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New Labour's Joined-Up Government and Social Service Reform

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Abstract

As policy areas are widened and more complicated, policy coordination becomes a challenge to the public administration. New Labour's promotion of the joined-up government was a holistic attempt to redress the fragmentation of the government in social policy. It promoted the joined-up activities by setting up joining-up units and agencies at the core of the government, the Prime-Minister's Office and the Cabinet office, and between the public, private and voluntary sectors. The joined-up government was criticised as being hierarchical and fragmented, and as confusing the line of accountability. Policy coordination has growing importance in Korea, and the experiences of the joined-up government will have implications on more coordinated promotion of social policy.

Key words: joined-up government, social policy, policy coordination, departmentalism, New Labour

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Introduction

As policy areas become wider and more complicated, government ministries and departments become more specialised and fragmented. However, growing fragmentation in the government has resulted in overlapping of functions and conflicting among ministries, and governments in various countries have sought ways of achieving policy coordination, and the term 'joined-up government' is frequently used for describing the coordinated government (Barret, 2003; Efficiency Unit, 2009; Perry 6, 2005; Ling, 2002). The New Labour government in the UK has the authorship of the term 'joined-up government' which was promoted as an essential part of 'modernisation' of the government. It was a prominent attempt to achieve policy coordination in a pluralistic governance.

Nevertheless, the joined-up government has not drawn much attention in social policy studies, even though uch terms as 'the public-private partnership', 'co-production' and inter-governmental cooperation have been highlighted in social policy. They have rather focused on key words of the contents of New Labour's social policy reform, such as the welfare to work, social inclusion, and the social investment states (Powell, 1999; Lister, 1998; Newman and McKee, 2005). Although these studies also review the institutional structure for social policy reform, they usually take a broader view, focusing on the relationships between the public and private or between the central and local (McGhee, 2003; Haugh and Kitson, 2007). However, overcoming departmentalism is also a major element of a reform in welfare governance (Richards and Smith, 2002: 21-22), especially for dealing with 'wicked problems' such as social exclusion, crime, homelessness and truancy which require concerted efforts between multiple departments (Kavanagh, 2001: 8; Bogdanor, 2005: 6; Rose, 2005: 32; Ling, 2002: 622). Moreover, the New Labour government's welfare strategy – the promotion of social inclusion, welfare to work and the social investment states - further required inter-departmental collaboration, as it combined economic, educational and welfare policies together (Newman and McKee, 2005: 658; Smith, 2003: 71). Therefore, research on the joined-up government helps us to understand more in detail how the New Labour government actually promoted its social policy reform in public administration.

In Korea, where the promotion of policies on welfare and employment has been emerging as a major goal in the recent governments, the strategies employed for it, such as the income-led growth

and the promotion of social economy, require the cooperation and coordination among government ministries, between the central and local governments, and between the government and civil society. However, policy coordination among different sectors have often been a difficult task to achieve. The UK experience of the promotion of the joined-up government – both its successes and failures – can have important implications to those who are interested in developing an 'integrated administration' (Park, Joo, and Jin, 2012).

In line with this, this paper aims to introduce the joined-up government under the New Labour government in the late 1990s and early 2000s: the background and actual promotion of the joined-up government, as well as criticisms to it. This paper examines the duration of, and changes in, the legacy of the ministerial system and policy coordination in the history of modern British politics, which is a highlighted factor in historical institutionalism (Thelen, 1999). The following sections will present what the joined-up government is, what the background was for the New Labour to promote it, how it was promoted, and finally how it was criticised.

What is the Joined-Up Government?

The joined-up government was one of the major elements of the 'modernising government' project fostered during the first period of Tony Blair's New Labour government (1997-2001). The Blair government highlighted the needs for tackling 'wicked problems,' such as social exclusion, crime, homelessness, truancy, teenage pregnancy, drug, alcoholism, and so on (Kavanagh, 2001: 8; Bogdanor, 2005: 6; Rose, 2005:32), whose solutions were 'either intractable or easily found,' as the problem itself is hardly to be defined and its causes are uncertain or disagreed (Bogdanor, 2005: 6). In tackling such issues, the Blair government sought a joined-up way 'regardless of the organisational structure of the government' (Prime Minister, 1999: 10).

