part. The second part of the paper describes how the territorial disputes among Japan, South Korea, and China look like and how strongly the peoples of these countries support their governments' efforts to resolve territorial disputes without any kind of armed conflicts. In the third part, the authors conceptualize two important variables, nationalism and Confucian Loyalty. And this part of the paper provides theoretical overviews about the relationship between two psychological feelings of loving for countries and the people's willingness of fighting for their countries. Section 4 examines variations in levels of nationalism and Confucian Loyalty that three

Northeast Asian countries have. Lastly, section 5 presents what this study finds about how these two independent variables -Confucian Loyalty and nationalism- influence on the way of escalating tensions among countries in territorial disputes. In addition, section 5 provides the statistical tests for the main hypothesis of this study: A country of the people with high level of Confucian Loyalty and low level of nationalism is more likely to support for peaceful resolution ways dealing with its territorial disputes than a country of the people with low level of Confucian Loyalty and high level of nationalism in Northeast Asia region.

## **II. The Public's Preference of Peaceful Resolution Dealing with Territorial Disputes**

Northeast Asia region is a boiling pot with the world's most vexing territorial disputes. It is not necessary for these territorial disputes to cover the entire soil of a particular country. Even small, barely habitable offshore islands can serve as the most persistent and explosive bone of contention. Besides the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute in East China Sea, such unresolved island disputes take places with competing sovereignty claims to the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands in the East Sea/Sea of Japan, to the Northern Territories/Kurile Islands in the Northwest Pacific Ocean, To the Islands of Sipadan, Sebatik, and Ligitan in the Celebes Sea, and lastly to the Paracel and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.


First, related to the relations between China and Japan, the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute dates back to the 1970s. Recently,

when China and Taiwan protested Japan's declaration of a 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) around the features, it erupted into the public feelings in June 1996. The eventual owner between China and Japan could claim some 11,700 square nautical miles of maritime space and continental shelf, as well as the resources therein. On 26 May 1997, a flotilla carrying Taiwan and Hong Kong activists attempted to land people on the islands as a challenge to Japan's claim of sole sovereignty over them. However, this time Japanese coast guard vessels successfully prevented a landing. This provocative public feeling of Chinese nationalism was a predictable response to a well-publicized visit to the rocks earlier that month (May 6) by Japanese nationalists led by Shin Nishimura, a member of the opposition New Frontier Party. On 5 September 1999, another landing was carried out by three members of the Japan Youth League, a Japanese nationalist group. This landing was presented as a protest against an increased presence of Chinese survey vessels in the vicinity. In the aftermath of the landing, China again demanded that Japanese government punish the offenders and take all possible measures to prevent future landings. Both governments feared that this incident would rekindle the domestically sensitive ownership issue in their countries.

According to the survey data that was conducted for Japanese adults in 2008<sup>1)</sup>, less than 9% of survey respondents agree to that both governments should be willing to compromise for the territorial dispute.

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1) "Soft Power in Asian Survey, 2008" provided by ICPSR. Data Downloaded on Sept. 6, 2012 from <http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR/TERMS/25342.xml>



<Figure 1> Public Opinions about Territorial Disputes in East Sea Rim Region

According to Figure 1, whereas the percentage of respondents who think “Japan should not be willing to compromise the conflict against China” is just little over of 37% in Japan, in the case of China, it shows that the percentage of people who think “China should not be willing to compromise the conflict against Japan” is over 87% in China. In other words, Chinese ordinary people’s level of hate feeling against Japan is almost twice higher than the level of Japanese feeling against China. One of plausible reason for why Chinese people express extremely aggressive feelings against Japanese territorial claims over the small island seems to be the current situation of territorial occupational status: the occupation by Japan. It has been occupied by Japan in 1945 with an exclusively endowed right of actual effect domination. Therefore, Japanese people do not have to take any actions in urgent which might stimulate Chinese peoples’ feelings of hate against Japan.

In terms of the Dok-Do/Takeshima dispute between Japan and South Korea (Korea hereafter), the dispute over two barren rocks

raised its ugly head. These rocks could allow claims to about 16,600 square nautical miles of sea and seabed and their associated (Valencia n.d., 2).

They have been in dispute since the liberation of Korea from Japanese occupation, and the tension increased when both Japan and Korea announced in February, 1996 that they were extending their respective 200-nautical mile EEZs to encompass the disputed features. Korea held military maneuvers around the islands and constructed a wharf on one of them. Japan's foreign minister demanded that the construction be halted and reiterated Japan's sovereignty claim over the islands. This generated a outrageous response in Korea: for instance, there were massive protest rallies in major cities, and Japanese national flags were burned.

