Class versus Generation: An Empirical Test of Their Relative Importance in Political Orientation and Socio-Cultural Values*

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Abstract: This study is to empirically test the relative importance between class and generation in political orientations, social attitudes and cultural values. Recent social changes occurred in Korea, including the 1997 economic crisis and subsequent neoliberal reform, consolidation of political democracy and ideological freedom, and drastic expansion of information technologies into everyday life, all seem to have contributed to make the generation gap wider and class issues obsolete. Regression analyses of the data drawn from a national sample survey indeed reveal that class is no more a major determinant of virtually all aspects of our lives. Instead, generation turns out to be a more important variable in accounting for political orientations and behavior, attitudes toward work, gender role and marriage, and cultural tastes in Korea, while class is still a major factor for some personal and social issues. The prominence of the generation variable in these analyses seems to pose a serious challenge to the traditional class analysis.

Key words: class, generation, political orientation, social attitudes, cultural values

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I. Introduction

In his classic text on class, Albert Szymanski argues that "class is an extremely powerful force ··· determining virtually all aspects of our lives." He goes on to indicate that "family life, sexuality, friendship patterns, religious beliefs and practices as well as consumption and leisure patterns are strongly class-related" (Szymanski 1983: 354). Are these class effects valid in contemporary Korea? Is it still a significant variable in this globalized, postmodern, digitalized era?

A major argument of this paper is that, in these recent years, class distinction in many aspects of individual life in Korea becomes less prominent than other factors, especially, generational differences, due to the changes occurred during the last decade, such as the 1997 financial crisis and resultant neo-liberal reform, the emergence of progressive politics, and "the rise of the net generation" (Tapscott 1998). One of the most salient consequences of these changes is a reversal of roles between younger and older generations: older generations are losing their former status as a mainstay of family as well as of national economy; their role as a socializer of younger generations are also diminishing considerably, rather increasingly reverse socialization becomes a norm; their authority as a pace setter in the area of lifestyles and as a bearer of mainstream cultural values is being eroded rapidly. Indeed generational differences and conflicts have recently become a hot issue not only in the academia but also in politics and the media.

Thus, in one of my previous papers reviewing researches done on Korean middle class since 1990, I proposed a hypothesis that "in a rapidly changing society like Korea, generational differences tend to matter significantly in lifestyles, values and politics. Especially, generation gap in political ideology seems to have been more acute in this era of ideological freedom (or con-

fusion?)" (Yang 2003: 49). This paper is an attempt to empirically test that hypothesis, by investigating the relative importance between class and generation in individuals' political orientations, social attitudes and cultural values.

Ⅱ. Recent Social Change and Class and Generation Issues

One of the most far-reaching changes occurred in the recent Korean history is the 1997 economic crisis that has since exerted a profound impact on every aspect of Korean society. The crisis not only has accelerated globalization and propagation of its neoliberal ideology, but also called in the IMF for a bailout, which imposed a series of reform policies including liberalization of markets, corporate restructuring, and globalization of the national economy (Yang 2000).

One of the most immediate and visible consequences of the crisis and subsequent neoliberal reform on the class structure is the shrinkage of the middle class. The bankruptcy of many small businesses, the layoff of many managers and white-collar workers due to plant closing and downsizing, and loss or devaluation of their savings and other financial assets hit especially hard on the middle class (Koo 2003). On the other hand, the effect of the crisis was not even; the class structure tends to be polarized because "those with financial resources or other properties took advantage of the credit-scarce situation and came better off after the crisis was over, while many others had to suffer layoffs, bankruptcies and the like" (Koo 2003: 1).

Another important consequence of the crisis is the widening gap between generations in terms not only of economic situation but also of social and political attitudes. As a result of corporate restructuring which includes downsizing, outsourcing and using contingent workers, there are fewer job openings, especially for newcomers in the labor market. As labor statistics show, the un-

employment rate for the youth aged between 15 and 29 is more than twice that for the total labor force. It is also noteworthy that the National Statistical Office began to report youth unemployment rates from 1999 in its annual volume of social indicators. Not only national statistics but also surveys conducted after the economic crisis report gaps between socio-economic statuses and between generations; a survey reports that those who are in the higher socio-economic status and in the younger age groups tend to be more progressive in their opinions on various social issues and cultural values (Joongang Ilbo, Feb., 4, and Oct., 11, 2002).

A second major change occurred during the 1990s was in the political area. The last decade of the twentieth century witnessed consolidation of political democracy in Korea by electing a truly civilian president Kim Young Sam in 1992 and by transferring the political power horizontally to the leader of the opposition party Kim Dae Jung in 1998 who was an internationally known dissident fighting against authoritarian military regimes for many decades. The election of more populist and progressive president Rho Moo Hyun in 2002 has made political democratization no more an important issue, but economic and social democratization a hot issue.

Another important political development in this period is furthering of ideological freedom by the so-called "sunshine policy" toward the North Korea and by easing the cold-war mentality and the anti-communist sentiment. With substantial economic aids to the poverty-stricken North Korea and diplomatic efforts, the Kim Dae Jung government has succeeded to a certain extent to ease the tension between the two opposing Koreas and to establish a cooperative relationship between them, culminated in a summit meeting between the two heads of states in Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea, for the first time since the establishment of the two separate states in the Korean peninsula.

This political development has greatly changed the ideological climate in South Korea. The anti-communist sentiment has somewhat eased to accept some leftist ideas, and allowed far more ideological freedom than before, though some limits still remain. And these political and ideological changes have important implications on the political roles and ideological orientations of the major classes and on the seemingly increasing generational conflicts.

Especially telling is the two related but seemingly contradictory political trends found among the classes. On the one hand, the financial crisis and subsequent economic recess put economic recovery on the top priority, so that politics do not matter much in everyday life. On the other hand, people tend to blame bad government for the sudden economic downturn and become active in various social movements demanding political as well as social reform. Especially middle class women who are highly educated but largely deprived from the occupational world become an important source of social movements, since they are very much concerned with quality-of-life issues (Moon 1992). Also professionals and intellectuals, or "new class" have played active and liberal political roles more than other middle class members (Shin, Cho, & Cho 2003; Chung 2002).

