

Truth and Criticism:

Two Different Faces of the Hermeneutic Task

김 희 현

주제분류 해석학, 현대철학

주요어 해석학, 전통, 이데올로기 비판, 이해, 언어, 한스 게오르그 가다머, 위르겐 하버마스

요약문

이 논문은 한스 게오르그 가다머의 철학적 해석학과 위르겐 하버마스의 비판이론을 서로 대조시킴으로써, 텍스트와 사건과 역사에 대한 이해와 해석에서 일어나는 두 개의 서로 다른 해석학적 관심과 동력이 무엇인지를 드러낸다. 이해가 발생하는 존재론적 조건을 밝히고자 하는 가다머와 비판이론의 토대로 기능할 수 있는 담론의 자기반성적 구조를 세우고자 하는 하버마스는 해석학의 역할에 대해서 근본적으로 다른 입장을 취하였다. 두 사상가의 해석학적 방법론 사이에 가로놓인 비통약적 성격은 해석학이 추구하는 핵심적인 두 방향의 역동성을 나타내는 것으로써, 이 비통약적 역동성을 대조시키는 작업은 해석학적 활동에서 유념해야 할 두 개의 근본주제 즉, <전통에로의 참여>와 <제도화된 사고방식에 대한 반성적 비평>이 서로 어떤 연관을 맺을 수 있는지를 드러내는 일이기도 하다. 본 논문은 가다머와 하버마스 사이에서 1967년부터 1971년까지 벌어진 논쟁의 주요주제를 분석하고, 이를 통해 두 사상가가 남긴 항구적인 해석학의 교훈이 무엇인지를 밝히고자 한다. 이 과제를 수행하기 위한 이 글의 주요 논점은 “전통의 권위와 이데올로기 비판 그리고 “보편성을 얻기 위한 해석학적 주장: 언어성 이다.

Introduction

This paper is an attempt to analyze the opposite hermeneutic paradigm between the philosophical hermeneutics of Hans Georg Gadamer and the critical theory of Jürgen Habermas. The antithesis between the two, as being reflected from different faces of hermeneutics, derives from their contrasting appreciation of the role of hermeneutics. On the one hand, Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics makes it mandatory for us to become aware of our horizon in any attempt to understand the past, text, other persons, and historical objects. On the other, Habermas applies hermeneutics within the specific area of the socio historical discipline in a critical-scientific manner.

In this paper, concentrating on the different concepts of the role of hermeneutics, I will examine the constructive legacy of the debate between the two thinkers. First, I will briefly point out basic ideas of both thinkers and analyze the main issues of their mutual criticisms. The debate took place on many levels and addressed a plurality of interconnected topics, including the nature of tradition and its authority, the epistemological attitude to the scientific methodology, the distinction between theory and practice, the nature of experience, the role of self-reflection, and the nature of language. However, I will concentrate on two focal points of the debate under the title of "Authoritative Tradition and Criticism of Ideology and "Hermeneutic Claim to Universality: Linguisticality. And, finally, I will remark what the debate leaves.

An Observation of Basic Ideas of the Two Thinkers

For Gadamer, the primary task of philosophical reflections on hermeneutics is not to develop a method of interpretation or understanding but to clarify the ontological conditions in which understanding takes place. In the very conclusion of his great book, *Truth and Method*, he says: “the certainty achieved by using scientific methods does not suffice to guarantee truth. ¹⁾ Gadamer’s project is explicitly a hermeneutic philosophy of human understanding. Here, it can be noted that Gadamer does not just consider the discussion of “method as subsidiary. Rather, he thinks of it as detrimental since it is usually guided by an objectivist empirical principle. He believes that considerations of method tend to obscure and hinder the natural human capacity of understanding. For him, the act of understanding and of the correct interpretation of what has been understood is a problem that cannot be addressed within available methodologies. Therefore, he convincingly demonstrates that hermeneutical, historical, or contextual understandings radically relativize the claim of any ahistorical version of rationalism such as the critical rationalism of the Enlightenment. He believes that methodology as such does not guarantee the philosophical productivity in its application. However, we should not regard his work merely as anti-methodological. For he sees his own work as an attempt to fulfill a deepest aspiration of all methodologies. At this point, he seems to consider the aim of his work as the liberation from the Cartesian anxiety, which turns

1) Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (New York: Continuum, 1997), 491.

philosophy into a rigorous science, discovers a scientific foundation, and becomes a legitimate form of knowledge. Against the Cartesian legacy, Gadamer seeks to overcome the misleading epistemological association of the subject-object distinction that pervades in modern thoughts. His hermeneutic goal is to free the natural capacity of human understanding by clarifying its nature and condition.

Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics calls for an attention to the operative force of tradition and eventually to the ontological primacy of linguisticity. For him, the paradigm of apprehending truth is not the individual-centered rational reflection of the Enlightenment but the context-related foundations, namely, traditions. These foundations constitute a person's historical reality. Tradition, therefore, happens over and above our hoping and doing. We may go on to the assumption, 'we find tradition'; however, Gadamer wants to bring out another aspect, 'tradition grasps us.' In Gadamer's view, tradition appears with its own authority in consciousness, and consciousness is passive in reception. By contrast, the Enlightenment rationalism evokes critical reasoning to be able to distinguish between legitimate and false tradition/prejudices. But in so doing, in Gadamer's sense, it is fallen into an artificial, abstract, and so destructive antithesis between reason and authority. To respect for authority is not opposite to a rational judgment that one is aware of one's own belongingness to tradition. Besides, such belongingness is evident in the nature of the linguistic existence of human beings. Linguisticity is ontologically primary in human existence in the sense that language becomes the ground of being upon which truth plays. The task of philosophical hermeneutics is, therefore, to show how the possibility

of truth becomes real in the linguistic existence of man.

Habermas seems to be a last great rationalist. He proposes the critical theory as a self-reflective mode of thought for establishing a comprehensive theory of rationality that focuses on the centrality of communicative action and discourse and that can serve as a ground for a critical theory. His initial proposal with this understanding is tied with his discussion of “anticipation. Through critical reason, he says, one can have an anticipation of “the final state of a formative process which can then function as a critical measure of all that is present in a tradition. That is, his ultimate concern is to envision an ideal future possibility that can be used to judge not only the legitimacy of an understanding of tradition but also of the tradition itself. For this purpose, he first presents the idea of “critique as the unity of knowledge and interest. As a member of the Frankfurt school, he regards the promotion of the Marxist emancipatory attitude in the present social reality that exhibits the process of exploitation, alienation, and the hypostatization of everyday experiences. In the same spirit of critique, his efforts aim at the recovery and justification of a similar emancipatory interest. Having argued for the philosophical location of an emancipatory cognitive interest, he turns his attention to a Freudian psycho-analytic theory that combines both areas of self-reflection and scientificity. For him, Freud’s theory is a new kind of a critical theory. He looks upon Freudian depth-hermeneutics as another discourse in that it brings light to the area that Marxist theories were unable to approach. Under these projects, his conviction on a possibility to set up a rationalistic methodology is working.

Issues Coming out of the Debate

The debate between Gadamer and Habermas took place directly and indirectly over several issues. We can find their encounters in their major books. Habermas' *Knowledge and Human Interests* in 1968 could be as an indirect reply to Gadamer's *Truth and Method* published in 1960. However, a direct debate was ignited from the side of Habermas by issuing "A Review of Gadamer's *Truth and Method* 2)" in 1967. In this thesis, he attacked the Heideggerian ontological hermeneutics in Gadamer, and raising the need of critical theory. This argument of Habermas entailed Gadamer's response by publishing a treatise under the title of "On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutic Reflection" in 1967. Another question was raised by Habermas through the thesis, "The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality" in 1970. He provoked here the problem of Gadamer's understanding that claims the hermeneutic universality based on the linguisticity of understanding. For this, Gadamer returned his answer to Habermas through "Reply, to My Critics" in 1971.

