



A Comparative Analysis of Female Representation in the Japanese and Korean Public Sectors*

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The purpose of this article is to review and compare female representation in the Japanese and Korean public sectors by looking at the measure of variation and the representative bureaucratic ratio. This study examines female representation not only in the national and local governments but also in the legislative and judiciary branches using a comparative perspective to provide a comprehensive picture of female employment and representation in the Korean and Japanese public sectors. Both in Japan and Korea, the representation of women in many public sectors has been increasing over time, but there are substantial regional and organizational variations in the level of women's representation within each country.

[Key Words: Representative Bureaucracy, Japan, Korea, Female Representation, Diversity]

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I . Introduction

Gender equality has been increasingly a sociopolitical issue around the world due to the increase in women's social activity; however, women's underrepresentation has been identified as a serious social problem. Closing the gender gap is a critical problem for a historically male-dominated society such as Japan and Korea such that gender diversity causes conflict within organizations (Kim & Lewis 1994). Accordingly, this study examines female representation in Japan and Korea not only in the national and local executive branches, but also in the legislative and judicial branches, in order to provide a comprehensive picture of female employment and representation in the Korean and Japanese public sectors. The normative view based on the theory of representative bureaucracy is that there should be numerical representation of women in the public sector that matches the percentage of women in the population represented (Sigelman 1976; Riccucci 1987; Kellough 1990). In both Japan and Korea, approximately 50% of the population is female. Therefore, it is desirable that this be reflected in the public sector at both the national and local levels.

Accordingly, by analysing the situation of women's representation in various public sectors in Japan and Korea, this paper tries to identify ways to further increase female representation in these sectors. This paper proceeds as follows. First, we explain how our study fits into the larger literature of representative bureaucracy. We then introduce the measures used to assess the Japanese and Korean levels of female numerical representation in the public sector, which is achieved by using the measure of variation (hereafter, MV) and the representative bureaucratic ratio (hereafter, RBO). Second, we review the efforts made by the Japanese and Korean governments to increase female representation in public sectors. Third, we present our findings with respect to female representation in national government, local government, the national legislature, the local legislature, and the judiciary in both Japan and Korea. For each public sector, we note differences between the two countries, changes over time, and some sub-

sector differences. We also identify factors that can explain the variation.

II. Theoretical Review and Research Methods

The term “representative bureaucracy” is generally attributed to J. Donald Kingsley’s book titled *Representative Bureaucracy* that was published in 1944 (Kim 1994; Krislov 2012). Representative bureaucracy is a form of representation that captures most aspects of a society’s population in the governing body of the state (Kim 1993, 1994; Kim and Lewis 1994; Krislov 2012). Krislov and Rosenbloom (1981) asserted that unrepresentative public bureaucracy’s power might be “the greatest threat to democratic government.” Thus many scholars suggest representative bureaucracy as the solution and this concept has finally influenced building the [American] Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 to reflect the nation’s diversity (Sowa and Selden 2003).

There are two kinds of representation patterns: passive representation and active representation. Passive representation refers to the statistical reflection of special characteristics; active representation means representatives actively work for the interests of men and women. In other words, when representatives work for the benefit of certain types of people, for example, women, then we can see the active representation of women (Meier 1975; Kim 1993, 1994; Kim and Lewis 1994). In the literature of women’s political representation, it is often argued that passive representation can be seen as the basis of active representation, even though the latter is not necessarily the inevitable and automatic result of the former (Phillips 1998). Studies of passive representation examine whether the composition of bureaucracies mirror the demographic composition of the general population. Hence, in this paper, we will examine the situations of passive representation in the Japanese and Korean public sectors.

Both South Korea and Japan have “a critical problem of a historically male-dominated society,” and this problem is often attributed to the legacy of Con-

fucianism. Under the Confucianism, the woman's role was confined to the home (Kim 1993; Lee and Lim 2001). Since 1996, both countries have tried to close the gender gap. For example, in 1996, the Korean Government enforced the policy employing women in public sector. In 1999, the laws prohibiting gender discrimination were established (Kwan 2000). The Japanese Government instituted a plan for gender equality to employ more women in public sector (Kim et al 1999; Kwan 2000).