The joining-up project was not limited to the government sector: it aimed to join up between the government and civil society, and between the central government and local authorities (Bogdanor, 2005: 2; Cowell and Martin, 2003; Ling, 2002). Especially focusing on the cooperation between the government and civil society in the joined-up government, there has been a view to link the

joined-up government to the idea of the Third Way, as the new public management under the Thatcher government has been linked to neo-liberalism (Ling, 2002: 632, 639).

Vernon Bogdanor (2005:1), an expert of the British constitution and politics, defines the joined-up government, citing *The Oxford English Dictionary*, as 'relating to, or designating a political strategy which seeks to coordinate the development and implementation of policies across government departments and agencies, especially with the aim of addressing complex social problems, such as social exclusion and poverty, in a comprehensive, integrated way'. In fact, however, it is difficult to find a clear definition of the joined-up government in both governmental and academic documents, including the white paper 'Modernising Government,' which opened the door to joining up the government under the Blair government. Tom Ling holds that the joined-up government is an umbrella term which is 'more fluid and more contested than might be inferred from the use of the homogenizing term "joined-up government"' (Ling, 2002: 616).

Moreover, the Blair government was not the first government in modern British history that attempted to organise better coordinated governance. For instance, in the early 1950s, Winston Churchill appointed 'overlords', who were responsible for coordinating policies among several ministries, and in the late 1960s and early 1970s, a 'super ministry' (the Department of Health and Social Security), and a muliti-disciplinary unit (the Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS)) was organised by the Labour and Consertive governments, respectively (Hennessy and Welsh, 1998; Clark, 2002; Klein and Plowden, 2005). The Blair government also employed a more traditional way of joining up. Its creation of a large ministry, the Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR), resembled Winston Churchill's 'overlords' and Edward Heath's 'super ministries'. Moreover, the Treasury, which had long been a main coordinating ministry in the British government, kept playing a significant role in policy coordination under in the Blairite joined-up government by using its budget allocation power, especially according to the Public Service Agreements (Ling, 2002: 617) following the introduction of Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) in 1998.

However, Blair's joined-up government was largely dependent on constructing joining-up agents, such as the Social Exclusion Unit (SEU), Performance and Innovation Unit (PIU), Women's Unit, outside of traditional ministries, at the core of the central government – the Prime Minister's Office

(commonly referred to as 'No.10') and the Cabinet Office. In this way, the Blair government set up a number of joined-up agencies, which are supposed to coordinate policies among departments, between central and local governments, and among the public, private and voluntary sectors. The promotion of the joined-up government was viewed as a challenge to the constitutional structure of British civil service, which has been based on ministerial responsibility and professionalization of civil servants according to departments, which, in a negative sense, have resulted in departmentalism.

Then, why did the Blair government promoted the joined-up government as a main goal of the policy reform? The following section discusses the development of the British civil service and its problems, and the ways the British government tried to cope with these problems.

Legacies of the British Civil Service

Ministerial responsibility and career civil servants

A clear line of accountability has been pointed out as a main feature of the Westminster system. Based on parliamentary sovereignty, this system draws a linear vertical accountability relationship among Parliament, ministers, and civil servants.

The Westminster model has been characterised as a unitary system. Political power is formally concentrated in the Westminster Parliament, especially the House of Commons, which is democratically legitimised through a free and fair election. A uni-linear accountability system is formed on the basis of this parliamentary sovereignty. Ministers are accountable to the Parliament; and civil servants are accountable to their respective ministers. Civil servants give their minister advice in policy-making processes, and implement policies decided by their minister.