The dispute erupted again in 1998 when the two countries failed to agree on a modus operandi for Dok-Do/Takeshima and the surrounding waters. And Japan unilaterally terminated its fisheries agreement with Korea. Korea responded by lifting all restrictions on Korean fishing boats operating in Japan's claimed waters, prompting Japan to begin arresting Korean fishing boats within its territorial seas. Korean public got angry enough to raise anti-Japanese demonstrations. The fisheries dispute was resolved with a new agreement in 1998. Currently, president of South Korea, Myoung Bak Lee visited Dok-Do/Takeshima island in 2012 and announced territorial sovereignty over Dok-Do. He was the first president who visited Dok-Do since Korea made its official diplomatic relations with Japan. Korean president's visit to Dok-Do pushed Japanese government to recall its ambassador from Korea.

In terms of Japanese and Koreans' perceptions about territorial dispute, Figure 1 shows that there is similar pattern between two countries in both countries' public opinions about Dok-Do/Takeshima



territorial dispute.<sup>2)</sup> In short, Chinese people show much higher level of aggressive and non-negotiable feelings against Japanese government than that of Japanese against China. There are two reasons for why Chinese people express such a diplomatic mean based on hard-power strategy. First, unlike the Dok-Do/Takeshima case in which S. Korean police men occupied, Daiyou/Senkaku is now under the control of Japanese government. For Japanese people, territorial dispute over Daiyou/Senkaku is not an emergent and time-limited issue. Second, except for the modern period of Chinese history, China had never been expelled from the leading position as a strongest regional power. Chinese people tend to have, somewhat, hostile feelings against Japan because they were treated as crummy country's people compared to the other Asian countries by Japanese imperial army during the WWII. It is not the fabulous thought that Chinese people may have unconsciousness desire to pay off their historical debt to Japan.

Before moving to the conceptualization of people's feelings toward their own countries (for instance, nationalism and Confucian loyalty), it is necessary to briefly inquire into why ordinary peoples' feelings or opinion are regarded as one of key factors in terms of foreign policy decision-making process. The theoretical assumptions of relationship between people's opinions/attitudes and foreign policy decision-making process is based in constructivism.

Like other systemic theories of international relations, constructivists believe that an objective world can be studied systematically. Unlike neorealism, but like some neoliberal institutionalists (NLI), constructivist

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2) Both Japanese and Korean public tend not to support for their governments' any efforts to peacefully solve the territorial conflict. Whereas about 39% of Japanese respondents are not likely to force their government to compromise the territorial dispute, about 36% of Korean respondents are not likely to force their government to compromise.

s believe that ideas affect choice. But, they differ from neoliberal institutionalists in two ways : first, while NLI argues that interests are structurally given, constructivism claims that interests are constituted through communication, interaction and persuasion, second, while NLI takes a position of methodological individualism, constructivism seeks to specify the dynamic relationship between agents and structure. Hence, while, for neoliberal institutionalists, ideas are a given property of individuals which may influence individual choice, constructivism believes that ideas have structural characteristics (Zehfuss 2002). According to Adler, Ideas - understood more generally as collective knowledge institutionalized in practices - define what is cognitively possible for individuals. Identities and interests of political agents are socially constructed by collective interpretations about the world. These collective understandings are in turn the outcome of interacting individuals who act purposively on the basis of their personal beliefs (Adler 1997).

With respect to the study of territorial disputes in East Sea Rim region, constructivism contests the neorealist/neoliberal assumptions of a fixed international system based on sovereign territorial states. According to Ruggie, state territoriality has become “unbundled” as a result of the diffusion of understandings across national boundaries, high levels of communication, economic interdependence and cooperative practices (1992). Moreover, constructivism emphasizes the need to analyze norms and understanding underlying particular regimes and to identify the actors who dominate the definition of these collective understandings (Snidal 1991). Rather than considering territorial disputes as rational responses to particular constellations of interests, constructivism views each country’s interests rooted from regional territorial disputes as imaginary ideas subject to be reinterpreted and persuaded. For constructivists, not only do they acknowledge the importance of system in which territorial disputes

take place, but also they are trying to catch up the importance of agents' ideas and attitudes.

