



Different Types of Human Rights, Different Effects?: The Effects of Human Rights on Economic Development in Developing Countries*

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This paper investigates the effects of two types of human rights, physical integrity rights and empowerment rights, on the economic growth rates of developing countries. Specifically, physical integrity rights can positively influence the economic growth of developing countries. Governments of developing countries that respect physical integrity rights can create an environment favourable to the development of human capital. In addition, freedom from the fear of coercion enables individuals to use their abilities to contribute to economic development. In contrast, empowerment rights have no significant influence on the economic growth rates of developing countries. Using the CIRI human rights index that differentiates the two different kinds of human rights, our analysis covering the years between 1981 and 2011 supports our hypothesis regarding the positive relationship between physical integrity rights and economic growth rates in developing countries.

[Key Words: Human rights, Economic development, Physical integrity rights, Empowerment rights]

* 이 논문은 2018년 대한민국 교육부와 한국연구재단의 지원을 받아 수행된 연구임(NRF-2018 S1A3A2075117). 이 논문은 고려대학교 특별 연구비 지원을 받아 수행된 연구임.

I . Introduction

Since the mid-1990s, the world has witnessed an interesting phenomenon: authoritarian countries such as China, Vietnam and Laos have achieved rapid economic growth rates since opening up their markets to the world (Chen and Feng 2000, Harvie et al. 1997). While both countries have suffered from COVID-19 in 2020 as every country did, the economic growth of China and Vietnam is remarkable and dramatic (Malesky and London 2014). Chinese GDP has increased about 10 per cent annually during the periods of 1991-2011, and it has varied from 5 per cent to 7 per cent from 2012 to 2019 (Wang et al. 2021). The Vietnamese economy has grown on average 7.5 per cent over the past three decades except 2020. With respect to this trend, we might question how they have achieved rapid economic development despite their poor conditions in terms of human rights due to their authoritarian regimes. While conventional explanations focus on economic factors like late development advantages (Gerschenkron 1962), government-led developmental policies (Johnson 1982, O'Donnell 1988) and foreign aid (Karras 2006, Veiderpass and Andersson 2007), this study contends that the human rights practices of these countries might influence their economic growth.

Despite the common assumption that people cannot enjoy any human rights under an authoritarian regime, we can observe some level of freedom, particularly in terms of physical integrity rights, even in authoritarian countries.¹⁾ Citizens do not seem to be concerned about being killed or detained by their own governments unless they speak out against their government or actively participate in political activities. The capitalistic market systems in these countries provide a better quality of life than in underdeveloped countries that face extreme poverty. This study explores this

1) According to Cingranelli and Richards (1999), these rights are variously termed 'personal integrity' or 'life integrity' rights.

interesting combination of market economy and authoritarianism by providing an explanation of the relationship between human rights and economic growth in developing countries. This relationship has not been rigorously studied beyond the normative claim of a rights-based approach aiming to integrate international human rights norms into the process of development; this paper attempts to fill this gap in the literature.

Why are some authoritarian countries more likely to achieve a high economic growth rate? How do the physical integrity rights in those countries influence their economic development and how is the effect different from other types of right, in particular empowerment rights? We will address these questions by examining the effects of two different types of human rights on countries' economic growth. First, we argue that respect for physical integrity rights positively influences a country's economic growth rate by creating an environment that is favourable to the development of human capital. Freedom from the fear of coercion enables individual agents to use their own abilities to contribute to the national economy. Second, we propose that empowerment rights have negative effects on economic growth because they might decrease the stability and predictability of state policies.

We adopt time series cross-sectional data from the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) human rights index. These annual data contain information on each state's respect for a variety of internationally recognized human rights. The analysis determines the effects of different types of human right on economic growth between 1981 and 2011. Unfortunately, our study only covers the period of 1981-2011 due to the limitation of data availability of CIRI human rights index, which only offers the data for this period. The results suggest that physical integrity rights regarding extrajudicial killings and disappearances have a significantly positive influence on economic growth. In contrast, empowerment rights related to workers' rights and freedom of speech have no significant influences on economic growth.

Since the extent to which protecting human rights is necessary for a country to economically develop is a major debate among scholars, this study contributes to the existing literature on human rights and economic development by emphasizing the varying influences of different types of human right on economic development. The paper consists of six sections. The second section reviews the existing literature and the third presents our knowledge on the topic and develops the theoretical relations between different types of human right and economic development. The fourth section describes the methods and data used in the empirical analysis. The fifth section presents the results of the quantitative analysis and the last section offers conclusions drawn from the results of the empirical analysis.

