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Does Migration Promote Democracy at Home? Social Remittance and Democratic Attitudes in the Philippines*

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| 논문요약 |

International migration exposes citizens of developing countries to different political, economic and social institutions in other parts of the world. Social remittances research suggests that international migrants absorb democratic attitudes such as trust and tolerance by socializing and participating in the democratic host country and spread them back to the home society. Yet this argument builds primarily from the experiences of what is essentially U.S.-Latin America migration. I use survey data from the Philippines, a developing country that sends migrants to both democracies and non-democracies, to examine whether

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migration changes citizen attitudes toward democracy at home. The findings challenge the social remittances argument that migration may contribute to the spread of democratic attitudes. Immersion in democratic cultures does not turn migrant households into principled democrats but likewise fails to spreads non-democratic values. Migration appears to play a limited role in shifting deep-rooted orientations of citizens—after all, it may not be a substitute for home-grown political change. I then speculate that what may be transmitted via migration is not so much democratic beliefs or practices but migration-induced exposure to high-quality government services, efficient public administration delivery or low corruption.

▪ Key words: International migration, social remittances, citizen attitudes, support for democracy, the Philippines

Ⅰ. Introduction

They bring us stories about how much life in America has proved what The Reader's Digest says it is. They also bring us homilies, delivered with the proselytizing zeal of Thomasites, which are forceful for their use of contrasts. It's too hot in the Philippines. It's nice to snuggle by the hearth in America. There's grime and smog in our streets. You can't drive without anti-pollutants in the States. Filipino drivers are maniacs. American drivers follow traffic rules… You defer too much to authority here. You can talk man-to-man even with the president of the United States.

Conrado de Quiros, "Bracing for Balikbayans"[1)]

1) Quoted in Vicente L. Rafael "Your Grief Is Our Gossip: Overseas Filipinos and Other Spectral Presences" in White Love and Other Events in Filipino History (2000).

One consequence of increased global labor mobility is exposure of citizens of developing countries to different political, economic and social institutions in other parts of the world. A group of studies attribute "democratizing effects" to international migration in which migrants from developing countries, to the extent that they move to democracies, adopt and then disseminate democratic beliefs and practices back to their home countries (Garza & Yetim 2003; Levitt 1998; Levitt 2001; Perez-Armendariz & Crow 2010). If migration flows are from authoritarian or newly democratized countries to more established democracies, this literature claims that these migrants observe, learn and more importantly diffuse democratic attitudes and behavior to their friends and families in their home country. Labeled the "social remittances" argument, this view emphasizes the global dimension in political learning at the mass level and suggests that integration with the world economy complements and even substitutes for home-grown political socialization.

However, the assumption that the idea of democracy is so novel to many international migrants they develop a measurable understanding and appreciation of democratic principles only after they arrive in the host country is problematic. Democracy in the twenty-first century enjoys normative superiority, with cross-national survey evidence showing that there is almost a universal endorsement of democracy around the world (Inglehart 2003)—democratic diffusion in this sense has already taken place.

This study examines migration-induced attitude change by using survey data from the Philippines, which is not only a high emigration country but sends migrants both to democracies and nondemocracies, which offers variation in the regime type at destination. For its destinations, in 2006 only about 20 percent of newly hired Filipino

migrant workers and 50 percent of the entire overseas Filipino stock are in the "West" (POEA 2006). In this sense, the Philippine experience with migration is more "representative" of the global trends. Worldwide, the picture of migration is quite different from the conventional image of migrants flocking solely to the U.S. and European borders. International migration is not entirely South-to-North flows, but nearly half of international migrants from developing countries (76 million) move to other developing countries, some democracies, others not (Ratha 2007).[2] To preview the findings, a mere exposure to the outside world does not necessarily create principled democratic citizens in the Philippines. The results call for caution in linking migration to citizen attitudes. From a broader perspective, this study also offers insight as to what we can realistically expect from globalization's influence on domestic politics.