In terms of constructivists' emphasis on understanding the active role of agents in resolving territorial disputes related with two or more countries' sovereignty claims, it is usually unable to formulate systematic predictions about who are key agents: for instance, government leaders negotiating the deal, global and regional networks, epistemic communities, mobile capital, bureaucracies or interest groups? In addition, constructivists have done little systematic empirical research mapping prevalent collective understandings, comparing regionally delineated collective understandings, and specifying the interaction between global and regional societies.

Unlike from the other systemic theories, constructivists tend to speculate political and social reality as something combined material world with normative-representational field(Wendt 1999, 170-171). For constructivists, although material world exists, it has a meaning. This meaning is socially constructed, develops through social interaction and may be different for different observers(Zehfuss 2002). Social interaction generates structures of collective meaning. Through such structures, actors acquire identity, which is the basis for interest formation, which in its turn is the basis for action. Identity, in case of escalating the tension between two countries involved in territorial disputes, can be understood as 'likability toward his/her own country' that influences how she/he recognize initial image about a certain country-level issue. Thus, likability of the ordinary public in East Sea Rim region would impact on their opinions about how to resolve territorial disputes, which is just like what constructivists expect.

### III. Theoretical Overview of Nationalism and Empirical Measurement

In terms of likability toward country (or nation), likability can be measured as psychological distance from the object that is supposed to an aimed target. Likability, for instance, can be estimated by asking a simple question to respondents, such as “How much do you like~?” Respondents may indicate one number in ten-scaled answer sheet. Yet, because this study tries to look into people’s psychological aspects about territorial disputes in East Sea Rim region, the concept of likability must be analyzed in different way with that a researcher is able to catch the psychological meaning or implication of respondents. To do so, a researcher needs to know better about “why the respondent like something” than “how much the respondent like something.”

Related to psychological aspect of answering to the question “why do you like~?” there are three causal linkages toward the respondent’s feelings of attractiveness: subjective reasons, objective reasons, and duty for making some other relations better. The meaning of subjective reasons of likability implies that people tend to like something because of some reasons which she/he subjectively defined based on her/his self-made measure (or standard). For instance, a respondent may answer to the question such as “I like my country because our history is far advanced than those of any other countries in the earth.” Related to likability toward the country, people in this type of answering tend to have high level of pride in his/her country and show off the superiority of his/her own nation. Objective reasons of likability implies that people tend to like something because

of some reasons which are objectively defined and estimated based on reliable measure (or standard). For instance, a respondent may answer to the question such as "I like my country because people's level of living standard is much higher than those of the other countries." Although two types (subjective and objective reasons) of answering presents some similarity in people's likeness of their country, people with the type of objective reasons tend not to show off the superiority of his/her own country. Therefore, people with the type of objective reasons tend to have open-mind and flexible to unexpected situation, which implies that they have better psychological aspect than people with the type of subjective reasons on the table of diplomatic negotiation with other countries. Unlike the people with objective or subjective reasons for loving country, there are some people who feel responsibility to like something which might be subconsciously influenced by a certain type of social culture or be involuntarily attained by social education system. People with this type of likability tend to be regarded as people with closed mind, non-negotiable characteristic on the table of diplomatic bargaining.

However, for analyzing the psychological aspects of the public's preference in determining diplomatic resolution methods, given the analysis of people's feelings of likability, this study suggests two types of national likability of ordinary peoples in East Sea Rim region: Nationalism and Confucian Loyalty. For the first concept, some scholars tend to understand the meaning of nationalism as something synthesized with more than one single meaning. They conceptualize "nationalism" as a multilayered concept which consists of two different types of national identity: "nationalism" and "constructive patriotism"(Davidov 2009). National identity represents different aspects of an individual's relationship toward his or her nation. Generally speaking, what it describes is the intensity of feelings and closeness

toward one's own nation(Blank and Schmidt 2003). Previously, empirical work has treated it as a one-dimensional construct. Only a few studies argued that national identity is two-dimensional (Sommerville 1981). Researchers arguing two-dimensionality of national identity are used to distinguish between two types or forms of national attachment, each one differing in the conception of how the relation between the individual and the nation is structured. They regard one aspect of national identity as blind, militaristic, ignorant, obedient, or irrational and the other as genuine, constructive, critical, civic, reasonable, and disobedient. The first is related to negative aspect of national identity that has been labeled "nationalism, pseudo-patriotism, chauvinism, or blind patriotism," and was found to be associated with authoritarianism(Blank 2003). The second has been labeled constructive or positive patriotism that has been labeled civic or political national pride based on being proud of the country's political institutions, culture, economy, and social welfare system (Hjerm 1998).