Despite all these efforts, both governments have remained at a low level of gender equality. According to the World Economic Forum, both countries constantly remain in the lower ranks since 2006. In particular, political empowerment is significantly lower than three other indices (economic participation and opportunity, educational attainment, and health and survival.). In 2015, Japan and Korea's political empowerment index is only 0.103 and 0.107 out of 1.0 (World Economic Forum 2015).

<Table 1> Gender Gap Index Over the Years

		2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Japan	Ranking	94	98	101	105	104	101
	Index	0.652	0.651	0.653	0.650	0.658	0.670
Korea	Ranking	104	107	108	111	117	115
	Index	0.634	0.628	0.636	0.35	0.640	0.651

Source: World Economic Forum (2015).

It may be possible to read these statistics as an indication of persistent gender inequality in these two countries, including in the field of politics and administration, due to cultural factors, such as the legacy of Confucianism. However, and although we do not deny the importance of cultural factors, our goal is to closely examine the cases of Japan and Korea to find out not only similarities but also differences between them. Indeed, as our paper demonstrates, we need a more context-specific and fine-tuned analysis that goes beyond simple cultural determinism to fully understand the women's representation and what more should be done to

achieve gender equality in Japan and Korea.

To describe the situation of female representation in the public sectors in Japan and Korea, we use the MV and RBO. The MV was developed by David Nachmias and David Rosenbloom (Nachmias and Rosenbloom 1973) upon publishing an article concerning bureaucratic representation and integration (Guajardo et al. 1996). The concept of the MV is that a greater number of differences among a group of elements results in a more mixed group as a whole, and therefore, a greater variation is found. Likewise, a smaller number of differences results in a less mixed group, and less variation is present. The MV consists of the total observed differences and the maximum possible differences (Nachmias and Rosenbloom 1973: 592). The number of observed differences may be related to different criteria for different purposes. Relating the observed differences to the maximum number of possible differences within the same unit has the effect of controlling the number of specific social characteristics in the unit. The maximum number of differences occurs when all the frequencies of individual attributes in the group are equal. Therefore, the expected maximum can be computed by equalizing the frequencies and then finding the number of differences that would be observed if all frequencies were equal (Nachmias and Rosenbloom 1973: 592). The MV takes on values between zero and one. If the numerator is zero or close to zero, the measure indicates the complete or near complete absence of variation. In the event of an equal division of observed frequencies of attributes, the measure will be 1.00.

In addition to MV, using government data from the Japanese and Korean governments, we computed the three following RBO: (1) a traditional baseline measure, (2) a stratification measure, and (3) an aggregate representativeness measure (Riccucci and Saidel 1997: 426). These measures provide a more comprehensive picture of the extent to which demographic groups are truly represented in an organization. First, the traditional baseline measure of demographic representative bureaucracy compares a group's percentage of the government workforce with the group's percentage of the total population. This ratio is a

baseline measure of the representativeness of most government employees for a particular jurisdiction. Second, the stratification ratio examines a group's percentage of upper-level appointments as a proportion of the group's percentage of the total population. Third, an aggregate representativeness measure averages the comparisons of a group's percentage of the total government workforce with the group's percentage of the total population and the group's percentage of upper-level appointments with the group's percentage of the total population (Ricucci and Saidel 1997: 426). If the ratio is one, the measure indicates that the bureaucracy adequately reflects the population. If the ratio is less than one, the measure shows that the bureaucracy lacks equal representation. Because this measure considers upper-level appointments, it is possible to not only measure the overall trend but where exactly women can be found in the public sector.

III. Efforts to Increase Female Representation

Before examining the actual situation of women's representation in public sectors in Japan and Korea, it is helpful to understand the efforts made by both governments to increase female representation so far. As discussed later in the paper, some of these measures have been successful in increasing women's representation, while others need to be more advanced and additional methods seem to be needed to achieve gender equality.