II. Literature Review

In the literature on human rights, human rights promotion is often studied as a political consequence. In other words, scholars seek to reveal the factors that explain respect for human rights and focus on the role of transnational social movements (Clark 2010, Keck and Sikkink 2014, Mutua 2001, Risse 2000) and foreign policies (Forsythe 2000, Sikkink 1993) in that process. In these studies, the numerous practical activities of international organizations, states and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) to promote human rights are emphasized. In terms of economic factors that affect human rights conditions, scholars tend to focus on the role of multinational corporations (Meyer 1996, Spar 1998, Smith et al. 1999). According to these studies, there is no definite answer to the question of whether multinational corporations promote human rights in developing countries or not. More broadly, studies investigating economic development and its relationship with democracy are also relevant (Acemoglu and Robinson 2005, Huntington 1993, Przeworski 2000,

Rueschemeyer et al. 1992, Teorell 2010, Treisman 2020). Many scholars argue that economic development has a positive influence on the democratisation process from the standpoint of modernisation theory (Lipset 1959, Moore 1966, Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994, Boix and Stokes 2003, Epstein et al. 2006, Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Applying the same reasoning to human rights instead of democracy, Kamga and Heleba (2012) suggest that economic growth was instrumental in the realisation of human rights in the South African context. Ahmed-ghosh (2006) claims that economic development is pivotal for human rights, particularly for women's rights in Afghanistan.

However, this study does not consider economic growth as the cause of democratisation or of human rights' promotion; it focuses on economic growth as a political consequence. Compared to the studies on human rights as a dependent variable, we can find a smaller number of studies examining the effects of human rights on societal conditions, particularly their economic consequences. If we can roughly equate human rights with the civic liberties and freedom provided under democratic regimes, some studies suggest that democracy promotes economic performance compared to authoritarian societies. Democratic governments provide institutional frameworks critical for economic growth, such as the rule of law and property rights, while autocracies do not provide the necessary conditions for safeguarding property rights, instead acting as predatory states (Olson 1993, North 1990, North and Thomas 1973). However, Pzeworski and Limongi (1993) argue that although differences may be evident by regime type, the regime type, per se, does not significantly influence economic development. They suggest that no common political factors facilitating or impeding economic growth exist within a given type of regime. Therefore, it is crucial to ascertain the specific mechanisms, apart from the macro-level factors that focus on the regime type, that influence economic growth.

A few studies explored the relationship between human rights conditions

and foreign direct investment (FDI) attraction (Blanton and Blanton 2007, 2009, Richards et al. 2001, Tuman and Emmert 2004). We build upon these studies by examining a more comprehensive economic consequence of respect for human rights than the inflow of FDI into developing countries. Moreover, different from these studies that just focus on a certain type of human rights, we incorporate the idea of disaggregating human rights and comparing the effects of different types of rights on economic outcomes.

III. Different Types of Human Rights and Their Impacts on Economic Development

This study argues that different types of human rights have different effects on the extent of economic growth in developing countries. To develop our theories, we should first examine the debates over the various concepts and categories of human rights. Since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948, the concept of international human rights has substantially advanced. Human rights have been a scholarly topic of interest, and scholars have attempted to establish the concept of human rights theoretically. Debates over the origins, definitions, primacy and relevancy of human rights have been continually developed (DeLaet 2014, Donnelly 2013, Feng and Van Ness 1999, Okin 1999, Peck 2011, Sen 1997, Stavenhagen 1996, Zakaria and Yew 1994).

This study considers human rights as either physical integrity rights or empowerment rights, following Humana (1986) and Cingranelli and Richards (2010b), who endeavoured to systematize longitudinal comparative research on human rights. This categorization is different from the most conventional classification, which is to distinguish between civil and political rights on the one hand and economic, social and cultural rights on the other. Also, there is

a different approach called three generations of human rights. The first-generation rights are civil and political rights that are normatively considered as 'the human rights' in capitalist societies. Second-generation rights are basic life conditions regarded as social, economic and cultural rights that are emphasized by socialist states and developing countries. Third-generation rights are the rights of self-determination, development, respect for cultural heritage and humanitarian support, but these rights are still in the discussion stage because of globalisation of the economy, and they have not been incorporated into international law. Despite the popularity of this categorization, there is no consensus regarding the authoritative grouping of human rights, we will focus on physical integrity rights, as a very visible and extreme violation regarding the minimal level of existential security, and empowerment rights, as a source of existential opportunities and success.

IV. Physical Integrity Rights and Economic Development

According to Cingranelli and Richards (1999, 407), physical integrity rights are 'the entitlements individuals have in international law to be free from arbitrary physical harm and coercion by their government'. Physical integrity rights can be violated via extrajudicial killings, torture, disappearances and political imprisonment. Violations of physical integrity rights threaten the existential security and survival of a person. When citizens cannot enjoy human dignity even at a minimal level, existential pressures keep most from contributing to the national economy. However, as Blanton and Blanton (2007, 144) argue, respect for physical integrity rights "creates an environment conducive to the development of human capital and encourages a more

open, well-trained, and economically efficient society” (Also see Cole 2016). Individuals who do not have to worry about physical survival are more likely to invest in education and become part of a well-trained workforce that is motivated to succeed. A society with a skilled, educated and productive workforce is more likely to achieve higher economic growth than one where even physical integrity rights are in danger.