According to Schatz, Staub, and Lavine, there are two types of patriotism: blind (or nationalism) and constructive patriotism(1999). They describe blind patriotism as "a rigid and inflexible attachment to country, characterized by unquestioning positive evaluation"(Schatz, Staub and Lavine 1999, 153). In contrast, they define constructive patriotism as "an attachment to country characterized by critical loyalty"(Schatz, Staub and Lavine 1999, 153). The blind patriot considers criticism of the state as disloyal, whereas constructive patriots may even criticize the state themselves, if they feel that the state violates their ideology or if they believe the state is mistaken.

Following the line of thoughts of Schatz, Staub, and Lavine(1999), Blank, Schmidt, and Westle also propose the consideration of two types of national identity: nationalism and constructive patriotism(2001

). They argue that one should distinguish between them both conceptually and empirically. Nationalism should reflect the idealization of one's own nation and its history. However, according to Adorno et al(1950). constructive patriotism is defined as the "love of the country" and attachment to its humanistic and democratic values(i.e., support for "humanistic" government, support for "democratic principles," support for advanced system of social welfare, etc.). Blank and Schmidt(2003) describe nationalism and constructive patriotism as more specific expressions of national of national identity, whereas national identity is the more general concept(Bar-Tal 1997). From this point of view, they argue that nationalism is characterized by idealization of the nation: a feeling of national superiority; an uncritical acceptance of national, state, and political authorities; a suppression of ambivalent attitudes toward the nation; an inclination to define one's own group by criteria of descent, race, or cultural affiliation; and derogation of groups not considered to be a part of the nation. By contrast, constructive patriotism is viewed as having the following aspects: the nation is not idealized, but critically evaluated; support for the system as long as the nation's aims are in accord with humanistic values; support for democratic principles and an advanced social system; rejection of an uncritical acceptance of state authorities; and acceptance of negative nation-related emotions(Blank and Schmidt 2003).

However, because this study is aimed to compare Nationalism and Confucian Loyalty, it is necessary to regard two types of nationalism (blind nationalism and constructive patriotism) as one type of nationalism with a long range of psychological spectrum, for instance, from low level of national pride (equalized to the characteristics of constructive patriotism, so called open-minded for critics) to high level of national proudness (blind patriotism which implies superior feeling

about own nationality). For empirically measuring peoples' levels of nationalism, this study uses a survey data with the following questionnaire: How much do you proud of your country?




<Figure 2> Time-series Data Graph for the Chinese Nationalism Level

<Figure 2> shows the changes of the level of Chinese nationalism between 1993 and 2007. Since the 1980s, Chinese government initiated state-driven economic development policy and opened all gates of economic exchange paths to the world. In generally speaking, successful economic development by government tends to promote people's pride of nationality (Seckington 2002). Yet, although the year of survey starting presented gradual rising pattern in Chinese nationalism, it reached the bottom of nationalism level in 2007. One of reasons for the lowest level of nationalism in 2007 is the government's failure in distribution policy resulted from unbalanced economic development between the eastern coast area and the western desert area, also between the urban area and the rural area. However, it seems to be understandable that the Chinese government made huge efforts in promoting Chinese people's level of nationalism by




successfully performing the Olympics in Beijing, 2008(Zhao 2008).



<Figure 3> Time-series Data Graph for the Japanese Nationalism Level

<Figure 3> shows that there is a certain pattern of the Japanese nationalism level from the early 1980s to 2007. The highest level of Japanese nationalism had never reached to the ceiling of the graph. Unlike the Japanese and Koreans cases, the level of Chinese peoples' nationalism had been at the top. In other words, the range of nationalism levels in China is longer than those of Japan and S. Korea. The pattern of up-and-down in Chinese peoples' nationalism implies that Chinese people are more (political or economic) issue-oriented people who are emotionally unstable when they face to some humiliated situation. For instance, the graph in <Figure 3> implies when the Japanese government or officials claim(s) their territorial occupation on islands, Chinese people would be expected to show their enthusiastic blind-patriotism.