In Japan, with the establishment of the Basic Act for Gender-Equal Society of 1999 (hereafter, the Basic Act), the government made efforts to increase female representation within the larger goal of promoting a gender-equal society. The Second Basic Plan for Gender Equality of 2005 (hereafter, the Second Plan) used 30% as the numerical goal for the percentage of women in leadership positions in all fields of society to be achieved by 2020 (*Danjo Kyōdō Sankaku Kihon Keikaku Dai2ji* 2005). Whereas the Japanese government has been explicit about its intention to increase the percentage of female public employees, it has been less

active about the representation of women in the legislature. However, in the Third Basic Plan for Gender Equality (hereafter, the Third Plan) adopted by the Cabinet in 2010, the Japanese government included the goal of increasing the percentage of female candidates in both the House of Representatives and the House of Councilors to 30% by 2020. At the same time, the Third Plan carefully notes that this goal is what the government uses in asking political parties to make an effort and should not be used to constrain the autonomous actions of political parties (*Danjo Kyōdō Sankaku Kihon Keikaku Dai3ji* 2010). These measures adopted by the Japanese government in the name of promoting gender equality have helped to create a common understanding that female representation in public sectors should increase at both the national and local levels and that actual efforts should be made to increase female representation. However, it should be noted that the numerical goals set out in the Basic Act do not have any legally binding force but only serve as goals the governments should strive to achieve. The Japanese government has mentioned the possible introduction of further strict and active legislation, yet not much has been implemented, making it difficult to increase the percentage of women in public sectors quickly (*Danjo Kyōdō Sankaku Kaigi Kihonmondai Eikyōchōsa Senmonchōsakai, Pojitibu-Akushon Wākungu Gurūpu* 2011).¹⁾

In Korea, the government policy to increase the number of female government employees enforces equal opportunities. In 1995, the Korean central government developed the “Recruitment Target System for Women” and inserted a corres-

1) Each ministry was asked to establish a 5-year plan, based on the Third Basic Plan for Gender Equality (2010), so that ministries can achieve the goal of hiring at least 30% of women through the Level I exam. Different ministries provided different specific methods to achieve the goal. For example, the Board of Audit of Japan and the Ministry of Justice, which set out the most detailed plan, included these methods. (1) try to increase female applicants in the first place by holding events that target female university students; (2) use female bureaucrats to deal with female applicants as those who are in charge of recruitment and interviews of applicants; (3) try to change the views of interviewers (both men and women, so that they won't have any biased views against female candidates; and (4) understand the importance of increasing the number of female bureaucrats. See more details at http://www.jbaudit.go.jp/pr/jinji/pdf/jinji_h230526.pdf and <http://www.moj.go.jp/content/000100314.pdf>.

ponding article into the “Government Decree of the Civil Service Entrance Examination.” To promote the development and representation of women in managerial-level positions, the Korean central government made the “Basic Plan for the Development of Female Officials” in 1999 (Ministry of Gender Equality & Family 2011). In 2002, the Recruitment Target System for Women was changed to the “Recruitment Target System for Equality of Both Genders” (“30 percent” of women must recruited; same as for men) for both central and local government officials, and the corresponding articles were revised in the Government Decree of the Civil Service Entrance Examination. In accordance with this, more training opportunities were provided to female officials particularly for capacity building and policy understanding. In 2003, the “Appointment Target System for Female Officials” was set by the Korean government. All related government employment policies were revised in 2004 to reflect these policy changes, and as a result, the “the Development Plan for the Employment of Female Officials at the Director-level Post” in the central and local governments was established in 2007. To reform the organizational culture, the Korean government adopted family friendly policies that were aimed at creating a friendlier working environment for female employees. Moreover, the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family (MOGEF) has been promoting various gender-equality policies in both private and public sectors over the years and it is fair to say that such initiatives could have influenced the increase of female representation in Korean business and government sectors. In addition, the Ministry of Personnel Management (MPM) as a central personnel authority in the Korean government also supports for a gender-balanced personnel policy in line with the previous regimes.

IV. Findings of Female Representation in the Japanese and Korean Public Sectors

How do the situations of Japan and Korea look in terms of women's representation in public sectors? In this section, we give our findings about the situation of women's representation at the levels of national government, local government, national and local legislatures, and judiciary, and provide some explanations for our findings. Our analysis demonstrates that the governments' efforts and some improvements in women's representation notwithstanding, there are persistent barriers for women to advance into the public sectors in both countries, but to different degrees.


1. National Government

1) MVs in Japan and Korea

We calculated the MV for both the Japanese and Korean national governments from 1998~2010. We could observe two major phenomena from this analysis. First, both in Korea and Japan, the MVs were increasing over time; the proportions of male and female government employees were approaching each other in both of these national governments. (See Figure 1).

