

# DYNAMICS OF PAKISTAN'S POST 9/11 CRISIS FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

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## 논문 요약

이 연구는 파키스탄에서 9/11 테러 이후 외교정책 결정 과정을 추적하기 위해 4단계 "위기에서의 국가 행동 모델"을 적용했다. 그것은 알카에다의 미국에 대한 불길한 공격과 테러에 맞서 싸우기 위한 부시 대통령의 후속 선언이 t1 단계의 세계와 지역의 정치 안보 차원을 변화시켰다고 주장한다. 이웃 국가인 파키스탄의 지원은 테러와의 전쟁에서 불가피했고, 미국은 이슬람 바드의 협력을 얻기 위해 강압적인 외교를 취했다. 결과적으로, 미국의 요구를 수용하지 않을 경우 파키스탄은 국가의 기본 가치/목표에 대한 위협을 인식하고 동시에 시간 압박은 t2 단계에서 의사결정자들의 심리적 스트레스를 증폭시켰다. 따라서 의사결정 포럼은 t3 단계에서 시작되었고 파키스탄은 외교 정책 위기를 완화시킨 t4 단계로 미국에 합류하기로 결정했다.

**주제어** : 9/11 테러 공격, 대외 정책 위기, 위기 국가 행동, 파키스탄의 외교 정책 의사 결정, 미국 테러와의 전쟁

## I. Introduction

The catastrophe of September 11, 2001 has attracted the keenest interest of experts in the field of foreign policy to study the centrality of decisions taken by the states and other independent actors. The events not only transformed the global politico-security dimensions but also altered the South Asian geo-political and geo-security environment. The United States announced to attack Afghanistan and compelled Pakistan to play frontline state role in the war on terror.

The present paper is intended to trace that how the September 11, 2001 terror attacks triggered the foreign policy crisis for Pakistan and what was the crisis foreign policy decision-making process in Pakistan? To answer the query, author has applied "*Model of State Behavior in Crisis*" proposed by Canadian born Political Scientist and crisis management expert Michael Brecher. The four-stage model effectively traced the crisis foreign policy decision making process in Pakistan, as it argues that the 9/11 terror attacks on t1 stage transformed the political and security environment at global and regional level. Immediately, after the attacks the U.S. designated bin Laden and al-Qaeda operating from Afghanistan culprits and President Bush introduced the "Bush Doctrine" to fight against global terrorism. In a televised speech to American nation he declared that from today the U.S. would not make any distinction between terrorists and those who harbor the worst evil of the day. To attack on Afghanistan the U.S. was desperately in need of Pakistan's

support and Washington threaten Islamabad to bomb back into Stone Age if it chooses to go along with the Taliban and al-Qaeda.

Therefore, the top hierarchy in Pakistan perceived grave threats to core values/objectives of the country and simultaneous time pressure for response and high probability of military hostilities intensified the psychological stress in the leadership at t2 stage, which provoked the foreign policy crisis for the country. The crisis management process was initiated at the t3 stage which comprised the sources of information, decisional forum, consultation and consideration of alternatives. And, the foreign policy choice was made at the t4 stage, which diffused the foreign policy crisis.

## **II. U.S. Foreign Policy Shift towards South Asia after 9/11 Attacks**

Foreign policy crisis erupts with an environmental change in the internal or external context of a state. The triggering of a foreign policy crisis is perceptual. More precisely it derives from three inter-related perceptions (a) threat to basic values/objectives, (b) finite time for response, and (c) heightened probability of involvement in military hostilities (Brecher 1993). The moment of 8:46:40 marked a paradigm shift in world politics when American Airlines flight 11 collided into the North Tower of WTC, and instantly all passengers including crew members perished along with unknown numbers in the tower (9-11 Commission 2004). The terrorist attacks on the United States consumed 2996 peoples and commenced an unending war against global terrorism. Senator Orrin

Hatch told media reporters that U.S. found evidence that bin Laden received messages from his associates that "actually saying over the airwaves, private airwaves at that, that they had hit two targets" (Schmemmann 2001).

The barbarism in the U.S. transformed the image of President Bush to commander-in-chief of the war on terrorism. At 8:30 p.m. he addressed the nation from Oval office and stressed that "We will make no distinction between those who planned these acts and those who harbor them"(Woodward 2002). It was a declaration to hunt down culprits and those who helped and protect them, rather than a targeted retaliatory strike.

