

## Name-callings in US-North Korea Diplomatic Rhetoric\*

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### 1. Introduction

Changes in diplomatic situations may produce changes in name-callings of the counterpart nations or leaders. Or changes in name-callings may produce positive or negative changes in diplomatic situations. President George W. Bush called the north Korean leader as 'Mr. Kim Jong-il'<sup>1)</sup> on May 31, 2005 during the White House press conference. He reiterated his intention to resolve

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1) Quite a few south Koreans still call the former President Kim Dae-Jung as Mr.(Seonsengnim in Korean). In this case, *Mr.* is an honorific higher than *President*. In China also, Mr. is an absolutely honored calling for senior citizens. It is like Sensei(先生) in Japan.: Kim, I.Y., professor of Seonggyungwan University, Joongang Ilbo, April 13, 2007.

the North's nuclear development plan through the 6-party talks and conveyed the message that the North would be respected by the world community if it would give up the plan.<sup>2)</sup>

Three days later on June 3, the North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman said that they noted the calling of President Bush and his remark was interpreted as a possible harbinger for North Korea to announce its intention to come back to the 6-party talks.

On June 17, South Korean Unification Minister met with Kim Jong-il in North Korea and said to him, "President Bush called Chairman Kim as Mr. Kim and it created a friendly atmosphere. Reciprocal recognition between top leaders is important. Please appraise President Bush."(Yonhap News, June 17, 2005). In response, Kim said, "May I call him His Excellency? There is no reason whatsoever for me to think badly of President Bush. I still remember President Putin of Russia said that President Bush was a good person to talk with. Premier Koizumi also told me in the same vein about him. I have taken a positive view since President Clinton. I have tried to be friendly. It's important to appreciate the counterpart of negotiation." Kim even seemed to want his message conveyed to Bush by adding, "You may announce my thought." Here, Kim's calling of Bush 'His Excellency' can be identical to 'Mr.,' used by Bush to call Kim.<sup>3)</sup> The effects of Bush's calling 'Mr. Kim' did

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2) And so it's a matter of continuing to send a message to Mr. Kim Jong-il that if you want to be accepted by the neighborhood and be a part of the .. of those who are viewed with respect in the world, work with us to get rid of your nuclear weapons program.

3) Mr. Kim, Dong-Hyun, who retired as a State Department interpreter in May, recollected that President Bush's own expressions gave rise to much understanding. For example, he called President Kim Dae-jung of South Korea in the White House summit 'this man,' which invited a lot of controversy within South Korea. In the 2001 summit, Mr. Kim interpreted 'this man' as 'this gentleman' in Korean. In his first summit with President Roh, Moo-hyun in 2003, Bush described President Roh as "He is an easy man to talk to." Mr. Kim's first interpretation of the sentence was

not stop there. On June 28, the North Korean spectators crowding the gymnasium of Pyongyang rose to the U.S. national anthem played before the boxing match between the boxers of WBCF<sup>4)</sup> from the two countries (Yonhapnews on June 28, 2005).

The spectators might well have been instructed to rise to the American anthem, but it may have been in the same vein with Kim's calling of Bush at the meeting with the south Korean minister.

Afterwards, during the 4th 6-party talks on July 27, held after a break of one year and half, Christopher Hill, the U.S. chief delegate, called Kim 'Chairman.' It was the highest honorific that the north wanted.<sup>5)</sup>

On September 19, at the plenary session among 6 parties of the 4th talks, they adopted a joint declaration that announced, among other things, that North Korea's abandoning of all nuclear arms and the existing programs. It was the 110 days since Bush called Kim 'Chairman' on May 31, 2005. The dramatic conclusion of the declaration may have been initiated by the calling. On June 5, 2007, in the absence of any sign that North Korea acts in compliance of the February 13 Agreement, President Bush called the North one of the world's worst dictatorships.<sup>6)</sup> The next day, on June 6, when he met with Japanese Prime Minister Abe in Heiligendamm, Germany, he said that they expect the North Koreans to honor agreements.<sup>7)</sup> It may not be a pure coincidence that

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"He is an easy talking partner" in Korean, but then next time he changed it to "*He is a comfortable partner for talk*." A Korean official expressed his displeasure about the expression, but the White House denied it. We can ascribe the trouble to the impromptu and straight forward style, but his expressions may imply his real intentions (Joong-ang Daily, May 22, 2006).

4) World Boxing Council for Females

5) North Korea calls Kim 'Chairman' in its English P.R. publications.