<Figure 4> Time-series Data Graph for the South Korean Nationalism Level

According to <Figure 4>, overall average of nationalism in S. Korea is the lowest compared it to the cases of China and Japan. Yet, the graph of <Figure 4> also implies that S. Korean society now entered into the way of democratic consolidation in 2004 because one of indicators for a state's launching the final stage of democratic development is social stability within territorial boundary(Diamond and Kim 2000). For the unusual case of S. Korea with stabilized feelings of Koreans but very sensitive towards any issues of their countries including territorial disputes, there might be other psychological aspect of national likability, in particular, more in Korean peoples' minds than in the other two states' peoples. What this study regards as the other "psychological aspect" is "Confucian Loyalty."

#### IV. Theoretical Overview of Confucian Loyalty: The Ethical System of Benevolence - Righteousness - Propriety (ren-yi-li)

According to Confucian's understanding of human beings as

biological organisms, human beings are born with a number of innate desires: there belongs to it, even at his birth, the love of gain, and as actions are in accordance with this, contentions and robberies grow up, and self-denial and yielding to others are not to be found.

“there belong to it envy and dislike, and as actions are in accordance with these, violence and injuries spring up, and self-devotedness and faith are not to be found; there belong to it the desires of the ears and the eyes, leading to the love of sounds and beauty, and as the actions are in accordance with these, lewdness and disorder spring up, and righteousness and propriety, with their various orderly displays, are not to found. It thus appears, that to follow human nature and yield obedience to its feelings will assuredly conduct to contentions and robberies, to the violation of the duties belonging to everyone’s lot, and the confounding of all distinctions, till the issue will be in a state of savagism(Levy-Bruhl 1966)”<sup>3)</sup>

Because of the innate desires of humans as biological organisms, Confucians of pre-Chin period argued that humans should be regulated by the ethical system of benevolence-righteousness-propriety (ren-yi-li). Among classical Confucian works, the following passage in The Golden Mean describes the relationships among benevolence (ren), righteousness (yi), and propriety (li) in Confucian ethics: Benevolence is the characteristic attribute of personhood. The first priority of its expression is showing affection to those closely related to us. Righteousness means appropriateness; respecting the superior is its most important rule. Loving others according to who they are, and respecting superiors according to their ranks gives rise to the forms and distinctions of propriety in social life. (Ford, Connors and Legge 2005) The notion of loving others according to who they are and

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3) In short, human nature is evil, thus human beings should be regulated.

respecting superiors according to their rank indicates an emphasis on the differential order of interpersonal relationships. The above citation from The Golden Mean not only demonstrates the interrelated concepts of benevolence, righteousness, and propriety, but also implies the dimensions along which Confucians assess role relationships in social interaction.

However, unlike three propositions of The Golden Mean, justice theory in Western psychology divides the concepts of justice into two categories - procedural and distributive justice,- the former refers to the steps that should be followed by members of a group to determine methods of resource distribution, and the latter is the particular method of resource distribution that is accepted by group members. (Leventhal 1980) Given the context of Confucian thinking, procedural justice in social interaction should follow the principle of respecting the superior. The person in the superior position has responsibility of playing the role of resource allocator. The resource allocator should then follow the principle of favoring the intimate in choosing an appropriate rule of resource distribution or social exchange. Righteousness in Confucian thinking as well as the rule for social exchange in the psychological process of resource allocator refers to distributive justice(Hwang 2001).

This study considers procedural justice as something related to ordinary people's levels of national loyalty because procedural justice directly implies the principle of respecting the superior. Confucians consider the relationships between father and son, sovereign and subordinate, husband and wife, elder brother and younger, and friends to be the most fundamental relationships in society and termed as the five cardinal relationships (wulun). Each pair of relationships in the five cardinal relationships has an appropriate type of interaction in accordance with the relative superior/inferior positions as well as with

the intimacy/distance of the relationship. In the five cardinal relationships, Mencius most emphasized those between father and son, and between sovereign and subordinate: 'In the family, there is the relation of father and son; abroad, there is the relation of prince and minister. These are the two important relations among men.' These two relationships provide examples of the way Mencius determined the various ethical rules for different role relationships(Chan 1955).

For empirical measurement of Confucian Loyalty in East Sea (Sea of Japan) Rim region, this study uses two survey questionnaires which represent respondents' level of agreement to the principle of respecting superior. Two questions are covering the level of respect to their parents and emphasis of children's obedience attitude.


