http://dx.doi.org/10.18350/ipaid.2017.26.2.1

■□□□□□

일반논문 「지역발전연구」 제26권 제2호: 1~32 JRSD

Mutual-accountability of Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives (MSIs) Partnership: A Comparative Evaluation*

Minjee Kim
Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs

Bokyeong Park
Kyung Hee University

This study evaluates the mutual-accountability of MSIs, particularly focusing on the dimension of participation among internal stakeholders, and compares across three different types of MSIs: representative, deliberative, and functional. We set up an evaluation framework applying the GAP and Brinkerhoff's framework on accountability of partnership, and define quantifiable scoring rules for an objective evaluation. The study evaluates 19 MSIs in different types. The result shows that representative MSIs secure the best mutual-accountability, while functional MSIs are the weakest and deliberate MSIs in between. As well, it suggests that MSIs formed around an inter-governmental organization are prone to construct a shadow hierarchy among partners regardless of their formal constitution.

[Key Words: multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs), development partnership, mutual-accountability, participation]

* This work was supported by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF-2015S1A3A2046224)

www.kci.go.kr

Ⅰ. Introduction

The complex and multi-dimensional nature of development naturally leads to the importance of multi-stakeholder partnerships in international development. Global dialogues have repeatedly stressed the multi-stakeholder approach for sustainable and inclusive development (World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002, Busan High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2011, etc.). Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly Goal 17, state development partnerships as pivotal means to execute their focus areas (UN 2016). The new paradigm in development is characterized by a new form of multilateral co-operation beyond intergovernmental diplomacy (Martens 2007). One of the innovative platforms to deliver this multi-stakeholder partnership is multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs).

Though the concept of MSIs remains rather vague in scope, this paper following the majority of literature understands MSIs to refer to the multi-sectoral initiatives designed to solve complex social or environmental problems.[1] The term of MSIs was first used in the follow-up process of the Rio conference in 1995 to identify collective initiatives among governments, intergovernmental bodies, the private sector and NGOs for environment issues. Thereafter, the concept has expanded to a more comprehensive term indicating the partnership platform among the trans-sectoral stakeholders addressing specific social issues (Koechlin and Calland 2009). A good

1) The concept of MSIs is variously named in the literature, for instance, as "multi-stakeholder initiatives" (Farsen and Kolk 2007; Martens 2007; Mena and Palazzo 2012; Rache 2012), "multi-stakeholder networks" (Roloff 2008), "multi-stakeholder partnerships" (Backstrand 2006), "multi-stakeholder processes" (Hemmati et al 2002), "multi-stakeholder platform" (Warner 2006; Faysse 2006), "multi-stakeholder regulation initiatives" (Haufler 2003), "non-governmental systems of regulation" (O'Rourke 2006), or "multi-stakeholder governance arrangements" (Schouten et al 2012).

www.kci.go.kr

example of MSIs is GAVI, a vaccine alliance which includes Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, WHO, the World Bank, and etc. as partner.

Since MSIs create a partnership which includes both public and private actors, MSIs and public-private partnerships (PPPs) are often used in an interchangeable manner. However, the former are distinguished from the latter in two aspects. First, the stakeholders of MSIs establish sustained collaborative governance or 'platform' to run and address programs or dialogue (Moog et al. 2015; Rasche 2012). Also, while PPPs delegate public functions or policy objectives to private partners, MSIs take a less hierarchical approach (Koechlin and Calland 2009). On the virtues of such a more solid and horizontal partnership, MSIs are regarded as an attractive platform to mobilize funding, technology, expertise and networks to leverage the different skills and resources of individual stakeholders, namely government, business, and civil societies. Some advocate that MSIs will play a complementary role to government funding and commitment to global development, and demonstrate the best practices and global standards in addressing complicated issues (Hemmati et al. 2002, Kirton and Trebilcock 2004, Fransen and Kolk 2007, Koechlin and Calland 2009, Rasche and Kell 2010, Levy et al. 2010 Gilbert et al. 2011, etc.).

These positive perspectives heavily rely on the sectoral inclusiveness of MSIs. This inclusiveness, however, provides simultaneously the reason for the skeptical views of MSIs. The views are related to the power dynamics among different stakeholders and accountability issues. Although the concept of MSIs is based on equal partnership among partners or stakeholders, exact equality is virtually impossible to secure in representation among the stakeholders. As a result, while the interests of weaker stakeholders may be under-represented, stronger stakeholders with an immediate access to power may control over important resources or opportunities (Brinkerhoff 2004, Tamm Hallstrom and Bostrom 2010, DIIS 2009, Chan and Pauw 2014).

www.kci.go.kr

Moreover, MSIs involving a wide range of stakeholders with different sectoral and geographical scopes tend to lack a proper framework for monitoring performance. Combined with the flexibility of the governance, it causes problems in representation and accountability (Dodd et al. 2002, Ivanova 2003, Gulbrandsen 2012).

Traditionally, the accountability is explained in terms of principal-agent relationship in the public sector. For a non-hierarchical partnership, particularly MSIs, however, the principal and agent are not clearly distinctive. Thus, some studies in partnership introduce a different principle of accountability such as mutual-accountability. They attempt to elaborate the theoretical framework on mutual-accountability. Still, there are few empirical studies to examine how mutual-accountability works in real MSIs.

This paper aims to evaluate and measure mutual-accountability of MSIs. In particular, this compares mutual-accountability of internal stakeholders across three different types of MSIs, focusing on the dimension of participation. The analysis applies a theoretical framework on accountability under partnership and a scoring tool for quantitative measurement.