6) "So I meet personally with dissidents and democratic activists from some of the world's worst dictatorships -- including Belarus, and Burma, and Cuba, and North Korea, Sudan, and Zimbabwe." June 5, 2007, President Bush, at Large Hall, Czeernin Palace, Prague, Czech Republic, when he visited Prague, Czech Republic, and discussed freedom on his way to G-8 summit.

North Korea again test-fired a short-range missile to West Sea on June 7, following the first one to East Sea on May 25, 2007.

How could name-callings entail such changes in diplomacy or how could those changes cause different name-callings? How should we translate those different names between Korean and English? This paper will survey a brief history of the U.S.' rhetoric vis-a-vis North Korea, the implications of name-calling in the communication studies and draw a conclusion from the results of the first calling of Mr. Kim until the dramatic conclusion of the 5th 6-party talks in February, 2007 and later. Finally, it will try to make some suggestions for translators to properly deal with different name-callings.

## 2. Implications of name-calling<sup>8)</sup>

The communication theories, in studying perception and language issues in the mass media, analyzes propaganda. In the first theories of decoding and effects, they cite seven propaganda devices: name calling, glittering generality, transfer, testimonial, plain folks, card stacking, and bandwagon. Each is defined and discussed with examples from contemporary socio-political campaigns, advertisements, newspaper columns, and statements by extremist groups. As a reference to the subject of this paper, name-calling, the first device of propaganda, is very useful and many implications as follows.

In the communication studies, name calling is giving an idea a bad label and is used to make us reject, and condemn the idea without examining the

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7) "Particularly we talked about North Korea. There is a common message here, and that is, we expect the North Koreans to honor agreements. And it's very important for the Japanese people to know that I strongly support Shinzo Abe's desire to deal with this very important issue of -- the abduction issue."

8) Severin, Werner J and Tankard, James 2001. Communication Theories: Origins, Methods, and Uses in the Mass Media, 5th ed. pp.111-113. Longman.

evidence" (Lee and Lee, 1939, p. 26). Name calling does not appear much in advertising, probably because there is a reluctance to mention a competing product, even by calling it a name. Its use in politics and other areas of public discourse is more common, however.

## 2.1 Terrorist and terrorism

Two most common examples of name calling are terrorist and terrorism. As the old maxim goes, "One person's terrorist is another person's freedom fighter." General semanticists point out that what we call a person will depend on our purposes, our projections, and our evaluations, yet the person does not change when we change the label.

## 2.2 Evolution of the meaning of terrorism/terrorist after 9/11

The incident on September 11, 2001 in New York helped change, at least narrow the definition of *terrorism/terrorist*, for Americans. They came to mean the acts of Al-Qaida, the radical Muslim terrorist group led by Osama bin Laden, who hijacked the American passenger planes and crushed the twin Trade Center buildings in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, and those organizations and states which help or sympathize with them.

The American administration called their efforts to settle the 9/11 incident War on Terrorism. When they finished the first settlement of the incident, they started checking the so-called rogue states such as Iraq, which were suspected to be developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to be possibly used against the U.S. and its allies. North Korea was called a country of axis of evil.<sup>9)</sup>

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9) "States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred, could attack our allies or

### 3. Brief History of the American Administration's Rhetoric toward North Korea

#### 3.1 Designation as State Sponsor of Terrorism

The U.S. State Department designated North Korea as State Sponsor of Terrorism in January, 1988, 7th year of President Reagan's term of office. It was right after the report that two North Korean agents bombed a Korean airliner.

Since then, North Korea has never been involved in apparent terrorist sponsoring. But it has been charged with harboring terrorists such as the Japanese Red Army agents who kidnapped a Japanese airliner in 1970 and in 2005, it was also charged with having kidnapped some Japanese to North Korea.

Up till now, five other countries, namely Cuba, Iran, Libya, Sudan and Syria have been designated as such. In 2004, Libya recovered its diplomatic relations with the US, severed for 24 years, after voluntarily denouncing its nuclear development program. But in May, 2006, the six countries are still on the list. In its '2006 World Terrorism Report,' the US designated North Korea again as a state sponsor of terrorism. In order for North Korea to be excluded from the list, it should abide by the promises on the agreement of February 13.