## V. SEM (Structural Equation Model) of a Survey Data

For scientific empirical testing of psychological aspects in loving for country in East Sea (Sea of Japan) Rim region, this study uses SEM (Structural Equation Model) with a longitudinal data set, "world values survey 1990 thru 2008<sup>4)</sup>". SEM is a statistical technique that combines elements of traditional multivariate models, such as regression analysis, factor analysis, and simultaneous equation modeling. SEM can account for less than perfect reliability of the observed variables, providing analyses of attenuation and estimation bias due to

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4) The European Value Survey (EVS) and the World Value Survey (WVS) are two large-scale, cross-national and longitudinal survey research program. About 102 countries/regions with altogether 423,084 respondents participated in the six waves conducted up to now: 1981 - 1984, 1989 - 1993, 1994 - 1999, 1999 - 2004, 2005 - 2006, and 2008 - 2010. Data was accessed on Jan. 11th, 2013 from [www.wvsevsdb.com](http://www.wvsevsdb.com)

measurement error. The SEM approach is sometimes also called causal modeling because competing models can be postulated about the data and tested against each other. Many applications of SEM can be found in the social science, where measurement error and uncertain causal conditions are commonly encountered.



<Figure 5> Structural Equation Model of Nationalism and Confucianism

<Figure 5> shows the potential endogenous variable of Confucianism and observed variable of Nationalism in the path to ordinary people’s “willingness of fighting for country”, which seems to have similar feelings of the public with their choice of hard-power diplomatic solutions for territorial disputes. The following equations present Structural Equation Model with one latent variable which represents each country’s level of Confucian culture.

(1) Direct effect on an independent variable: 
$$\frac{\text{Observed Var.}}{(\text{Nationalism})_i} = \beta_1 x_1 + \beta_2 x_2 + \dots + \beta_i x_i + \varepsilon$$

(2) Latent (Hidden) variable for Confucians: 
$$\frac{\text{Latent Var.}}{(\text{Confucianism})_i} = \beta_1 x_1 + \beta_2 x_2 + \varepsilon$$

(3) SEM for "Willingness of fighting for country":

$$\frac{\text{Dep. Var.}^5}{(\text{Willingness})_i} = \alpha + [\beta_1 x_1 + \beta_2 x_2 + \dots] + \beta_i N_i + L_i + \varepsilon$$

However, public opinion about the resolution method in his/her countries' territorial disputes can be translated into people's choice of the resolution method either hard-power (military power, occupation, sanction, so on) or soft-power (negotiation, multilateral discussion, and so on). In equation (3) of full SEM, represents coefficient of Nationalism on people's willingness of fighting for country and presents coefficient of latent variable thru principal factorial analysis, so called Confucianism. The reason for using latent variable of Confucianism is that two variables for reflecting people's Confucian attitudes are not directly related to the concept of Confucian Loyalty. Yet, one of main Confucian culture is the emphasis of respecting parents and children's obedience. Because of the emphasis of respecting to superior in family and society is similar to the procedural justice in Western society, people with the choice of hard-power resolution methods dealing with territorial disputes in East Sea (Sea of Japan) rim region are expected to fight for his/her own countries. <Table 1> shows the results of statistical analysis for equation (3) above.