This system of the government was constructed in the 19th and early 20th centuries. It came from the Northcote-Trevelyan reforms in the middle of the 19th century. Charles Trevelyan, criticising the then-existing civil service as patronage, reformed the recruiting system from appointment to competitive open examination. As a result, in 1854, an examination board for the civil service was established (Hennessy, 2001: 44).

In 1918, The Haldane Report suggested that departments would better be divided according to

their functions, and that ministers of the departments would take responsibility for the functions and organisations of their departments to Parliament (His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1918). As well as the functional division of departments, the professionalisation and de-politicisation of civil servants were also promoted. This de-politisation of civil servants is related to the recruitment by fair and open competition (that is, by examination) and by securing permanent tenure.

Under this line of accountability, civil servants have been expected to be politically neutral and administratively professional: civil servants may concentrate better on serving public interests, when they are relatively insulated from a direct social and political influence, and career civil servants may be better to maintain this virtue than political appointees. Therefore, the British government conducted a series of reforms that were intended to foster professionalism of civil service within the framework of the ministerial responsibility, which provided political neutrality to civil servants.

In 1968, the Fulton Committee furthered the reform of civil service, emphasising professionalism of civil servants in policy implementation (Hennessy, 2001: 45). The Fulton Report criticised the 'amateurism' of the generalist civil servant as resulting in inefficiency. The Report recommended giving more responsibility and authority to such specialists as scientists and engineers, making clearer definition on functions of each department, and promoting civil servants' clearer understanding on their duties. For this purpose, the Report recommended a new Civil Service Department and a Civil Service College.

The ministerial responsibility with professional career civil servants have been embedded in the structure of civil service and are often legitimised on the basis of civil service ethos, even in civil service reforms. In this sense, Richards and Smith (2002: 48) characterise the British Civil Service as follows: permanence, anonymity, neutrality, expertise, informal 'village-like' networks, accountability to political masters, and ensuring defence of the public interest.

Pathology of departmentalism and the promotion of coordination

For all its clear line of accountability and professional ethics, the traditional civil service structure has been criticised as a basis for 'departmentalism,' which makes it difficult for the government to achieve policy coordination. On the one hand, each department fosters its own interest in gaining resources, especially budgets, and reshaping their organisations (Dunleavy, 1991). In the Cabinet,

ministers, rather than conducting coordinating roles, become representatives of their respective departments (Richards and Smith, 2002: 21-22).

On the other hand, departments become 'silos,' where 'policy problems are defined, processed, and handled on the basis of the intellectual and physical resources of the particular organisation that is handling it' (Page, 2005: 14). As departments even construct their civil servants' perception of policy problems and solutions, it becomes even more difficult for civil servants to communicate with those in other departments.

Indeed, there has been a more traditional form of solving departmentalism – the Cabinet system. Ministers have not only been managers of their own departments but also members of the Cabinet. For around two centuries, ministers, together with the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of Exchequer, have come together in the Cabinet and discussed collectively core issues of the government. They have been expected to achieve certain 'Cabinet solidarity,' which have encouraged ministers to cooperate with each other in achieving policies proposed by each other's departments. Then, these ministers have been expected to take 'collective responsibility' for decisions of the Cabinet (Foster, 2005: 117-118).

However, especially since the latter half of the 20th century, the Cabinet has revealed problems in carrying out its policy-coordinating functions. The expansion of government affairs propelled by such factors as the entry into the European Union (EU), the promotion of social policies, macro-economic difficulties since the 1970s, and soon have made it difficult for the Cabinet to review and discuss the massive amount of policy issues. As the volume of government affairs have grown, specialised departments and civil servants, rather than generalist ministers and the Cabinet, have been expected to play a greater role (Foster, 2005:119).

Moreover, in this specialised departmental system, civil servants' assistance has become more important for ministers to grasp the business that their ministries are involved in; ministers have become more familiar with the cultures and interests of their respective departments. On the other hand, for the development of their individual political career, ministers have been likely to produce achievements in their own ministries rather than 'collective' achievements in the Cabinet (Richards and Smith, 2002: 21-22). Therefore, the Cabinet has become insufficient institution for policy coordination.