These political and ideological conflicts are not simply between the major classes and between segments of the middle class, but seem to be more acute among different generations. For example, President Rho's election victory in 2002 was said to be made possible at least in part by mobilizing younger supporters using the Internet on the day of election. His supporters were only partly class-based, mostly from lower classes, but also drawn from younger "netizens"[1] and from the liberals. Two major parties in today's politics in Korea can be identified ideologically, the

1. Citizen who use, and are connected with, the Internet.

conservative opposition party and the progressive ruling party, as well as be regarded as representing different generations, the ruling party representing the so-called 386[2] and younger generations, and the opposition party the older generations.

A third major change witnessed during the last ten years is the drastic expansion of information and communications industries and extensive penetration of such information technologies (IT) as personal computers, mobile phones, satellite TVs, and the internet into the everyday lives of average Koreans. Statistics testify the remarkableness of the growth and spread of the IT industries. The share of the IT industries in GDP has grown from less than 10 percent before 1999 to about 15 percent in 2002. The IT industries' share in the total export is more remarkable: more than 30 percent of all exports are from them. By 2002 one every two Koreans owned a personal computer and three every four used a mobile phone. And two thirds of all Koreans used the Internet in 2003 (NSO).

But the distribution of information technologies among the population is neither uniform nor even. Statistics show that the rates of Internet use vary by such socio-economic factors as sex, age, education, income and occupation. The male, the younger, the more educated, the more income, tend to use more of the Internet. For example, while 94.8 percent for the younger population aged between 6-19 uses the Internet, it is 94.5 percent for the 20s, 80.7 percent for the 30s, 51.6 percent for the 40s, and 22.8 percent for the 50s (Dong-A Ilbo, Feb., 12, 2004). Others also argue for s digital divide or information inequality in Korea, by indicating statistically significant differences in perception, access, capability and use of information technology by sex, age, education and income (Yoo 2002). Among the factors age is most im-

2. The 386 generaion denotes those who were born in the 1960s, attended college in the 1980s, and were in their 30s in the 1990s.

portant for the digital divide according to the study. A survey conducted in 2000 shows that there is a clear rank-order among the age groups in terms of the proportion of those who enjoy computer-related leisure activities; while 46.4 percent of those aged between 15 and 19 use computer for their leisure activities, the proportions are 24.3 percent for the 20s, 8.8percent for the 30s, 4.9 percent for the 40s and only 1.7 percent for the 60s (Kim 2004: 211, Table 9-3).

From the above observation it seems to be clear that generational differences become more and more prominent in many aspects of modern life in this post-industrial, information age. Indeed, the issue of generation has recently become a hot topic in scholarly research as well as in the media and politics. The concept generation may be used in four different ways, that is, as a principle of kinship descent, as a cohort, as life stage, and as historical period, according to Kertzer (1983:126). But it is used here as a group of people born in a certain period of time sharing similar cultural and historical experiences and exhibiting similar consciousness, attitudes and behavioral patterns, following Park (2003A) who used the term "socio-historical generation." In this sense of the term, generational differences and conflicts tend to be more acute in a rapidly changing society than in a stable society. Thus it is usually the case that social change affects generational experience. But experiences shared by a generation can also lead to significant social change. In fact generational difference and social change are related with each other in the form of cyclical interaction (Park 2003 B).

Having undergone tremendous but compressed social change, Korean society has produced so many different generations, such as the war generation, the baby-boom generation, the April-19th generation, the June-3rd generation, the Yushin generation, the 386 generation, the X generation, the N generation and so on, depending on experiences of specific historical events and the pass-

ing of particular historical moments. These diverse generations all represent unique historical moments or cultural traits, but some are regarded more significant than others in terms of their social, political or cultural roles. For example, Ham (2002), Cho (2002) and Park (2002) focus on historical experiences and cultures of the baby-boom generation, the 386 generation and the N generation respectively

On the other hand, Kim (2004) differentiates three generations by their major life concerns: survival and maintenance of economic standing for those who were born between 1950 and 1964; production and labor for those who were born between 1965 and 1974; consumption and leisure for those who were born after 1974 (Kim 2004: 261).

Other studies try to show the existence of a particular generation by showing similar traits shared by a certain cohort. An example of this is the P generation which is roughly equivalent to the age group of 17-39. The initial "P" represents passion, potential power, participation and paradigm shift (Jeil Gihoek 2003).

But more systematic mapping of generations was done by Park (2003B) who identifies four different generations in contemporary Korea based on crucial historical events collectively experienced by those who were in their 10 to 25 years of age. The first one is those who were born before 1941 and experienced colonization and Korean war. The second generation is those who were born between 1940 and 1960, and the first stage of both industrialization and democratization was the most important historical events in their youth. The third generation is the 386 generation which refers to those who born in the 1960s and spent their college years in the 1980s. This generation is in a sense a transitory generation located between the early stages of economic growth and political democratization and their mature stages. This generation is unique not simply because they witnessed the

Kwangju Uprisings and Mass Massacre by the military regime in 1980 and shared the first spontaneous anti-American sentiment, but also because they displayed an unusual solidarity among the members and exerted significant social and political influence. The fourth generation is the youngest among the four generations, and consists of those who were born after 1970. This generation is called the post-ideology, information generation because its members do not care much about political or ideological matters and their lives center around information technology. They are children of economic affluence, consolidated democracy and information age.

From the above discussion one may have an impression that the rapid social change occurred recently in Korea has made the concept class obsolete and instead put the concept generation forward. But others may insist on the continuing importance of the class variable in the Korean context. The studies cited above provide only fragmentary evidence in regard to the issue of relative importance between the two variables. Thus we need a comprehensive study to deal with both concepts together in an empirical setting and to adjudicate the issue in a more definite way. My strategy here is to compare the effects of the two variables on individuals' political orientations and socio-cultural values by statistically analyzing a set of data drawn from a national survey.

Ⅲ. Data and Method of Analysis

Measurement of Variables

Two most important independent variables in this study are social class and generation. Identifying and classifying social classes basically follow Hong's procedure. His scheme of class classification use two criteria, the three level of control over socially valued resources such as power, wealth, prestige and education, and the sectoral differentiation into the organizational, the

entrepreneurial and the agricultural (Hong 1983). By intersecting the two criteria, Hong's scheme produces nine cells or classes, but since in the agricultural sector none controls high resources, there remain eight classes from the upper to the lower as seen in table 2. For our purpose we regroup the eight classes into 4, that is, upper middle, new middle, old middle, and the lower class including the working and the urban lower class. Farmers and rural lower classes are excluded in the analysis.