This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I review the social remittances argument in democratic attitudes along with the global migration patterns. Section III describes the data and Section IV presents the results. In Section V, I speculate that attitudes toward governance, not democracy, are more likely to be affected by migration. The final section concludes.

Ⅱ. Social Remittances and Migration-Induced Democratic Diffusion

The literature on migrant transnationalism (Schiller & Basch &

2) The scope of the study is limited to labor migration and excludes any other cross-border population movement driven by political persecution, civil conflict, war or natural disasters since the latter has distinctive causes, dynamics and consequences.

Blanc 1995; Levitt, 2001; Levitt & Schiller 2004) emphasizes that contemporary migrants maintain close ties with their country of origin and continue to participate in various aspects of its political, economic and social life. They pay special attention to non-monetary flows of information, ideas, beliefs, preferences, and skills that are transmitted through return visits and technology-mediated communication. These are "social remittances," as opposed to financial remittances, which may be unobservable but as important as monetary contributions because they may be a driving force of change in sending countries. Through these durable ties, migrants communicate to their family members that, for example, politicians are held accountable, women enjoy a higher social status, and lines are shorter at city halls in the host country and encourage them to pursue "reforms" back home (Levitt 2001, 63).

Research on social remittances contends specifically that democratic values and behaviors are transmitted back to home countries via migration. Drawing on evidence primarily from Mexico, this line of research suggests that migrants to a well-established democracy, e.g., U.S. and Canada, are immersed in a democratic environment where they learn, adopt and reinforce democratic values, orientations, skills and commitments. It also claims that migrants simultaneously and subsequently share these attitudes with their loved ones in the country of origin through various migration channels. Survey evidence indicates that respondents connected to migration (return migrants, friends and family of migrants and residents of a high migration community) show more democratic attitudes compared to those around non-migrants (Camp 2003; Garza & Yetim 2003; Perez-Armendariz & Crow 2010). According to these findings, current migration may be a new type of civic education that enlightens citizens of sending countries to democratic principles and empowers them to demand

change.

From a historical perspective, this claim is apparently supported by the fact that, although still selective, today's migrants represent a far more inclusive group of developing-country citizens—the global diffusion of nationalism and socialism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was mostly channeled through colonial elites who had spent a considerable time in the imperial metropoles of Europe. With more and more non-elites included in the migrant stock, the situation is more conducive to the flow of ideas at the mass public level. Thus, the argument goes, migration facilitates a new international-domestic linkage where ordinary citizens, not traditional elites, may benefit from knowledge transfers and thus become empowered to influence the politics of their home country to challenge the status quo.[3)]

By considering global migration patterns more closely, we can begin to understand better what sorts of ideas might be being exchanged through migration channels. I begin by reviewing migration patterns with respect to democracy. In fact, migration-receiving countries include both democracies and nondemocracies. Especially among countries importing a large number of labor migrants as share of their population, such as Singapore and oil-exporting states, authoritarian regimes are more frequent. In 2000, the top ten immigration countries with population more than 500,000 were Qatar (66.4% of the population), United Arab Emirates (59.2%), Kuwait (50.6%), Jordan

3) In its original conception, social remittances are considered as value-neutral, posited that they could be positive and negative (Levitt 1998). Nonetheless, the transnationalism literature in general implicitly suggests that this international connectivity will result in positive changes in the sending communities (Levitt 1998; 2001). Some scholars within migration studies counterargue that transnational political engagement is highly selective and contingent on the host country context, and carries a risk of reproducing pre-migration power relations (Waldinger 2004; Waldinger 2008). The theoretical framework of this paper intends to reclaim the original concept of social remittances without any normative baggage.

(40.5%), Bahrain (39.1%), Israel (31.5%), Oman (28.4%), Latvia (25.8%), Saudi Arabia (25.4%), Switzerland (21.9%). Top thirty countries include Canada (18.6%), United States (12.3%) and Germany (11.1%) but also Singapore (14.0%).[4)]

To demonstrate that there is variation in democracy levels at destination, Figure 1 provides a visual presentation of the level of democracy in the top quartile of receiving countries with population above 500,000 in 2002.