To tackle the limits of departmentalism, the British government has attempted several reforms, which can be categorised into three models: institutional integration, economic coordination, and sociological networking. The institutional integration means the merge of ministries into a single cabinet or a few 'super ministries'. Here, the unit of coordination is the ministry. Economic coordination means knitting ministries not by institutional formulation but by economic means, such as budget allocation or procurement. Sociological networking denotes the setting up of nods (units, committees, or perhaps coordinating ministries) of networks among ministries or between the public and private sectors. It is different from institutional integration in the sense that it does not merge ministries themselves but connect relevant ministries according to issues. It is also different from the provision of economic incentives in the sense that, instead of leaving sectors fragmented and promoting competitions among them, sociological networking encourages cooperation among different sectors.

These three ways of coordination can further be divided by its hierarchical or horizontal characteristics. Regarding institutional integration, a supervising institution may stand above ministries or different ministries may be merged horizontally. Regarding economic coordination, the Treasury may allocate budgets authoritatively or the government promotes quasi-market competition among ministries. Regarding sociological networking, the networking may be achieved hierarchically and authoritatively or left voluntary cooperation in a bottom-up way.

Table 1 Modes of coordination[1)]

	Institutional	Economic	Networking
Hierarchical	Cabinet system Overlord	Treasury's budget allocation, including public service agreements	Central joined-up units
Horizontal	Super ministry	Quasi-market	CPRS

The British government has often used institutional integration for coordination. The Cabinet system itself is an example. In 1951, Winston Churchill tried to resume his war-time Cabinet by

1) The author has revised the categorisation of coordination by Christopher Hood (2005: 27) and Perry 6 (2005: 45).

appointing certain 'supervising ministers' or 'overlords' from the House of Lords, each of whom coordinated or 'supervised' a couple of ministries (Hennessy and Welsh, 1998; Bogdanor, 2005: 5). In 1968, Edward Heath merged the Department of Health and the Department of Social Security into a 'super ministry' - the Department of Health and Social Security (Bogdanor, 2005: 5). Tony Blair also joined the creation of a 'super ministry' by setting up a Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR) (Clark, 2002: 112).

Using economic incentives as a policy tool for coordination is not unfamiliar to British politics. A most prominent example is Treasury's traditional role in financial coordination (Ling, 2002: 617). Under the Blair government, Treasury adopted Public Service Agreements in allocating resources: Treasury made agreements with spending ministries on policy outcomes and distributed budgets accordingly, which emphasised outcomes in policy coordination (James and Nakamura, 2013).

However, financial coordination has not always been conducted in a top-down way: the Conservative government in the 1980s and 1990s introduced market competition in the provision of public services. By introducing outsourcing and market competition, these reforms further broke up, rather than joined up, the civil service. Since holding office in 1979, the Thatcher government sought a way to diminish the size of government and to reduce public expenditure. The Conservative government emphasised the managerial role of the government: central civil service should consist of a relatively small core engaged in the function of servicing ministers and managing departments (Drewry, 1994: 389). The Conservative government distinguished between ministerial support and policy functions on the one hand, and executive or service delivery functions on the other. Then it recommended that executive function would rather be transferred to semi-autonomous executive agencies.

In this way, the Conservative Government in the 1980s and 1990s introduced market mechanisms in the government, which included 'the creation of agencies, internal markets, privatisation, market testing, and compulsory competitive tendering (CCT)' (Ling, 2002: 618). The promotion of marketisation in the government further broke up the public sector, which exacerbated the coordination among government agencies (Ling, 2002: 618).

Sociological networking has also been used for policy coordination. Examples of voluntary cooperating devices among civil servants are interdepartmental meetings, where civil servants from

different departments meet to discuss interdepartmental issues (Foster, 2005: 120), and Bill teams for developing new legislations (Page, 2005: 151).