Table 1. Hong's Class Classification Scheme and Sample Distribution

Control level of socially	Sectoral differentiation		
valued resources	Organizational	Entrepreneurial	Agricultural
High	Upper-middle (4.3)	Upper	
Intermediate	New middle (27.3)	Old middle (21.3)	Farmers (7.6)
Low	Working (34.1)	Urban lower (5.2)	Rural lower (0.1)

Note: figures in parentheses are percentage distribution of the sample.

Another important variable is generation. Though there are many classification schemes of generation as seen in the previous section, we follow Park's four-generation scheme, because it is theoretically sound, comprehensive enough to cover all age groups, and sensitive to historical change. He identifies four generations, that is, those who were born before 1941, those who were born between 1941 and 1960, the 386 generation, and those who were born after 1970. We will sometimes call these generations the oldest generation, the early industrialization generation, the 386 generation and the youngest generation.

Four more independent variables are used in the analysis as control variables. They are respondents' gender, educational attainment, monthly family income, and father's educational attainment.

Dependent variables are of two sorts: various measures of po-

litical orientation and those of socio-cultural values. Political orientation consists of five indicators: political orientation (liberal versus conservative), attitudes toward North Korea, closeness to North Korea and the U. S. A., and voting behavior. On the other hand, six indicators are used to represent respondents' socio-cultural values. They are central life concern, concern with important social issues, attitudes toward work, gender role, and marriage, and most watched TV programs. Detailed descriptions of these variables are appeared in respective sections.

Data Collection

The data for this study were collected from the first Korean General Social Survey conducted on a sample of 1,315 during the period of July 1 through August 31, 2003. In this study, 867 cases are analyzed, excluding housewives, students and those who have never had jobs. The sample was selected randomly among the population aged over 18, based on the proportional probability sampling method. The interviews were conducted by a group of trained interviewers, mostly college students, who themselves filled out the questionnaire by asking questions to the respondents. Most of the questions in the questionnaire are closed-end questions and items.

Some of the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the sample are as follows. 56 percent of the sample is females and about half of the respondents are less than 40 years of age. 21.3 percent of the sample is in their 20s, 26.5 percent in their 30s, 23.3 percent in their 40s and 11.3 percent in their 50s. Exactly two third of the sample are currently married, while 23.7 percent are never married. 33.8 percent of the respondents have high-school education, and about 44 percent have at least some college education. This is contrasted with much lower educational level of their fathers. A majority of the respondents' fathers (40.3 percent) have less than middle school education, and only 12 per-

cent of them have at least some college education. Those respondents who had paid-job at the time of interview amount to 56.3 percent of the sample, while remaining 43.7 percent either did not work or engaged in unpaid family work. In terms of occupation, service and sales workers are the largest occupational category, representing 16.3 percent of the sample, followed by white-collar workers (11.8 percent), technicians and semi-professionals (9.2 percent), skilled and related workers (7.7 percent) and professionals (7.6 percent). The share of the category of law-makers and high-ranking administrators and managers in the sample is 7.1 percent, as is the skilled workers in agriculture and fishery. 24.3 percent of the respondents have the monthly family income in the range of 200 million won – 300 million won (Korean currency unit), and 20.6 percent in the income category of 100-200 million won, and 19.1 percent in the 300-400 million won range. In fact these three categories of family income ranging from 100 to 400 million won represent 64 percent of the sample. Another 13.2 percent earned less than 100 million won a month, while those respondents whose family income is more than 500 million won amount to 14.3 percent. About one third of the respondents reside in large cities and another one third in small cities. Most of the rest live in suburban areas near the large cities and only 8.2 percent of the sample residing in rural area.

Method of Analysis

In order to analyze the relationships between independent variables and dependent variables, such statistical methods as ordinary and logistic regression and factor analysis will be used, depending on the levels of measurement of variables and on the purpose of analysis. R^2s for regression equations will be compared between one for the equation without the variable, generation, and the other without class to decide which variable is more important in accounting for dependent variables. F-tests for

R^2s are also performed for the increment effects of either class or generation.

Ⅳ. Political Orientation

In order to find out relative effects of class and generation on the political orientations and behavior, three types of indicators, that is, political orientation, attitudes toward North Korea and the U. S. A., and voting behavior are drawn from the survey data.

The first indicator, political orientation, is to see whether respondents were politically conservative or liberal. In order to test statistical significance of the relationship between political orientation and the independent variables including class and generation, a multivariate regression analysis is carried out. In the regression analysis we include other independent variables, that is, gender, respondent's education, family income and respondent's father's education, to control for the effects of these variables on the relationships between political orientation on the one hand, and class and generation on the other. In order to decide relative importance between class and generation, we perform two more regression analyses, one with all the variables except for generation, the other with all but class variable.

Table 2 reports the results of the three sets of regression analyses. First, when all variables are included, no variable appears to be significantly related with political orientation at the .05 significance level. The results of the two other regression analyses are essentially same in this regard. When coefficients of determination (R^2) for the regression equations are compared, the one without class is greater (.051) than that without generation (.040), meaning that generation contributes more to the political orientation than class does. F-test[3] for the increment in the R^2 for adding the generation variable to the equation including the class

variable turns out that it is not statistically significant. (F = 2.793, $d.f.$ = 3 & 619).

A second set of variables to tap the political orientation of the middle class includes attitudes toward North Korea, and closeness to North Korea and to the U. S. A. Since there recently appeared some signs of conciliation between the communist North Korea and the liberal South Korea due primarily to the South Korean government's "sunshine policy" toward North Korea, South Korean people's anti-communist sentiments and attitudes toward the "main enemy" North Korea and toward the most important ally the U. S. A. have been changing. Once almost uniform ideologically, South Korean people are now enjoying ideological freedom more than ever, and divided into different ideologies, which is reflected in their attitudes toward North Korea. More than three fifth of the respondents want to support or cooperate with North Korea, while remaining two fifth are against it.