The second observation we can make is that the MV for the Korean national government was considerably greater than in that of Japan. The Japanese government has adopted the goal of increasing the percentage of female national government employees and has implemented various measures to recruit more female students and make working conditions more women-friendly at the level of national government (Jinjiin Jinzaikyoku Kikakuka 2011), but the difference between Japan and Korea remains.

<Figure 1> The MVs in the Japanese and Korean National Governments




Sources: Korea - Ministry of Public Administration and Security (2011b); Japan - Danjo Kyōdō Sankakukyoku (2012a); Jinjiin (2010).

2) RBOs in Japan and Korea

Figure 2 shows RBOs in the Japanese and Korean governments. Overall, Korea's RBOs are slightly greater than those in Japan. Of the three RBOs, the traditional baseline measure in both countries is greater than 0.7 (0.704 in Japan and 0.839 in Korea), but the stratification measure in both countries is substantially low (0.038 in Japan and 0.045 in Korea). In the meantime, the aggregate measure in Japan is 0.371 and in Korea is 0.442. In Korea, the traditional baseline improved from 0.632 in 2000 and 0.839 in 2010. However, the stratification measure, which is related to upper level appointments, is quite low: 0.028 in 2000 and 0.045 in 2010. Therefore, the representation of high-level Korean women is still low despite the visible increase in the percentages of successful female candidates in the high-level entry examination in Korea.

<Figure 2> The Representative Bureaucracy Ratios (RBOs) in Japan and Korea



Sources: Korea - Ministry of Public Administration and Security (2011b); Japan - Danjo Kyōdō Sankakukyoku (2012a), Jinjiin (2010).


In Japan, there has also been a gradual increase over time in the traditional baseline, stratification, and aggregate measures. For example, the traditional baseline increased from 0.647 in 2000 to 0.704 in 2010, the stratification measure increased from 0.007 in 2000 to 0.038 in 2010, and the aggregate measure increased from 0.327 in 2000 to 0.371 in 2010. Despite these gradual increases, such as for Korea, the low stratification measure suggests an underrepresentation of women at middle and high levels.

3) Variation in National Ministries

Another way to delve into the situations of female representation at the national government level is to examine women’s representation in different ministries because women tend to be clustered in those ministries that address so-called women’s issues, such as family and welfare (Guy and Newman 2004). Overall, Korean ministries tend to have greater MVs than those in Japan except for the Ministry of Justice. Indeed, the Korean Ministry of Education, Science, Technology (MEST) and the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MW) have the MVs that are greater than 1 (1.102 and 1.011, respectively), meaning that women are represented

more than men in these ministries. In both countries, the ministries that address welfare and health issues have relatively high MVs. In fact, the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW) has the greatest MV in Japan, whereas the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MW) has the second greatest MV among Korean ministries.

<Figure 3> The MVs in Central Ministries in Japan and Korea²⁾



Sources: Korea - Ministry of Public Administration and Security (2011b); Japan - Danjo Kyōdō Sankakukyoku (2012a).

2) Note: Abbreviations and acronyms for the Japanese and Korean ministries are as follows: For Japan, MIC: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications; MOJ: Ministry of Justice; MOFA: Ministry of Foreign Affairs; MOF: Ministry of Finance; MLTI: Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism; MEXT: Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology; MAFF: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries; MHLW: Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare; MOE: Ministry of the Environment. For Korea, MOPAS: Ministry of Public Administration and Security; MOJ: Ministry of Justice; MOFAT: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade; MOSF: Ministry of Strategy and Finance; MLTM: Minister of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs; MEST: Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology; MFAFF: Ministry for Food, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries; MW: Ministry of Health and Welfare; MOE: Ministry of Environment.

The ministries whose jurisdiction is in land and transport, conversely, tend to have lower MVs in both countries. In Japan, the lowest MV was found in the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT). The Korean equivalent of the Japanese MLIT, which is the Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs, also has the second lowest MV among the Korean ministries. Another similarity between Korea and Japan can be found in Ministry of Finance that has an MV that is ranked seventh in both countries.