As a more artificial coordinating unit, in 1971, Edward Heath set up a Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS), which was responsible to maintain collaboration among ministries to promote policies the governing party had manifested during the election campaign (Clark, 2002: 112-113). In 1976 under James Callaghan's Labour government, a Joint Approach to Social Policy (JASP) was launched, with the recommendation by the CPRS (Klein and Plowden, 2005). Sociological networking became the Blair government's main approach to the joined-up government. The Blair government set up such joining-up units as the SEU and the PIU at the core of the government – No.10 and the Cabinet Office – as control towers of the coordination.

The Joined-Up Government

The Blair government promoted the joined-up government as a way of tackling cross-cutting issues, such as community safety, sustainable development, and social exclusion, should be solved in 'joined-up' ways (Cabinet Office, 1999). However, the promotion of the joined-up government meant more than a simple administrational reform for addressing given problems. It pursued the realisation of values of the 'Third Way' politics: social inclusion and participatory (inclusive) governance (Lister, 1998; Ling, 2002; Newman and McKee, 2005).

First, as a policy goal, the Blair government highlighted social inclusion. During the rule of Thatcher's Conservative government, market values and economic efficiency had been prioritised under neo-liberal reforms. The New Labour government differentiated itself from its Conservative predecessor by highlighting social solidarity as its policy goal. The joined-up government aimed to prevent vulnerable service users, including the youth, the elderly, and those suffering from traumatic experiences, from wandering between uncoordinated agents (Cowell and Martins, 2003: 160). However, social inclusion highlighted equality of opportunity through education and paid work, rather than through redistribution and social benefits. In this sense, according to Lister (1998), the New Labour government shifted its attention from equality to social inclusion, and thus, emphasised social exclusion as a major social problem rather than inequality. The New Labour

government emphasised prevention over repair of social problems, and the integration between economic and social policies (Powell, 1999: 15). For achieving these aims, inter-departmental cooperation was required: between those in charge of economy, welfare, education, and so on. In this sense, the joined-up government was a tool for the promotion of the social investment state (Newman and McKee, 2005), and many joined-up units and policy initiatives, such as the SEU, the Women's Unit, Sure Start, and the Chilren and Young People's Unit (CYPN) were set up for this purpose (Newman and McKee, 2005; Dobrowolsky, 2002).

Second, in achieving these social aims, the New Labour government would promote not only competition but also collaboration among various sectors. The Thatcher government had furthered the fragmentation of the government by dividing managerial and administrative agencies, contracting out administrative roles, and promoting market competition in the delivery of public services among public, private and voluntary sectors (Bogdanor, 2005: 15). Through privatisation and inter-departmental competition, the Thatcher government tried to achieve cost reduction and budget constraint (Newman and McKee, 2005: 660). By contrast, the New Labour government fostered cooperation not only within the government but also among the public, private and voluntary sectors (Cabinet Office, 1999: 11, 61; Ling, 2002: 624; Richards and Smith, 2002: 244). This mode of networking seems to fit Jan Kooiman's (2000: 139) idea of 'governance' which denotes 'arrangements in which public as well as private actors aim at solving problems or create societal opportunities, and aim at the care for the societal institutions within which these governing activities take place'.

However, it should be noted that the New Labour's joined-up government was not a bundle of horizontal networks between the public and private sectors. These networks were closely coordinated by joined-up agents at the centre, especially in No.10 and the Cabinet Office (Cowell and Martins, 2003). As Martin J. Smith puts it, the New Labour government desired 'to multiply the sources of policy advice, pluralise service delivery and to decentralise power, whilst simultaneously ensuring that it achieves a coherent set of goals' (Smith, 2003: 71).