So far, the list of state sponsor of terrorism is as follows:

State sponsor of terrorism	Designation date
Cuba	March 1, 1982
Iran	January 19, 1984
Libya	December 29, 1979
North Korea	January 20, 1988
Sudan	August 12, 1993
Syria	December 29, 1979

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attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic." (January 29, 2002 The President's State of the Union Address The United States Capitol Washington, D.C.)

### 3.2 Clinton's naming of North Korea

Right after President Clinton was inaugurated in 1993, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty on March 12. Since Clinton was the first American President after the end of the Cold War, it is appropriate to say that the new American administration had no time or scheme in calling North Korea(Kuypers, 57-73, 175-202) and it used North Korea and Kim Jong-il as neutral calling, aiming at a compromise with them.

When the Cold War meta-narrative lost its ground with the collapse of the Cold War, President Clinton could no longer depend on the typical Presidential data of rhetoric used by his predecessors since 1947. The Cold War had an important significance in that it provided the Americans with a banquet of words which conveyed a clear image of enemies. The common image of enemies had been a basis of rhetoric that the American Presidents could use in implementing a particular foreign policy. The enemies were often depicted as 'moral threat against freedom,' 'barbarism' or 'evil empire.' When the President comments on diplomacy, they were restricted in terms of precedents and tradition. When they describe the enemies, they often depended upon the American public's knowledge about the enemies.

### 3.3 George W. Bush's calling of North Korea and its leaders

On March 8, 2001, right after his inauguration, President Bush had a press conference with the South Korean counterpart, Kim Dae-jung after a summit meeting at the White House. In his opening statement, Bush remarked that he had some *skepticism* about the North Korean leader. His skepticism seemed to linger on all along his first term of office.

In his second State of the Union speech in February, 2002, he designated North Korea as one of the axis of evil and specified it as a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens.<sup>10)</sup>

In May, 2002, in his private meeting with some Republican lawmakers,

Bush called Kim as 'a pigmy' and 'an ill-bred child at the dining table.' In return, North Korea retorted that Bush is an incarnation of evil and politically ignorant.

During the three first 6-party talks between August 2003 and June 2004 in Beijing, there had been no particular calling of North Korea and its leader. But when the third talks ended without the prospect for the 4th meeting, Bush called Kim 'tyrant' and the North Korean Foreign Ministry retorted that Bush is a tyrant of tyrants and a leader of a typical political thugs.

#### **4. Changes in Calling Kim since 2005**

##### **4.1 Calling Kim of the current American Administration<sup>11)</sup>**

- In January, 2005, in her confirmation hearing, State Secretary Rice called North Korea 'outpost of tyranny.' On April 28 that year in a press conference, President Bush again called Kim a tyrant who starves his people and a man who said he was going to do something and he didn't do it.<sup>12)</sup> In return, the North's Foreign Ministry spokesman, in his press conference on April 30, retorted, "Bush is a rascal and morally immature

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10) "North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens."

11) Refer to 'National News' section in Yonhapnews from January to October, 2005.

12) "Kim Jong-il is a dangerous person. He's as man who starves his people. He's got huge concentration camps. And, as David accurately noted, there is concern about his capacity to deliver a nuclear weapon. We don't know if he can or not, but I think it's best when you're dealing with a tyrant like Kim Jong.il to assume he can. That's why I've decided that the best way to deal with this diplomatically is to bring more leverage to the situation by including other countries. It used to be that it was just America dealing with North Korea. And when Kim Jong-il would make a move that would scare people, everybody would say, America, go fix it. I felt it .. it didn't work. In other words, the bilateral approach didn't work. The man said he was going to do something and he didn't do it, for starters."



child. We do not expect any progress in the bilateral relations during his term of office. We will just proudly pursue our direction of our choice."

- On May 27, 2005, President Bush in his congratulatory remarks on the commencement ceremony of the US Naval Academy, not singling out North Korea, said that terrorists and tyrants can no longer feel safe hiding behind innocent life.<sup>13)</sup>
- On May 30, 2005, the Pyongyang Radio called State Secretary Rice a dominant hen who is ruining the White House and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld a rooster who is nudged out by the hen.
- On May 31, 2005, President Bush told the press that if Mr. Kim Jong-il wants to be accepted by the neighborhood and be a part of the community of those who are viewed with respect in the world, work with us to get rid of your nuclear weapons program.<sup>14)</sup> A European doctor who spent many months treating children in North Korea said: "There are two worlds in North Korea: one for the senior military and the elite; and a living hell for the rest." On May 31, 2005, with his second term of office, he showed the first change of attitude in calling him with the honorific, "Mr." Until then, the U.S. Presidents and high-ranking officials used to call his name without any honorific,

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13) "In this new era of warfare, we can target a regime, not a nation, and that means terrorists and tyrants can no longer feel safe hiding behind innocent life. In the 21st century, we can target the guilty and protect the innocent, and that makes it easier to keep the peace."