Chapter 2 discusses further accountability and typology in MSIs. Chapter 3 presents the theoretical framework for analyzing mutual-accountability in MSIs. Chapter 4 explains the methods for quantitative measurement, and Chapter 5 discusses the results. The last chapter concludes the paper.

Ⅱ. Accountability and Typology in MSIs

1. Mutual-accountability in MSI

Accountability has long been recognized as the cornerstone of successful partnership management. Keohane (2005) defines an accountable

www.kci.go.kr

relationship as "one in which an individual, group or other entity demands that an agent report on his or her activities and can impose costs on the agent". Internally, it can be the internal stakeholders' responsibility to shape their organizational missions and values, or externally, for the internal stakeholders to account for their legitimacy and achievement of their performance to external stakeholders (Blagescu and Yong 2005). There are different types of accountability based on the stakeholders being accountable to whom or what, but accountability is always crucial to the effectiveness of partnership and to performance of the stakeholders.

The relationship among stakeholders at different levels distinguishes accountability into three types: (a) upward accountability, (b) downward accountability, and (c) inward accountability. Upward accountability follows a conventional understanding of accountability, where individuals or organizations are accountable to the higher authority in response to the financial resources provided by the authority. In contrast, downward accountability refers to individuals being accountable to the actors to whom they provide their services. For example, the subject of downward accountability of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) can be the beneficiary communities. Inward accountability represents how an organization is accountable to its members and staff. The effectiveness of inward accountability depends on the control that these members exert on the governance of their organization. Inward accountability usually takes the form of formal staff meetings, training sessions, monthly reports, and staff evaluation (Maiyegun 2007).

This distinction of analysis on accountability is applicable to traditional principal-agent (or donor-recipient) partnership, since it assumes the vertical relations among the stakeholders. However the multilateral sectoral partnership in MSIs displays more horizontal relationships. The academia in public administration has acknowledged that inter-organizational

www.kci.go.kr

partnerships such as PPP and MSIs present noteworthy challenges to traditional accountability (Bardach and Lesser 1996; Milward 1996; O'Toole 1997; Radin and Romzek 1997; Webber 1999).

Acar and Robertson (2004) states that these challenges emerge from the characteristics of this partnership as follows: non-hierarchical control over partners, partners in different levels and with different types of power, participants with different stakes in the collaboration, the presence of voluntary-based or temporary partners, normative and operational differences among participants, the performance to be co-determined by all participants. In that sense, horizontal partnerships such as MSIs have no obvious principal or agent (Agranoff and McGuire 2001). Because those partnerships are voluntary and have a dynamic nature, the oversight and control aspect of accountability become less important.

In response to this concern, Whietaker et al. (2004) suggests "mutual accountability" among partners as a process that "involves key stakeholders in dialogue to determine responsibilities, authorize discretion, establish reporting procedures, and create review processes for the relationship." In this view, the accountability is rather the projection created in the process of answering questions about responsibilities, discretion, reporting and reviewing. The accountability in MSIs needs to be analyzed in this context.

The advantage of MSIs largely comes from stable institutional spaces where participants from different sectors can perform their expertise (Detomasi 2007; Rasche 2009). On the other hand, this institutional stability and sectoral inclusiveness frequently causes the skeptical views of MSIs in terms of the power dynamics among the different stakeholders, or mutual-accountability. The accountability issues of MSIs result from the lack of a monitoring framework, and dispersed responsibilities. As MSIs involve a wide range of stakeholders with different sectoral and geographical scopes, it is difficult for them to develop a proper framework for monitoring

www.kci.go.kr

performance. This is directly linked to another critical view pointing out that MSIs can suffer from a lack of representation and accountability (Dodd et al 2002; Ivanova 2003). The flexibility of the governance causes a lack of stringency and comparability, and as a result, the responsibilities and accountabilities of the stakeholders weaken (Gulbrandsen 2012). This paper aims to examine how mutual-accountability is actually structured in MSIs and, further, to shed light on its differences across different types of MSIs.

2. Typology of MSI

The functions of MSIs can be categorized as 1) dialogue/forum, 2) institution building, 3) rule setting, 4) rule implementation and 5) rule monitoring (Koechlin and Calland 2009). Another function of MSIs is sharing knowledge and expertise (Global Development Incubator 2015; Fransen and Kolk 2007). Based on the understanding of these functions, the International Civil Society Center suggests a typology of MSIs as Table 2. The Center modifies the typology defined by Beisheim and Liese (2014) aimed to classify transnational Public Private Partnerships. The Center classifies MSIs into three types: (a) service delivery/implementation, (b) transfer of knowledge, and (c) standard setting. An example of MSIs for service provision and implementation is the Global Fund which provides programs for intervention of HIV and malaria with financial investment, and provides the platform for implementing specific programs or forming a financial pool to support the programs. The knowledge transfer MSIs focus on the exchange of partner stakeholders' expertise and knowledge in specific fields, and the Global Water Partnership is one of the examples. Standard-setting MSIs are those which put priority on setting a standard to be applied across multiple sectors. Using their wide sectoral and geographical scope, MSIs can claim legitimacy on the global norms they set.

www.kci.go.kr

Another typology, suggested by May Miller-Dawkins (2014) of Oxfam, highlights the difference in partners' participation in MSIs rather than the functions. Asking when it would be better for 'civil society' to engage in an MSI, she categorizes the participatory forms of MSIs into three types: (a) representative, (b) deliberative, and (c) functional. In the "representative" form of participation, the governance of an MSI focuses on stakeholder representation in the process of providing services. Common chambers structure found in the Roundtable on Palm Oil Sustainability and Forestry Stewardship Council can be one of the examples. In this type of MSIs, the decision-making body is usually designed to equally represent all the sectors, electing board members as representatives of each sector like in the 4C Association. Second, "deliberative" schemes focus on dialogue. In this type, the stakeholders collect and marginalize their knowledge and experience on a specific issue, and facilitate global dialogue as an oppressed group so that they can be heard by the global society. These tend to initiate dialogue in a forum and then move to an ongoing chamber structure so as to facilitate global dialogue. In the third participation type, "functional" scheme, the major concern of the stakeholders is to draw on expertise and resolve conflict. A good example for "functional" is the International Seafood Sustainability Foundation which is a collective technical expertise for conservation of marine species. This paper adopts the Dawkins's typology because we attempt to evaluate mutual-accountability particularly focusing on the dimension of participation within MSIs.