Joining-up units at the centre

As a way of promoting centralised coordination system, the Blair government set up a number of

joining-up units at the core of the government. As social exclusion was presented as a main issue that the Blair government would cope with, the SEU was established in the Cabinet Office in December 1997. The SEU was responsible for fostering joined-up way of tackling issues that arose from social exclusion (Cabinet Office, 1999: 18; Burch and Holliday, 1999: 38). In 2006 the SEU was reshaped as a Social Exclusion Task Force (SETF) and merged to the Prime Minister's Strategy Unit. In May 1998 another major joining-up unit – the PIU – was established in the Cabinet Office. The PIU reported policy issues directly to the Prime Minister, proposed innovations for public service delivery, and reviewed inter-departmental coordination (Cabinet Office, 1999: 18). As the delivery of social services gained highlight during the second term of the Blair government (Ling, 2002: 615; Page, 2005: 139), In June 2001 another strong joining-up unit was set up in the Cabinet Office: the Prime Minister's Delivery Unit, which was responsible to 'ensure the delivery of the Prime Minister's top public service priority' and shared joint accountability with the Treasury for the public service agreements (PSAs).

In No.10, the Policy Unit was expanded in May 1998 to think through policy issues that the Prime Minister was interested in (Burch and Holliday, 1999: 34-35). In 1998 the Strategic Communications Unit was set up in No.10 to deliver a coordinated message to the media (Burch and Holliday, 1999: 34; Kavanagh and Richards, 2001: 12).

There were also units that dealt with more specific policy issues. The Women's Unit supported the Minister of Women by conducting researches and projects, and the UK Anti-Drug Co-ordination Unit concerned with the cooperation of agencies for tackling drug problems (Cabinet Office, 1999: 18). Both units were established in 1997 and transferred to the Cabinet Office in 1998 (Richards and Smith, 2002: 244).

In the Cabinet, the post of the Minister without Portfolio was created in May 1997. The Minister without Portfolio was responsible for fostering inter-departmental cooperation in the implementation of government policy.

Staffs of these units were recruited not only from the government but also from business and voluntary sectors. In the SEU, half of the staffs had backgrounds other than career civil servants. The Strategic Communications Unit was also a mixture of civil servants and non-civil servants, including ex-journalists (Burch and Holliday, 1999: 34, 38-39). In this way, the Blair government

expanded the pool of human resources outside the boundary of career civil servants.

Cooperating with these joining-up units, the Treasury, a traditional coordinating department in the British government, performed a more comprehensive role. PSAs, which made ministries to make agreements on outcomes of their policies in the allocation of budgets, were introduced in the budget allocation in 1998, and the Treasury played the central role in financial coordination among spending ministries on the basis of the PSAs (James and Nakamura, 2013).

Table 2 Examples of joining-up units in the central government[2)]

Social Exclusion Unit	Cabinet Office	1997 established 2006 merged to Strategy Unit, renamed as Social Exclusion Task Force 2010 abolished
Performance and Innovation Unit	Cabinet Office	1998 established 2002 renamed as Prime Minister's Strategy Unit (Strategy Unit) 2010 abolished
Policy Unit	No.10	1974 established 1998 expanded
Women's Unit	Cabinet Office	1997 established
UK Anti-Drug Co-ordination Unit	Cabinet Office	1997 established
Strategic Communications Unit	No.10	1998 established

Joining-up agencies at the implementation level

At the implementation level, the Blair government was interested in making public authorities cooperate with those groups outside of the government, such as the National Health Service (NHS) agencies, local authorities, voluntary organisations, and so on (Page, 2005: 147). Various agencies, ad hoc advisory groups and task forces were created to promote inter-sectorial and central-local collaboration on various social issues. To list a few names of task forces, the Advisory Group on Citizenship, School Standards Task Force, Youth Homelessness, Cancer Task Force, Working Group on Forced Marriage, Human Rights Task Force, Health Act Partnership, Excellence in

2) Source: Richards and Smith (2002: 247)

Cities, Local Strategic Partnerships, and the like (Richards and Smith, 2002: 247, Table 10.1; Stoker, 2005: 158, Table 7.1). The membership of these joined-up agencies also reflected the Blair government's promotion of inter-sectorial cooperation: they comprised in government ministers, civil servants, voluntary sector activists and private sector businessmen (Richards and Martin, 246).