Logistic multiple regression analyses were performed by collapsing the categories of the dependent variable into two, one combining the answers, (1) to support and (2) to cooperate with, and the other putting together (3) to guard against and (4) to fight against. Results of the analyses also reveal no statistically significant relationship between attitudes toward North Korea and independent variables (Table 3). But again generation turns out to be more important variable than class as seen in the comparison of R-squares between the regression equation without the generation variable (R^2 = .015) and that without the class variable (R^2 = .020). (But the F-ratio for the effect of the R^2 increment by the generation variable turns out to be not statistically significant: F = 1.072, $d.f.$ = 3 & 402). Indeed, younger generations

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3. This iscalculate using the equation $F = \frac{(R^2y_{123} - R^2y_{12})/(k_1 - k_2)}{(1 - R^2y_{123})/(N - K_1 - 1)}$ where k_1, k_2 = numbers of independent variables, N = number of cases.

are more supportive to North Korea than older generations; about two thirds of the members of the generation born after 1970 want to support or to cooperate with North Korea, followed by the 386 generation (62%), the generation born between 1941-1960 (52.2%) and the oldest generation (48.6%). More than half of the oldest people among the four generations still regard North Korea as an enemy either to guard against or to fight against. Chi-square test for the relationship between attitudes toward North Korea and generation turns out to be significant at the .01 level.

To measure closeness to other countries, the initial question includes five countries, the U. S. A., Japan, North Korea, China, and Russia. Respondents were asked to choose one of these five countries they felt closest to. About half of the respondents choose the U. S. A. as the closest country, followed by North Korea (30%), Japan (10%), China (9.7%). Less than one percent chooses Russia as the closest. Among the five countries we take only North Korea and the U. S. A. for further analysis.

To control for the effects of other independent variables, logistic regression analyses were carried out for North Korea versus all other countries, and for the U. S. A. versus all others. Among the independent variables, only the generation dummy variable 3 (those who were born between 1941 and 1960) turns out to be statistically significantly related with closeness to North Korea at the .10 level (Table 4). Comparison of R^2s between that for the regression without generation (.026) and that without class (.038) reveals the generation variable is more important in predicting closeness to North Korea than the class variable. (However, the F-ratio for the increment effect of the generation variable is not statistically significant ($F = 2.777$, $d.f. = 3, 543$). In fact, more members of younger generation feel close to North Korea than older generations: 35.7 percent for the youngest generation, 30.7 percent for the 386 generation, 22.5 percent for the generation born between 1941 and 1960, and 19.7 percent for the

oldest generation.

Similar to the results for North Korea, logistic regression analyses show that the generation variable is the only significant variable to be related with closeness to the U. S. A. The dummy variable, generation born after 1970 is significantly related with the dependent variable after controlling for the effects of all other variables at the .005 level (Table 5). Again comparison of R^2s reveal that generation is more important variable than class in explaining variance in closeness to the U. S. A. (.050 versus .016). (But the F-test for the increment in R^2 by the generation variable is not statistically significant: $F = 6.896$, $d.f. = 3$ and 543). Comparison of the proportions of generations choosing the U. S. A. as the closest country is more revealing. 71.1 percent of the generation born before 1941 chooses the U. S. A. as the closest, in contrast to only 31.8 percent for the youngest generation. The proportion for the 386 generation is 47.7 percent and that for the generation born between 1941 and 1960 is 61.4 percent. So, there is a clear pattern; the older the closer to the U. S. A.

A final indicator of political orientation is voting behavior, which is measured by whether respondents voted in the last presidential election (December, 2002) or not. 84.7 percent of the respondents voted, while 15.3 percent did not.

Logistic regression analyses reveal that the dummy variables of the new middle class and the youngest generation, respondent's gender and father's education are significantly related with voter turnout at the .10 level (Table 6). But comparison of R^2 for the equation without the generation variable (.037) and that for the equation without the class variable (.047) testifies that the generation variable is more important than the class variable in terms of its effects on voter turnout. Voter turn out rates are lowest in the youngest generation (65.6%), followed by the 386 generation (85.9%), and those who were born between 1941 and 1960 (92.6%). But the F-ratio for the increment effect of the generation

variable is not significant: $F = 105.714$, $d.f. = 3$ and 674.

The above regression analyses do not provide any definite conclusion on the relative importance of class and generation in accounting for political orientation. But they seem to clearly indicate the diminishing power of the class variable and the rising influence of the generation variable in the area of political attitudes and behavior. Recent trends of globalization, post-modernization and advancement of information technology seem to have notable effects on traditional class politics in Korea.

Table 2. Regression Analysis for the Effects of Social Class and Background Variables on Political Orientation

	All variables			less generation			less class		
Variable	*b*	*β*	*p*	*b*	*β*	*p*	*b*	*β*	*p*
U-middle	.172	.036	.415	.131	.028	.532			
N-middle	.004	.019	.731	.005	.024	.661			
O-middle	-.001	-.006	.894	-.005	-.021	.645			
Gen-71	.379	.172	.074				.357	.162	.089
Gen-6170	.105	.048	.609				.007	.034	.706
Gen-4160	.105	.045	.589				.008	.038	.644
Male	.009	.048	.237	.007	.036	.365	.101	.048	.230
Education	.005	.072	.252	.008	.114	.048	.006	.088	.117
Income	-.003	-.046	.308	-.003	-.047	.292	-.003	-.042	.349
F-edu	.005	.075	.117	.007	.099	.035	.005	.078	.100
a	2.482		.000	2.551		.000	2.463		.000
	$R^2 = .053$, $n = 630$			$R^2 = .040$, $n = 633$			$R^2 = .051$, $n = 633$		

Note: 1. Variables: U-middle=upper middle class, N-middle=New middle class, O-middle=Old middle class, Gen-71=Generation born after 1970, Gen-6170=Generation born between 1961 and 1971, Gen-4160=Generation born between 1941 and 1961, Male=Respondent's sex, Education=Respondent's educational attainment, Income=Respondent's family income, F-edu=Respondent's father's educational attainment

2. b=regression coefficient, β=standardized regression coefficient, p=probability

Table 3. Logistic Regression Analysis for the Effects of Social Class and Background Variables on Attitude toward North Korea

	All variables			less generation			less class		
Variable	*b*	*SE*	*p*	*b*	*SE*	*p*	*b*	*SE*	*p*
U-middle	-.230	.522	.659	-.221	.510	.665			
N-middle	-.190	.309	.540	-.214	.306	.486			
O-middle	.011	.285	.969	.090	.277	.747			
Gen-71	-.336	.535	.529				-.284	.526	.590
Gen-6170	.129	.513	.802				.206	.498	.679
Gen-4160	-.156	.475	.743				-.116	.470	.805
Male	-.265	.215	.217	-.230	.211	.277	-.257	.213	.228
Education	-.072	.125	.566	-.075	.108	.489	-.113	.112	.313
Income	.071	.097	.460	.066	.095	.492	.063	.095	.504
F-edu	-.029	.087	.743	-.047	.086	.584	-.032	.086	.712
a	-.113	.425	.791	-.182	.338	.590	-.072	.421	.864
	R^2=.023, n=413			R^2=.015, n=405			R^2=.021, n=405		