Ⅲ. Analytical Framework for Accountability Assessment

This section examines two analytical frameworks which might be applied

www.kci.go.kr

to our assessment of mutual-accountability in MSIs. The first one is the Brinkerhoff's framework. While most of the literature on partnership evaluation concentrates on the results or outcome of partnerships, Brinkerhoff (2002) proposes a framework for partnership evaluation from a distinctive perspective. She observes that the efficiency of services delivery under partnership is associated with the process of participation of the partners. Adding to the conventional success factors of partnerships, her framework focuses on mutual-accountability and organizational identity among the partners. In terms of partnership accountability, the framework considers the partners' access to information, participation in decision making, and transparency. Although the framework provides many implications for evaluating partnership accountability, it stays at a theoretical level and does not provide specific indicators for measurement.

Table 1. Brinkerhoff's framework for accountability and transparency of partnership

Category	Targets
Mutuality and equality	- Equality in decision making - Democratic procedure - Satisfaction that all views are considered - Joint determination of program activities and procedures - Process for determining division of labor and risk/reward
Resource exchange	- Relative balance - Nature of resources exchanged
Reciprocal Accountability	- Regular reporting among partners - Access to performance information - Financial controls balanced with administrative imposition - Joint design of evaluation/assessment
Transparency	- Channels for continuous dialogue and information sharing - Timely response to information request - Sharing of information beyond specified agreement

www.kci.go.kr

Partner representation and participation in partnership activities	– Participation in planning and review meetings – Program activities – Partner satisfaction with opportunities to participate – Rules governing who can represent the partnership
Mutual respect	– Consideration of partners and convenience in the planning of meetings and other organizational requirements – Recognition of indispensability of each partner – Shared understanding of respective partner drivers
Even benefits	– Perception of fairness – Satisfaction with benefit distribution – Satisfaction with the criteria for benefit distribution

Source: Brinkerhoff (2002)

Another possible framework to measure accountability is the GAP framework suggested by One World Trust. With the acknowledgement on the traditional approach which largely focuses on vertical accountabilities, the GAP framework defines accountability as "the process through which an organization actively creates, and formally structures, balanced relationships with its diverse stakeholders, empowering these (stakeholders) to hold it (the organization) to account over its decisions, activities and impacts, with a view to continuously improving the organization's delivery against its mission" (Hammer and Lloyd 2011). This definition observes that the traditional framework to concentrate on the binary relationship between principal and agent is no longer appropriate under the conditions of multilateral governance.

The GAP framework identifies four core accountability dimensions which are regarded as significant in managing accountability claims from internal and external stakeholders (Blagescu and Lloyd 2009). They are transparency, participation, evaluation, and complaint and response mechanisms, as conceptualized in Figure 1. Transparency requires the organization to provide timely access to information to all its stakeholders, and conduct an assessment of their own performance and share the results with stakeholders.

www.kci.go.kr

Accountability in participation demands the systems for active participation in the organization's decision making and activities of stakeholders. Evaluation in the context of accountability refers to the monitoring and reviewing process in which the key stakeholders are involved. Complaint and responses mechanism enables stakeholders to express their complaints on the organization's decisions, actions, and working processes, ensuring internal accountability.

Figure 1. Four core accountability dimensions in GAP framework



Source: Hammer and Lloyd (2011)

The GAP framework is more useful because while not being limited to the traditional principal-agent approach, it provides an analytical tool to assess the mutual-accountability of stakeholders. Based on the core dimensions of accountability, the GAP framework suggests the policy indicators as shown in Table 2, which can be used as an evaluation tool. This paper also largely adopts the GAP indicators for internal stakeholders to assess mutual-accountability among member organizations/governments of MSIs,

www.kci.go.kr

partly applying Brinkerhoff's framework. Further, it should be noted that this paper focuses on only the dimension of participation by internal stakeholders out of the four dimensions. Under the limited availability of information on MSIs accountabilities, we select the dimension which is regarded as the most crucial to mutual-accountability.

Table 2. GAP indicator framework for accountability of partnership

Core Accountability Dimension	Indicators
Transparency	- Transparency Policy - Narrowly defined conditions for non-disclosure - Commitment to respond to all information requests - Information appeals process - Stakeholder involvement in policy development - Roles, responsibilities, and leadership in transparency policy - Building staff capacity - Dissemination of commitments - Rewards and Incentives - Quality management systems
Participation	(External Stakeholders) - Stakeholder engagement policy - Process commitments - Stakeholder involvement in policy development - Roles, responsibilities and leadership - Building staff capacity - Disseminations of commitments - Rewards and incentives - Quality management system - Stakeholder engagement in senior decision making **(Internal Stakeholders)** **- Member control of highest decision-making body** **- Member control of executive body** **- Good governance** **- Equitable shareholder control at annual general meeting** **- Shareholder control of the board of directors**
Evaluation	(INGOs and NGOs) - Evaluation policy and framework

www.kci.go.kr

	- Stakeholder engagement, transparency and learning in evaluation - Independence in evaluations - Level of evaluation - Stakeholder involvement in policy development - Roles, responsibilities, and leadership - Building staff capacity - Rewards and incentives - Quality management system - Disseminating learning and lessons
Complaints and Responses	(External Stakeholders) - External complaints policy - Process (Channels and procedure) - Independence of Investigation - Protection of external stakeholders - Stakeholder involvement in policy development - Roles, responsibilities, and leadership - Building staff capacity - Dissemination of commitments - Quality management system (Internal Stakeholders) - Whistle-blower policy - Process (Channels and procedure) - Independence of investigation - Protection of whistles-blowers - Roles, responsibilities and leadership - Building staff capacity - Dissemination of commitment - Quality management system