The debate initially focuses on our attitude in terms of "tradition and its authority. Gadamer feels that the study of tradition is indispensable for the hermeneutic examination of the concept of "understanding. According to him, all understanding is embedded in tradition. However, critics, who are baptized by the rational spirit of the Enlightenment, would raise questions in regarding Gadamer's

2) I will follow the titles translated into English even though some of the titles are greatly changed when they are translated from German.

initial understanding. Can we trust tradition as a resource of truth, or should we criticize it as a source of ideology? What in Gadamer does shape the seemingly “uncritical attitude of philosophical hermeneutics toward tradition? Why does the philosophical hermeneutics seek “truth in tradition? These questions detonate the controversy. In contrast to these questions, however, we also would have questions against the critic, Habermas. Should we consider tradition as a mere source of deception in language? So, do we have to place tradition at the frontline of criticism and scrutinize it under a rigorous hermeneutic method? Does tradition itself not have a reflective function? And, moreover, are there sufficient reasons why we should consider ideology as a distorted communication so that for its abolition we need to apply the critical examination of psychoanalysis? These inquiries become a counterpart to the former questions. As I said in the introduction, I will analyze each thinker’s position in regarding to the concepts of “tradition and its authority and elaborate the ideas in the first half of the body section. Also, here, the notion of self-reflection and the potentiality of tradition to contain reflective character in itself will be discussed.

The second point at issue is the “linguisticity of all understanding and the universal dimension of hermeneutic experience. This issue is one of the most crucial points in the dispute. So I will concentrate on this in the second half with some following questions: How can we conceive of the linguisticity of all understanding that philosophical hermeneutics proclaims? Wouldn’t the proposition of critical theory itself reversely become the object of criticism and severe further questioning? What reasons permit

psychoanalysis to be used legitimately as a model of “critical theory? On what ground can the transfer of its methodology and therapeutic results to a “critical theory of society be seen as a permissible theoretical exercise?

The main aim of this paper is to grasp the two hermeneutical paradigms in their conflicts and dialogues, and to suggest a complementary way in which each benefits from the other. In this sense I contend in agreement with the conclusion of Paul Ricoeur’s thesis, “Hermeneutics and Critique of Ideology. Although Gadamer’s and Habermas’ views appear to be in total irreconcilable antithesis, the two hermeneutic paradigms, exemplifying “critical consciousness and “hermeneutic awareness, can be brought into a dialogue, and each one can learn from the other’s limitations. One of my concerns in the debate is to show that philosophical hermeneutics can be seen as endowed with critical abilities. Therefore, I would like to show that philosophical hermeneutics can be considered a critical enterprise for the examination of our prejudices and can be capable of projecting humanist ideas.

A Discussion on Two Focal Points of the Debate

1) Authoritative Tradition and Criticism of Ideology

For Gadamer the tradition is the basis of all prejudices and of everything that is transmitted to us. In order to clarify and rightly characterize our prejudices, it is essential that we should comprehend the fact that we live in tradition. We have been formed by tradition and, everything from the past is transmitted to us through it. The

innately connected relationship between tradition and us constitutes one of his strongest claims. We could find a very similar argument in the suggestion of Paul Ricoeur who believes that values are not created *ex nihilo* but always *transvaluations* of previous values which tradition transmits to us. Of course, such an understanding are naturally accepted to all who willingly reject the ahistorical conception of a knower as one who stands outside what he or she has known. It would not be wrong to suspect, however, whether Gadamer's idea might produce a strong impression of conservatism with respect to tradition and its authority. As Habermas quickly points out against Gadamer, we could first raise a question: Is all tradition welcome, trustful and acceptable? This is a question that any reader of Gadamer, who is in line with the Enlightenment, could raise legitimately. In response to such a question, Gadamer also knows the general tendency of the Enlightenment to accept no authority and to decide everything before the judgement seat of reason. Accordingly, he illustrates the fact: what constitutes the ultimate source of all authority is not tradition itself but reason to examine it. However, Gadamer believes that the absolute opposition the Enlightenment creates between authority and reason is misleading. For him, authority does not always entail the unreasonable exercise of force and domination. What we have to know is that tradition is truth and being that already take place of our understanding even before we judge its authority.