Table 4. Logistic Regression Analysis for the Effects of Social Class and Background Variables on Closeness to North Korea

	All variables			less generation			less class		
Variable	*b*	*SE*	*p*	*b*	*SE*	*p*	*b*	*SE*	*p*
U-middle	-.930	.823	.259	-1.043	.813	.199			
N-middle	-.259	.366	.480	-.258	.364	.479			
O-middle	-.382	.393	.331	-.539	.384	.160			
Gen-71	-.038	.639	.953				.036	.629	.955
Gen-6170	-.514	.626	.411				-.473	.609	.437
Gen-4160	-1.175	.620	.058				-1.184	.616	.055
Male	-.389	.278	.162	-.519	.274	.058	-.388	.275	.158
Education	.198	.164	.225	.276	.143	.053	.146	.147	.322
Inco me	.026	.120	.830	-.007	.118	.954	-.001	.118	.992
F-edu	.065	.109	.554	.096	.105	.363	.051	.108	.636
a	-2.029	.495	.000	-2.566	.448	.000	-1.977	.489	.000
	R^2= .041, n=554			R^2= .026, n=405			R^2= .038, n=405		

Table 5. Logistic Regression Analysis for the Effects of Social Class and Background Variables on Closeness to the U. S. A.

	All variables			less generation			less class		
Variable	*b*	*SE*	*p*	*b*	*SE*	*p*	*b*	*SE*	*p*
U-middle	-.528	.481	.272	-.225	.460	.625			
N-middle	-.082	.259	.753	-.047	.253	.852			
O-middle	-.007	.243	.976	.100	.236	.672			
Gen-71	-1.212	.433	.005				-1.143	.428	.008
Gen-6170	-.659	.411	.109				.583	.402	.147
Gen-4160	-.009	.375	.981				.026	.371	.944
Male	-.031	.186	.866	.179	.180	.318	.017	.185	.926
Education	.045	.106	.674	-.143	.091	.118	.017	.095	.855
Income	.050	.082	.540	.046	.078	.559	.037	.080	.644
F-edu	-.002	.075	.983	-.051	.073	.479	-.009	.075	.909
a	.350	.334	.295	.353	.270	.191	.394	.330	.233
	R^2 = .052, n = 554			R^2 = .016, n = 546			R^2 = .050, n = 546		

Table 6. Logistic Regression Analysis for the Effects of Social Class and Background Variables on Vote in the Presidential Election

	All variables			less generation			less class		
Variable	*b*	*SE*	*p*	*b*	*SE*	*p*	*b*	*SE*	*p*
U-middle	1.192	.682	.081	1.343	.672	.046			
N-middle	.722	.312	.020	.719	.310	.020			
O-middle	.170	.289	.557	.303	.284	.286			
Gen-71	-1.017	.553	.066				-1.149	.551	.037
Gen-6170	-.331	.540	.541				-.540	.532	.310
Gen-4160	.194	.516	.707				.088	.513	.864
Male	.599	.225	.008	.684	.221	.002	.543	.221	.014
Education	-.054	.131	.681	-.226	.113	.046	.094	.116	.420
Income	.120	.096	.212	.129	.094	.173	.146	.094	.119
F-edu	-.148	.089	.095	-.184	.086	.032	-.132	.087	.132
a	1.573	.441	.000	1.658	.335	.000	1.430	.436	.001
	R^2 = .057, n = 685			R^2 = .037, n = 685			R^2 = .047, n = 685		

Ⅴ. Socio-Cultural Values and Tastes

This section is devoted to investigating the relative effects of class and generation on socio-cultural values and tastes. For this purpose six sets of variables are chosen: central life concern, concern with important social issues, attitudes toward work, gender role and marriage, and most watched TV programs.

The first item to look at is central life concern. Respondents were asked to rate in a scale of four grades the importance of each of the 10 items: family, friends, neighbor, work, leisure time, money, power, educational attainment, health and religion. More than 90 percent of the sample regards family and health most important, followed by work (71.4%), money (65.1%) and friends (55.6%). Power is the least important among the ten items (18.6%), and religion (18.8%) and educational attainment (23.2 percent) follow power in terms of the least importance.

A principal component factor analysis extracted two components from these ten items: one consisting of six items, that is, family, friends, neighbor, work, leisure time and health; the other comprising three items, money, power and educational attainment. We call the first component the intrinsic concern variable and the second, the instrumental concern variable. Religion is left out in this analysis.

Regression analyses are carried out on each of these two life concern variables to determine the effects of independent variables on central life concern. In a regression analysis including all the independent variables and the intrinsic concern variable, the old middle class dummy variable, the 386 generation dummy variable, the generation born between 1941 and 1970, and the respondent's educational attainment among the independent variables are significantly related with the dependent variable at the .10 level (Table 7). Thus both class and generation turn out to be

significant in this analysis. But comparison of R^2s reveals that class is more important variable than generation in accounting for intrinsic life concern (.023 versus .016).

For the instrumental concern the old middle class dummy variable and gender turn out to be significant at the .05 level (Table 8). Other independent variables including the generation dummy variables are not statistically significant. The R^2 comparison between the equation without generation and that without class also confirm the relative importance of class variable as compared to the generation variable. R^2 for the former is .035 and that for the latter is .028. Chi-square tests reveal that only neighbor, work and leisure among the ten items are strongly related with class. In general, the upper middle class regards neighbor least important among the four classes, and the old middle class the most important. In terms of work, the old middle class think it important more than any other class, while the lower class the least. Again the lower class regards leisure the least important among the four classes, and the new middle class the most important.

Respondents were also asked how much they are concerned with some of the important social issues. The question is "Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on the following ten items?" The ten items are (1) improving and protecting the environment, (2) improving and protecting the nation's health, (3) solving the problems of the big cities, (4) halting the rising crime rate, (5) improving the nation's education system, (6) the military, armaments and defense, (7) welfare, (8) mass transportation, (9) parks and recreation, (10) assistance to children.

A factor analysis extracts one component comprising nine items excluding only one, the military, armaments and defense. Regression analyses on the new composite variable reveal that only respondent's education is significantly related with the new composite variable, the important social issues. A slight difference

in the values of R^2 between that for the regression equation without generation (.082) and that for the equation without class (.078) indicates that the class variable is a little more important than the generation variable in accounting for concerns with important social issues. But the difference is so small that no significant conclusion can be drawn in regard to their relative importance (Table 9).