14) "It's a matter of continuing to send a message to Mr. Kim Jong.il that if you want to be accepted by the neighborhood and be a part of the .. of those who are viewed with respect in the world, work with us to get rid of your nuclear weapons program."

implying that he was a tyrant hungering his people while developing a nuclear program.<sup>15)</sup> Thus, the press and the international community paid attention to the honorific "Mr." pronounced by President Bush. He may have expressed his will for diplomatic efforts to resume the talks and North Korea may have positively responded to him.

The former U.S. President Reagan made his famous speech on June 12, 1987 before the Brandenburg Gate in West Berlin, he repeatedly called General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party "Mr. Gorbachev.' From the western point of view, 'Mr.' sounds a little bit degrading since it is less official and more private than the official title, 'General Secretary.' However, in socialist countries like North Korea or China, 'Mr.' is literally translated as 'senior' or 'born before,' it can be a highest honorific.<sup>16)</sup>

In Korean, 'Mr.' should be translated as 'Seonseng,' not as 'Seonsengnim.' The Korean suffix 'nim' to honor names does not sound presidential nor diplomatic.

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15) "Kim Jong.il is a dangerous person. He's as man who starves his people. He's got huge concentration camps. And, as David accurately noted, there is concern about his capacity to deliver a nuclear weapon. We don't know if he can or not, but I think it's best when you're dealing with a tyrant like Kim Jong.il to assume he can. That's why I've decided that the best way to deal with this diplomatically is to bring more leverage to the situation by including other countries. It used to be that it was just America dealing with North Korea. And when Kim Jong.il would make a move that would scare people, everybody would say, America, go fix it. I felt it .. it didn't work. In other words, the bilateral approach didn't work. The man said he was going to do something and he didn't do it, for starters" (White House press conference on April 28, 2005).

16) There is one sign the Soviets can make that would be unmistakable, that would advance dramatically the cause of freedom and peace. General Secretary Gorbachev, if you seek peace, if you seek prosperity for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, if you seek liberalization: Come here to this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, open this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!

- On July 27, 2005, during the 4th 6-party talks which was held after more than a year of break, the US Chief negotiator Christopher Hill called Kim as 'Chairman.' It was the highest honorific wished by North Koreans. The North calls Kim as Chairman in their English publicity booklets.

#### 4.2 Comparing North Korea with Iran

President Bush, in his press conference on August 9, 2005, called Kim without any honorific. To a question why the United States supports a civilian nuclear program for Iran, but not for North Korea, he said that the Iranians have expressed a desire to have a civilian nuclear program. At the end of the conference, comparing his policy between North Korea and Iran, he said that in the case of North Korea, it is to let Kim Jong-il understand that he should give up any ambitions to develop a nuclear weapon proliferate it.<sup>17)</sup> It can be

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17) "Yes. The Iranians have expressed a desire to have a civilian nuclear program, and we've said that it is the .. it makes sense only so long as the plant is under strong international inspection regimes and the uranium used to run the power plant is provided by a country with whom we're comfortable .. with which we're comfortable, and the spent fuel is collected. In other words, there will be a strong regime .. I talked about this at the National Defense University speech, about how we can enhance the spread of nuclear power, but in a peaceful way that will assure countries that spent fuel will not be enriched for bomb-making capacities. Secondly, the Iranians have been, we hope, straightforward in their willingness to accept this kind of international cooperation.

North Korea is in a different situation. The North Koreans have .. didn't tell the truth when it came to their enrichment programs. But what's different about it is the South Koreans have offered power. In other words, the South Koreans have said, we'll build and share power with you, which seems to me to make a good .. good sense, so long as the North Koreans give up their nuclear weapons, so long as there's full transparency, so long as there's the ability for the international community to know exactly what's going on in a potential weapons program.

The strategy is the same, by the way, in terms of dealing diplomatically with

said that President Bush showed to the world that he is objectively judging Kim, not as a respectable and trustworthy counterpart, but as one less dependable than even Iran.