As mentioned, Vietnam and Laos seem to be interesting cases when their high economic growth rates and respect for physical integrity rights are considered. Both countries’ economic growth rates are substantively high compared to those of other developing countries. Both countries have achieved high economic growth rates for three decades, particularly since 1990. Their growth rates have been greater than 5 per cent and as high as 9 per cent every year. The average annual economic growth rate of Vietnam from 1985 to 2011 was 6.75 per cent, and Laos’s economic growth rate was 6.24 per cent.

Along with their economic growth rates, an interesting feature of these two countries is their human rights standards with respect to physical integrity rights. Even though they have human rights violations, the physical integrity rights of the people are respected in comparison with other developing countries.²⁾

The Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) guaranteed physical integrity rights to the Vietnamese people after the outset of its economic reforms. According to the CIRI dataset, extrajudicial killings have rarely occurred since 1988 when the reform policies were promoted by the party. With respect to disappearances,

2) Based on the CIRI human rights index, the average score for extrajudicial killings in Vietnam was 1.19, and in Laos it was 1.38, from 1981 to 2011. As these scores are higher than 1 (occasional occurrence) and lower than 2 (no extrajudicial killings), the data suggest that extrajudicial killings have not often occurred in these two countries. Regarding disappearances, the average in Vietnam was 1.70 and the average in Laos was 1.61 during the study period, which is close to 2 (no disappearances).

Vietnam has not scored '0' (frequent disappearances) since 1981, suggesting that human rights related to physical integrity have been relatively protected in the country. Significant economic reforms began in Vietnam in the late 1980s. The very beginning of Vietnamese economic growth dates back to 1986, when the Sixth Party Congress was held and liberal reformers became influential in intraparty politics. This was a period of stabilisation in Vietnamese society in the aftermath of a mass campaign of collectivisation that caused severe human rights (physical integrity rights in particular) abuses. It is estimated that at least 1,000,000 were sent to re-education camps and about 165,000 prisoners died in the late 1970s and early 1980s. About 100,000 people were executed via extrajudicial killings (Desbarats 1990). The economy was in chaos because it was almost impossible for individuals to focus on economic activities.

However, since the mid-1980s, the CPV has politically secured the physical integrity rights of the citizenry. Spurred by a favourable external environment, such as normalized relations with other capitalist countries, Vietnamese citizens have been actively involved in economic activities because they do not have to worry about their physical survival. They invest in education and become a well-trained workforce with the motivation to succeed. Vietnam has become a society with a skilled, educated and productive workforce achieving high economic growth.

Laos is another one-party communist state that has demonstrated a high rate of economic growth in recent years. According to the World Bank, Laos was rated as a lower-middle-income economy in 2011. Laos's natural resources, forests, agricultural lands, hydropower and minerals are well-known sources of the development that has helped the country achieve consistently high economic growth rates.³⁾ Laos has benefitted from FDI and external demands for its products because it is surrounded by the fastest growing

3) See the World Bank's website(<http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/lao/overview>, Access Date: 11/03/2021).

economies in the world, such as China, Thailand and Vietnam. As respect for physical integrity rights makes a country more attractive for FDI (Blanton and Blanton 2007, 2009), the remarkable economic growth of Laos has been possible due to the role of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP). The LPRP has created a structural foundation favourable to the development of human capital, as physical integrity rights have not been seriously violated by the government. The party's respect for physical integrity rights has positively affected the development of human capital, as individual citizens who are free from coercion have contributed to the national economy by freely engaging in economic activities, and independent firms have been actively established since its transition from a socialist economic system to a capitalist one in 1986. Based on this theoretical perspective, we hypothesize the following:

Hypothesis 1: States respecting for physical integrity rights are more likely to achieve higher economic growth rates.

V. Empowerment Rights and Economic Development

According to Cingranelli and Richards (2010, 424), empowerment rights are 'constructed from the freedom of movement, freedom of speech, workers' rights, political participation, and freedom of religion'. Compared to physical integrity rights, the discussion on empowerment rights is not very well developed, but we can still find that they are widely protected for citizens in countries with a good human rights record. In terms of their implications, empowerment rights are less directly related to existential security than physical integrity rights, but are still closely related to existential opportunities. If we can equate physical integrity rights with rights at the survival level, empowerment rights are the thriving level of human rights. In other words,

people can enjoy a more promising life with empowerment rights beyond just the fight to survive. Another important component of empowerment rights is giving a voice to the voiceless—even a voice against the political system. Empowerment rights are the driving force of social change, which decreases the stability and predictability of state policy. Therefore, scholars have long held that the repression of empowerment rights might help encourage rapid economic growth. In contrast, the recent studies show that the empowerment rights like freedom and participation rights might have a positive impact on economic growth in a long run (Koob, Jorgensen, and Sano, 2017). Since multinational corporations rely on the repressive mechanisms of developing countries, repressive regimes can host more FDI that can foster the national economy (Spar 1999). If the wage levels remain low enough and state policy is not heavily influenced by the interests of the working class, international businessmen regard the political environment as stable and business-friendly (London and Ross 1995).