The variable, attitudes toward work, is measured by asking the respondent whether he or she (1) strongly agrees, (2) agrees, (3) neither agrees nor disagrees, (4) disagrees, or (5) strongly disagrees on the statement, "a job is just a way of earning money – no more." Regression analyses for the relationships between attitudes toward work and the independent variables indicate that all the generation dummy variables and the upper middle class dummy variable, and gender are significantly related with attitudes toward work (Table 10). In terms of the coefficient of determination (R^2), about 10 percent of the variance in the dependent variable is explained by all the independent variables. Without generation R^2 reduces to .087, and without class to .094, which means that generation contributes more to the explanation of attitudes toward work than class does. But the test of increment in R^2 by generation turns out to be not statistically significant. (F = 3.208, $d.f.$ = 3 and 667, p > .05). But there is a clear difference among the generations in attitudes toward work. The younger generations disagree most among the four generations on the instrumental view of work, while the oldest generation agrees on the view most.

Attitudes toward gender role are measured by asking respondents to indicate their answer to the four statements in an agreement-disagreement scale same as the one used in attitude toward work. A principal component factor analysis extract one component comprising two items; (1) a man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family; (2) it is

not good if the man stays at home and cares for the children and the woman goes out to work. So, only these two items among the initial four are analyzed here.

Among the independent variables, generation, gender and respondent's educational attainment appear to be significant in accounting for attitudes toward gender role according to regression analyses. The class variable turns out to be insignificant for attitudes toward gender role (Table 11). It is quite understandable that respondent's gender is sensitive to gender role difference. Generational differences in this regard seem to indicate changing values in gender roles; older generations still keep traditional values on gender role, whereas values of younger generations differ considerably from those of the older generations. Also generation turns out to be more important factor than class in accounting for attitudes toward gender role, as indicated by comparison of R^2s between that for the equation without generation (.129) and that without class (.172). F-ratio for the increment in R^2 by generation turns out to be significant at the .05 level ($F = 13.25$, $d.f. = 3$ & 664, $p < .05$). In fact, the youngest generation is most open-minded among the four generations in terms of gender role, while the oldest generation the most conservative.

Nine statements are used to construct a scale for measuring attitudes toward marriage. The nine items tend to gather together into two groups, one including the first five items, and the other the remaining four items. In general the first group emphasizes the necessity of marriage in life, while the second one argues that marriage is only an option in life. Thus we call the first the necessity of marriage variable, the second the option of marriage variable. Indeed a factor analysis extracts these same composite variables from the nine items.

Class is not a significant factor for attitudes toward marriage according to multiple regression analyses including the six independent variables. Instead the three generation dummy varia-

bles, gender, education and father's education turn out to be significant factors for the necessity of marriage factor at the .10 significance level (Table 12). R^2 comparison produces the same result; R^2 for the regression without generation is .162 while that for the regression without class is .213. F test for the increment of the generation variable also shows the statistical significance of contribution of the generation variable to overall R^2 for the equation including all independent variables ($F = 14.54$, $d.f. = 3$ and 645, $p < .05$).

For the option of marriage factor, the upper middle class dummy variable, the youngest generation dummy variable, the 386 generation dummy variable are revealed to be significant factors (Table 13). Again generation seems to be more important factor than class in accounting for the option of marriage variable. R^2 comparison proves this difference in relative importance between the two variables; the two R^2s are .036 and .088 for the equation without generation and that without class respectively. F ratio for the increment of the generation variable turns out to be significant at the .01 level ($F = 13.38$, $d.f. = 3$ and 650, $p < .05$). In general, older generations tend to agree with the necessity of marriage despite of its possible problems, whereas younger generations tend to regard marriage as an option.

Finally, in order to tap cultural tastes of the respondents we asked what kind of program they watch most on TV. The programs are grouped into six categories: (1) news and current events, (2) drama, (3) entertainment, (4) educational and documentary, (5) sports, (6) others.

For the regression analyses to test the effect of each independent variable after controlling for the effects of other independent variables, the six categories of TV programs are combined into two groups, one including news and current events, and education and documentary, the other including drama, en-

tertainment and sports. Logistic regression analyses reveal that the youngest generation dummy variable, gender, education and income significantly relate with the dependent variable (Table 14). Again generation seems to be more important than class in explaining cultural tastes. R^2 comparison (.107 versus .142) and F test for the increment in R^2 by generation also testify this conclusion ($F = 10.625$, $d.f. = 3$ & 665, $p < .05$). In fact, a majority of the youngest generation watches popular culture and entertainment programs, while majority of other older generations tends to watch news and current events. Educational and documentary programs are watched most by the 386 generation, and entertainment programs by the youngest generation.

These results of statistical analyses regarding the relationship between socio-cultural values and tastes on the one hand and the two independent variables on the other after controlling for four control variables may be summarized as follows. Class seems to be more important factor than generation for central life concern and important social issues, but generation turns out to be more important for other values and tastes. Thus, unlike political orientation, the data produced a mixed result regarding the relative importance of class and generation; we can not conclude that either class or generation is more important in accounting for socio-cultural values and states. Rather their relative importance differs depending on the issue at hand. Still generation seems to be gaining ground more and more.

Table 7. Regression Analysis for the Effects of Social Class and Background Variables on Central Life Concern (factor 1)

	All variables			less generation			less class		
Variable	*b*	*β*	*p*	*b*	*β*	*p*	*b*	*β*	*p*
U-middle	.000	.003	.952	-.000	-.003	.938			
N-middle	.002	.021	.687	.001	.017	.743			
O-middle	.008	.125	.006	.009	.133	.003			
Gen-71	.009	.145	.109				.103	.159	.077
Gen-6170	.101	.155	.073				.125	.193	.024
Gen-4160	.103	.148	.050				.120	.174	.022
Male	.000	.010	.795	.001	.014	.723	.000	.007	.865
Education	-.002	-.113	.074	-.001	-.084	.137	-.002	-.116	.040
Income	.001	.051	.258	.001	.065	.142	.001	.062	.161
F-edu	.000	.022	.631	.000	.025	.581	.000	.024	.612
a	3.505		.000	3.561		.000	3.509		.000
	R^2 = .029, n = 674			R^2 = .023, n = 677			R^2 = .016, n = 677		