By late evening of September 11, President Bush chaired two separate meetings. The larger meeting consist heads of domestic departments, while the smaller meeting involved the top advisors, a group later he called "War Cabinet". In this restricted meeting, the President stressed that it is time for self-defense and the U.S. must teach lesson to terrorists and those who support and harbor them. During the meeting Secretary Powell stated that the United States should send clear message to Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Arab states for prompt action. On the following day, President Bush headed two more meetings. In the first meeting, he stressed that we are at war with new kind of enemy and directed principals to expand the pre-9/11 homework and prepare a new war plan(9-11 Commission 2004).

President George W. Bush urged the world community to struggle for good versus evil. Collin Powel, the U.S. Secretary of State gave statement expecting fullest support from Pakistan. The United Nations Security

Council (UNSC) adopted the resolution 1368 on 12 September 2001 by unequivocally condemning in the strongest terms of horrifying terrorist attacks on the U.S. It calls upon all states around the globe to work together to bring the culprits to justice. On September 13, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice presided a principals committee meeting in the Situation Room to develop war strategy against Al-Qaeda. And during the meeting, principals specifically concentrated on Pakistan and concluded that "if Pakistan decided not to help the U.S, it too would be at risk"(9-11 Commission 2004).

The abrupt transformation after the terrorist attacks has altered the security apparatus in South Asia and posed grave threats to Pakistan's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Pakistan was in a dilemma to face newkind of security challenges after a drastic change in international and regional geopolitical and geostrategic environment. South Asia was going to become hotbed for the global war on terrorism after American invasion in Afghanistan. Pakistan's eastern neighbor India had already expressed utmost solidarity with the U.S. and offered logistic support along with air and naval bases(Jamshed Ali Baloch 2014). The new Indian rhetoric undermined Pakistan's safety and security, and policymakers were concerned that India might take a favor from emerging scenario and would attack on Pakistani Kashmir and Northern parts of the country. The territorial integrity and security of the state was at stake and it was primary responsibility of decision makers to protect the country from foreign aggression.

Although Pakistan had condemned the attacks by conveying condolence message of president Pervez Musharraf on late evening of Tuesday

(Musharraf 2006). But the events triggered an environmental change in the global and regional security landscape which provoked the foreign policy crisis for Pakistan at t1 stage.

### **III. Key Variables of Foreign Policy Crisis**

The first section thoroughly discusses the environmental change in the wake of terror attacks on WTC and Pentagon. While, the section two empirically tests the key variables of foreign policy crisis, which are perceived by the decision makers at t2 stage. The section three elaborates the foreign policy crisis management process in Pakistan, which began at t3 stage, and the final policy choice ensues at t4 stage.

#### **1. High Probability of Military Hostilities and Threat to Core Values/Objectives**

The probability of war, more precisely involvement in military hostilities or, in an intra-war crisis, the likelihood of an adverse change in the military balance is another attribute for a crisis situation. Whatever the context, it is uncertainty about value threat, war or adverse change in the military balance, and time pressure that generate the foreign policy crisis. Capabilities have varying consequences for the use of violence in crisis(Brecher 1996). The Post 9/11 scenario exposed that, there was a high probability of military hostilities between Islamabad and Washington, if the former stay neutral or chosed the Taliban in the war against terrorism.

Military balance was highly favorable to the U.S. as it retains the global reach military with modern warfare technology. While Pakistani military was much vulnerable and was facing difficulties to acquire hardware and weapons system. The morale of the military was already in doldrums due to Kargil adventure where American pressure forced it to retreat. Although, Pakistan was modernizing military, but sanctions imposed by the Washington were creating troubles to acquire military weapons and hardware. Most importantly, after the nuclear explosives in May 1999 Washington withhold the delivery of F-16 fighters purchased by Pakistan which severely damaged the warfare capability of Pakistan Air force.

"Threat concerns harms or losses that have not yet taken place but are anticipated"(Folkman 1984). It may be active or passive, strong or weak, and central or peripheral to one's values. The ICB project researchers argued that foreign policy crisis began when policymakers perceive that basic values are under threat. The basic values are further divided into core and high priority values. The core values are closely linked with the state itself, regardless of the specific government in power-such as survival of a state and its population, the prevention of grave damage through war. The high priority values "derive from ideological or material interests as defined by the decision-makers at the time of specific crisis"(Jonathan Wilkenfeld 1988). The later incorporates the decision makers concerns for their reputation and ability to remain in power. Thus, the political considerations are seen the potential object of threat and a source of stress for decision makers.