Source: Hammer and Lloyd (2011)

Ⅳ. Methodology for Accountability Evaluation

1. Case Selection

For a quantitative evaluation of mutual-accountability in MSIs, we adopt the strategy as follows: (1) to select and classify MSIs to be evaluated, (2) to set up measurable indictors relevant to mutual-accountability, (3) to define

www.kci.go.kr

scoring criteria for each indicator, (4) to score indicators for MSIs using their publicly available information.

To select initiatives which can belong to MSIs, this study applies the following criteria. First, the partnership should involve more than two sectors out of public sector, private sector, corporate, civil society, and initiatives among those stakeholders. So, those partnerships to include only one or two sectors of stakeholders are excluded. Second, the partnership should have formed a platform for ongoing collaboration around sustaining governance structure. That is, the platform for implementing short-termed pilot projects or programs is excluded even if the initiative involves tri-sectoral stakeholders. In accordance with these criteria, 38 MSIs are selected and classified three types of MSIs by function, namely, representative, functional, and deliberate. They are listed in Table 3.

To evaluate mutual-accountability of those MSIs, we use only publicly available information including information on homepages, terms of reference, codes or regulations, annual reports, meeting reports, and other documents. We attempted to collect information on accountability over all of the 38 MSIs, but only from 19 MSIs we could obtain enough information necessary to evaluate accountability. In Table 3 are indicated in bold the MSIs that provide enough information.

Table 3. MSIs selected for mutual-accountability evaluation

Type	MSIs
Representative	Aspen Management Partnership for Health (AMP Health) **Cities Alliance (CA)** Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC) **Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP)** **Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI)** **Fair Labor Association (FLA)** **Forest Stewardship Council (FSC)** **Global Partnership for Education (GPE)** Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels (RSB)

www.kci.go.kr

Functional	**Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO)** **Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)** **Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights** Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) Alliance for Affordable Internet (A4AI) Aspen Network of Development Entrepreneurs (ANDE) Global Alliance For Clean Cookstoves (GACC) **Global Reporting Initiative** **Roll Back Malaria Partnership(RBM)** Toilet Board Coalition (TBC) **Water Supply and Sanitation Collaborative Council** **GAVI Alliance** **Marine Stewardship Council (MSC)**
Deliberative	**Better Than Cash Alliance (BTCA)** **Oil and Gas Methane Partnership (CCAC)** **Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition** Global Partnership for Oceans (GPO) Higher Education Sustainability Initiative IDH Initiative for Sustainable Trade **IHP+** Multi-stakeholder Partnerships for Small Island Developing States **Open Government Partnership (OGP)** Pacific Partnership Initiative RTRS Roundtable on Responsible Soy Sanitation and Water for All (SWA) **Kimberley Process Certification Scheme** UN Global Compact UN Sustainable Energy for All (SE4ALL) United Nations Sustainable Development Summit

* MSIs in bold are to be evaluated.
Source: Organized by the authors following the Dawkins (2014)'s classification rule.

2. Evaluation Criteria

The indicator framework of GAP is composed of five sections following the four core accountability dimensions and one additional section, accountability strategy. Further, each section presents indicators and detailed explanations. Although the both frameworks for partnership evaluation cover

www.kci.go.kr

the accountability of both internal stakeholders and external stakeholders, this study to address the mutual-accountability among the partners focuses on only the category or dimension immediately related to mutual-accountability. Those are the dimension of internal stakeholder participation in the GAP framework, and the category of mutuality and equality, and reciprocal accountability in the Brinkerhoff's framework. After considering and comparing the indicators or targets under those categories in the two frameworks, we set up a set of five measurable indicators: (a) member representation in the highest decision-making body (HDMB), (b) equal votes in HDMB, (c) member control of executive board (EB), (d) good governance, (e) mutual reporting. These indicators are selected so as to comprise the elements of relevant categories and also with consideration of information availability. The first two indicators measure how well and equally all partners are represented in HDMB. The third indicator evaluates how well all partners are represented in EB. The good governance indicator examines how clearly the rules of governing body are defined. The last indicator, mutual reporting, measures how appropriate a mechanism is established to communicate and share information among partners.

Each indicator is measured on a scale from 0 to 3. Our scoring criteria are designed in accordance with the criteria suggested by the GAP framework. The criteria for each indicator are summarized in Table 4.

