

MacIntyre's Teleological Explanation and the Theory of Virtue

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주요 어

덕 이론, 목적론적 설명, 사회과학적 설명, 매킨타이어, 아리스토텔레스

요약 문

본 논문은 매킨타이어의 사회적 설명 이론과 덕 이론의 관계를 다룬다. 매킨타이어는 『덕의 상실 *After Virtue*』에서 현대 사회의 도덕적 태도를 성찰하며 아리스토텔레스의 윤리 전통을 복원하고자 한다. 논자는 덕 이론 성립에 기초가 되는 그의 사회 존재론적 설명이 현대의 경험주의적 세계관을 비판하고 아리스토텔레스의 목적론적 세계관을 어떻게 복원하고 있는지 추적한다. 현대 사회에 걸맞은 아리스토텔레스 전통을 세우기 위해 그는 현대 과학의 발전에 부응하지 못하는 형이상학적 생물학을 목적론적 체계에서 제거해야 할 것을 주장한다. 그러나 생물학적 요소를 제거하는 것이 경험주의를 비판하는 데 보다 효과적인 것은 아니며, 오히려 자신의 덕 이론을 견고히 하는 데 장애물이 된다고 본다. 이러한 전략은 의미가 없으며 아리스토텔레스의 체계에서 생물학적 요소를 제거할 문헌적 근거도 희박하다는 것이 논자의 견해이다.

1. Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relation between MacIntyre's position of social explanation and his theory of virtue. Chapter 7 and 8 of *After Virtue* describe his view of explanatory theory in social sciences. According to MacIntyre, twentieth-century social life turns out in key part to be the concrete and dramatic re-enactment of eighteenth-century philosophy. This means that contemporary society is under the influence of empirical (and positivistic) disciplines. He rejects an empiricist view of explanation. Instead, he advocates teleological explanation as an appropriate method in the area of social sciences, and applies it to his theory of virtue which is rooted in Aristotle's ethics.

The object of MacIntyre's *After Virtue* is to show that "the Aristotelian tradition can be restated in a way that restores intelligibility and rationality to our moral and social attitudes and comments."¹ Can we consider that this project is successful enough to recall Aristotle now? MacIntyre's main concern is to discard unacceptable aspects and to keep the doctrine of Aristotle's teleology. This paper focuses on this project: his rejection of biological aspects in Aristotle's teleology.

He thinks that modern society is so developed that it cannot accept the untimely scientific view of Aristotle. However, it is doubtful that the biological aspects (metaphysical biology) can be removed without giving any damage to the Aristotle's teleological system. Even this is successful, there remains another question: does this newly restated Aristotelianism can survive against contemporary sciences attack on teleology?

This paper will review MacIntyre's view of social explanation (teleological explanation) by focusing on his critique of modern social science, and then try to show the way how he establishes his theory of virtue on this explanatory theory. In the conclusion, I will demonstrate that MacIntyre's restated Aristotelianism is not strong enough to sustain the project against his opponents.

2. MacIntyre's critique of empirical view of social explanation

The Chapter 7 of *After Virtue* begins with his critique on today's wrong conceptualization. According to MacIntyre, the concept of 'fact' in modern culture is a 'folk-concept.'² This concept is a product of empiricism that is rooted in the Enlightenment. In this doctrine, 'fact' becomes value-free, 'is' becomes a stranger to 'ought' and explanation, as well as evaluation, changes its character as a result of this divorce between 'is' and 'ought.' But he insists that this was an error about which today's philosophers of science largely agree.

Empiricist philosophers see that it is at the very least clear that what both saw can

1) MacIntyre. 259.

2) MacIntyre. 84.

be so described. They emphasize the measurement and statistical analysis, which renders social reality as variables, by definition abstracts away from the material reality.