<Table 1> Results of Structural Equation Model

	Structural Variables	Independent Variables	Standardized Coefficient	Robust Standard Error	Z value	P> z
China	Nationalism (Observed variable)	Age (↑)	-0.00944	0.02146	-0.440	0.660
		Education (↑)	0.03203	0.02291	1.400	0.162
		<b>Income (↑)</b>	<b>0.08050</b>	<b>0.02219</b>	<b>3.630</b>	<b>0.000</b>
		1=Male,2=Female	0.01851	0.02122	0.870	0.383
	Confucianism (Latent variable)	<b>Age (↑)</b>	<b>-0.06677</b>	<b>0.03761</b>	<b>-1.780</b>	<b>0.076</b>
		Education (↑)	0.03841	0.03345	1.150	0.251
		<b>Income (↑)</b>	<b>0.10165</b>	<b>0.03092</b>	<b>3.290</b>	<b>0.001</b>
		1=Male,2=Female	-0.07762	0.03145	-2.470	0.014
		Children's Obedience(↑)	-0.00318	0.03169	-0.100	0.920
	Willingness of fighting for country	<b>Nationalism (↑)</b>	<b>0.10900</b>	<b>0.04643</b>	<b>2.350</b>	<b>0.019</b>
		<b>Confucianism (↑)</b>	<b>0.69689</b>	<b>0.03082</b>	<b>22.610</b>	<b>0.000</b>
		Constant value	6.08349	0.26390	23.050	0.000
		N		2223		
		Log pseudolikelihood		-25334.782		
Japan	Nationalism (Observed variable)	<b>Age (↑)</b>	<b>0.28658</b>	<b>0.02947</b>	<b>9.720</b>	<b>0.000</b>
		Education (↑)	-0.01406	0.03144	-0.450	0.655
		Income (↑)	-0.04550	0.03077	-1.480	0.139
		<b>1=Male,2=Female</b>	<b>-0.05567</b>	<b>0.02858</b>	<b>-1.950</b>	<b>0.051</b>
	Confucianism (Latent variable)	<b>Age (↑)</b>	<b>0.33500</b>	<b>0.06432</b>	<b>5.210</b>	<b>0.000</b>
		<b>Education (↑)</b>	<b>0.07508</b>	<b>0.04449</b>	<b>1.690</b>	<b>0.091</b>
		Income (↑)	-0.05464	0.04189	-1.300	0.192
		<b>1=Male,2=Female</b>	<b>-0.30976</b>	<b>0.03958</b>	<b>-7.830</b>	<b>0.000</b>
		Children's Obedience(↑)	-0.05415	0.03663	-1.480	0.139
	Willingness of fighting for country	Respect for Parents(↑)	0.05986	0.03939	1.520	0.129
		<b>Nationalism (↑)</b>	<b>0.15997</b>	<b>0.08649</b>	<b>1.850</b>	<b>0.064</b>
		<b>Confucianism (↑)</b>	<b>0.66570</b>	<b>0.01668</b>	<b>39.900</b>	<b>0.000</b>
		Constant value	1.07062	0.01633	65.570	0.000
		N		1134		
	Log pseudolikelihood		-13710.224			
S. Korea	Nationalism (Observed variable)	<b>Age (↑)</b>	<b>0.08475</b>	<b>0.02294</b>	<b>3.690</b>	<b>0.000</b>
		<b>Education (↑)</b>	<b>-0.11318</b>	<b>0.02392</b>	<b>-4.730</b>	<b>0.000</b>
		<b>Income (↑)</b>	<b>-0.06440</b>	<b>0.02338</b>	<b>-2.750</b>	<b>0.006</b>
		1=Male,2=Female	0.03332	0.02037	1.640	0.102
	Confucianism (Latent variable)	Age (↑)	0.11128	1.02824	0.110	0.914
		Education (↑)	0.08264	1.40920	0.060	0.953
		Income (↑)	-0.11604	0.77740	-0.150	0.881
		1=Male,2=Female	0.00589	0.41069	0.010	0.989
		Children's Obedience(↑)	-0.01868	0.03056	-0.610	0.541
	Willingness of fighting for country	<b>Respect for Parents(↑)</b>	<b>0.11319</b>	<b>0.03670</b>	<b>3.080</b>	<b>0.002</b>
		Nationalism (↑)	0.13412	8.24215	0.020	0.987
		<b>Confucianism (↑)</b>	<b>0.66896</b>	<b>0.09122</b>	<b>7.330</b>	<b>0.000</b>
		Constant value	1.93799	35.25119	0.050	0.956
		N		2353		
	Log pseudolikelihood		-26615.399			



According to <Table 1>, in terms of the first structural variable (Nationalism), people's income level has a positive relationship to their levels of Nationalism in China. Yet, there is no relationship between them in Japan and a negative relationship in S. Korea. For Chinese people, the benefits from rapid economic development by the Chinese government give ordinary people's satisfaction in daily lives although there is huge income gap among different social classes. With the similar feature of economic inequality among the different social classes, Korean peoples with high level of income tend to show the low level of Nationalism because they prefer "Small government" to "Big government." Most of the rich in S. Korea think that the Korean government always tries to increase tax rate to distribute for people in the low level of income. For China, even though the income gap in China looks like bigger problem in whole society, last 30 years of state-led economic development raise up all social classes' levels of income has contributed to increase the average income level in China. In other words, if the speed of Chinese economic development gets slow and stabilized, people with below the average income level won't feel the proud of their nationality anymore and withdraw their strong support for the government and CCP (Chinese Communist Party). In terms of the effect of Age on Nationalism, the old in both Japan and S. Korea are more likely to have strong feeling of pride in their nationality than those of the young. However, while Japanese men show the higher level of national pride than that of women, less educated peoples in S. Korea tend to show the higher level of national pride than those of more educated peoples. Because all men in S. Korea must finish their military service years before the age of 35, Korean men exhausted their passion of national pride in their military service periods. Thus, we can't find any difference in the level of national pride between Korean men and women.