In present case, the U.S. intentions to fight against terrorism after the gruesome crime of 9/11 threaten the basic values/objectives of Pakistan. The President Pervez Musharraf's speech on September 19th, 2001 identified four basic values/objectives of the country. He outlined that "our critical concern is our sovereignty, second our economy, third our strategic assets (nuclear and missiles), and fourth our Kashmir cause" (Fair 2013). The preservation of sovereignty/territorial integrity and the strategic assets were the core values. While the acquisition of military/economic assistance, recognition of military regime, Kashmir cause and the prevention of Indian influence in the war on terrorism in Afghanistan were the high priority values.

## 2. Time Pressure and Stress Development

Time pressure is closely associated with uncertainty, notably about intentions of the adversary, balance of capability and the quality of information to be processed. In essence, it refers to the available time for a decision in relation to the deadline for choice. Time pressure is likely to be greater when decision makers are uncertain(Brecher 1993). It plays indispensable role in decision-making process, if decision makers perceive that enough time is available for the decision they might extensively discuss every alternative and chose the best decision with higher expected utilities(Robert S. Billings 1980).

The crisis situations pose time constraints on decision makers to take urgent and immediate decisions. This is also true in case of Pakistan's post 9/11 crisis foreign policy decision(Jaspal 2017). In a meeting with



selected group of retired army generals, veteran diplomats, and politicians, on 18<sup>th</sup> September Musharraf stated that the decision to extend "unstinting support" to the U.S. was taken under tremendous pressure and a possibility of a direct military action by a coalition of the U.S., India, and Israel against Pakistan. Similarly, answering to a question about lacking of a cross-section consultation, he mentioned that a short deadline was given for decision(Abbas 2015).

The concept of stress is even more extensively discussed in the health care fields, but it also employed in economics, political science and foreign policy studies(Folkman 1984). Crisis for foreign policy decision develop acute stress in decision makers. The individual stress model identifies that stress in decision makers derive from perceptions of threat and time pressure(Tanter 1975). It not only threaten collectives, organizations and nations but their individual members and citizens as well(North 1962). The more severe the crisis, the greater the stress, all other things being equal since stress is positively associated with the severity of the threat, shortness of time, and degree of surprise, all of which increase the felt need for decision and response(Raphael 1982).

Pakistan's post 9/11 crisis foreign policy decision-making process revealed that core values/objectives of the country were threatened by American officials, which augmented the psychological stress in decision makers. In a telephonic conversation, the U.S. Secretary of State Collin Powel questioned Pervez Musharraf either you are with us or against us. Similarly, on September 12, President Pervez Musharraf received a call from Wendy Chamberlain, the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan expressing the hope that Pakistan would come on board and extend all its

cooperation to the U.S. in bringing the perpetrators of the terrorist act to justice. President Pervez Musharraf recalled the psychological stress by commenting his anxieties that in case of any delay in the decision, it was apparent that Washington would attack on Pakistani territory and jeopardize the strategic assets(nuclear & missiles)(Ranjha 2016).

#### **IV. Crisis Management Process**

The crisis management process began at the t3 stage which includes the search for information, decisional forum, search for foreign policy alternatives and selection of foreign policy option from alternatives (Folkman 1984).

##### **1. Information Sources**

The primary step in coping process is search for information by decision makers about the threatening act, event or change. They may employ ordinary or special channels to probe and it might be modest or marginal, thorough, depending upon the level of stress(May 1975). Pakistan had employed both ordinary and special channels to acquire information about terror attacks and the future course of actions by the U.S. The then Director General of ISI Lt. General Mahmood Ahmad was happened to be in Washington for high-level talks. Prior to 9/11, he held top-level meetings in the White House, the Pentagon, the National Security Council, and with the head of the CIA George

Tenet, and Marc Grossman, the under-secretary of state for political affairs(Brecheer 2004).