However, MacIntyre does not see this position as developed. He says “The notion of fact is transformed in the transition from the Aristotelian to the mechanist view...On the former view the facts about human action include the facts about what is valuable to human beings; on the latter view there are no facts about what is valuable.”³⁾ If all our experience were to be characterized exclusively in terms of this bare sensory type of description, we would be confronted with not only an uninterpreted, but also an uninterpretable world.⁴⁾ The emphasis on objective facts has been said to conceal both the partial and specific standpoints from which the facts are observed and described and the social construction of the facts themselves. Empiricist scientific method has a very uneasy attitude to unobservable entities or forces.⁵⁾

According to Empiricism (from Comte and Mill to Hempel) the aim of the social sciences is to explain specifically social phenomena by supplying ‘law-like generalizations’ which do not differ in their logical form from those applicable to natural phenomena, in general.

J. S. Mill believes that the thoughts and feelings of humans are the causes of their actions. On this basis, he argues that we can investigate the causal connections between thoughts and actions by employing the same canonical method of inference that we use to discover and justify causal regularities in the physical world. For Mill, subsumption under causal generalization is at the heart of explanation. When we explain an event (either a physical occurrence or a human action) we must subsume it under an appropriate causal generalization.

In *Logic*, Mill suggests that the regularities revealed by historical studies are themselves to be explained by showing that they are derived from laws of character development. Laws of character development, in turn, are to be explained by showing how they result from the operation of general laws of the mind.⁶⁾

Hempel's explanatory theory is deeply originated from this tradition.⁷⁾ He argues that insofar as explanations in history and other social sciences are complete, rather than elliptical or partial, these explanations require relevant universal or statistical generalizations. Both Hempel and Mill insist that explanatory laws have empirical content, but Hempel, unlike Mill, countenances noncausal explanatory laws.

Hempel argues that explanations in terms of mental causes, such as motivating

3) Ibid.

4) Ibid. 79.

5) Frazer, E. and Lacey, N. 266.

6) Mill, J. S. 589.

7) MacIntyre. 92. “The thinkers of the Enlightenment were infant Hempelians.”

reasons, have the same logical structure as covering-law explanations⁸⁾ in the physical sciences. A human action, like a physical event, he says, is explained when it is shown to follow from explanatory facts that include at least one law statement. Hempel presents the following model for explaining behavior that is a result of rational deliberation:

Agent A was in a situation of type C. [Initial Condition]
A was disposed to act rationally. [Initial Condition]
Any person who is disposed to act rationally will, when in situations of type C,
invariably (with high probability) does X. [General law]

A does X. [Event to be explained] ⁹⁾

This model displays clearly what he means when he says that explanations in physical and social sciences are similar to one another: Each has the logical structure of an argument (inductive or reductive) in which the event to be explained is the conclusion and some initial conditions and law or laws constitute the explanatory premises. This is typical form of law-like generalization in empiricists social explanation.

On the contrary, MacIntyre claims that the salient fact about the social sciences is the absence of the discovery of any law-like generalizations whatsoever.¹⁰⁾ According to conventional accounts after the Enlightenment, the aim of the social sciences is to explain social phenomena by supplying law-like generalizations which do not differ in their logical form those applicable to natural phenomena in general. However, he says that although some highly interesting generalizations have been offered that are well supported by confirming instances, they all share features that distinguish them from law-like generalizations:

First of all, they all coexist in their disciplines with recognized counterexamples, and the recognition of these counter-examples if not by the authors of the generalizations themselves, at least by colleagues at work in the same areas does not seem to affect the standing of the generalizations in anything like the way in which it would affect the standing of generalizations in physics or chemistry. A second feature is that they lack not only universal quantifiers but also scope modifiers. Thirdly, these generalizations do not entail any well-defined set of counterfactual conditionals in the way that the law-like generalizations of physics and chemistry do.¹¹⁾

To avoid the first criticism, some social scientists suggest that most laws of social

8) This is the very idea of positivism. Hempel said "What is now understood when we speak of an explanation of facts is simply the establishment of a connection between single phenomena and some general fact." Quoted by Salmon, Merrilee H. 385.