<Figure 1> Democracy Level of Major Receiving Countries

* The figure was created using data from the Global Migrant Origin Database and the Polity IV project for 2000 and 2002 respectively. Full country names are provided in Table 4.

4) Migration data come from the bilateral migrant stock data set created by Parsons, Skeldon, Walmsley and Winters (2005) in cooperation with the Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty of the University of Sussex, built around the census year of 2000.

Western democracies cluster in the top left corner of the graph, confirming the widespread notion that these countries are popular destinations, but it is noteworthy that many other top receiving countries are authoritarian with Polity IV scores below zero—in this set, the oil rich states of the Middle East and Singapore figure prominently. These autocratic receiving countries are known to import a large number of guest workers ranging from top corporate executives to domestic workers. The extreme case includes United Arab Emirates, whose foreign workers make up about 85 percent of the resident population and 99 percent of the private workforce in 2007 (Deparle 2007).

Going beyond descriptive statistics, econometric analyses using bilateral migrant stock data suggest that, controlling for other factors, (1) democracies send out more migrants than dictatorships; and (2) dictatorships receive more immigrants than their democratic counterparts because they are less constrained by public opinion against immigration and more able to restrict immigrants' access to government services (Breunig et al. 2012). This is also consistent with evidence about emigration barriers in developing countries: authoritarian countries have more restrictions on out-migration in forms of passport fees and exit visa (McKenzie 2007).

Migration exposes citizens of sending countries to different political and government institutions. Nonetheless, the extent to which migrants and those under migrants' influence change their democratic attitudes as a result of migration is likely to be limited considering the widespread availability of democratic knowledge around the world as discussed above. The stylistic differences exist in the practice of democratic principles, but it is hard to accept that committed democrats need to be taught to be one in the twenty first century.

Going back to the opening quote by Conrado de Quiros, one can

detect certain skepticism about the democratic attitudes argument. Upon temporary visits, overseas Filipinos offers criticism about the public life of the Philippines—how individual citizens conduct their daily lives and how social and political life is organized—by referencing supposedly better examples, for instance, from the United States. Yet there is a strong public sense that these speeches are mere cheap talk and rarely acted upon, resulting in resentment among non-migrant Filipino citizens (author interview, Manila 2009). The spread of democratic attitudes through a migration network is far from settled.

The next section puts the social remittance hypothesis to an empirical test. It examines whether migrant household members with family members in democracies display more democratic attitudes than members of non-migrant households or migrant households with family members in authoritarian countries.

Ⅲ. Data and Measures

I test my argument using 2003 Social Weather Stations Survey (SWS). Respondents comprised 1,200 voting-age Filipino citizens and the sample is nationally representative. I take advantage of the fact that the Philippines has a large number of migrants abroad, and more importantly, has them in both democratic and authoritarian countries. The 2003 SWS data contain information about the migrant status of household members and their destinations. Although slightly more than half of overseas Filipinos reside in Europe, Americas and Oceania (POEA 2006), only about 20 percent of new Filipino migrant workers move to the usual wealthy democracies. In 2007, its top destination for newly hired workers was Saudi Arabia (19.8%) followed by United

Arab Emirates (12.1%). Table 1 presents the distribution of destination of Filipino migrants.

<Table 1> Destinations of Filipino Migrant Workers

Destination	2005		2006	
	new hires	percentage share	new hires	percentage share
Saudi Arabia	194,350	26.2	223,459	28.4
UAE	82,039	11.1	99,212	12.6
Hong Kong	98,693	13.3	96,929	12.3
Kuwait	40,306	5.4	47,917	6.1
Qatar	31,421	4.2	45,795	5.8
Taiwan	46,737	6.3	39,025	5
Singapore	28,152	3.8	28,369	3.6
Italy	21,267	2.9	25,413	3.2
UK	16,930	2.3	16,925	2.1
Korea	9,975	1.3	13,984	1.8
Other Destinations	170,762	23.1	151,041	19.2
Landbased Total	740,632	100	151,041	100

* Philippines Overseas Employment Administration 2006.