For other ministries, there are few similarities between Korea and Japan. For example, whereas the Korean Ministry of Justice has the lowest MV among Korean ministries with a value of 0.452, in Japan, the Ministry of Justice has the 5th greatest MV among Japanese ministries with a value greater than that of Korea by 0.551. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the second greatest MV among ministries there; however, the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade has the 6th greatest MV. Such dissimilarities suggest that there are other factors beyond the nature of the issues that are handled by these ministries (whether these issues are women's issues or other issues) that can influence the representation of women in different ministries. One key factor that needs more analysis is the rate of women's representation at different job levels within each ministry. The difference between Korean and Japanese Ministry of Justice, for example, may be influenced by the greater representation of women in the lower ranking job positions in Japan.

4) Different Levels of Tracks in the National Government


Indeed, in order to fully understand women's representation in the national government, it is crucial to examine women in different levels of jobs there because both in Japan and Korea, civil servants enter the national government through different entry points that would lead them to different levels of jobs.

The Japanese government has three entrance examinations levels (Levels I, II, and III)³ as does the Korean government (Grade 5, Grade 7, and Grade 9 exami-

nations). The Japanese Level I exam is similar to the Korean Grade 5 exam; both of which are for entry-level managerial positions, such as a Deputy-Director. Different entry levels will lead to different career paths, i.e., candidates who pass the Japanese Level I and the Korean Grade 5 examinations will become elite bureaucrats, whereas those who pass the Japanese Level III and the Korean Grade 9 examinations will mainly engage in clerical jobs. Thus, analyzing the female representation at different exam levels can provide us with a better picture regarding whether women might be found in more powerful positions within the national governments.

Figure 4 shows the rate of women’s representation in the national government for different employment positions as measured by the percentage of female candidates who passed various civil service entrance examination levels.

<Figure 4> The Percentages of Women Who Passed the Entrance Examinations in Japan and Korea



Sources: Korea - Ministry of Public Administration and Security (2015b); Japan - Danjo Kyōdō Sankakukyoku (2012a, 2015).

- 3) A new examination system has been introduced for the national civil service examination in Japan from 2012. The old Level I exam is now restructured as the examination for comprehensive service and the Level II and III exams are categorized into examination for general services targeting university graduates (Level II) and high-school graduates (Level III). In this paper, we use the old labels to indicate these three new examinations after 2012.

In Korea, the success rate of women in the Grade 9 exam (low-level entry) was 51.6% in 2015, which is the highest among the three examination levels; following Grade 5 (48.2%) and Grade 7 (37.4%). This could be interpreted to mean that female applicants are aiming high in their goals (the Grade 5 exam) resulting in an increasing success rate since 2005. Further, in the Grade 9 exam, the success rate of women reversed the success rate of men.

In Japan, the Level II (mid-level entry) and Level III (low-level entry) representation of women has been increasing incrementally when measured by the percentage of women among the successful candidates who passed the entrance examinations, but Level I (high-level entry) is the lowest. These findings indicate that at the level of the national government, we should expect to find a larger percentage of women in high-ranking positions in the Korean national government than in Japan.

Why do we see lower percentage of women entering the Japanese national government through the highest level of the recruitment examination than in Korea? First, it can be observed that there have been lower percentages of women who applied for these exams in the first place.⁴⁾ When there is a smaller number of women who apply for the examination, then, it can be assumed that the number of women who eventually get the positions of elite bureaucrats will be also small. Then, why have there been a small number of women who applied for the examination compared with men? The job of elite bureaucrats is well-known for its long working hours. According to the survey of female public employees conducted by the National Personnel Authority, in response to the question “what do you think is required for women to play an active role in senior posts?” 49.3% answered that “significant reduction in overtime work” is necessary (Jinjiin Jinzaikyoku Kikakuka, 2011, p.41). When this work condition is combined with the idea and practice of traditional gender roles, in which women play the roles of

4) For example, after the introduction of the new examination system (started to be used from the 2012 examination), the percentages of women who applied for the Comprehensive Service Examination have been 30.6% in 2012, 30.3% in 2013, and 30.8% in 2014.

mothers and wives at home, that are still prevalent in Japan, it can discourage women from even wanting to work as elite bureaucrats.⁵⁾ When working outside of the home is considered as a man's job, then, young women would eschew from choosing a job, such as that of elite bureaucrats, that requires longer working hours than other jobs.⁶⁾