9) Hempel. 27. In this model, agents are considered rational, and Hempel regards the attribution of rationality to an agent as an explicit initial condition in the explanation.

10) MacIntyre. 88.

11) Ibid. 90-91.

science are probabilistic rather than universal. MacIntyre replies that this misses the point. According to him, we cannot throw light on the status of the characteristic generalizations of the social sciences by calling them probabilistic; for they are as different from the generalizations of statistical mechanics as they are from the generalizations of Newtonian mechanics or of the gas law equations.¹²⁾

MacIntyre's second point is about the problem of universal quantifiers and scope modifiers. In the physical sciences, the exact conditions under which the law is supposed to apply are presumably explicit, whereas in the social sciences, vague clauses specifying under normal conditions or some such equivalent are substituted. This difference can be interpreted in several ways. MacIntyre regards the *ceteris paribus* clauses as required because of the ineliminability of Fortuna, or basic unpredictability, in human life.¹³⁾

The third point is about the impossibility of counterfactual conditionals. MacIntyre insists that we do not possess any philosophical account of counterfactual conditionals which respects them for what they are; rather, we treat them as failed attempts at the formulation of laws.¹⁴⁾

MacIntyre rejects the social explanation of Empiricists for the above reasons. In addition, he extends this attack on Empiricism onto the problem of morality. MacIntyre shares the critical theorists' claims that the attempt to model the social sciences on the pattern of the physical sciences is not only erroneous but also immoral.¹⁵⁾ He insists that the appeal to the bureaucrat's ability to deploy a body of scientific and above all social scientific knowledge, organized in terms of and understood as comprising a set of universal law-like generalizations operates as an ideology to justify their own bureaucracy.¹⁶⁾ Then what does he suggest as an alternative to correct this ideological doctrine?

MacIntyre advocates the Aristotelian account of human behavior which has been regarded as one of strong traditions in moral history.¹⁷⁾ Contrary to the empirical explanation, the Aristotelian explanation accepts the value and its order as playing a role in the explanation of human behavior. This means that there exist the facts that empiricists cannot cover with their concept of fact. They have too narrow sight to see the social phenomena.

12) Ibid. 91. However, Salmon indicates that this position represents a serious misunderstanding of the nature of statistical laws. See Salmon, Merrilee H. 402.

13) Salmon, Merrilee H. 402.

14) MacIntyre. 91.

15) Salmon, Merrilee H. 402.

16) MacIntyre. 86. In the line of this critique, Elizabeth and Nicola link empiricism with liberalism, and especially with the metaphysical and moral individualism central to the liberal tradition. See Elizabeth and Nicola. 266.

17) Ibid. 83-84. "It is perhaps necessary to do to Quine what Marx did to Hegel, that is, to stand his argument on its head... It is not surprising that any attempt to understand human behavior in terms of mechanical explanation must conflict with Aristotelianism."

3. MacIntyre's concept of a virtue

After the chapters concerning the problem of explanation, MacIntyre begins to explore historical traditions of a virtue. In addition to the virtues of Homer, Aristotle, and the New Testament, he includes those of Austen and Franklin as the key sources of contemporary virtues.¹⁸⁾ As a result, he characterizes the concept of a virtue as a secondary one which is posterior to social and moral life, as a complex, historical and multi-dimensional concept. In spite of its diversity, he insists that we can pose the question “Are we or are we not able to disentangle from these rival and various claims a unitary core concept of the virtues?” and his answer is “Yes.”¹⁹⁾

Now MacIntyre suggests three main categories to account what a virtue is: practice, narrative order of a single human life, and moral tradition. They form three stages of logical development in the sense that each earlier stage provides an essential constituent of each later stage, and each later stage presupposes and modifies the earlier.²⁰⁾ Through this investigation, he defines the first and partial concept of a virtue as following:

A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practice and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods.²¹⁾

This definition shows that virtue is a kind of human characteristic, and this character leads us to the status of the good in the course of practice. Practice cannot be a means to achieve the good, because MacIntyre thinks that the good is not external to the practice, but internal: Internality is suggested as a main point of a theory of virtue in the moral tradition through the whole human history.²²⁾ This means that the good, as an end, cannot be adequately characterized independently of a characterization of the practice. In MacIntyre, practice is recognized not only as the means to achieve goals, but also as an end in itself. In this context, he suggests two examples. One is the case of a child who learning chess game, the other is the case concerning the practice of a painter. Both cases reveal the difference between internal and external goods.²³⁾

18) We can raise the question that Yu propounded “What is the criterion to select them as a tradition?” in this point.