Habermas charges Gadamer with the inability to arrive at the consequences of "hermeneutic reflection which liberates us from dogmatic forces residing within tradition. He points out that Gadamer does not see any opposition between authority and reason. For him also, knowledge is rooted in tradition, bound at the same time to

contingent conditions and norms. This is the least consent between Habermas and Gadamer. However, Habermas requests a certain critical stance to check dogmatic forces lying in tradition. He says, “the acceptance of the truth claim of tradition can be equated with knowledge itself only when freedom from force and unrestricted agreement about tradition have already been secured within the tradition.”³⁾ But he believes that opposition between authority and reason does in fact exist. We find here Habermas’ strong presumption that tradition and its authority include norms of repressive/dogmatic nature which stand in opposition to reason. Although his views about tradition might be correct to a great extent, he nevertheless does not acknowledge Gadamer’s claim: tradition is also inhabited by truth that can teach us and be of great benefit in the construction of our lives. The absolute gap between reason and tradition Gadamer ascribes to the Enlightenment is again apparent in Habermas’ position. Why is such discrepancy between the two occurring in dealing with the relationship between tradition and reflection? In my opinion, we cannot find a mediation to reconcile them. But we could only accede a kind of the constant oscillation between the philosophical reasoning of Gadamer and the sociological-scientific reasoning of Habermas. For the two, the role of reason works differently along with each person’s own direction. While, for Habermas, reasoning roles to get rid of the shadow of obscurantism; for Gadamer, reasoning has a meaning in that it makes people aware of their hermeneutic situation as being thrown into the world.

3) Jürgen Habermas, “The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality(Hereafter, HCU), in *The Hermeneutic Tradition: From Ast to Ricoeur* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 267.

And then, does Habermas legitimately attack against Gadamer's indifferent attitude to self-reflection? Gadamer probably has a question in his mind: can reflection emancipate itself from its historical conditions? In his thought, hermeneutic experiences are unable to enjoy the absolute freedom by disregarding or rejecting truths that come from the past. And language, as the mode of being of such experience, is just the reservoir of tradition and the medium in and through which we exist and perceive our world. In the eyes of Habermas, to the contrary, such a position seems to absolutize the hermeneutic experience, while the transcending power of reflection is unconsidered. Hence, allowing tradition as being transmitted through language, he establishes further relationship between language and sociology and then delivers some basic reference system, i.e., labor and domination.

Habermas argues that language could be thought of as a "meta-institution upon which all other social institution depend. However, such a meta-institution itself depends upon social processes. In other words, language has been shaped by the social interactions. Thus, language as a social 'meta-institution' necessarily becomes another medium of domination in society and exercises a social power. He concludes that language is ideological. For it institutionalizes power relations, when and because it conceals the true structure of domination in the relations. Therefore, he finally drives to the conclusion that "deception occurs in language and in tradition which is after all language. For this reason, he says that one should treat tradition with "suspicion. This constitutes the legitimate effort of Habermas to point out Gadamer's silence about

the contingency of tradition/language to be ideological or distorted.

However, we could raise another question from the Gadamerian notion: Is all tradition ideological? Or should we consider tradition as the very source of deception in language? There are a number of answers that Gadamer delivers in response to the charges leveled against him by Habermas. He first argues that the hermeneutic dimension would be narrowed down if certain elements of social reality, articulated by Habermas such as work, power, and domination, be detached from the very nature of tradition. Of course, for Gadamer, work, power, and domination present some real sense of domination of social life; nevertheless, they do not really stand outside tradition/language, the fundamental area of hermeneutic experience. Gadamer reminds us of the fact that hermeneutics is also interested in work and politics because they might be the main sources for a number of prejudices that hermeneutics uncovers. However, he unfortunately never furnished in his work a proper framework for the comprehension of such social categories in a critical mode. This attitude seems to show his intention to avoid the main problem previously indicated, that is, whether tradition needs to be criticized at all.

Otherwise, such Gadamer's intention looks correct and becomes strong to my eyes. This is also engaged in the issue to claim the universal application of hermeneutics. We could inquire: Do we understand only when we unmask false pretensions? According to Gadamer, Habermas' critique of ideology presupposes this narrow meaning. Habermas' argument about the power of reflection is strengthened only when we accept the fact that the convictions

which reflection reveals are always ideological and false. I applause this idea Gadamer submits! What we have to keep in mind is that, for Gadamer, tradition is not merely to be an object of critical reflections in a narrow sense, but to engulf the whole area of being itself.

The views and criticisms of such topic as tradition, its authority, and the critique of ideology are continually debatable from two antithetical sides. One side is occupied with Gadamer's voices, while the other side consists of Habermas' positions and critical remarks. Then, can there be any mediation expectant between these two antithetical views? According to Demetrius Teigas, these two opposing views on tradition express possible characteristics of the content of tradition itself.⁴⁾ They express opposing features which can be found in our tradition. This means that we live together with such contrary elements. Tradition is not a homogeneous sphere composed entirely either of distorted and dogmatic view, or of truths. It basically has an embracing characteristic.