However, the terror attacks abruptly transformed the entire politico-security milieu for Pakistan. The attacks by Al-Qaeda operatives triggered the crisis situation and it require steady analysis of emerging situation in the White House(Yamin 2014). Initially, Pakistan received information through the news in electronic media, however later special channels were employed to obtain future discourse of U.S. foreign policy towards South Asia in general and Pakistan in particular. In this regard, the then DG ISI and Pakistani ambassador to U.S. had played crucial role. General Mahmood held meetings with the deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage and the pentagon officials. After meeting he relayed the terse message to President Pervez Musharraf, and that the United States had made its mind to fight terrorism and it require fullest support from Pakistan including; the intelligence and logistic.

## 2. Decisional Forum

Richard Snyder argued that crisis situations lead to the closer integration of foreign policy-making group, the identification of values, and adaptive innovation(Snyder 1963). Crisis management also requires the creation or activation of a decisional forum. As with other aspects of information processing, changes in the intensity of crisis induce stress which affect the patterns of consultation, the search for and evaluation of alternatives, and the type and size of the decisional unit.

The researchers in foreign policy analysis introduced three major decision making patterns. Irving L. Janis introduced the groupthink in 1972. He argued that groupthink stands for an excessive form of consensus seeking among members of high prestige, tightly knit policy-making groups(Paul't Hart 1991). He noted that key decisions are often made in small groups often five to twelve members, in which there is a high degree of cohesion. The disagreement to group decision and consideration of alternatives often suppressed by the group cohesion. Secondly, the Governmental Politics Model (Bureaucratic Politics) argued that foreign policy decisions are being made by many actors rather than a unitary actor. The actors involved in foreign policy decision represent different governmental agencies and focus not on a single strategic issue but on many diverse problems as well(Zelikow 1999).

The rational actor model (RAM) often uses in the making of foreign policy decisions. It refers "to a matter of selecting among a set of given alternatives, each of which has a given set of consequences. The agent selects the alternative whose consequences are preferred in terms of the agent's utility function which ranks each set of consequences in order of preference. In an uncertain world, the decision analyst maximizes expected utility"(Zelikow 1999).

Contrastingly, the present study discover that Pakistan neither employ "RAM" nor the "Bureaucratic Model", because on the one end abandoning support for Taliban was not the preference of Islamabad whereas on the other hand, civilian bureaucracy was sidelined and the foreign policy decision was transferred to top military hierarchy. The insights about foreign policy decision confirmed that a group of five decision makers including the

President Pervez Musharraf, two anonymous military generals, foreign minister and foreign secretary were dealing the crisis situation(Hussain 2016).

On late evening of September 12, 2001 President Pervez Musharraf summoned the National Security Council (NSC) for a high level meeting at the army house Chaklala, Rawalpindi(Sattar 2016). The meeting was lasted about four hours and the decision makers evaluated the pros and cons of various foreign policy options. And finally the decision makers come up with the idea to support the United States in the war on terrorism(Haq 2016).

Freedom of expression and opinion bear significant impacts on vigilant decisions. The independent opinions enable decision makers to consider alternatives with higher utilities and assessment of pros and cons of every alternative. However, autocratic regimes restrict the expression of opinions in policy-making process because of their zeal to retain power for longer-term(Kinne 2005). Same is true with the President Pervez Musharraf. His ambition to remain in power derives him to cut ties with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and revive alliance with the U.S. In the NSC meeting he used extra constitutional powers to suppress the dissident opinions and retained the dominant position in decision making process(Sattar 2016).

### 3. Role of State Leader in Crisis Management

When a predominant leader has the command to make ultimate decisions for government and such leader's position is well known, those with differing points of view stop generally talking alternative positions

out of respect for the leader or fear of political reprisals. These leaders have been vastly called in the literature "Crusaders", "ideologues", "autocratic leaders", and "low self-monitors". Their dispositions are a source to guide them based on "inside looking outward" perspective on life and selectively use the incoming information to support their predispositions (Hermann 1989).

The foreign policy decisions are being made quickly in crisis situations under the military regimes because autocrats overwhelmingly control the corridors of power and interdict the involvement of civilian bureaucracy. The then Chief of Army Staff (COAS) and the Chief Executive (CE) later self-appointed President General Pervez Musharraf was in Karachi, when he was informed about the catastrophe in the U.S. In his opinion the brutalization in the U.S. equally brought opportunities and challenges for Pakistan. He promptly condemned the attacks and expressed utmost solidarity with America and employed various channels to garner information (Sattar 2016).

The president had played the ultimate role in filtering and evaluating the situation and its possible implications for Pakistan. The military leadership encountered in worst crisis after Kargil war, but this time threat was not posed by arch rival India, instead it came from the most allied ally the United States. So, the president and military high commanders were fully aware of vulnerabilities on western border connecting Pakistan with Afghanistan.