Actually, the theory on the positive relationship between repression of empowerment rights and rapid economic growth has a long history. Bureaucratic-authoritarianism (O'Donnell 1988) and East-Asian developmental states (Johnson 1982) are two popular models for explaining economic growth in developing countries. Both states tend to be authoritarian, with poor records on upholding human rights (empowerment rights in particular), since empowerment rights threaten governments' autonomy in designing economic policies and reduce stability and predictability.

The CPV, the only political party allowed to govern in Vietnam, has continuously restricted empowerment rights, particularly freedom of speech. In 2009, the European Parliament called on the Vietnamese government to end its repression of freedom of expression and belief.⁴⁾ Vietnamese national

4) 'Motion for a Resolution on Human Rights in Vietnam and Laos' B7-0157/2009. (<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=B7-2009-0157&language=EN>, Access Date: 11/03/2021).

security laws enable the government to punish anyone who criticizes the regime, and this is the biggest issue regarding the restrictions on freedom of speech. Not only is the official media controlled through government censorship and obstruction, the Internet is also controlled. Regarding workers' rights, many foreign governments and NGOs have targeted the Vietnamese government. They recommend that the government consider ratifying the International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention No. 189 concerning decent work for domestic workers and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. According to a report by the ILO office in Hanoi, workers in Vietnam are in vulnerable occupations and lack social protections and safety nets.⁵⁾

These restrictions on human rights may be due to the maintenance of the political stability and legitimacy of the CPV, which provides stability and predictability for state-led economic policies. As a one-party state, strong party leadership is required because of the state's objective to work toward development and make a huge contribution to economic growth by implementing an effective set of policies, the Doi Moi policies, which involved renovation aimed at a more open social economy. After the introduction of the market economy, the CPV could no longer base its rule on a Marxist-Leninist ideology (Gillespie 2006), and the most important source of legitimacy for the CPV became the country's socioeconomic performance (Le Hong 2012). The CPV may have been concerned about losing its political power and, so as not to lose its political leverage over the public and private sectors and to simultaneously attain political legitimacy, controlled society by suppressing freedom of speech and workers' rights. Because of its sustained control, a high economic growth rate was achieved for 20 years.

Empowerment rights are seriously violated in Laos as well. Many

5) ILO - Viet Nam Decent Work Country Programme. 2012-2016. (https://www.ilo.org/hanoi/Countriescovered/WCMS_434270/lang--en/index.htm, Access Date: 11/03/2021)

international agencies, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the United League for Democracy in Laos, have raised serious concerns about its human rights' status. Among several categories of human rights, empowerment rights are relatively more seriously abused in Laos. Despite Article 44 of the Constitution, amended in 2003, guaranteeing freedom of speech and the press, the sole legal political party, the LPRP, has not allowed anyone to question its rule. Since the late 1980s, when the LPRP embarked on a journey of economic reforms aimed at establishing a market economy, economic and cultural freedoms have been expanded, whereas all challenges to its power have been hindered. The government has strictly controlled all types of media, including television, radio and print. It has censored all content that is considered detrimental to national interests, traditional culture or dignity. Workers are also denied their rights. They have no option but to be part of the Lao Federation of Trade Unions, which is controlled by the government. Not surprisingly, they have no right to strike in response to restrictive labour laws.⁶⁾

The LPRP government suppresses empowerment rights in order to maintain its dominant political leverage over society. Similar to other authoritarian governments, it does not allow criticisms directed toward its political system. The party is also concerned with its legitimacy because the introduction of the market economy threatened its ability to base its rule on a socialist ideology. There is inadequate space for the various stakeholders to have a voice because sustaining the regime during the process of expanding the private sector depends on economic performance. The LPRP government has the power to set the goals of economic development as a developmental state, although a transition from a socialist central economic system to a liberal market economy has been implemented. The LPRP could not have designed its

6) See the Human Rights Watch's website (<http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/06/10/laos-no-progress-rights>, Access Date: 11/03/2021).

economic policies and allocated its resources without the suppression of empowerment rights. Therefore, a high economic growth rate is evident in Laos. Based on this theoretical perspective, we hypothesize the following:

Hypothesis 2: States respecting for empowerment rights are less likely to achieve higher economic growth rates.

VI. Method

The unit of analysis in this paper is country-year with a time series cross-sectional dataset from 1981 to 2011. One of the key independent variables in the CIRI human rights dataset is only available from 1981 to 2011, which limited our coverage to that period. The cross-sectional aspect of the empirical study includes countries based on the list of the World Bank. Four categories of economy were constructed, following the World Bank.⁷⁾ The World Bank classifies countries into low-income (\$1,035 or less), lower-middle-income (\$1,036 to \$4,085), upper-middle-income (\$4,086 to \$12,615) and high-income (\$12,616 or more) economies according to gross national income per capita.⁸⁾

After the countries were categorized into the different levels of economy, an empirical analysis was performed. Countries were grouped based on their levels of economic development: (1) 34 low-income countries; (2) a

7) These categories were solely based on the economic performance of countries. For categorisation, it might be possible to include other socioeconomic conditions such as mortality rate, illiteracy rate or life expectancy. However, the level of economic development is a straightforward way to sort countries into different levels of development.