Among these agencies and initiatives, the Rough Sleepers Unit and the Early Years Development and Childcare Partnerships were well-known success stories of the joined-up government. The Rough Sleepers Unit was established in 1997, aiming at reducing rough sleeping. The Unit worked in partnership with local authorities, voluntary organisations, health services and police (NAO, 2001: 4). The Rough Sleepers Unit achieved the reduction of the number of rough sleepers in England from 1,850 in June 1998 to 700 in June 2001 (NAO, 2001: 5). The Early Years of Development and Childcare Partnerships were launched in 1998 by the Department for Education and Skills. This initiative was promoted in partnership with private and voluntary sectors.

Criticisms

There have been criticisms to the joined-up government. The criticisms can be categorised into two aspects, which seemingly contradict to each other. On the one hand, the joined-up government is said to have concentrated coordinating power to the centre, especially No.10 and the Cabinet Office, both of them supported the Prime Minister. The Blair government strengthened joined-up units, disregarding the coordinating role of the Cabinet (Richards and Smith, 2002: 249). Moreover, the number of political appointees increased, which made the executive system almost 'presidential' (Richards and Smith, 2002: 244). Regarding the relationship between the central and local governments, the joined-up government was said to strengthen the hierarchical control and vertical integration, which weakened horizontal joined-up working in the local level (Cowell and Martin, 2003). In this line, after the governing party turn-over in 2010, the new coalition government headed by David Cameron criticised this as the 'micromanagement' of public service delivery by the centre (Minister for Government Policy, 2011: 41), and in November 2010 disbanded the Prime Minister's Strategy Unit (former PIU) and the Delivery Unit.

On the other hand, the joined-up government is criticised to have made the civil service system more fragmented rather than integrated. As the joined-up government emphasised a cross-cutting process of policy-making and implementation, civil servants were now subject to a cross-cutting accountability *as well as* their traditional accountability to ministers. Meanwhile, political appointees from business or voluntary sectors were less accountable to their ministers, as ministers have fewer sanctioning devices to these members than to career civil servants.

Furthermore, there was the proliferation of joining-up or cross-cutting agencies, which intensified, rather than reduced, the fragmentation of the public service system (Smith, 2003: 71). At the central level, various units and task forces for the joined-up government competed and conflicted with each other (Richards and Smith, 2002: 246). At the local level, there was a burgeoning of partnership bodies; more than 5,500 bodies were created during the first term of the Blair government (Stoker, 2005: 157). The fragmented cross-cutting government system makes it more difficult to recognise who is accountable to whom.

In this light, Tim Clark (2002: 114-115) criticises the joined-up government to have been absorbed in a 'new managerialism,' which created 'another layer of bureaucracy'. It is reported that there were tensions between traditional ministries and the new joining-up agencies (Kavanagh and Richards, 2001: 9; Richards and Smith, 2002: 242; Smith, 2003: 71). In addition, joining-up agencies themselves became trapped in their own 'silos' by working on their own performance targets (Kavanagh and Richards, 2001: 9). Moreover, the increasing fragmentation of joining-up agencies as well as the confusion in chains of accountability, in turn, made it increasingly difficult for the centre to coordinate policies (Richards and Smith, 2002: 242).

In a sense, these 'pitfalls' of the joined-up government were something unavoidable. Regarding the centralisation of coordinating power, joining-up units and agencies cannot function without strong support from the Prime Minister. Traditional ministries are equipped with jurisdictions and responsibilities based on the Constitution, whereas joining-up units and agencies cannot but rely on the Prime Minister's political authority. The rise and fall of the CPRS and JASP in the 1970s and 1980s demonstrate the importance of the political support from the central political power in the survival of joining-up units and initiatives (James, 1986; Klein and Plowden, 2005).