The decision-making process was worked under intense pressure after a change in the regional and global security dimensions. As, Janis and others have noted that key decisions are often taken in small groups in

which there is a high degree of cohesion(Zelikow 1999). The argument of Janis is applicable on Islamabad's post 9/11 foreign policy decision making process, where a close group of policy makers developed consensus for a change in the foreign policy. Lt. General Rashid Qureshi (Spokesperson for President Pervez Musharraf) in an interview with Dr. Danish during a television program (SawalYeh Hai) exposed that from 1999 to 2002 president Pervez Musharraf took every decision by himself first, and later consulted with his close aides from military and federal Cabinet(Qureshi 2009).

On September 13 and 14, President Pervez Musharraf presided National Security Council (NSC) and the corps commanders meeting. In the corps commander's meeting General Usmani argued that what America would offer in return to Pakistan. But Musharraf replied that it is a matter of principle and is inappropriate to ask for a reward, but he assured that America would understand the condition of Pakistan and would help us. Lt. General Aziz expressed his concerns that a change in foreign policy would bring a domestic fallout and his concerns were conveyed to Wendy Chamberlain by explaining that in such an eventuality Pakistan would expect the United States to understand such pressure and continue to support Pakistan(Frontline 2002).

#### 4. Role of ArmyGeneral Head Quarters and Military Intelligence

The military has been a formidable actor in shaping foreign relations since the coup of General Ayyub Khan in October 1958(Hassan 2009). The threat perception from eastern and western neighbors offered an

opportunity to the military to turn itself a guardian of the state borders. Similarly in the post 9/11 scenario, the decision makers gave primacy to security concerns in their external relations and sphere of the foreign policy decision making was transferred to a closed group of military top brass and foreign office bureaucrats(Haq 2016). Before taking a decision, generals from army headquarters exposed the military imbalance as compared to the U.S. because Pakistan had no indigenous resource base for military modernization and always seek external assistance. By keeping in mind its disparity and vulnerabilities, the military was fully aware that it is not rational choice to confront with the U.S. military might.

In the wake of new geopolitical environment, the assessment was made on military strengths and weaknesses. History of the country exposed that time and again Pakistan turned to regional and international powers (U.S. and China) to acquire military parity with regional rival India. However, its relationship with the U.S. repeatedly fell in a trap on a number of issues particularly; its so-called Islamic bomb and the U.S. retaliatory sanctions. Prior to the 9/11 attacks, military somehow maintained the regional balance of power by employing various strategies including the low-intensity war in the Indian occupied Kashmir. However, the events in Washington D.C. and the Pentagon made difficult for military to continue its old doctrine towards regional security. The Indo-U.S. strategic partnership imposed the threats to ongoing Pakistani strategy to seek strategic depth in Afghanistan and the low-intensity war in Indian occupied Kashmir(Frontline 2002).



To discuss emerging developments in international and regional security arena, on 14th September 2001, corps commanders were called by Pervez Musharraf in a nuclear bunker built near Islamabad, believing that their talk is safe from the risk of U.S. surveillance. Nine corps commanders and a dozen of other senior staff officers from the army General Headquarters (GHQ) were in attendance, including the chiefs of ISI and MI. Musharraf gave out a cogent exposition of why Pakistan had to join America in the war on terrorism that was supported by the UNSC, or expect to be declared a terrorist state, leading to economic sanctions. Most of his commanders supported his argument, but General Mahmood remain in sullen silence, however Lt. General Aziz lodged polite disagreement; General Mushtaq was entirely consistent and honorable in dissent: and the unfortunate Lt. General Jamshed Gulzar seemed to have lost his sanity and discovered his nonexistent gallantry to join the dissenters. The voice chief of army staff Lt. General Muzaffar Usmani also registered his impolite disagreement(Abbas 2015).

General Usmani argued that what Pakistan would get from America after abandoning the long-standing policy of supporting the Taliban. Musharraf replied that Pakistan should be supportive of the United States as a matter of principle, and any bargain for economic incentives would be inappropriate at a time when the United States is in a shock and anger mood(Frontline 2002). Lt. General Aziz, on the other hand, was of view that there will be a possibility of domestic backlash if Afghanistan would be attacked, to which Musharraf agreed, but he stressed that in case of any delay in agreeing to the U.S. terms, India would assist the United States. Thus, the Indian threat raised by President Pervez

Musharraf was sufficient for the Pakistani military commanders to agree with his opinion and it took them six hours to reach consensus.