19) MacIntyre. 186. “We can discover a unitary core concept of the virtues, and it turns out to provide the tradition of which I have written the history with its conceptual unity.”

20) Yu. 10.

21) MacIntyre. 191.

22) See Ibid. 183-191.

23) See Ibid. 188-190.

However, MacIntyre does not seem to satisfy this first and partial notion of a virtue, so that he proceeds to the second more developed notion of a virtue.²⁴⁾ To bring specific practices into harmony with one another, we need to put practices and virtues in the larger arena of human life. For this reason we must regard a life not merely as a sequence of individual actions and episodes, but as a unity. MacIntyre therefore proceeds to stage two of his concept of virtue to envisage each human life as a whole, as a unity, whose character provides the virtues with an adequate telos.²⁵⁾ He provides a second supplementary concept of a virtue as following:

The virtues therefore are to be understood as those dispositions which will not only sustain practices and enable us to achieve the goods internal to practices, but which will also sustain us in the relevant kind of quest for the good, by enabling us to overcome the harms, dangers, temptations and distractions which we encounter, and which will furnish us with increasing self-knowledge and increasing knowledge of the good. We have then arrived at a provisional conclusion about the good life for man: the good life for man is the life spent in seeking for the good life for man, and the virtues necessary for the seeking are those which will enable us to understand what more and what else the good life for man is.²⁶⁾

This supplementary concept still requires a step toward the next stage, because it is not able to seek for the good or exercise the virtues only qua individual.²⁷⁾ It is within a tradition that practices are situated, shaped, and transmitted across generations. Hence the individuals search for his or her good is generally and characteristically conducted within a context defined by those traditions of which the individuals life is a part, and this is true both to those goods which are internal to practices and of the goods of a single life.²⁸⁾

MacIntyre's concept of virtue is based on that of Aristotle. In his own assessment, MacIntyre suggests three commonalities with Aristotle. First, he defends and elaborates various ideas of Aristotle, such as voluntariness, the distinctions of different kinds of virtues, the relation between virtue and passion, the structure of practical reasoning etc. Second, his account can accommodate an Aristotelian view of pleasure and enjoyment. Third, his account is Aristotelian in that it links evaluation and explanation in a characteristically Aristotelian way.

Aristotle tells us that the 'well-being or eudaimonia' which is the good for man is an activity in accordance with virtue; each virtue is a disposition (including feeling and action) for making (right) choices.²⁹⁾ In *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle indicates

24) Yu indicates that the new teleology (of MacIntyre) is introduced at stage two. See Yu. 10.

25) MacIntyre. 204.

26) Ibid. 219.

27) Ibid. 220.

28) MacIntyre. 222. Yu indicates that this account of tradition in *After Virtue* is brief, yet tradition becomes the central theme of the two volumes subsequent to *After Virtue*: *Whose Justice? Which rationality?* and *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry*. See Yu. 12.

three aspects of virtuous man: Firstly the person must have knowledge, secondly the person must choose the action for its own sake, and thirdly his action must proceed from an unchangeable character.³⁰⁾ This means that virtuous man can achieve 'well-being' only if he exercises what he knows in general. In Aristotle, which determines what human qualities are virtues is the telos of man as a species. We can infer that to achieve man as a such is the goal of Aristotle's ethics by reference to his metaphysical system. Man as a species can be understood in this context. But it is doubtful to interpret the species as a scientific concept of biology. Rather, its meaning is closer to that of MacIntyre's man as a unity.³¹⁾ MacIntyre also recognized this enough to notice it in *After Virtue*:

Its basic structure (of moral history) is that which Aristotle analyzed in the Nicomachean Ethics. Within that teleological scheme there is a fundamental contrast between man-as-he-happens-to-be and man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-essential-nature. Ethics is the science which is to enable men to understand how they make the transition from the former state to the latter. Ethics therefore in this view presupposes some account of potentiality and act, some account of the essence of man as a rational animal and above all some account of the human telos.³²⁾

So it is with the virtues and the telos which consist of the good life for man on Aristotle's account.³³⁾ These aspects are gained by practicing virtuous acts. The exercise of a virtue is itself a crucial component of the good life for man. MacIntyre's first and second concept of virtue that I described above is no more than the repetition of Aristotle.³⁴⁾

The third aspect MacIntyre suggests is concerning the problem of fact/value relation. According to their standpoint, identifying certain actions as manifesting or failing to manifest a virtue or virtues is never only to evaluate; it is also to take the first step towards explaining why those actions rather than some others were performed.³⁵⁾ This implies that to give evaluative accounts is inevitable to explain human behavior. Contrasting to the modern social sciences, they see that the social facts cannot be explained without allusion to the place that justice and injustice, courage and cowardice play in human life. As has been shown in the last section, this view is confronted with the empirical discipline. In Empiricism, 'fact becomes value-free, 'is' becomes a stranger to 'ought' and explanation, as well as evaluation,

29) Mackie. 186.

30) Aristotle. 1105a 33-5.

31) See MacIntyre. 202-3.

32) MacIntyre. 52.

33) Ibid. 184. MacIntyre puts the 'practices' in the place of Aristotle's telos instead. But Yu sees the relation between virtue and practice at stage one also has an Aristotelian origin.

34) In this sense, I disagree with Yu's insistence that the new teleology is introduced at stage two. See the note 24 in this paper.

35) MacIntyre. 199.

changes its character as a result of this divorce between 'is' and 'ought.'³⁶⁾ However, for MacIntyre, man's moral nature and moral practice are tied up with his sociality, his membership of a tradition and his participation in practice: not with his individuality and autonomy (as a fact).³⁷⁾

4. Justification of teleological explanation in social science

Two main traditions can be distinguished in the history of ideas, differing as to the conditions an explanation has to satisfy in order to be scientifically respectable.³⁸⁾ The one tradition is sometimes called Aristotelian, the other Galilean. The contrast between the two traditions is usually characterized as teleological versus causal explanation. The Galilean tradition in science runs parallel with the advance of the causal-mechanistic point of view in man's efforts to explain and predict phenomena, the Aristotelian tradition with his efforts to make facts teleologically or finalistically understandable.

The philosophy of science that has an empiricist concept is usually called positivism. One of the tenets of positivism is methodological monism, or the idea of the unity of scientific investigation. A second tenet is the view that the exact natural sciences, in particular, mathematical physics, set a methodological ideal or standard which measures the degree of development and perfection of all the other sciences, including the humanities. A third tenet is a characteristic view of scientific explanation. Such explanation is, in a broad sense, causal. It consists, more specifically, in the subsumption of individual cases under a hypothetically assumed general law of nature, including human nature.³⁹⁾ Therefore, it is obvious that the attitude of positivism towards a teleological explanation, i.e. towards attempts to account for facts in terms of intentions, goals, purposes, is either to reject them as unscientific or to try to show that they can be transformed into causal explanations. Then, what is the response of the Aristotelian tradition? The scholars who are under the influence of Aristotelianism deny methodological monism. They refuse to view the pattern set by the exact natural sciences as the sole and supreme ideal for a rational understanding of reality. They emphasize a contrast between those sciences which, like physics or chemistry or physiology, aim at generalizations about reproducible and predictable phenomena, and those which, like history, want to grasp the individual and unique features of their objects.⁴⁰⁾ They indicate the psychological aspects and intentionality which are unique in human behavior. In this

36) MacIntyre. 84.