In 2006, North Korea test-fired a missile in July and a nuclear bomb in October. In the meantime, the U.S. and North Korea did not exchange name-calling until President Bush said that he can meet with *Chairman Kim* during his summit meeting with President Roh of South Korea in November, 2006. His last try to call Kim Jong-il Chairman seemed to have little effect since the U.S. and the rest of the world had very hard time inducing North Korea to an agreement in February, 2007 during the 5th 6-party talks in Beijing.

The calling seemed to produce no lingering impact at all in the year 2006, during which North Korea test-fired a missile in July and conducted a nuclear test in October, which was followed by the UN Security Council's resolution to sanction North Korea on Oct. 15. Amidst a series of diplomatic efforts of the world community, President Bush said, after a summit with South Korean President in Hanoi, "we want the North Korean leaders to hear that if it gives up its weapons -- nuclear weapons ambitions, that we would be willing to enter into security arrangements with the North Koreans, as well as move forward new economic incentives for the North Korean people." Two days before in Singapore, Bush said, "We want the North Korean leaders to hear that if it gives up its weapons -- nuclear weapons ambitions, that we would be

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both countries. As I mentioned, the EU 3 is taking the lead .. we have a little different strategy, obviously, different players with North Korea, but nevertheless, it's the same concept: A group of nations are negotiating on behalf of the free world to let, in this case, Kim Jong.il understand that we're united in our desire to .. for you to give up any ambitions to develop a nuclear weapon, and united in our desire, by the way, to prevent you from proliferating (Bush Ranch, Crawford, Texas).

willing to enter into security arrangements with the North Koreans, as well as move forward new economic incentives for the North Korean people."

Bush's remarks, including his calling of North Korean leaders, may have contributed to the adoption of the agreement of February 13, 2007 in Beijing during the closing ceremony of the 5th 6-party talks. Bush did not employ any honorific, but the press reported that his remarks were the greatest possible 'carrot' delivered by mouth, because he insinuated that Kim Jong-il could be recognized as counter-signatory of a security agreement with the U.S.

Name-callings could result from changes in diplomatic situations or contexts or they might cause changes in diplomatic situations or contexts. Translators should be sensitive in translating changing name-callings, particularly when they appear in spoken statements of high-ranking diplomats or politicians. Only when those name-callings are immediately and properly conveyed by translators, diplomacy could produce changes in accordance with the actual turnings of contexts in history.

### **5. Difficulties in translating different name-callings**

Difficulties in translating different name-callings in diplomacy can be doubled by the fact that name-callings are not only uttered in speeches which are usually broadcast live by TV(Kurz, 957-965) but also are usually very short, allowing interpreters very little time to reflect on the delicate nuances in changed names.

TV interpreting has been considered by interpreters as one of the most difficult of its kind (Kwak, 269-276) and in such intrinsic difficulties of TV interpreting, interpreters should be very sensitive in catching the slight changes of name-callings uttered usually by very high-ranking officials like Presidents or Foreign Ministers who often use crisis rhetoric<sup>18)</sup> in their diplomatic speeches.

## 6. Conclusion and suggestions

### 6.1 Conclusion

How to call an individual, an organization, and even a country could bring about a delicate and considerable impact on human relations, social connections and world diplomacy. For the last 50-odd years since the armistice in the Korean peninsula, the US and North Korea has maintained hostile relationship and called each other not-friendly names.

While the US has called Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-il as 'dictator' or 'tyrant' who harassed their people in North Korea, North Korea has called the American Presidents as 'imperialists.' They used harsher and harsher names each time the US called them names.

After the Cold-War structure collapsed after so many years of the US-Soviet confrontation, September 11 incident broke out in 2001. It resuscitated the controversy on the name of 'terrorists' which had been a most primitive name-calling since the end of the 2nd World War. Because North Korea was suspected of producing and selling WMDs, they were criticized as such. As a result, North Korea has been designated by the US State Department as state terrorism sponsor until now for almost 20 years since 1988.

Following the September 11 incident, 2001, the US attacked Iraq, but could not find WMDs there, and was criticized by the world community. In the meantime, they started the first 6-party talks in late August in 2003, second in February, 2004 and third in June the same year. It was on May 31, 2005 that President Bush called Kim Jong-Il as 'Mr.,' maybe helping to lead to the 4th talks in late July and then to the announcement of the joint communique on September 19. But the positive effects of calling 'Mr.' ended there. When

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18) Kwak, Joong-Chol. 2003. "American Presidential Rhetoric on the North Korean Nuclear Crisis." Department of Journalism and Communication, Graduate School of Kyunghee University, Seoul.