While the first condition allows us to have enough migrant household members in the sample, the second offers an opportunity to study public opinion variation attributable to the destination's regime type. Existing research on migration-induced attitude formation primarily uses data from Mexico and other Latin America countries and is disadvantaged in identifying the source of attitudinal change. Since most countries in Latin American send their migrants to US, which is a democracy, there is almost no variation in the independent

variable. Using data from the Philippines can help address this problem.

For the dependent variable, I use respondents' principled, unconditional support for democracy as a preferred political system. In SWS, following the widespread practice in the study of popular support for democracy, respondents are asked to choose among the following three statements: 1) Democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government; 2) Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one; and 3) For people like me, it does not matter whether we have a democratic or a non-democratic regime. This variable separates principled support for democracy (category 1) from a utilitarian consideration of the form of government (category 2) and disillusion (category 3).

The independent variables of interest are (1) whether respondents belong to a household that has a family member working abroad; and (2) which of the following three groups respondents belong to: "household with a migrant worker in democracy," "household with no migrant worker," and "household with a migrant worker in autocracy." Each variable is created based on responses to two questions: whether the household has a current migrant worker, and in which country that family member is currently working. The creation of three groups —households to democracy, non-migrant households, migrant households to nondemocracy—helps test whether the receiving country's regime type has any correlation with respondents' attitudes.

To construct the independent variable, I use information only about whether a respondent has a current migrant family member and exclude whether the respondent or a family member is a return migrant. This decision is made after considering the possible adverse selection of return migrants as a carrier of information. It is possible

that those migrants who are better adjusted to their host environment —thus in possession of better knowledge and influence—are less likely to return home. This is empirically confirmed by my own statistical analysis and was also reported in previous works on migration-induced norm diffusion (Perez-Armendariz & Crow, 2010). Thus, this study does not address the cases of return migrants but instead focuses on the spread of knowledge and attitudes affecting members of migrant households. This is to an extent a harder test since it examines not only the adoption of new attitudes but their spread in the home society.

To code the regime type of the receiving country, I use the Polity IV score from year 2002.[5] In my sample, 11.8% of respondents have a family member living abroad. Among them, the democracy mean score of the sample is 3.71 and standard deviation is 8.94 (Polity IV score changes from -10 to 10), suggesting large variance. Using 0 as a cut-off point, 72.7% of migrant households have a family member in a democratic country and 27.3% in a non-democratic country.

Furthermore, this destination variable also enables us to isolate exposure effects from remittances effects, because the level of remittances may be empirically correlated with the level of democracy at destination. Estimates from the 2003 Survey of the Overseas Filipino Workers (SOF) indicate that remittances levels are higher for democratic host countries than autocratic ones. The Survey of the Overseas Filipino Workers is a rider to an annual household income survey conducted by the National Statistics Office of the Philippines and serves as a source of important migrant statistics in the country. Although SOF does not ask political questions, it offers a wealth of

5) For a different specification, I also used the Gastil Index of Democracy. The raw scores of two categories in political rights and civil liberties are first combined and then rescaled so that they lie between 0 (full non-democracy) to 12 (full democracy).

information about the household's migrant workers, including remittance transfers. Calculations based on 2003 SOF suggest that migrant households with family members working in a democratic country receive 14% more remittances than households with a migrant in an authoritarian country. What this implies is that using categorical variables such as "households to democracy" and "households to autocracy" sets up a hard test. If migration-related exposure to democracy has no effect on the respondent's governance concerns even in the presence of higher levels of remittances coming from democracies, this makes a convincing case that remittances have no effect on citizen attitudes we are discussing.