37) Frazer, E. and Lacey N. 270.

38) Von Wright. 2.

39) Ibid. 4.

40) Von Wright. 5.

context, Droysen, who coined for this differences the names 'explanation' and 'understanding,' insists that the aim of the natural sciences is to explain; while, the aim of history (as a kind of science of human behavior) is to understand the phenomena which fall within its domain.⁴¹⁾

For them, as for Aristotle, the idea of law is primarily that of an intrinsic connection to be grasped through reflective understanding, not that of an inductive generalization established by observation and experiment.⁴²⁾ Explanation consists in making phenomena teleologically intelligible rather than predictable from knowledge of their efficient causes.

MacIntyre follows the Aristotelian tradition. According to him, modern moral philosophy, i.e. the contemporary disagreement of morality, is due to the rejection of Aristotle's teleology.⁴³⁾ As a follower of this tradition, he insists that the concept of 'fact'—as an object of scientific explanation— is in modern culture a 'folk-concept' with an aristocratic ancestry.⁴⁴⁾ He criticizes the empiricist concept of experience which has flourished since the late seventeenth century. The doctrine is that there is to be nothing beyond my experience for me to compare my experience with, so that the contrast between seems to me and is in fact can never be formulated.⁴⁵⁾ This modern fact-value distinction is absurd to the Aristotelians.

MacIntyre is an Aristotelian in that his theory of virtue links evaluation and explanation in a characteristically Aristotelian way. For Aristotle, to identify certain actions as manifesting or failing to manifest a virtue or virtues is never only to evaluate; it is also to take the first step towards explaining why those actions rather than some others were performed. In agreement with this, MacIntyre says that without allusion to the place that justices and injustice, courage and cowardice play in human life very little will be genuinely explicable. In addition, without an overriding conception of the telos of a whole human life, conceived as a unity, our conception of certain individual virtues has to remain partial and incomplete.⁴⁶⁾ Human life has to be understood as a whole. This is the reason why he rejects the empiricists' view of social explanation and goes back to Aristotle's teleology. Then, how does he justify teleological explanation in this developed scientific society? His strategy is to remove biological aspects from Aristotle's teleology and strengthen its social account.

5. Metaphysical biology and teleological explanation

41) Ibid. same page.

42) Ibid. 7-8. Von Wright insists that Hegel and Marx are followers of Aristotle in this sense.

43) MacIntyre. 119.

44) Ibid. 79.

45) Ibid. 80.

46) MacIntyre. 202.

MacIntyre thinks that metaphysical biology is not an essential part of Aristotle's teleology and, indeed, it becomes a hindrance to make Aristotle compatible with modern sciences. He says that Although my account of a virtue is teleological, it does not require any allegiance to Aristotle's metaphysical biology.⁴⁷⁾ According to him, Aristotle's metaphysical biology is to see human beings like the members of all other species to have a specific nature; and that nature is such that they have certain aims and goals, such that move by nature towards a specific telos.⁴⁸⁾ However, MacIntyre insists that this teleological view of human nature has to be dismissed because of the development of modern sciences.⁴⁹⁾ But this view has been attacked by other Aristotelians like Taylor and Yu.

According to Taylor, the notion that human beings have something like a telos qua human can be separated from the thesis that everything in nature belongs to some class or other, whose behavior is explained by some Form and Idea.⁵⁰⁾ The fact that we no longer explain the movements of stars and stones teleologically does not mean that we cannot explain humans in these terms. It does rather mean that the mechanization of natural science by no means makes inevitable the changes in moral outlook which have often been justified by it.