In terms of the second structural variable (Confucianism as a latent variable), while there is a negative relationship between Age and Confucianism in China, there is a positive relationship in Japan. Due to the experience of 1960s Cultural Revolution in China, the old tend to forget their traditional and historical heritage of Confucian culture. For Japanese case, male has positive relationship to both Nationalism and Confucianism and female has negative one. The cultural heritage of Japanese Samurai (the culture of warriors in 17th and 18th century) makes Japanese men more traditional (Confucianism) and proud of nationality than women. However, only in S. Korea, observed variable for measuring Confucianism (“Respect for Parents”) shows some positive effect on the level of Confucianism. One of Korean social characteristics is Korean parents’ strong enthusiasm in educating their children. Long period of public school life tends to make Korean young peoples have traditional Confucian value in their minds.

In terms of dependent variable in the SEM (“willingness of fighting for country”), Nationalism and Confucianism have positive effect on the people’s level of willingness of fighting in both Japan and China. Yet, in S. Korea, only one independent variable - Confucianism- has positive effect. In other words, Nationalistic aspect of psychological patriotism does not play any important role in territorial dispute against Japan. Unlike the case of S. Korea, the tension of territorial dispute between Japan and China has been influenced by both people’s nationalistic pride and Confucian Loyalty, which implies that Japan and China will choose “hard-power” methods as conflict resolution rather than “soft-power” ones if the conflict of territorial dispute gets into more serious level.

## VI. Conclusion

This study is designed to shed some light on the future of territorial disputes in Northeast Asia region, especially among three countries - Japan, China and S. Korea. The sovereignty claims over small islands - Senkaku/Daioyu and Dokdo/Takesima - provoke very serious conflicts and play an important role in destabilizing regional order and peace in this region. Based on constructivism's assumption as international relation theory, "The international system is not something 'out there' like the solar system. It does not exist on its own. It exists only as inter-subjective awareness among people. It is a human invention or creation not of a physical or material kind but of a purely intellectual and ideational kind" (Jackson and Sorensen 2003, 253), the focus of this study is to analyze the public's psychological aspect of patriotism of three countries in East Sea Rim region. Unlike the concept of nationalism originated from the Western culture, there is a unique and traditional concept, so called as "Confucian Loyalty." Due to a fundamental tenet of Confucianism - all things in the universe exist for harmonious relations with others-, it is expected that patriotic people with Confucian Loyalty are not likely to choose hard-power methods of diplomacy (for instance, a small or large scale of war and economic embargo, and so on) compared to patriotic people with Nationalism aspect. What this study finds is that, if the problem of territorial disputes emerges as the top priority issue in East Sea Rim region, the relations between Japan and China is going to be worse than that of between Japan and S. Korea.

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ABSTRACT

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## **Psychological Aspects of Patriotism and Territorial Disputes in Northeast Asia**

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This study is designed to shed some light on the future of territorial disputes in Northeast Asia countries - claiming territorial sovereignty over small islands - Senkaku/Daioyu between China and Japan, and Dok-do/ Takesima between Japan and S. Korea. Without a doubt, the strong nationalism of three countries' publics has been regarded as a key factor making the situation of sovereignty conflict even worse. Unlike the concept of nationalism originated from Western culture, there is a unique and traditional concept as, so called "Confucian Loyalty" a psychological aspect of patriotism in Northeast Asian countries. Due to the cultural influence by the fundamental tenet of Confucianism in Northeast Asia - all things in the universe exist in or survive for the harmonious relationship with other things - this study assumes that the public with a high level of Confucian Loyalty is less likely to support the government's use of hard-power diplomatic methods for resolving the disputes than the public with a high level of nationalism. Given the statistical analysis of three countries' public surveys, this study argues, when the territorial disputes emerging among three countries become the most important diplomatic issue in Northeast Asia, the relationship between Japan and

China is going to be more serious than that of between Japan and S. Korea. Because both publics in Japan and China have a stronger nationalistic aspect of patriotism than S. Korean people, they won't accept any situation in which their governments need to yield territorial sovereignty for a peaceful compromise against other states in disputed relations.

- Key words: Nationalism, Confucian Loyalty, Northeast Asia, Territorial Disputes, Peace