For controls, I first include the economic class and location in urban or rural areas of the household. Economic class is assessed by a field interviewer based on the conditions of the housing resulting in four levels. In addition, to account for the long-running insurgency in the Muslim-populated Southern Philippines, a Mindanao dummy is included. Personal characteristics of respondents consist of education, age, gender, and employment status. Finally, it is very likely that unobservable individual characteristics such as ambition and ability of the respondent are correlated with the migration status of the household and democratic attitudes. To address this problem, I include a binary indicator variable that measures the respondent's willingness to go abroad as a migrant worker.

This study has the usual limitations associated with using cross-sectional and observational data. As previous research noted (Perez-Armendariz & Crow 2010), a dual-sited panel survey of migrants and their families before, during and after randomized migration, would be better equipped than this study to test migration-induced learning effects. In addition, like many other works in the literature, this is also a single country study, which gives

advantages in controlling for unobservable country-specific effects but limits its generalizability. At least for the possible selection bias, however, it is hard to make a case that individuals with non-democratic inclinations purposefully choose to work in the Middle East over an equivalent opportunity in the U.S. or Australia.

Ⅳ. Models and Results

The empirical analysis in this section reviews the claim that principled democratic attitudes develop as a result of exposure to established democracy via migration. Table 2 displays the results of a cross-tabulation between migration and support for democracy. It shows whether commitment to a democratic rule ("Democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government," "Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one" and "For people like me, it does not matter whether we have a democratic or a non-democratic regime") varies by migration groups ("Migrant household connected to autocracy," "Non-migrant household," and "Migrant household connected to democracy"). If the democratic attitudes argument is true, respondents belonging to migrant households with ties to democracy should show more commitment to democracy since they share the knowledge and ideals of democratic citizenship through their migrant family members. The results, however, show no significant difference in principled support for democracy by migration. A chi-square test against the null hypothesis that all cells have equal frequencies by migration status yields a p-value of 0.30, indicating that the variation in democratic attitudes among these three groups is not significant. It is interesting to note that the percentage of explicit support for

democracy is even lower for households with a family member working in a democratic country (56.99%) than among non-migrant households (61.22%). We can speculate that this might be caused by the unequivocally higher socio-economic status of Filipino migrants to democratic countries, most notably U.S., in conjunction with severe economic inequality—elites may not be principled democrats in a highly unequal society (Boix 2003)—but the results are insignificant anyway. This offers strong evidence against the democratic attitudes hypothesis in which citizens connected to democracy express high levels of democratic attitudes.

<Table 2> Democratic Attitudes, by Migration

	Democratic Commitment (%)			Total
	Democracy is always preferable	Autocracy works better sometimes	For people like me, it doesn't matter	
Migrant Household to Autocracy	(48.57)	(31.43)	(20.00)	35 (100)
Nonmigrant Household	(61.22)	(19.60)	(19.18)	954 (100)
Migrant Household to Democracy	(56.99)	(18.28)	(24.73)	93 (100)
Total	654 (60.44)	215 (19.87)	213 (19.69)	1082 (100)

* $\chi 2(4)=4.93$ P=0.30

To ensure the reliability of the results, I perform two additional tests. The first is the same analysis as the baseline model except I drop the third response to the regime preference question ("For people

like me, it does not matter"). Second, I use all three regime preference responses but this time only keeping in place migrant households (those with ties to democracy and autocracy). Chi-square test results of these specifications produce p-values of 0.19 and 0.27 respectively, suggesting insignificant relationships and providing further support for the initial finding.

Although the results of this simple cross-tabulation are straightforward enough to make unnecessary any further analysis, additional statistical models with full controls were estimated for robustness checks. A binary probit regression analysis using the "Democracy is always preferable" variable also produced insignificant relationships between migration and democratic attitudes (Table 3).