Table 4. Working criteria to score mutual-accountability indicators

Indicator	Criteria	Score
Member representation in HDMB	All members are represented in the decision-making body	3
	Not all members are represented in the decision-making body, but the initiative has put in place measures to counteract the imbalances this causes (e.g. double majority, regional threshold, caps, co-decision making, etc.)	2
	Not all members are represented in the decision-making	1

www.kci.go.kr

	body and no measures are in place to counteract the imbalances this causes	
	No representatives of partner institutions/countries in the highest decision-making body	0
Equal Votes in HDMB	All members have equal vote in the decision-making body	3
	Not all members have equal vote in the decision-making body, but the initiative has put in place measures to counteract the imbalances this causes (e.g. double majority, regional threshold, caps, co-decision making, etc.)	2
	Not all members have equal vote in the decision-making body and no measures are in place to counteract the imbalances in this causes	1
	The members of the highest decision-making body is named by another authority/nomination committee, not by vote of partner institutions/countries	0
Member Control of EB	The initiative ensures all of the following in its executive body	3
	The initiative ensures three of the following in its executive body	2
	The initiative ensures two of the following in its executive body	1
	The initiative ensures one or none of the following in its executive body	0
	(The following) ・Members are able to nominate candidates for all executive board seats ・Members are able to initiate a process of dismissal of individuals in the executive body ・Candidates for the executive body are elected by a majority of equal votes cast by members ・Members of the executive body have an equal number of votes or if they do not, measures are in place to counteract the imbalances this causes	
Good governance	The initiative ensures all of the following in its governing body	3
	The initiative ensures two of the following in its governing body	2
	The initiative ensures one of the following in its governing	1

www.kci.go.kr

	body	
	The initiative ensures none of the following in its governing body	0
	(The following) ・A clear procedure for recruitment of board members which is open to a broad field of candidates ・Clear term limits and a cap on the number of consecutive terms a board member can serve ・The majority of the board can demonstrate their independence from the organization	
Mutual reporting	All levels of the governance body conduct regular meeting, and share the result with all the other governance bodies	3
	There are regular meetings among the different parts of the governance bodies(e.g. steering committees, or executive boards), and the result of the meeting is shared with all the other governance bodies.	2
	There are regular reporting meetings among the part of representatives(e.g. steering committees, or executive boards), but the result of the meeting is limited to the participants of the meetings	1
	There are no regular reporting meetings for the members	0

Source: Organized by the authors based on the GAP and Brinkerhoff's framework

As mentioned earlier, the indicators were scored based on publicly available data including by-laws and terms of reference which define the organizational structure, composition of governance body, and regulate the number of meetings and the level of participants, voting right of each partner, process of nomination of member of main governance body, and etc. All the information is gained from the official website of each MSI.

This study has some limitations because it adopts only the limited parts of the GAP and Brinkerhoff's framework. Nevertheless, the purpose of this study which is to relatively evaluate mutual-accountability among different types of MSIs rather than to measure their absolute levels, may mitigate the limitations and, thus, the outcomes also can provide meaningful implications.

www.kci.go.kr

V. Results and Comparison

This section presents the results of mutual-accountability evaluation where the scoring criteria are applied to 19 MSIs of three different types. First, the nine representative MSIs show high scores overall, as shown in Table 5. The average of total score records 12.7 out of 15, which is the highest among three types. In particular, for good governance indicator all the representative MSIs obtain 3 points, implying that governance-related rules are appropriately established. Mutual reporting system is highly evaluated, whereas partners' control over the executive body turns out relatively weak.

Since the representative MSIs stress the sectoral representation of internal stakeholders in their activity, they receive relatively high scores in the member representation in the HDMB. Usually, internal stakeholders are represented through the sectoral constituency that ensures the balanced representation of each sector. However, it is notable that in The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, and Forest Stewardship Council, all the partner institutions or countries can directly appoint their own representatives as member of the decision-making body.

As for mutual reporting, most of the representative MSIs turn out to have clear policies and terms in their meeting and reporting systems among the internal stakeholders. Relevant information is clear and fully accessible to internal stakeholders, and largely accessible to external stakeholders including the public.

www.kci.go.kr

Table 5. Evaluation results of representative MSIs

Name	Member Representation in HDMB	Equal Votes in HDMB	Member Control of EB	Good Governance	Mutual Reporting	Total
The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights	3	3	3	3	3	15
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor	3	3	2	3	3	14
Cities Alliance	2	3	2	3	3	13
Forest Stewardship Council	3	2	3	3	2	13
Global Partnership for Education	2	3	3	3	3	14
Ethical Trading Initiative	2	2	2	3	3	12
Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil	2	2	2	3	3	12
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative	2	2	2	3	3	12
Fair Labor Association	2	2	0	3	3	10
Average	2.3	2.3	2.1	3	2.9	12.7

Source: Evaluated by the authors.

In contrast to representative MSIs, functional MSIs show even lower scores overall as in Table 6. The average of score of this type, 8.4, is the lowest among three types. It is notable that on average the functional MSIs are vulnerable particularly to equal votes in the HDMB and partners' control of the executive board. The result probably comes from the characteristic of functional MSIs, which put priority on the expertise of partners rather than equal participation. Therefore, functional MSIs tend to constitute its governance body in accordance with the individual expertise of members regardless of their affiliations to the partner institutions or countries of the initiatives. This is likely to lead to weak representation of each partner.

www.kci.go.kr

Table 6. Evaluation results of functional MSIs

Name	Member Representation in HDMB	Equal Votes in HDMB	Member Control of EB	Good Governance	Mutual Reporting	Total
GAVI Alliance	2	2	0	3	3	10
Global Reporting Initiative	1	1	1	3	2	8
Roll Back Malaria Partnership	1	0	1	3	3	8
Water Supply and Sanitation Collaborative Council	1	0	2	3	2	8
Marine Stewardship Council	1	1	0	3	3	8
Average	1.2	0.8	0.8	3	2.6	8.4

Source: Evaluated by the authors.