Intelligence agencies (IAs) are tasked to acquire and evaluate relevant data. They are also obliged to prevent important information in wrong hands and counterintelligence. Therefore, the intelligence agencies claim that they are the country's "first line of defense". The ISI was established in 1948 under the GHQ and operates directly under the president, prime minister and the services chief(Durrani 2007). During military regimes, ISI had increased its profile in Pakistani security and foreign policy-making process and it repeated its practice in the post-September 11 period.

The then head of the ISI Lt. General Mahmood Ahmad had played a critical role in Pakistan's decision to bandwagon with the U.S demands. He was in Washington at the time of terror attacks(Jones 2002). On the following day, at 8.00 a.m. General Mahmood called upon Director Tenet, the Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and few other State Department officials. "Armitage sat beside himself with rage. He was not prepared to listen anything,(Nawaz 2008) and gave him no choice": "You are either 100 percent with us or 100 percent against us, there is no grey area"(Jones 2002).

General Mahmood began talking that in past his country had faced tough times but Pakistan is not a big or mighty power. Armitage cut in by saying that Pakistan is an important country and "the future begins today," Pass the words to General Musharraf with us or against us (Woodward 2002). As the Pakistani delegation was leaving after meeting, a U.S. official startled Mahmood by swearing that a discussion is going

on regarding the possible use of nuclear weapons on a target possibly in Afghanistan(Nawaz 2008). Mahmood reported somberly to Musharraf that Armitage had threatened to bomb Pakistan "back into the Stone Age" if they sided with the terrorists(Musharraf, 2006). Musharraf instructed him to assure the Americans that they would get what they wanted. At 3.00 p.m. Armitage held a second meeting with Mahmood and Lodhi and this time he handed over seven demands to Mahmood.

The next day on 13th September, Lt. General Mahmood along with Pakistan ambassador Lodhi again met with Richard Armitage. When Armitage inquired about Pakistani response, Mahmood stated that "all the demands are accepted to us"(Hussain 2007). Deputy Secretary surprisingly looked at him and stated that these are most powerful words, but the head of ISI replied that he knows the mind of the president and he is speaking on behalf of him(PBS 2002).

### 5. Role of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)

The post September 11, foreign policy making process was a top-down process in which MOFA was acting on guiding principles of president. The MOFA issued a routine condolence statement with an expression of grievance and sorrow for victims and their families and setup communication channels with Pakistan embassy in the U.S. for further information, but it only prepared briefing reports for the president. Foreign Secretary presided internal meetings for assessment of the attacks and implications for Pakistan. It is exposed in interviews with foreign office officials that from very beginning MOFA was ready to support the U.S. war on

terrorism(Khan 2016) because in their opinion it was clear and straight away scenario that a big disaster had happened and culprits should bring down to justice.

As far as foreign office role is concerned in decision making, eventhough the foreign minister and foreign secretary were present in the initial decision making meeting but they were restrained to express dissident opinions. On the contrary, to please dictator both individuals from the ministry immediately agreed on the analysis of President Pervez Musharraf and assured him for their fullest support. On September 13, 2001 foreign minister Abdul Sattar presided a high level meeting at foreign affairs office to review the emerging situation, and after meeting he responded to media questions by stating that Pakistan would avoid any direct confrontation with the United States, which exposed that the ministry had already acquiesced the decision made by the state leader

## **V. Consultation and Alternative Policy Options**

The inflow of information about a foreign policy crisis leads to consultation with colleagues in the political élite, military and bureaucratic advisors, and possibly others from various interest groups. Consultation may be ad hoc or institutional, frequent or infrequent, and may take place within a large or small circle.

However, in case of Pakistan the government began consultation process after adjustment in foreign policy of the country. The President Pervez Musharraf held several meetings to develop consensus for new foreign policy decision. On Wednesday the foreign minister Abdul Sattar

presided a meeting of senior officials in Islamabad and review the regional developments in the wake of terrorist attacks and its possible implications for the country(The News International 2001). On September 13th the then interior minister Lt. General ® MoinUd Din Haider Qureshi stated that Pakistan will evolve its strategy over the arising situation of a possible attack of U.S. forces in Afghanistan in a high-level meeting(The News International 2001). On 15 September, a joint meeting of National Security Council (NSC) and the Cabinet was convened by the President Pervez Musharraf to discuss emerging situation in the wake of terrorist attacks(The News International 2001).