Note: Factor 1 includes (1) family, (2) friends, (3) neighbor, (4) work, (5) leisure time, (9) health

Table 8. Regression Analysis for the Effects of Social Class and Background Variables on Central Life Concern (factor 2)

	All variables			less generation			less class		
Variable	*b*	*β*	*p*	*b*	*β*	*p*	*b*	*β*	*p*
U-middle	.002	.010	.815	.001	.006	.894			
N-middle	.108	.090	.088	.110	.092	.080			
O-middle	.150	.113	.012	.136	.102	.021			
Gen-71	.005	.046	.609				.006	.053	.554
Gen-6170	-.001	-.016	.853				.000	.003	.974
Gen-4160	-.003	-.028	.711				-.001	-.012	.871
Male	-.164	-.146	.000	-.174	-.155	.000	-.174	-.155	.000
Education	-.001	-.031	.623	-.000	-.010	.858	.000	.003	.957
Income	.000	.000	.991	-.000	-.005	.909	.000	.016	.718
F-edu	-.001	-.043	.362	-.001	.031	-.001	-.042	.374	
a	3.149		.000	3.131		.000	3.141		.000
	R^2 = .039, n = 670			R^2 = .035, n = 673			R^2 = .028, n = 673		

Note: Factor 2 includes (6) money, (7) power, (8) educational attainment.

Table 9. Regression Analysis for the Effects of Social Class and Background Variables on Important Social Issues (factor)

	All variables			less generation			less class		
Variable	*b*	*β*	*p*	*b*	*β*	*p*	*b*	*β*	*p*
U-middle	-.244	-.055	.239	-.0199	-.045	.333			
N-middle	.126	.062	.288	.137	.067	.245			
O-middle	.005	.025	.609	.006	.026	.583			
Gen-71	-.219	-.106	.278				-.185	-.089	.355
Gen-6170	-.194	-.093	.319				-.170	-.082	.376
Gen-4160	-.006	-.028	.732				-.004	-.021	.792
Male	-.003	-.019	.659	-.002	-.010	.819	-.005	-.026	.537
Education	-.173	-.247	.000	-.204	-.290	.000	-.162	-.231	.000
Income	-.002	-.027	.576	-.002	-.031	.513	-.002	-.028	.548
F-edu	-.001	-.029	.569	.001	.018	.710	.001	.028	.582
a	.740		.000	.697		.000	.753		.000
	R^2 = .086, n = 556			R^2 = .082, n = 561			R^2 = .078, n = 561		

Note: This factor includes all categories but (6) the military, armaments and defense.

Table 10. Regression Analysis for the Effects of Social Class and Background Variables on Attitude toward Work

	All variables			less generation			less class		
Variable	*b*	*β*	*p*	*b*	*β*	*p*	*b*	*β*	*p*
U-middle	-.409	-.076	.072	-.477	-.088	.035			
N-middle	-.193	-.077	.131	-.226	-.090	.077			
O-middle	-.003	-.014	.753	.001	.004	.921			
Gen-71	.468	.187	.032				.526	.210	.015
Gen-6170	.624	.250	.003				.698	.280	.001
Gen-4160	.508	.192	.009				.547	.207	.004
Male	.004	.018	.647	.005	.022	.566	.004	.019	.615
Education	-.175	-.212	.001	-.131	-.158	.004	-.219	-.264	.000
Income	-.006	-.068	.118	-.004	-.044	.302	-.007	-.082	.055
F-edu	-.004	-.052	.252	-.004	-.052	.242	-.004	-.057	.202
a	3.630		.000	3.902		.000	3.680		.000
	R^2 = .100, n = 678			R^2 = .087, n = 681			R^2 = .094, n = 681.		

Table 11. Regression Analysis for the Effects of Social Class and Background Variables on Attitude toward Gender Role (factor)

	All variables			less generation			less class		
Variable	b	β	p	b	β	p	b	β	p
U-middle	.379	.083	.040	.227	.049	.226			
N-middle	.000	.000	.996	-.002	-.012	.812			
O-middle	.004	.021	.618	.003	.014	.736			
Gen-71	1.062	.500	.000				1.020	.481	.000
Gen-6170	.807	.380	.000				.778	.366	.000
Gen-4160	.594	.265	.000				.580	.259	.000
Male	-.436	-.219	.000	-.482	-.242	.000	-.429	-.215	.000
Education	.113	.160	.007	.224	.317	.000	.123	.174	.001
Income	-.000	-.009	.825	.001	.010	.802	.000	.002	.954
F-edu	-.004	-.063	.142	-.001	-.023	.597	-.003	-.056	.192
a	2.138		.000	2.479		.000	2.119		.000
	R^2 = .178, n = 675			R^2 = .129, n = 678			R^2 = .172, n = 678		

Table 12. Regression Analysis for the Effects of Social Class and Background Variables on Attitude toward Marriage (factor 1)

	All variables			less generation			less class		
Variable	b	β	p	b	β	p	b	β	p
U-middle	-.009	-.030	.452	.001	.005	.911			
N-middle	-.004	-.034	.479	-.002	-.020	.686			
O-middle	-.006	-.042	.302	-.004	-.027	.522			
Gen-71	-.622	-.433	.000				-.617	-.429	.000
Gen-6170	-.407	-.284	.000				-.409	-.285	.000
Gen-4160	-.199	-.130	.056				-.204	-.133	.048
Male	.150	.111	.002	.198	.147	.000	.152	.113	.002
Education	-.004	-.103	.077	-.128	-.267	.000	-.005	-.121	.021
Income	-.000	-.015	.716	-.001	-.020	.631	-.001	-.024	.558
F-edu	-.005	-.109	.011	-.007	-.155	.000	-.005	-.111	.009
a	3.803		.000	3.681		.000	3.811		.000
	R^2 = .215, n = 656			R^2 = .162, n = 659			R^2 = .213, n = 659		

Note: Factor 1 includes (1) happiness, (2) financial security, (3) to have children, (4) bad marriage, (5) to want children.

Happiness: Married people are generally happier than unmarried people.
Financial security: The main advantage of marriage is that it gives financial security.
To have children: The main purpose of marriage these days is to have children.
Bad marriage: It is better to have a bad marriage than no marriage at all.
To want children: People who want children ought to get married.