At the same time, it should be noted that the percentage of women who are hired through the Level I (Comprehensive Service) Examination has jumped significantly in 2015: from 24.6% in 2014 to 37.3% in 2015 (See Figure 4). This can be seen as the result of the Japanese government's effort. The Cabinet of Japan adopted the Third Basic Plan for Gender Equality in 2010 and it included a goal that the percentage of women who were hired through the Level I examination should be increased to 30% by the end of 2015. It can be argued, therefore, even in a situation that can hinder women from wanting to become elite bureaucrats, the government's efforts can support those women who decide to choose the career of elite bureaucrats.

5) For example, according to one survey of young people (13-29 years old) in seven countries conducted in 2014, the percentage of Japanese young people who agreed to the statement "Man should work outside the home and woman should protect home" was 22.3% while 38.7% disagreed with it, while the percentage of those who agreed with the statement is much lower in Korea (12.3%) and those disagreed was much higher (80.4%) (Naikakufu, 2014, p.48).

6) Another way of examining the question of, "Why there has been a smaller percentage of women who enter the Japanese national government through the highest level of examination?", is to pay attention to the fact that the success rate of female applicants has been lower than that of male applicants. The percentages of women who passed the examination were 22.4% in 2012, 19.6% in 2013, 21.2% in 2014, and 24.6% in 2015, respectively. It is difficult to explain why men have done better in the examination without having detailed data about each applicant. Yet, one possible indirect factor that can systematically lead to this gender difference is the rate of women's attendance in universities, especially those that have produced many elite bureaucrats, such as the University of Tokyo. As of 2016, for example, there are only 195 women among 952 students in the University of Tokyo's Faculty of Law (The University of Tokyo, 2016). Those who reject the idea that it is more important for men to attain university education is lower in Japan than in Korea (World Values Survey Association). Thus, one possible indirect cause of the dearth of female elite bureaucrats can be the idea about gender and higher education.


2. Local Governments

1) MVs in Japan and Korea

Although Korea fares better than Japan at the national government level, as Figure 5 shows, the MV of women in Japanese local governments is greater than in the Korean local governments. The MV in the local Japanese governments was 0.935 in 2008. In Korea, although there has been a considerable increase over 10 years, in 2008, its MV was 0.829 and was less than in the central government (Kim 2004).

The MV of women in Japanese local governments was greater than in the national government, suggesting that it has been easier for women to gain jobs in the local governments. This might be because, as previously mentioned, there are more positions in the local governments than in the national government in Japan compared with Korea. Another possibility is the existence of local government jobs that do not require high educational credentials. In fact, many women are recruited through the mid-level examination that targets those who have completed a junior college education compared with the high- or low-level examinations (Danjo Kyōdō Sankakukyoku 2012a: 44). It has been predominantly women who have selected junior colleges (Saito 2001); hence, the choice of the mid-level jobs at the local government can be observed as one major career path for many women in Japan. In addition, a larger percentage of women are engaged in specific types of jobs, in particular, jobs in nursing and health as well as in social welfare (Danjo Kyōdō Sankakukyoku 2012a: 42-43).

<Figure 5> The MVs in Japanese and Korean Local Governments




Sources: Korea - Ministry of Public Administration and Security (2011a); Japan - Danjo Kyōdō Sankakukyoku (2012a)

2) Regional Variation within Local Governments

As observed in Figure 6, Korea has 16 provincial-level local governments including Seoul Metropolitan City, provinces, and other large metropolitan cities. The average MV in the Korean provincial-level government is 0.825, and the difference between the greatest and least MVs in the Korean local government is 0.118. Among provincial-level governments, the Gangwon province (a mountainous region) had the lowest MV (0.759) followed by the island Jeju province (0.777). Among large metropolitan cities, Daegu has the lowest MV, which could be affected by the conservative local culture.


<Figure 6> The MVs in the Korean Provincial-Level Governments



Source: Ministry of Public Administration and Security (2011a).