Regarding the fragmentation of the joined-up government, it should be noted that the joined-up

government was promoted surrounding issues rather than institutions. The number and complexity of issues decide those of joining-up agencies. For instance, social exclusion, a major wicked problem, encompasses various issues and problems. As the joined-up method was applied not only in the policy-making but also implementation, the whole structure of the joined-up government could not avoid fragmentation.

Nevertheless, the hierarchical and fragmented characters of the joined-up government, which seems contrary to its original meaning and intention, could not avoid criticism, especially from the subsequent Conservative-Liberal Democratic coalition government, which favoured a decentralised public administration and a 'big society' (Minister of Government Policy, 2011).

Conclusion

The growing complexity in policy areas draws two mutually conflicting tasks. On the one hand, the government should develop professionalism in specialised, and not politicised, departments, especially in contemporary social welfare where boundaries between economic and social policies and between the public and private are increasingly blurred. On the other hand, the government should coordinate policies on various areas. In the UK, the norms of ministerial responsibility and professional civil servants have resulted in departmentalism. In contrast, the government's efforts for overcoming departmentalism have resulted in other problems, such as the confusion of the line of accountability.

The New Labour's promotion of the joined-up government also shows such problems. It promoted the joined-up government as a way of overcoming traditional problem of departmentalism, coupled with further fragmentation of the government due to the Thatcher government's new public management. However, its hierarchical character, the burgeoning of joining-up units and agencies, and the confused line of accountability made the joined-up government to face criticisms.

The UK experience of the joined-up government has implications to Korea. Since the developmental state era, the Korean social policies has been connected to economic ones. Such

buzzwords in the welfare as the productive welfare, the income-led growth, and the social economy present the continuing interconnectedness between economic, labour and welfare policies. Moreover, businesses and non-profit organisations play an important role in the realisation of these policies. Therefore, they reveal necessity of cooperation among the public, private and the third sector, as well as among multiple ministries in the government. However, policy coordination between ministries has been a difficult task, while the cooperation between the public and private sectors has frequently been criticised as being dominated by government bureaucracy.

In this sense, an issue-oriented joined-up governance may help policy coordination. Secretariats of the President become nods of joining-up networks, while ministries play their professional roles. In this way, not only technocratic but also social values can be fostered in policy coordination. The governmental structure seems helpful for the joined-up government: n Korea Secretariats of the President have been coexisting with government ministries, while the UK politics has legacies of the Cabinet solidarity and the ministerial responsibility.

However, we should pay attention to possible side effects, especially the centralisation of power. The Korean presidentialism has already been criticised as concentrating too much power to the President. The promotion of the joined-up government may replace politisation for bureaucratisation and marketisation. For promoting the joined-up government, we may need to find a way of checking central joining-up units by, for instance, setting up joined-up select committees in the National Assembly, as well as strengthening their legal obligation for transparency.

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◖ 국문요약 ◗

신노동당의 연계정부(joined-up government)와 사회서비스 개혁

임상헌*

정책 분야들이 넓어지고 복잡해지면서 정책 조정은 행정의 도전이 되고 있다. 신노동당의 연계정부(joined-up government)는 사회서비스 공급에 있어 정부의 분절화를 개선하기 위한 종합적인 접근법이었다. 신노동당은 총리실과 내각부 등 정부의 핵심기관과 민관협력분야에 연계기관들을 두어 정부부처 간, 그리고 민관 간 연계된 활동을 추진하였다. 그러나 연계정부는 행정체계를 더욱 수직적으로 만들고, 분절화시키며, 책임소재를 불분명하게 하였다는 비판을 받았다. 영국의 연계정부의 경험은 부처 간, 중앙과 지방 간, 그리고 민관 간의 정책 조정의 중요성이 더욱 커지고 있는 한국에 함의를 줄 것이라 기대한다.

주제어: 연계정부, 사회서비스 공급, 정책 조정, 부처 할거주의, 신노동당

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