Table 13. Regression Analysis for the Effects of Social Class and Background Variables on Attitude toward Marriage (factor 2)

	All variables			less generation			less class		
Variable	*b*	*β*	*p*	*b*	*β*	*p*	*b*	*β*	*p*
U-middle	.260	.073	.088	.141	.040	.361			
N-middle	.000	.000	1.000	-.001	-.007	.891			
O-middle	-.000	-.001	.982	-.003	-.018	.682			
Gen-71	.709	.428	.000				.676	.408	.000
Gen-6170	.423	.255	.002				.392	.236	.004
Gen-4160	.192	.109	.134				.175	.100	.167
Male	-.002	-.015	.705	-.008	-.053	.181	-.001	-.011	.777
Education	-.003	-.065	.299	.005	.098	.087	-.002	-.051	.369
Income	-.001	-.018	.675	-.001	-.016	.718	-.000	-.010	.824
F-edu	.002	.062	.174	.005	.111	.017	.003	.069	.132
a	2.491		.000	2.608		.000	2.475		.000
	$R^2 = .093,\ n = 661$			$R^2 = .036,\ n = 664$			$R^2 = .088,\ n = 664$		

Note: Factor 2 includes (6) one parent, (7) cohabitation, (8) pre-marriage, (9) divorce.
One parent: One parent can bring up a child as well as two parents together.
Cohabitation: It is all right for a couple to live together without intending to get married.
Pre-marriage: It's a good idea for a couple who intend to get married to live together first.
Divorce: Divorce is usually the best solution when a couple can't seem to work out their marriage problems.

Table 14. Logistic Regression Analysis for the Effects of Social Class and Background Variables on Most Watched TV Programs

	All variables			less generation			less class		
Variable	*b*	*β*	*p*	*b*	*β*	*p*	*b*	*β*	*p*
U-middle	-.319	.053	.527	-.478	.481	.320			
N-middle	.184	.251	.464	.180	.244	.462			
O-middle	-.347	.238	.146	-.497	.232	.032			
Gen-71	1.009	.426	.018				.997	.422	.018
Gen-6170	.201	.406	.620				.096	.396	.808
Gen-4160	-.426	.375	.256				-.498	.370	.178
Male	-1.111	.176	.000	-1.200	.172	.000	-1.117	.175	.000
Education	-.203	.104	.050	-.027	.089	.760	-.172	.093	.064
Income	-.141	.079	.075	-.161	.076	.033	-.148	.077	.056
F-edu	.004	.073	.955	.065	.069	.352	-.003	.072	.970
a	1.040	.333	.002	.805	.265	.002	.999	.328	.002
	R^2 = .148, n = 676			R^2 = .107, n = 681			R^2 = .142, n = 681		

Note: TV programs are classified into two; one includes (1) news and current events (4) education and documentary, the other (2) drama, (3) entertainment, and (5) sports.

Ⅵ. Summary and Discussion

Findings from the above analyses can be summarized as follows (See the summary table 15).

In general, Korean people's political orientation seems to have been changing toward a more liberal side, as measured by such indicators as political inclination (conservative versus liberal), attitude toward North Korea, Closeness to North Korea and the U. S. A., and voting behavior. Among the independent variables, the generation variable seems to be more strongly related with political orientation than the class variable does. In fact, multiple regression analyses consistently show that generation is more important than class in accounting for political orientation in general, as seen in the comparisons of R^2s for regression equations

with or without class and generation, though the F-tests for increment in R^2 by generation turn out statistically not significant.

In terms of socio-cultural attitudes and values, Koreans seem to have more intrinsic than instrumental concerns, and more postmaterial than material values. And these concerns and values differ according to one's class position. Indeed class turns out to be a more important determinant than generation, though F-tests fail to statistically confirm this.

Similar to liberal political orientation, Koreans show more liberal attitudes toward work, gender role and marriage. Generation turns out to be strongly related with these attitudes, while class does not. Younger generations have more liberal attitudes toward these items than older generations.

Finally, cultural tastes measured by the most-watched TV programs are also strongly generation-related. A comparison of R^2 s between the regression equations, and F ratio for the increment by generation, all confirm that generation is more important factor for cultural tastes than class.

What are the implications of these findings in terms of the hypothesis posed at the outset of this paper?

As multiple regression analyses show, neither class seems to be a major determinant of virtually all aspects of our lives, nor it seems to be true that virtually all attitudes toward social and political issues are class-related, as Szymanski asserts. Instead, generation turns out to be a more important variable in accounting for political orientations, attitudes toward work, gender role and marriage, and cultural tastes at least in the Korean context. Class is still a major factor for some personal and social issues. In a sense, generation has become an important factor in political and cultural areas, while class remains a major determinant of social issues. The prominence of the generation variable is probably due to the rapidity of social change in recent years, such as globalization, ideological liberalization, and growing penetration

of IT technology into everyday life, which has made the generation gap wider and more prominent. Thus, one of the most serious challenges the class analysis faces now in Korea is that the changes occurred recently seem to increasingly make class analysis obsolete and put the generation concept forward.

Table 15. R^2s for regression equations and significant variables

R^2 for regression equations					
Dependent variable	All	Less generation	F-test for increment	Less class	Significant variables
Political orientation	.053	.040	<	.051	Gen-1°
Attitude toward North Korea	.023	.015	<	.021	
Closeness to North Korea	.041	.026	<	.038	Gen-3°
Closeness to The U. S. A.	.052	.016	<	.050	Gen-1**
Vote in the election	.057	.037	<	.047	Gen-1° Class-1° , 2*
Central life concern (1)	.029	.023	>	.016	Gen-2° , 3*
Central life concern (2)	.039	.035	>	.028	Class-2° , 3* Class-3**
Important social issues	.086	.082	>	.078	
Attitude toward work	.100	.087	<	.094	Gen-1*, 2**, 3** Class-1°
Attitude toward gender	.178	.129	<*	.172	Gen-1**, 2**, 3** Class-1*
Attitude toward marriage (1)	.215	.162	<*	.213	Gen-1**, 2**, 3°
Attitude toward marriage (2)	.093	.036	<*	.088	Gen-1**, 2** Class-1°
Most watched TV program	.148	.107	<*	.142	Gen-1*

Note: Gen-1, 2, 3 are generation dummy variables; 1=the youngest generation; 2=the 386 generation; 3=those who were born between 1941 and 1960
Class-1, 2, 3 are class dummy variables; 1=upper middle class; 2=new middle class; 3=old middle class
significance level: ° $=p<.10$, * $=p<.05$, ** $=p<.01$

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