8) This classification has not changed for the last decades even though there has been a small change in each range.

combination of low-income and lower-middle-income (82 countries); and (3) all of the developing countries except for the high-income ones, which consisted of 133 countries. Among these three groups, (1) low-income and (2) lower-income and lower-middle-income countries were the main target countries of interest in this paper. Depending on the availability of other control variables, cross-sectional components may slightly vary. Since the analysis was conducted using time series cross-sectional data, temporal differences intrinsic to time series data and dimensional differences among countries need to be addressed. Therefore, we adapted fixed effects models for empirical studies. Fixed effects models are widely used for analysing time series cross-sectional data to control for time-invariant and unobserved variables, and avoid the risk of spurious relationships being detected between the independent and dependent variables (Allison 2009).

VII. Data

The dependent variable was the annual economic growth rate of the gross domestic product (GDP) in a given year. The growth rate was used rather than the absolute value of the GDP or GDP per capita to understand the influence of different kinds of human right on the economic growth of a country. This variable is widely used in the study of economic development (Borensztein et al. 1998, Levine 1997).⁹⁾

9) Economic growth rate might not incorporate every aspect of economic development of developing countries since economic development is a bigger concept than a short-term high growth rate. In this sense, our contribution can be limited. However, governments make their economic policy based on the annual economic growth rate to control for inflation and unemployment rates that have huge implication for the quality of life of the people in developing countries. Even small rates of growth would make greater changes when the numbers are accumulated.

To measure the level of human rights, the CIRI Human Rights Dataset was used.¹⁰⁾ Along with other indicators to measure human rights, it is one of the commonly used measurements of human rights (Hill Jr 2010, Kim and Sikkink 2010, Ross 2012). As a combined measurement, physical integrity rights varied from 0 (no government respect) to 8 (full government respect). It consisted of four variables, which were (1) disappearances, (2) extrajudicial killings, (3) political imprisonment and (4) torture. The variable measuring disappearances was measured using the values 0 (frequent occurrence of disappearances), 1 (occasional occurrence of disappearances) and 2 (no disappearances). Extrajudicial killings, political imprisonment and torture were similarly measured with the values 0 (frequent occurrence), 1 (occasional occurrence) and 2 (no occurrence) in a given year. If individuals feel threatened by either of these, there is no way that they can contribute to any kind of economic activity. The inability to focus on work leads to lower productivity.

The empowerment rights varied from 0 (no government respect) to 14 (full government respect). They were constructed from (1) foreign movement, (2) domestic movement, (3) freedom of speech, (4) freedom of assembly and association, (5) workers' rights, (6) electoral self-determination, and (7) freedom of religion indicators (see Cingranelli and Richards, 2010a). Similar to the physical integrity rights, each indicator had a value of 0 when the government did not respect the right and violations of it were frequent.

Control variables that measured some of the political, economic, social and demographic characteristics of developing countries were used in the analysis. It might be impossible to control for the effects of all of the factors that may influence the economic growth of developing countries; however,

10) This dataset was developed by David L. Cingranelli, David L. Richards and K. Chad Clay. See(<http://www.humanrightsdata.com>). In this dataset, there are several missing categories, such as -999 (missing data), -77 (periods of interregnum) and -66 (periods of interruption). These are all replaced with missing values and excluded in empirical studies.

the variables included in the analysis measured the essential components of economic growth. Polity IV was included to measure the political situation since the impact of democracy on economic development seems to be significant (Olson 1993). To control for the effects of the economic situation of developing countries, the following variables were included: (1) logged GDP per capita, (2) trade volume and (3) FDI per capita. Logged GDP per capita was included to control for the effects of the level of current economic development. Trade volume measures the percentage of trade in GDP. It is debatable whether a higher volume of trade has a positive influence on economic growth (Schneider 2005). Nonetheless, its effects should be controlled for. The effects of FDI also needed to be controlled to understand the extent of external influences on the economies of developing countries. The social conditions of developing countries were measured using life expectancy, such that higher life expectancy indicated better social conditions. Demographic characteristics are also important for understanding economic growth, and thus two variables, urban population rate and logged population, were included.