Last, the mutual-accountability of deliberative MSIs is evaluated to be in between representative and functional, displaying the average of 10.0. This type shows large variation among individual MSIs in representation or equal participation in the HDMB and member control of the executive body. For instance, while the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme and CCAC Oil and Gas Methane Partnership are evaluated as the highest level in the HDMB-related indicators, Better than Cash Alliance and Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition where the UN functions as secretariat are evaluated to be very weak. In the indicators of good governance and mutual reporting also, deliberative MSIs are slightly weaker than the former types.

www.kci.go.kr

Table 7. Evaluation results of deliberative MSIs

Name	Member Representation in HDMB	Equal Votes in HDMB	Member Control of EB	Good Governance	Mutual Reporting	Total
The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme	3	3	3	3	3	15
Open Government Partnership (OGP)	2	3	3	3	3	14
CCAC Oil and Gas Methane Partnership	3	3	2	2	2	12
IHP+	2	2	1	3	2	10
Better Than Cash Alliance (BTCA)	0	0	1	3	2	6
Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition	1	1	0	1	2	5
Average	1.7	1.8	1.7	2.5	2.3	10.0

Source: Evaluated by the authors.

In sum, Figure 2 compares the mutual-accountability among internal stakeholders across three different types of MSIs. Overall, most of the MSIs are evaluated to substantially consider mutual-accountability by defining the formation of governance bodies and forming a sectoral constituency to elect the decision-making or executive board members. However, the level of representation varies with the types.

The best mutual-accountability of representative MSIs can be largely explained by the excellence in highest decision making body. The governance bodies of representative MSIs are constructed to make their constituency proportional to sectoral composition. One of the good examples is Global Partnership for Education, a funding platform, which is composed of developing countries, international organizations, civil society, teacher organizations, the private sector and foundations (Global Partnership for Education, 2017). Its board of directors, the highest decision-making body, is made of 19 constituencies with consideration on fair distribution of each sector. Therefore, all the partners attend as a constituency and have the right

www.kci.go.kr

to select the representative of the constituencies. Consequently, representative MSIs put priority on fair representativeness in the governance body, which naturally leads to the highest score in the evaluation.

In contrast, functional MSIs are relatively weak in equal representation because the expertise of the board members is greatly valued. One of the functional MSIs which are very weak in member representation and equal vote in HDMB is Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). Even though its board of directors has different constituencies for labor, CSOs, business, and mediating institutions, the partners do not have the right to nominate or vote for the board members. The stakeholder council has the right to vote for the board members. The partners can vote for the stakeholder council, but still, their votes are counted as 60% of the voting result, and the rest is determined by the board of directors. The members of the stakeholders who are elected through this process tend to represent their constituency, rather than their organizations. Nomination of the stakeholder council is open to all internal stakeholders, and voters make decisions following their expertise and knowledge rather than considering the member representation. Although the board of directors of GRI represents each sector by their constituencies, it is means to optimize their sectoral expertise rather than means for partner representation. (GRI, 2015)

In some cases, functional MSIs try to maintain partner representation and expertise at the same time by setting individual experts committee like in GAVI Alliance. Its highest decision making body, *the Board*, is composed of 19 representative board members and 8 unaffiliated board members. Those members are divided into two groups: (1) Eligible Constituency meaning each of developing country governments, donor country governments, vaccine industry in industrialized countries, the vaccine industry in developing countries, and civil society and technical health research institute, and (2) Eligible Organizations meaning each of the WHO, UNICEF, IBRD, and Bill &

www.kci.go.kr

Melinda Gates Foundation. The unaffiliated Board member means individuals appointed on their personal capacity such as their skills or qualifications (2014 GAVI Alliance). All the partners don't have their representatives in the board and some are appointed without any consideration on the partner representation. Nevertheless, GAVI Alliance acquires a relatively high score in partner representation among functional MSIs. This is possible due to the existence of Independent Review Committee (IRC) which supplements its expertise of the governance body. IRC is an independent, impartial group of national health program experts who are elected by the Board. They come from a pool nominated by the Secretariat in consultation with partners and others. IRC members shall be selected on the basis of their skills, expertise and independence. The IRC serves to guarantee the integrity and consistency of an open and transparent program funding process (GAVI Alliance, 2013).

Deliberative MSIs also display a weak representation of internal-stakeholders, which may be due to their primary function to form dialogues or fora and to collect voices on specific issues.

It needs to be noted that MSIs evaluated to secure better mutual-accountability are likely to disclose more information on the partnership policy to the public. In the case of representative MSIs, 9 out of 12 MSIs provide enough information to evaluate partner policies. In contrast, only 5 functional MSIs out of 10 release enough information and again the ratio for deliberative MSIs is smaller than for functional. This implies that mutual-accountability among internal stakeholders can be extended to the accountability to external stakeholders.

www.kci.go.kr

Figure 2. Average score of mutual-accountability indicators by MSI type



Source: Evaluated by the authors.

Ⅵ. Conclusion

This study evaluates the mutual-accountability of MSIs, particularly focusing on the dimension of participation among internal stakeholders, and compares across three different types of MSIs. To set up an evaluation framework, it refers to the GAP and Brinkerhoff's framework on accountability of partnership. Also, it defines quantifiable scoring rules for an objective evaluation and applies them to publicly available information on accountability among internal stakeholders.

The result shows that on average representative MSIs secure the best mutual-accountability in that dimension, while functional MSIs are the weakest. In deliberative MSIs, especially those where an inter-governmental organization serves as the governing body show a weak representation of partners and weak member control over the body even though the governing body comprises sectoral representatives. This suggests that MSIs formed

www.kci.go.kr

around an inter-governmental organization are very likely to construct a shadow hierarchy among partners regardless of their formal constitution.

The positive assessment of representative MSIs in representation and mutual reporting indicators implies that equal representation can easily lead to better reporting and information-sharing, and consequently to better mutual-accountability. In contrast, functional MSIs are prone to the risk of weak representation because of their emphasis on the expertise of partners. It is assumed that each MSI has developed its governance to be proper to its own duty and the level of mutual accountability does not merely indicate the level of performance. However, the MSIs with a low level of mutual accountability, for instance a functional MSI, are likely exposed to possible malfunctioning of responsibilities and conflicts among the partners. Thus, those MSIs need to find a solution to supplement the low level of partner representation.