Figure 7 shows the MVs of major Japanese prefectures. The average MV in Japanese prefectures is 0.818, which is lower than that of Korea. For example, the Iwate prefecture has the greatest MV among the 47 prefectures with a score of 1.014 followed by Tokushima with a score of 0.980. These scores are greater than the highest in Gyeonggi-do in Korea (0.877). The lowest MV was observed in the Kyoto prefecture, which fills the gap between the greatest and least MVs in the Japanese local government 0.527, which is much greater than that of Korea. It would require more in-depth research to fully explain why Kyoto’s MV is the lowest. However, it is notable that the percentage of women hired through the low-level examination administered by the Kyoto prefectural government is the lowest among all the prefectures. Furthermore, this prefecture does not use the mid-level examination, whereas the percentage of women who received jobs through the high-level examination is not necessarily lower than other prefectures (Danjo Kyōdō Sankakukyoku 2012b).

〈Figure 7〉 The MVs in the Japanese Prefectural Governments



Source: Danjo Kyōdō Sankakukyoku (2012b).


3. National and Local Legislatures

When the proportion of women in the national legislatures before 2000 are compared, smaller percentages of female legislators can be found in Korea than in Japan both in the national and local legislatures (Ministry of Gender Equality & Family, 2001; Hwang, 2002; Kim et al., 2005). However, since the 2004 election, the percentage of women in the Korean National Assembly exceeded the number of the female members in the Japanese Diet (Figure 8). Similarly, after the 2006 election, the percentage of Korean female politicians in the local assemblies surpassed the percentage of Japanese female politicians (Figure 9).

The reason why Korea surpassed Japan can be largely attributed to the introduction of the gender quota systems in Korea and its non-existence in Japan. As of 2013, for both the Korean national and local assemblies, it is stipulated that at least 50% of the candidates in the party list prepared for the proportional representation seats should be women even though there is no penalty for non-compliance at the national level. In addition, parties are encouraged to nominate at least 30% of female candidates for small member district seats even


though the level of compliance by political parties has been relatively low (Chun 2011; Shin 2014). This implies that the quota system can enhance women’s numerical political representation in the legislature even when it is implemented in culturally male-dominant society.

<Figure 8> The Percentage of Women in Congress in Japan and Korea



Sources: Korea - National Election Commission (2013); Japan - Naikakufu (2011).

<Figure 9> The Percentage of Female Local Councilors in Japan and Korea




Sources: Korea - National Election Commission (2013); Japan - Naikakufu (2011).

4. Judiciary


Figures 10 and 11 show that the MV of female prosecutors and judges in both countries has been increasing over the years. In Korea, as of 2010, the overall female representation is close to 0.909 in the judicial branch, but the proportion of prosecutors is quite low. Furthermore, there have only been three female Supreme Court Justices in Korea since 1948. Two women, Kim Young-ran (2004-2010) and Jun Soo-Ahn (2006-2012), previously served in the Court; and Park Bo-Young is currently serving as a Supreme Court Justice (2012-present). The proportion of successful female applicants to the bar examination was greater than 40 percent in 2010. The organizational culture in the prosecutor's office is somewhat more conservative than other government offices, which might explain the low MV score in both countries.

〈Figure 10〉 The MVs for Prosecutors in Japan and Korea



Sources: Korea - Ministry of Public Administration and Security (2011b); Japan - Sendai Danjo Kyōdō Sankaku Zaidan (n.d.).

<Figure 11> The MVs for Judges in Japan and Korea



Sources: Korea - Ministry of Public Administration and Security (2011b); Japan - Sendai Danjo Kyōdō Sankaku Zaidan (n.d.).

In Japan, the MV scores for both female prosecutors and female judges are noticeably lower than in Korea, although there have been five female judges at the Supreme Court: Takahashi Hisako (1994~1997), Yokoo Kazuko (2001~2008), Sakurai Ryuko (2008~present), Okabe Kiyoko (2010~present), and Onimaru Kaoru (2013~present). When we compare prosecutors and judges, such as for Korea, the MV score for prosecutors is less than the MV score for judges. When compared with the MV for national government ministries, the scores for Japanese judges and prosecutors are not relatively low even though they are still at the lower end of the spectrum. It is suspected that the Public Prosecutor’s Office imposed a limitation on the number of women to be hired at least between 1995 and 1999 (Nihon Bengoshi Rengōkai 2002: 81~82). Although it is difficult to identify if this alleged active discrimination against women is why the MV scores have been lower for prosecutors than judges, the possible existence of such a practice can be taken as a sign of an organizational culture that is not friendly to women.