VIII. Empirical Results

〈Table 1〉 shows the effects of physical integrity rights and empowerment rights on the economic development of all of the developing countries: low-income, lower-middle income and upper-middle income. Models 1 to 3 show that physical integrity rights have a statistically significant impact on economic growth. Hypothesis 1 stated that the more developing countries guarantee physical integrity rights, the more they achieve economic growth. The results of the analysis support this hypothesis. This result implies that the more that physical integrity rights are guaranteed in developing countries,

the higher their economic growth rates. These results were consistent when we tested all developing countries (Model 1), a combination of low and lower-middle countries (Model 2), and only low-income countries (Model 3). Countries in the 34-country low-income group included many sub-Saharan African nations, such as Zimbabwe, Eritrea and Rwanda, and countries in parts of Asia, such as Myanmar, Nepal and Cambodia. Similar to the results of the analysis of the entire set of developing countries, physical integrity rights positively influenced the economic growth rates of the low-income countries, as shown in Model 3.

Interestingly, some of the control variables were statistically significant. Political, economic and social aspects of developing countries seem to be important to explaining variation in the economic growth rate as Polity IV, life expectancy and FDI show positive impacts on economic development. Demographic aspects, such as logged population and urban population, were not significantly important to the economic growth rate.

Hypothesis 2 stated that empowerment rights are likely to have a negative effect on economic growth rates. The results did not clearly support this hypothesis. Rather, we had mixed results. The coefficient in Model 4 indicated the effect of empowerment rights on economic growth rates but did not show any statistically significant results for any developing country. When we ran the empirical analysis with low and lower-middle-income countries (Model 5), we did not find any statistically significant results. Different from our expectation, Model 6, with only low-income countries, showed a significantly positive result. This implies that empowerment rights need to be guaranteed in low-income countries. As for interpreting these complex findings, it seems that empowerment rights are not essential for economic growth, but they have some limited influence on economic growth in low-income countries.

〈Table 1〉 Economic Growth of Developing Countries with Physical Integrity Rights and Empowerment Rights from 1981 to 2011

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
<i>Physical Integrity Rights</i>	0.189*** (0.067)	0.200** (0.081)	0.526*** (0.145)			
<i>Empowerment Rights</i>				0.079 (0.049)	0.086 (0.060)	0.214** (0.109)
<i>Polity IV</i>	0.083*** (0.031)	0.109*** (0.037)	0.145** (0.063)	0.076** (0.033)	0.099** (0.040)	0.126* (0.068)
<i>Logged GDP per capita</i>	1.533*** (0.528)	0.602 (0.710)	-1.493 (1.305)	1.607*** (0.532)	0.729 (0.715)	-0.875 (1.297)
<i>Life Expectancy</i>	0.237*** (0.038)	0.280*** (0.049)	0.312*** (0.079)	0.246*** (0.038)	0.294*** (0.048)	0.324*** (0.079)
<i>Trade Volume</i>	0.013** (0.006)	0.018** (0.008)	-0.012 (0.014)	0.014** (0.006)	0.020** (0.008)	-0.006 (0.014)
<i>FDI per capita</i>	0.148*** (0.022)	0.169*** (0.028)	0.155*** (0.045)	0.147*** (0.022)	0.168*** (0.028)	0.158*** (0.045)
<i>Urban Population Rate</i>	-0.064* (0.037)	-0.056 (0.054)	0.052 (0.105)	-0.068* (0.037)	-0.066 (0.054)	-0.003 (0.105)
<i>Logged Population</i>	-0.366 (0.989)	-1.451 (1.160)	-2.238 (2.101)	-0.531 (0.988)	-1.618 (1.161)	-2.368 (2.117)
<i>Constant</i>	-15.073 (14.927)	6.430 (17.415)	28.876 (31.357)	-13.207 (14.998)	7.903 (17.557)	28.390 (31.637)
<i>R2</i>	0.066	0.076	0.082	0.064	0.074	0.071
N	2,888	1,905	826	2,888	1,905	826

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

For low and lower-middle-income countries, 〈Table 2〉 shows the results of the empirical analysis with four detailed indicators of physical integrity rights: disappearances (Model 1), extrajudicial killings (Model 2), political imprisonment (Model 3) and torture (Model 4). Interestingly, the results provided an interesting implication. While disappearances and extrajudicial

killings showed a statistically positive impact on economic development, political imprisonment and torture did not show any statistically significant results. This might be because disappearances and extrajudicial killings are more directly related to life-threatening human rights. In many developing countries, 'disappearance' means that a person might have been killed or sent to an illegal prison permanently. The victims that do not have these two rights have a low chance of survival and protection by the law. Relatively speaking, political imprisonment and torture are not directly life-threatening dangers. It seems that people in developing countries need to have the very basic right to not be killed by their own government in order to work toward economic growth.