This study has the limitations due to relying on only open information and focusing on only the internal participation dimension. Despite the limitations, this study helps figure out the differences in mutual-accountability among three types of MSIs. Further studies will require a wider use of deep information collected through partner interviews or surveys, and the expansion to other dimensions of mutual-accountability.

References

Acar, M., & Robertson, P. J. (2004). Accountability Challenges in Partnerships and Networks: Evidence from Educational Partnerships in the United States. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 70, 359-374.

Agranoff, R., & McGuire, M. (2001). Big Questions in Public Network Management research." Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 11, 295-326.

www.kci.go.kr

Bardach, E., & Lesser, C. (1996). Accountability in Human Services Collaboratives: For What and to Whom? Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 6, 197-224.

Bäckstrand, Karin. (2006). Multi-stakeholder Partnerships for Sustainable Development: Rethinking Legitimacy, Accountability and Effectiveness. European Environment, 16(5), 290-306.

Beisheim, M., & Liese, A. (Eds). (2014). Transnational Partnerships: Effectively Providing for Sustainable Development?. Springer.

Blagescu, M., & Lloyd, R. (2009). Accountability of Transnational Actors: Is There Scope for Cross-sector Principles? Non-state Actors as Standard Setters. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

Blagscu, M., & Yong, J. (2005). Partnerships and Accountability: Current Thinking and Approaches among Agencies Supporting Civil Society Organizations. Overseas development Institute (ODI).

Brinkerhoff, J. M. (2002). Assessing and Improving Partnership Relationships and Outcomes: a Proposed Framework. Evaluation and program planning, 25(3), 215-231.

Brinkerhoff, J. M. (2004). Partnerships between International Donors and Non-governmental Development Organizations: Opportunities and Constraints, International Review of Administrative Sciences, 70(2), 253-270.

Chan, S., & Pauw, P. (2014). A Global Framework for Climate Action-Orchestrating Non-state and Subnational Initiatives for More Effective Global Climate Governance. Bonn: Deutsches Institut fur Entwickslungpolitik

Danish Institute for International Studies [DIIS]. (2016). The Promises and Pitfalls of Global Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives. Copenhagen. DIIS Publications.

www.kci.go.kr

Detomasi, D. (2007). The Multinational Corporation and Global Governance: Modelling Global Public Policy Networks. Journal of Business Ethics, 71: 321-334.

Dodds, F., Gardiner, R., Hales, D., Hemmati, M., & Lawrence, G. (2002). Post Johannesburg: The Future of the UN Commission on Sustainable Development." London: WHAT Governance Programme. Paper, 9.

Faysse, N. (2006). Troubles on the Way: An Analysis of Challenges Faced by Multi-stakeholder Platforms. Natural Resources Forum, 30(3), 219-229.

Fransen, L. W., & Kolk, A. (2007). Global Rule-setting for Business: A Critical Analysis of Multi-stakeholder Standards. Organization, 14(5), 667-684.

Gavi Alliance. (2013). Gavi Alliance By-laws. Washington DC. Gavi Alliance

Gilbert, D. U., Rache, A., & Waddock, S. (2011). Accountability in a Global Economy: The Emergence of International Accountability Standards. Business Ethics Quarterly, 21(1). 23-44

Global Partnership for Education[GPE]. (2017, April 27). About Us. Retrieved August 21, 2017, from http://www.globalpartnership.org/about-us

Global Reporting Initiatives[GRI]. (2015, March 20). Rules and Procedures for the GRI Board of Directors, Retrieved August 21, 2017, from https://www.globalreporting.org/SiteCollectionDocuments/2016/Governance%20documents/Rules%20and%20Procedures%20for%20the%20GRI%20Board%20of%20Directors.pdf

Gulbrandsen, L. H. (2010). Transnational Environmental Governance: the Emergence and Effects of the Certification of Forest and Fisheries. Edward Elgar Publishing.

Hammer, M., Lloyd, R., Lingán, J., & Obrecht, A. 2011. Pathways to Accountability II: The 2011 Revised Global Accountability Framework: Report on the Stakeholder Consultation and the New

www.kci.go.kr

Indicator Framework. One World Trust.

Haufler, V. (2003). New Forms of Governance: Certification Regimes as Social Regulations of the Global Market. Social and Political Dimensions of Forest Certification, 237-247. Germany: Remagen-Oberwinter

Hemmati, M. (2002). Multi-stakeholder processes for governance and sustainability: beyond deadlock and conflict. London: Routledge./

Ivanova, M. H. (2003). Partnerships, International Organizations, and Global Environmental Governance. Progress or peril, 9-36.

Keohane, R. O. (2005). Abuse of Power." Harvard International Review, 27(2), 48.

Kirton, J. J. & Trebilcock, M. J. (2004). Introduction: Hard Choices and Soft Law in Sustainable Global Governance. In J. J. Kirton & M. J. Trebilcok (Eds.), Hard Choices, Soft Law: Voluntary Standards in Global Trade, Environment and Social Governance: 3-29. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Koechlin, Lucy and Calland, Richard. (2009). Standard Setting at the Cutting Edge : an Evidence-based Typology for Multi-stakeholder Initiatives. In: Non-state Actors as Standard Setters. 84-112. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Levy, D. L. Brown, H. S., & De Jong, M. (2010). The Contested Politics of Corporate Governance: The Case of the Global Reporting Initiative. Business & Society, 49(1), 88-115.