<Table 3> Democratic Attitudes, by Migration

DV: Democracy always preferable (Binary Variable)	Migration Effect 1	Destination Comparison 2	Destination Comparison 3
Household Characteristics			
Migrant Household	-0.13		
	(0.13)		
Migrant Household to Democracy		-0.05	0.42
		(0.15)	(0.28)
Migrant Household to Autocracy		-0.33	
		(0.22)	
Urban	-0.17*	-0.17*	-0.31
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.30)
Class	0.10	0.10	-0.22
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.19)
Mindanao	0.37***	0.37***	0.23
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.39)

Respondent Characteristics			
Education	-0.01	-0.01	-0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.10)
Want to Work Abroad	0.13	0.13	0.23
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.26)
Age	0.01**	0.01**	-0.01
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Female	-0.06	-0.06	-0.07
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.24)
Employed	0.21**	0.21**	0.37
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.25)
Constant	-0.26	-0.24	0.88
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.76)
N	1082	1082	128

* p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

* Results are from binary probit regressions with unconditional support for democracy as the dependent variable. For Models 1 and 2, the reference category is non-migrant household. For Model 3, the reference category is migrant household with a family member in an autocracy.

A final point about the cross-tabulation results concerns potential autocratic diffusion. A comparison between migrant households to autocracy (31.43%) and nonmigrant households (19.6%) for "Autocracy works better sometimes" suggests that there might be autocratic learning from migration, but a chi-square test rejects the possibility.

Ⅴ. Governance: A Missing Link?

Although social remittances scholars convincingly explain the

existence of non-monetary exchange between migrants and their home communities, their approaches have not fully taken into account the global migration patterns. Much of current findings in support of social remittances in democratic attitudes come from studies using survey data generated in Latin America, where migrants predominantly move to the U.S. and Canada, which happen to be both democratic and well-governed. This makes it difficult to identify precisely what respondents mean by democracy in survey contexts—it could be institutional protection of freedom, quick issuance of permits and licenses, or even timely collection of garbage and waste.

Democracy and good governance are both desirable quantities and, importantly, due to the abstract nature of the concept of democracy, people often understand it through its correlates such as good governance, economic development and, in some occasions, peace. Even when asked to consider democratic principles and values, what goes into the respondent's mind may not be just democratic principles such as political freedom or the check on executive power but a whole array of real-world outcomes that are associated with democratic government. Existing studies that emphasize democratic diffusion via migration allude to this: "The economic well-being and efficiency of most migrants' host countries constitute a powerful incentive for migrants to emulate what they observe there" (Perez-Armendariz & Crow 2010, 122). Despite the considerable effort by scholars put into isolating democracy effects, this raises a question about what information is actually being transmitted through migration channels.

While there is huge variation in democracy levels, receiving countries tend to have consistently better-than-average institutions. A country needs some level of government effectiveness to import and manage a large-scale foreign labor force on a sustainable basis. This

means that receiving country governments tend to have certain levels of law and order, better regulations, better-than-average efficient administrative services and lower levels of corruption. Figure 2 shows that countries with a large number of migrants as a share of their population tend to have better quality governance using modified World Bank Governance Indicators. I combine government effectiveness, rule of law, control of corruption dimensions of 2002 World Bank Governance Indicators to create the governance variable. The coded index ranges from -7.5 to 7.5. Wealthy democracies in the top left corner of the graph have the highest levels of governance, but Singapore (5.98) excels and other Middle Eastern countries are also



<Figure 2> Governance Level of Major Receiving Countries

* The figure was created using data from the Global Migrant Origin Database and World Bank Governance Indicators for 2000 and 2002 respectively. Full country names are provided in Table 4.

well above the global mean.

Then, what is transmitted via migration may be not so much democratic beliefs or practices but new reference points about government services such as law and order, efficient public administration delivery or low corruption. The exposure to better performing institutions make migrant citizens realize that they are poorly served by their home government. Once these views are transmitted, the relatives of migrants may become less satisfied with the status quo and develop higher expectations of government performance. Whether law and order are maintained, contracts are enforced, public services are effective and bureaucratic inefficiencies are checked is conceptually distinctive from democracy, but nonetheless important to the well-being of citizens.