North Korea's financial (money) scandal was revealed early 2006, the US and North Korea returned to the past name calling and in July 2007, North Korea test-fired a missile. So when the two sides were confronted on a very realistic issue, the importance of name-calling stopped there.

Nevertheless, name-calling between two leaders or countries may well ignite changes of bilateral relations for better or for worse. North Korea is said to be very unpredictable. But when it abides by the 2006 joint communique some time in 2007, the US would again call Kim Jong-Il as Mr. or even Chairman and North Korea may be excluded from the list of State terrorism sponsors. Then North Korea and Kim Jong-il may well behave as a responsible member of the world community.

## 6.2 Suggestions

This paper was based upon the assumption that name-calling between the US and North Korea, as an independent variable, must have affected the political and diplomatic situation in and around the Korean peninsula. However, it can also be assumed that name-calling is only a dependent variable, resulting from the changes taking place in the US-North Korea relations and the ensuing situation in the peninsula.

Nevertheless, this paper could be meaningful in its descriptive analysis of how name-calling, as an independent variable, has affected the diplomacy, as a dependent variable. In this case also, this paper may leave something to be desired in that it could well extend the historical scope of the analysis or compile cases of name-calling between the two countries beyond the well-known, already-reported ones.

Furthermore, it would be better to expand the discussion beyond the bilateral relations between the US and North Korea to other 6-party talks member countries. In doing so, the study should deal with relevant studies of Goffman (1974), Gitlin (1980) and Iyenger (1991), since name-calling in

politics is related to framing. At the same time, the recent study of Lakoff (2002, 2004) on the impact of metaphor on framing may well be mentioned.

Translators should be very careful in translating different name-calls in changing diplomatic situations in international politics. Their understanding of name-calling as a propaganda device in perception and language issues in the mass media could help them properly convey its shade of meaning into another language.

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[Abstract]

## **Name-calling in US-North Korea Diplomatic Rhetoric**

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On May 31, 2005, President Bush called the north Korean leader as 'Mr. Kim Jong-il', when he reiterated his intention to resolve the North's nuclear development plan through the 6-party talks. His first-ever honorific for Kim was noted by North Korea and the rest of the world. On June 17, Kim proposed to call Bush with the honorific, 'His Excellency' and expressed his favorable feeling about the American leader.

On June 28, the whole north Korean spectators stood up to the American national anthem in a Pyonyang gymnasium and on July 26, and the long-delayed 6-party talks was resumed in Beijing during which the American chief delegate called the north's leader 'Chairman Kim'.

On September 19, during the second round of the 4th talks, a joint communique was issued, with the north's commitment to abandoning all its nuclear arms and existing nuclear development plan. It was about 110 days after Bush uttered 'Mr. Kim Jong-il'. You may well observe that changing diplomatic situation naturally produce changing name-callings between the two countries, but we could also say that the short honorific help produce the dramatic turn-about of the difficult negotiations.

Unfortunately, however, that the positive name-calling effect seemed to end in 2005. From the beginning of 2006, the illegal financial problem of North Korea(Banco Delta Asia savings) seemed to scrap all the positive effects of name-calling in 2005.

In 2006, North Korea test-fired a missile in July and a nuclear bomb in

October. In the meantime, the U.S. and North Korea did not exchange any name-calling until President Bush said that he can meet with 'Chairman Kim' in November, 2006. His last try to call Kim Jong-il Chairman seemed to have little effect since the U.S. had very hard time inducing North Korea to an agreement during the 5th 6-party talks in February, 2007.

On March 25, 2008, Bush reportedly said, in his probably last naming of Kim, "When I was inaugurated as President in 2001, he was like a child who throws down the food in order to draw attention."

It can be said that there is a cause and effect relationship between name-callings and changing situations in international diplomacy. When the situation seems to improve, positive name-callings could well accelerate the trend but there should be a limit in the case of a long and difficult relationship like the US and North Korea.

Translations of changing name-callings are all the more difficult because they are uttered by high-ranking officials in their speeches of crisis rhetoric which are broadcast live by TV in a short moment since names are usually very short. In this context, translators' understanding of name-calling as a propaganda device in perception and language issues in the mass media could help them properly and promptly convey its shade of meaning into another language.

▶ Key Words: Interpretation, diplomatic rhetoric, honorific, name-calling as a propaganda device,

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