〈Table 2〉 Economic Growth of Developing Countries with Four Physical Integrity Rights from 1981 to 2011

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
<i>Disappearance</i>	0.472** (0.232)			
<i>Extrajudicial Killings</i>		0.465** (0.229)		
<i>Political Imprisonment</i>			0.349 (0.240)	
<i>Torture</i>				-0.430 (0.270)
<i>Polity IV</i>	0.116*** (0.038)	0.123*** (0.037)	0.112*** (0.038)	0.128*** (0.037)
<i>Logged GDP per capita</i>	0.350 (0.714)	0.308 (0.718)	0.359 (0.715)	0.367 (0.715)
<i>Life Expectancy</i>	0.293*** (0.048)	0.291*** (0.048)	0.304*** (0.048)	0.313*** (0.048)
<i>Trade Volume</i>	0.016** (0.008)	0.016* (0.008)	0.017** (0.008)	0.019** (0.008)
<i>FDI per capita</i>	0.170*** (0.028)	0.170*** (0.028)	0.170*** (0.028)	0.169*** (0.028)
<i>Urban Population Rate</i>	-0.060 (0.054)	-0.059 (0.054)	-0.063 (0.054)	-0.060 (0.054)
<i>Logged Population</i>	-1.583 (1.179)	-1.331 (1.199)	-1.740 (1.175)	-2.338* (1.214)
<i>Constant</i>	9.855 (17.757)	6.436 (18.021)	12.216 (17.700)	21.615 (18.326)
R2	0.077	0.077	0.076	0.076
N	1,842	1,840	1,841	1,841

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

〈Table 3〉 shows how each empowerment indicator influenced the economic growth of low and lower-middle-income countries. Seven indicators had a

mixed impact on economic development. Only two indicators showed statistically significant results; they were freedom of assembly and association and freedom of religion. Interestingly, freedom of assembly and association showed a positive influence on economic growth, while freedom of religion showed a significantly negative result. We believe that the reason why freedom of religion had a negative impact on economic growth might be due to Islamic countries, which have a relatively higher economic development rate, and their high level of suppression of religious freedom. Freedom of assembly and association was more relatively related to the power of people in daily life. As people become more involved in economic activities, they become more likely to gather together. As this indicator is closer to the characteristics of physical integrity rights, it might have a positive impact on economic growth.

(Table 3) Economic Growth of Developing Countries with Seven Empowerment Rights from 1981 to 2011


	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
<i>Freedom of Movement (Foreign)</i>	0.085 (0.246)						
<i>Freedom of Movement (Domestic)</i>		-0.185 (0.231)					
<i>Freedom of Speech</i>			-0.325 (0.278)				
<i>Freedom of Association</i>				0.555** (0.251)			
<i>Worker's Rights</i>					0.145 (0.243)		
<i>Electoral Self-Determination</i>						0.362 (0.256)	
<i>Freedom of Religion</i>							-0.626*** (0.230)
<i>Polity IV</i>	0.124*** (0.037)	0.135*** (0.037)	0.134*** (0.039)	0.087** (0.041)	0.118*** (0.038)	0.094** (0.041)	0.148*** (0.037)
<i>Logged GDP per capita</i>	0.515 (0.709)	0.437 (0.710)	0.387 (0.715)	0.555 (0.721)	0.463 (0.725)	0.414 (0.715)	0.308 (0.716)
<i>Life Expectancy</i>	0.291*** (0.048)	0.307*** (0.049)	0.302*** (0.048)	0.311*** (0.049)	0.304*** (0.048)	0.301*** (0.048)	0.296*** (0.048)
<i>Trade Volume</i>	0.018** (0.008)	0.018** (0.008)	0.017** (0.008)	0.019** (0.008)	0.018** (0.008)	0.018** (0.008)	0.018** (0.008)
<i>FDI per capita</i>	0.171*** (0.028)	0.171*** (0.028)	0.169*** (0.028)	0.166*** (0.029)	0.168*** (0.028)	0.169*** (0.028)	0.170*** (0.028)
<i>Urban Population Rate</i>	-0.064 (0.054)	-0.058 (0.054)	-0.059 (0.054)	-0.076 (0.055)	-0.063 (0.054)	-0.066 (0.054)	-0.051 (0.054)
<i>Logged Population</i>	-1.707 (1.170)	-2.185* (1.192)	-1.945 (1.183)	-1.521 (1.180)	-1.760 (1.175)	-1.594 (1.179)	-2.266* (1.161)
<i>Constant</i>	11.418 (17.566)	18.839 (17.874)	15.897 (17.874)	7.174 (17.881)	11.989 (17.770)	9.722 (17.794)	21.902 (17.515)
R2	0.074	0.075	0.075	0.077	0.074	0.075	0.078
N	1,882	1,880	1,843	1,839	1,842	1,843	1,878

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(Figure 1) shows the relationship between the means of the economic growth rates and empowerment rights from 1981 to 2011. Even though the

results of the regression analysis did not support the hypothesis that empowerment rights have a significantly negative influence on developing countries' economic growth rates, Figure 1 implies that a negative relationship between these two variables may exist. In addition, the figure shows that Afghanistan, Bhutan, Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos and Myanmar have high economic growth rates and the weakest empowerment rights. In contrast, countries that guarantee empowerment rights, such as El Salvador, the Philippines and Papua New Guinea, do not have high economic growth rates.