VI. Conclusion

Largely overlooked in the discussion of citizen attitudes in developing countries is the role of globalization. The global connection matters but relatively little is known about the political consequences of emigration. This paper draws attention to the migration phenomenon experienced by sending countries and examines the resultant attitude change among citizens connected to migration. This paper has offered a more nuanced view of social remittances and confirmed one mechanism for attitude change through empirical testing.

Migration-induced exposure has little impact on democratic attitudes. This challenges the social remittances argument which heavily emphasizes the democratic dimension of migration-driven attitude change. Migration appears to play a limited role in shifting

deep-rooted orientations of citizens—after all, it may not be a substitute for home-grown political change. Political freedom is a universally cherished good but short of state repression and violence, unconditional commitment to democratic principles is a tricky political concept.

The analysis shows that the type of destinations' political institutions—democracy or autocracy—has no effects on civic attitudes. This suggests that immersion in democratic cultures does not turn migrant households into principled democrats but also tells us that migration to autocracies likewise fails to spreads non-democratic values. The failure of the democratic attitudes argument is not the confirmation of authoritarian conversion by migration.

Future research could explore the governance dimension in two ways. First, governance is not a single, undifferentiated concepts. There is reason to believe that migration-induced attitude change should have differential impacts in different areas of governance. It is important to understand how this occurs and what this implies for governance reform. Second, the next step could investigate whether and how these newly formed preferences are translated into organized citizen action and lead to discernable institutional outcomes. If migrant households have strong enough preferences for better government performance, in conjunction with their financial resources, they may become a constituency that pushes forward governance improvement by political mobilization.

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ABSTRACT
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국제이주를 통한 민주주의적 가치 확산 연구: 필리핀의 경우

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이 논문에서는 국제이주로 인해 형성된 이주자와 본국 가족 간의 초국가적 이주네트워크(migrant networks)를 통해 민주주의적 가치와 태도가 확산된다는 민주주의적 사회송금(social remittances) 가설을 필리핀의 사례를 통해 살펴본다. 민주주의적 사회송금가설은 개발도상국 출신 이주자들이 민주적 수용국에 체류하면서 참여와 관찰을 통해 민주주의적 덕목과 가치를 습득하고, 이를 초국가적 이주네트워크를 통하여 본국에 전달한다는 내용으로 미국과 이주네트워크가 주로 형성되어 있는 멕시코에 대한 연구에서 제기되었다. 중남미와 비교하여 필리핀의 경우 이주대상국이 미국과 같은 민주주의뿐만 아니라 중동이나 아시아의 권위주의국가들을 포함하기 때문에 이주대상국의 정권형태가 보다 다양하여 민주주의적 가치 확산뿐만 아니라 비민주주의적 가치 확산 역시 이주와 연결하여 분석할 수 있다는 장점이 있다. 2003년 필리핀 설문조사 자료를 실증분석한 결과 이주대상국의 정권형태는 필리핀에 남아 있는 가족들의 민주주의에 대한 원칙적 지지 여부에 영향을 주지 않는 것으로 나타났으며, 필리핀에서 민주주의적 사회송금은 관찰되지 않는다는 것으로 보인다. 대신 민주적 수용국들이 대부분 거버넌스 수준이 높다는 점을 고려하여, 민주주의적 태도나 가치보다는 이주대상국의 높은 정부효율성, 즉 거버넌스에 대한 정보를 기반으로 본국의 가족들이 본국정부의 거버넌스에 대한 기대수준을 높일 수 있다는 대안적 가설을 향후 연구에서 탐색해 볼 수 있다.

▪ 주제어: 국제이주, 사회송금, 시민태도, 민주주의에 대한 지지, 필리핀