In sum, we could see a lack of critical stances toward tradition in Gadamer's view. That is because he does not want to reduce his hermeneutic reflective experience to a sociological critical theory. On the contrary, we could see that Habermas skillfully uses traditional notions of critique of Marxist and Freudian theories. However, what he has to pay attention is that he himself already acts within tradition with traditional theoretical tools. No are all beliefs and

4) Demetrius Teigas, *Knowledge and Hermeneutic understanding: A Study of the Habermas-Gadamer Debate* (Cranbury: Associated University Presses, 1995), 132.

tradition ideological. Therefore, we acknowledge Gadamer's conception of tradition as quite true, although it is in need of incorporating a critical view of tradition.

2) *Hermeneutic Claim to Universality: Linguisticality*

Gadamer says that all understanding is linguistic. This idea is a central principle of his hermeneutics: language conditions all understanding. Language is the fundamental mode of operation of our being-in-the-world and the all-embracing form of the constitution of the world.⁵⁾ Because of its linguistic nature, we inescapably receive and understand any experience in linguistic terms. Such a conclusion leads to the position that the experience of the world is hermeneutical and this situation is universal. And the universality of the hermeneutical experience indicates that we are "interpretative beings. This ontological aspect of hermeneutics in Gadamer's thought refers to the hermeneutic claim to universality. We can accept Gadamer's claim to universality only when we should acknowledge our ontological conditionedness in the world. At this moment, however, one would raise a question. If an unbiased proclamation is needed for epistemological inquiry, how do we legitimate the ontological position of our being, that is, the hermeneutical conditionedness of our being in the world? Of course, we must remember that such a question is not expected in Gadamer's philosophical inquiry. He just answers that we have to separate the ontological character of hermeneutic conditionedness from the prejudices of scientific methodology. However, such ontological persistence of Gadamer evokes Habermas' rebuke.

5) Hans-Georg Gadamer, "the Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem, in *The Hermeneutic Tradition: From Ast to Ricoeur*, 147.

For Habermas, there is no universality in hermeneutics, because there is no universality of language. He believes that language itself is constrained by extra-linguistic forces. He specially cites Jean Piaget's conception of the "non-linguistic roots of operative thought."⁶⁾ In this view, cognitive categories such as space, time, causality, and substance are pre-linguistic. According to Piaget, our use of language is determined by extra-linguistic conditions. Hence, Habermas suggests that if it is the case that operative intelligence goes back to pre-linguistic schemes, then the hermeneutic claim to universality would find its limit. To respond to Habermas, Gadamer agrees with the fact that there is pre-linguistic experience. He says, nonetheless, that language still remains rolling as the medium of hermeneutic experience. So to speak, our interpretive access to pre-linguistic experience and our ability to understand it are through and through conditioned by language. For Gadamer, linguisticity of human existence becomes the basis of all his ontological descriptions.

Another Habermas' project is to show the limited character of Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics for sustaining the systematic scientificity and its inability to examine "distorted communication in a methodical way. He thinks of the philosophical hermeneutics as encircled in everyday natural language in which the subject cannot perceive the intentions guiding her/his expressive activities. In this way, philosophical hermeneutics is unable to explain the distorted communication because it does not base itself on a meta-language that could expose the distortions. His main task remains in the question of whether there is a different way of understanding the meaning methodologically, especially the meaning of distorted communication.

6) Habermas, "HCU, 251.

For such a project, he supposes “the psychoanalytic model , with its depth-hermeneutics, capable of serving as a guide by transferring its methodological experience to the critique of ideology. He believes that a case of systematically distorted communications often happens in normal speech situations, but hermeneutics cannot detect them. The result of such situation is pseudo-communication that occurs in a whole system of misunderstanding and remains undetected beneath a “false consensus between the participants of the communication. Habermas says, therefore, that if we want to detect and examine a pseudo-communication we should require the engagement in a systematic and scientific explanation.