Taylor indicates that MacIntyre also recognized this in *After Virtue*.⁵¹⁾ He agrees with MacIntyre's demonstration that the change in the understanding of morality is to be explained itself in terms of changing moral vision. We have to admit the fact that a great deal of reciprocal action there certainly was between science and morality in these centuries, as at any time in our civilization. But it is quite wrong to fix on only one direction of causation, and propound a story in which scientific discovery simply brings changes in moral outlook in its train.⁵²⁾

Other crucial aspect that Taylor remarks is a new understanding and valuation of freedom and dignity behind the fact/value split (dualism). Indeed, he says that he can find this aspect in MacIntyre's own theory: "MacIntyre points out its theological origins. The fact/value split is first a theological thesis at this stage the spiritual motivation of this view is evident. The thesis is propounded to defend Gods freedom of choice."⁵³⁾

Through this enquiry, what Taylor wants to show is that if the reason MacIntyre rejects

47) Ibid. 196.

48) Ibid. 148.

49) Yu. 8.

50) Taylor. 17.

51) Ibid. 16-7. "MacIntyre knows that the decline of teleological conceptions cannot just be understood as an independent development in science and epistemology. He points here to the important role of Protestant and Jansenist theologies, with their sense of the powerlessness of fallen human reason" (AV, 51-2).

52) Taylor. 18.

53) Ibid. Same page.

metaphysical biology in the Aristotle's teleology is in its incompatibility with the advanced contemporary sciences, it is not correct. I have a sympathy to Taylor's position in that this gives MacIntyre's view of social explanation the foundational concreteness. If the social sciences are not the area of law-like generalization,⁵⁴⁾ as MacIntyre demonstrates in *After Virtue*, metaphysical biology is not the matter, following Taylor's strong insistence, even though it is incompatible with contemporary natural sciences.

In relation to the problem of metaphysical biology, Yu criticizes MacIntyre more strongly. He says that Aristotle himself does not clearly affirm such a strong point: "Virtues attach not to men as inhabiting social roles, but to man as such. It is the telos of man as a species which determines what human qualities are virtues (AV. 184)."⁵⁵⁾ In this reason, he insists that Aristotle's theory of virtue is not rooted in his metaphysical biology, but it related to the latter only in an external way. If this is the case, MacIntyre must have overemphasized the connection between Aristotle's virtue and his (biological) teleology.⁵⁶⁾

6. Conclusion

Until now, I have investigated MacIntyre's view of social explanation and theory of virtue. He insists on reconstructing an Aristotelian teleological explanation as an alternative to the wrong views of empiricists, and he makes this reconstruction the foundation for his theory of virtue. Arguing the falsification of the empiricist's social explanation, he suggests three points concerning the inapplicability of law-like generalizations to social facts. Then, he takes up the Aristotelian explanation which admits the role of telos in human behavior. This reflects his different (social ontological) view from that of twentieth-century philosophy under the influence of empiricism.

MacIntyre's teleological explanation is situated as a necessary condition to establish his theory of virtue. His initial strategy against empiricists' views is to deny the role of law-like generalizations in the realm of human sciences. Nevertheless, he seems to admit the role of general laws, in part. He insists that many of the central features of human life derive from the particular and peculiar ways in which predictability and unpredictability interlock.⁵⁷⁾ This point contradicts with his teleological explanation denying the role of law-like generalization, because this interlock (of predictability and unpredictability) can be possible when we admit the role of general laws in a more advanced (or revised) way, and I think this ambiguous attitude explains why MacIntyre is so negative to the biological aspects

54) MacIntyre denied the existence of law-like generalizations in social sciences. See this paper page5.

55) Yu. 15.

56) Ibid. 14.

57) MacIntyre. 103.

in Aristotle's teleology.

MacIntyre's rejection of metaphysical biology from Aristotle's teleology is overemphasized, and, in addition, according to Yu, we cannot find textual ground for doing that.⁵⁸⁾ If we follow Taylor's thesis which denies the connection of science and morality this implies the biological peculiarity of human being and his indication that MacIntyre also presupposes this dualistic view in his virtue theory, MacIntyre's revised teleology without metaphysical biology does not make sense. With this reason, MacIntyre has to make it clear what he meant by new Aristotelianism without metaphysical biology more persuasively, or he should amend this strategy.

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58) Yu. 18.

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