〈Figure 1〉 Means of Economic Growth Rate and Empowerment Rights



IX. Conclusion

This paper attempted to explain the influence of human rights on

economic development. More specifically, it analysed the ways that different types of human right influence developing countries' economic growth rates. Our empirical analysis used a time series cross-sectional dataset, and the results showed that physical integrity rights may promote a higher economic growth rate, but empowerment rights do not have a significant direct impact on economic growth rates.

The study has some limitations. First, the effects of all of the factors that influence the economic growth rates of developing countries could not be controlled. Many scholars have different understandings of the meaning and causes of economic development in developing countries. Although the effects of some of the traditional factors related to economic development were controlled for, it is likely that the problem was not fully addressed. Second, endogeneity may be a problem in which there is a causality loop between the dependent and independent variables. This study approached the topic in an effort to understand the influence of human rights on economic development, yet economic development clearly influences the extent and types of human rights' abuses in a country.

This study argued that the extent of economic growth in developing countries depends on the extent of different types of human right and provided empirical evidence.¹¹⁾

Although we do not take the position that there is a hierarchy of human rights, we assume that priorities might exist. In other words, there are two important principles of human rights, indivisibility and interdependence, which claim that all human rights are equally important and efforts should be made to realize all of them together because of their deep connectedness.¹²⁾

11) At the same time, we assume that economic growth might improve the human condition by improving the extremely poor economic environments in developing countries.

12) The principle of indivisibility is that no human right is inherently inferior to any other. Economic, social and cultural rights must be respected, protected and realized on an

Despite those principles, it is important to determine the types of human right that should be implemented first to advance economic growth that enables every citizen to enjoy human dignity at a basic level. However, there is no scholarly consensus as to the rights that are the most essential to individuals' or groups' wellbeing. Decisions about which human rights should be protected seem to depend on political calculations. For example, the US liberal human rights foreign policy is closely connected to the values of protecting free trade and market economies, although economic, social and cultural rights are not ratified (Donnelly 2013). Therefore, to avoid arbitrary and self-interested prioritisations, we believe that it is important to determine the types of human right that should be protected first and why a particular right should be given priority based on empirical evidence as opposed to political intentions.

Our theory and empirical findings clearly show the importance of physical integrity rights in terms of economic development in developing countries. Human rights related to individual survival should be respected for the sake of economic growth, even in authoritarian countries. Our study also revealed that the political rhetoric of authoritarian regimes that a strong state with repression of citizens' empowerment rights is necessary for economic performance is not empirically supported. Our findings implied that there is no reason to sacrifice empowerment rights in favour of rapid economic growth. However, our study should be interpreted cautiously, as we examined economic growth rates, not long-term development. As the long-term development of a society is much more complex than economic growth, we should acknowledge that the institutional features created during a period of rapid economic growth can lead to the development of distorted economies and ultimately hamper the future growth of a country (Pei 2009, Naughton

equal basis with civil and political rights (HR/PUB/06/8, p. 2). The principle of interdependence recognizes the difficulty (and, in many cases, impossibility) of realising any one human right in isolation from the others (HR/PUB/06/8, p. 2).

2008, Huang 2008).

This study could be expanded into related theoretical and empirical research. First, the impact of women's rights on the economic, social and political development of developing countries is an important issue to address. To do so, we need to theoretically define whether women's rights are physical integrity rights or empowerment rights, or constitute a special category of human rights. Afterwards, it would be interesting to analyse how women's participation in economic activities can influence economic growth in various categories of developing countries. Second, other dimensions of development in developing countries, such as social development, warrant attention, since few studies have addressed the relationship between social development and human rights. Studies along this line might reveal the ways that different types of human right influence the social development of societies.

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인권의 유형에 따른 상이한 영향?: 개발도상국의 경제 발전에 대한 인권의 영향

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본 논문은 신체보전권과 권한강화권이라는 두 가지 유형의 인권이 개발도상국의 경제 성장률에 미치는 영향을 조사하였다. 신체보전권은 개발도상국의 경제 성장에 긍정적인 영향을 미칠 수 있다. 신체보전권을 존중하는 개발도상국 정부는 인적 자원 개발에 유리한 환경을 조성할 수 있으며, 강압에 대한 두려움에서 벗어나 개인이 자신의 능력을 활용할 수 있게 하여 개발도상국의 경제 발전에 기여할 수 있다. 이에 반해 권한강화권은 개발도상국의 경제 성장률에 큰 영향을 미치지 않는다. 본 논문은 이러한 두 가지 유형의 인권을 구별하는 CIRI 인권 지수를 사용하여 1981년에서 2011년 사이의 통계적 분석을 통해, 개발도상국의 신체보전권과 경제성장률 사이의 긍정적인 관계에 대한 가설을 증명하였다.

[주제어: 인권, 경제발전, 신체보전권, 권한강화권]

논문접수일: 2022년 02월 15일

논문수정일: 2022년 03월 04일

게재확정일: 2022년 03월 25일

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