Maiyegun, O. I. (2007). Participation in the Deliberative Process of the United Nations: The Influence of Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) on Decision Outcomes. ProQuest.

Martens, J. (2007). Multistakeholder Partnerships- Future Models of Multilateralism? (Vol. 29). Berlin: Friedrich-Elbert-Stiftung.

Mena, S., & Palazzo, G. (2012). Input and Output Legitimacy of Multi-stakeholder Initiatives. Business Ethics Quarterly, 22(3), 527-

www.kci.go.kr

556.

Miller-Dawkins, May. (2016). How Can You Tell whether a Multi-Stakeholder Initiative is a Total Waste of Time?: From Poverty to Power. Oxfamblogs.org. Retrieved 28 December 2016, from https://oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/how-can-you-tell-whether-a-multi-stakeholder-initiative-is-a-total-waste-of-time/

Milward, H. B. (1996). Symposium on the Hollow State: Capacity, Control and Performance in Inter-organizational Settings. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 6, 193-195.

Moog, S., Spicer, A., & Böhm, S. (2015). The Politics of Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives: The Crisis of the Forest Stewardship Council. Journal of Business Ethics, 128(3), 469-493.

O'Rourke, D. (2006). Multi-stakeholder Regulation: Privatizing or Socializing Global Labor Standards? World Development, 34(5), 899–918.

O'Toole, L. J., Jr. (1997). The Implications for Democracy in a Networked Bureaucratic World. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 7, 443-459.

Radin, B. A., & Romzek, B. S. (1996). Accountability Expectations in an Intergovernmental Arena: The National Rural Development Partnership. Publius: Journal of Federalism, 26(2), 59-81.

Rasche, A. (2009). Toward a Model to Compare and Analyze Accountability Standards: The Case of the UN Global Compact. Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management. 16: 192-205.

Rasche, A. (2012). Global Policies and Local Practices: Loose and Tight Coupling in Multi-stakeholder Initiatives. Business Ethics Quarterly, 22(4), 679–780.

Rasche, A. & Kell, G. (2010) The UN Global Compact: Achievements, Trends and Challenges. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Roloff, J. (2008). Learning from Multi-stakeholder Networks: Issue Focused

www.kci.go.kr

Stakeholder Management. Journal of Business Ethics, 82(1), 233-250.

Schouten, G., Leroy, P., & Glasbergen, P. (2012). On the Deliberative Capacity of Private Multi-stakeholder Governance: the Roundtables on Responsible Soy and Sustainable Palm Oil. Ecological Economics, 83, 42-50.

Tamm Hallström, K. & Boström, M. (2010). Transnational multi-stakeholder standardization: Organizing fragile non-state authority. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

United Nations [UN]. (2016). Global Partnerships - United Nations Sustainable Development. (n.d.). Retrieved December 26, 2016, from http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/globalpartnerships

Warner, J. F. (2006). Multi-stakeholder Participation? Multi-stakeholder Platforms for Integrated Catchment Management. International Journal of Water Resources Development, 22(1), 15-35.

Whitaker, Gordon P., Lydian Altman-Sauer, and Margret Henderson. (2004). Mutual Accountability between Governments and Nonprofits. Moving beyond "Surveillance" to "Service." American Review of Public Administration, 34. 115-133

www.kci.go.kr

국문초록

Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives(MSIs)의 상호책무성 비교평가

김민지
한국보건사회연구원
박복영
경희대학교

본 연구는 multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs)를 파트너들의 참여 행태에 따라 대표형(representative), 심의형(deliberative), 기능형(functional) MSI로 분류하고, 해당 참여 행태에 따른 개별 MSI의 파트너 간 상호책무성(mutual-accountability)을 평가했다. 평가체계 수립을 위해 본 연구는 Global Accountability Project[GAP]의 책무성 평가 프레임워크 및 Brinkerhoff의 파트너십 평가 프레임워크를 적용했고, 정량적 점수부여를 통해 참여 유형별 MSI의 상호책무성을 비교했다. 파트너 간 책무성 연구에 활용 가능한 공공정보를 공개하고 있는 19개의 MSI를 평가 대상으로 하였다. 연구 결과 전반적으로 대표형 MSI가 가장 높은 수준의 상호책무성을, 기능형 MSI가 가장 낮은 수준의 상호책무성을 보이는 것으로 나타났다. 심의형 MSI의 경우, 정부 간 기구가 파트너로 참여했을 때 파트너들의 대표성이 약화되는 경향이 있는 것으로 나타났는데, 의사결정기구에 분야별 파트너들이 균등하게 참여한 경우에도 비슷한 현상이 관찰되었다. 이는 정부 간 기구가 중심이 되어 형성된 MSI의 경우 의사결정기구 구성방식과 상관없이 정부 간 기구와 다른 파트너간의 암묵적 위계질서(shadow hierarchy)가 형성될 위험이 있음을 시사한다.

[주제어: 상호책무성, 개발파트너십, 다부문 기관참여 이니셔티브(MSI)]

논문접수일: 2017년 6월 1일 / 게재확정일: 2017년 8월 23일

제1저자: 김민지(Minjee Kim)는 경희대학교 국제대학원에서 국제개발협학 석사를 취득했으며, 현재 한국보건사회연구원 글로벌사회정책연구센터 연구원으로 재직중이다 (minjeek@kihasa.re.kr).

제2저자: 박복영(Bokyeong Park)은 서울대학교 경제학과에서 박사를 취득한 후 대외경제정책연구원(KIEP)에서 국제개발과 세계지역경제를 연구하였다. 현재는 경희대학교 국제대학원 부교수로 재직하고 있으며 주요 연구분야는 개발경제학, 개발과 금융 등이다 (bokyeong23@khu.ac.kr).

www.kci.go.kr