V. Concluding Remarks

Our findings suggest the effectiveness of the affirmative action measures to increase women's representation in public sectors. As the cases of the national government and the legislature show, the introduction of the quota systems in Korea successfully increased the percentages of women in these sectors. For the Japanese national government, the recent increase (24.6 percent in 2014 to 37.3 percent in 2015) in women's representation in the successful applicants of the Level I examination can be seen as the result of the government's affirmative action.⁷⁾

In Korea, the success rate of women in the Grade 9 exam (low-level entry) was 51.6% in 2015 and this means that the success rate of women reversed the success rate of men. If this situation continues in the future, there might be no female under-representation in the clerical positions of the Korean government. Moreover, the success rate of women in the Grade 5 exam (high-level entry) in 2015 was 48.2%, which is much closer to 50%. Such an indicator shows the possibility of fair representation of women in the senior posts in the Korean government in the future, if successful female entrants stay and move forward successfully in the Korean government over the years.

However, as demonstrated in our analysis, women's representation has not achieved parity with that of men in many public sectors. In addition, as mentioned earlier, in terms of political empowerment, Japan and Korea lag behind many other OECD countries. These findings imply that the existence of barriers for women's advancement into certain areas of the public sector are perhaps due to an organizational culture that is male oriented as well as a culture that lacks adequate

7) Indeed, if we look at the percent of women who passed the Level-1 exam in 2014 (the 2014 exam was used to select those who started to work in 2015), it was 21.2%, while that of those who were actually hired was 37.3%. Such a situation, where the percentage of women who were hired was greater than percent of women who passed the exam, has continued since the exam of 2003. According to the 4th Basic Plan for Gender Equality that was established in 2015, this same 30% goal has been included again, suggesting that the trend will continue (or at least not will be reversed so easily).

and effective support for women to balance work and family responsibilities in the midst of the busy and hard work that is required for the high-ranking positions. Subtle assumptions, attitudes, and stereotypes may exist in the public workplace in both countries manifesting as organizational cultures that affect the employment and mobility patterns of women in both countries. It can be expected that more women will pursue a career in the public sectors in both countries. More women should be employed and promoted without being hindered by any barriers, and in so doing, a more equal gender representation in the public sectors can be achieved.

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한국과 일본의 공공분야에서의 여성대표성에 대한 비교분석 연구

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이 논문의 목적은 한국과 일본의 공공분야에서의 여성 대표성을 대표관료비율(RBO)과 분산도(MV) 등을 측정하여 비교 분석하는데 있다. 한국과 일본에서의 여성임용과 대표성에 대한 전체적인 실상을 살펴볼 수 있는 비교적 시각을 제공할 수 있도록, 이 연구는 한국과 일본의 중앙정부와 지방정부는 물론 입법부와 사법부 등의 여성대표성을 비교 분석하는데 있다. 한국과 일본의 공공분야에서 여성 대표성은 시간이 경과하면서 증가해왔지만, 각국의 여성대표성의 수준과 정도는 지역과 조직 등에 따라 상당한 정도의 차이가 있다. 그리고 한국과 일본의 경우에 여성들의 공무원시험 합격률이 상승하고 있지만, 양국간에 차이가 발견된다. 한국의 2015년의 경우에 여성들의 9급합격율이 남성을 능가하기 시작했고, 여성들의 5급합격률도 거의 50퍼센트수준에 근접하고 있어서 상당한 진전을 보이고 있다. 그리고 일본의 경우에 여성들의 관리직(Level-1) 합격률이 높지 않았지만, 최근 일본정부가 시행한 남녀형평정책 등의 영향으로 2015년에는 과거보다 높은 합격률을 보여 일본정부에서도 여성들의 대표성이 향상되고 있음을 발견할 수 있다. 그러나 양국 공히 여성들은 공무원채용시험에 합격한 이후에도 가사와 육아 등 여러 가지 추가적인 어려움이 있으므로 여성공무원들을 위한 가족친화적인 정책 등이 지속적으로 지원되어야 할 것이다.

[주제어: 대표관료제, 한국, 일본, 여성대표성, 다양성]

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