After extensive discussions and thorough assessment of reports received from the DG ISI Lt. General Mahmood Ahmed and other sources, and emerging situation in regional and global politico-security environment, three alternatives were emerged for foreign policy decision(Sattar 2016).

1. Stay neutral in the war on terrorism.
2. Continue support to the Taliban and al-Qaeda.
3. Align with the U. S. against the war on terrorism.

All the three alternatives and their cost and benefits were evaluated from different perspectives in consecutive meetings of policy makers and were found that the first two alternatives are not rational in the context of new developments. If Islamabad remains neutral in the war against terrorism or continue support to Taliban and al-Qaeda it would face American antagonism and wrath, and might be Pakistani territory subject to American attack. As already discussed in the previous sections that America had informed Pakistan for grave repercussions for its non-involvement in the war on terrorism. Sources also revealed the America accused that terrorists

involved in attacks on the U.S. had allegedly received training in the tribal areas, which was solid excuse to attack on Pakistani territory(Yamin 2014). The rogue connections between the terrorists and Islamabad alarmed the ring bells of threat and it was not possible for Pakistan to restrain America to attack on its territory. However, the third policy option was most rational based on higher expected utilities, because Pakistan was in dire need of American military and economic assistance. And it was only possible after its involvement in the war against terrorism. Therefore, Pakistan chooses the third foreign policy alternative and became frontline ally against the war on terrorism.

## VI. Foreign Policy Choice

According to the "*Model of State Behavior in Crisis*" choice ensues at the t4 stage, which is the last stage in the foreign policy crisis management. After consultation and assessment, decision makers usually select the choice which might diffuse the foreign policy crisis. So is true in the present case, when President Pervez Musharraf announced the new foreign policy decision in a telecast address to nation on 19th September 2001 by accepting all the U.S. demands. Pakistan offered territorial access to the U.S. forces for logistic supplies, four airbases namely Shamsi, Dalbandin, Pasni and Jacobabad for launching airstrikes in Afghanistan, immediately cutoff diplomatic relations with the Taliban, shared intelligence information and captured major al-Qaeda figures including Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, the mastermind of September 11, 2001 attacks.

## **VII. Conclusion**

The catastrophe of barbaric attacks on the U.S. had altered the security structure at international and regional level. However, particularly Pakistan faced worst ever crisis for its foreign policy decision after the U.S. declaration to fight against terrorism. Washington pressured Pakistan to join the global coalition and American officials threaten Pakistan to bomb back into the Stone Age. The threat to basic values/objectives in perceived high probability of military hostilities and simultaneous time pressure increased the psychological stress in decision makers.

Subsequently, the decisional forum was set up under the command of President Pervez Musharraf, who established the special channels for information attainment and processing. After the assessment of policy options in hand, the restricted NSC reversed the foreign policy of the country and joined the U.S. hands to fight against terrorism. The transformation diffused the foreign policy crisis for Pakistan and paved the way for strategic partnership between Islamabad and Washington.

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## &lt;Abstract&gt;

**DYNAMICS OF PAKISTAN'S POST 9/11 CRISIS  
FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS**

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The study has applied the four stage "*Model of State Behavior in Crisis*" to trace the post 9/11 crisis foreign policy decision making process in Pakistan. It argues that ominous attacks on the United States by al-Qaeda and subsequent declaration of President Bush to fight against terrorism transformed the global and regional politico-security dimensions at t1 stage. Being a neighboring country, Pakistan's support was inevitable in the war on terror and Washington applied coercive diplomacy to win the cooperation from Islamabad. Consequently, in case of decline to accept American demands, Pakistan perceived threat to basic values/objectives of the country and simultaneous time pressure amplified the psychological stress in decision makers at t2 stage. Therefore, the decisional forum was setup at t3 stage and Pakistan decided to join the United States at t4 stage, which defused the foreign policy crisis.

**Key Words** : 9/11 Terror Attacks, Foreign Policy Crisis, State Behavior in Crisis, Pakistan's Foreign Policy Decision Making, U.S. War on Terror

**Annexure-I- Model of State Behavior in Crisis**