In spite of Habermas’ critical observation on the distorted communication, his criticism goes too far with disregarding the extent of its comprehensibility. First of all, we could see his notion of “distorted communication itself threatened by its own premise. In order to evaluate what is distorted in communication, we need to establish what is normal, or what is undistorted. It means that extremely efficient criteria would be required to clarify what is distorted or ideological. However, how can we employ a faithful criterion of normality to detect distortions? In addition, we could suspect a certain blind equation of the distorted with the ideological in Habermas’ idea. The yielding problem is here whether classical Marxist examples of ideological discourse could be studied within the Freudian notion of (pathological) distorted communication. This problem will be further discussed later.

At this moment, I would like to go back to Gadamer’s illumination. According to him, all our experiences primarily has a linguistic character, and all our understandings are based on the experience of this hermeneutic nature. As we saw, this idea leads Gadamer to

pronounce the universality of the hermeneutic problem and consequently the general ontological situation in which we find ourselves. Consequently, Gadamer concludes with the ontological priority of linguistic tradition over all possible critiques. At the same time, he concedes that tradition is possible only on the basis that we are part of the comprehensive context of the tradition of language. This understanding is authentic. Actually, Habermas quite clearly shows that a false consensus in communication has been imposed by force and, so doing, promoting a context of domination. However, he seems to go into a wrong direction in that his refutation of the ontological conclusion of Gadamer evades its legitimacy. He must be astray in discerning linguisticity as ontological primacy in human existence so that he conflates two things together—our inevitable position in dialogue and the possibility of criticizing it. Our predicament in language as well as the inevitable existence of a consensus—either true or false—is a different issue from a possible criticism of the consensus or tradition.

Why is Habermas falling into the conflation? In my eyes, the reason is in his incessant hostility toward the ontological existentialist position in Gadamer's thought. Indeed, there is no need to mention the antagonistic attitude of the Frankfurt school against Heideggerian existentialist philosophy. The existentialist quest is usually seen suspicious to the follower of the school. Gadamer's philosophy is quite accusable in that it conceals the actual socio-historical conditions. This clear weakness in Gadamer's thoughts makes Habermas ignite himself to go over beyond the limit of criticism. Of course, we can observe Gadamer's apparent lack of social criticism particularly by the help of Habermas. Nevertheless, we'd rather not deny the fact that Gadamer enriches our awareness

of certain basic features of human life. For, with Gadamer, we get the opportunity to comprehend the complex picture of our historicity and our position within language in and through which we think. The ontological predicament within language and our hermeneutic experiences in tradition cannot prevent a critical understanding of society which is the continuing challenge from the critical theorist; however, we learn from Gadamer the insight to examine the limited character and premises of the critical theory.

A Brief Evaluating Discussion

I would like to reexamine Gadamer's legacy in relation to the issue of how he embraces a critical attitude. We know in Gadamer's view that reflection roles not in the way of epistemological methodology, but in the way of ontological awareness. Accordingly, although critique is possible, it works within the wall of the language-tradition framework. This speculative character of Gadamer's philosophy would arrive at a position that his political and ethical parlance would seem conservative. However, if we pay our attention to the genuine meaning of criticism, Gadamer would tell us that it is a grave misunderstanding to assume that the emphasis on tradition implies an uncritical acceptance of traditional conservatism. In truth, for him, every experience is confrontation, and the confrontation of our historic tradition is always a critical challenge to other traditions. Indeed, the ontologically oriented hermeneutic stance inevitably draws an appellation of conservatism to his philosophy. However, I would like to consider a latent radical strain in his way of thinking that is pulling us into a different direction. Gadamer's entire project of philosophical hermeneutics could be read as

an attempt to recover a deep meaning of what we truly are. His understanding, including fusion of horizon, effective history, and so on, directly depicts our being as to be *dialogical*. This is not just the mode of being but a real potential that ought to be actualized. In that sense, the dialogical character of what we are could be a meaningful response to the deformation of our being that has occurred in the modern technological societies.

What I have been keeping a question since I discussed Habermas is following: Can we convincingly argue that the truth disclosed by hermeneutics is significant for practical life? I don't overlook the gains that Habermas can make through his theoretical project of distorted communication. However, I feel some blind intermingling of emancipatory interest with its practical application when Habermas equates the Marxist idea of the ideological with the Freudian notion of distorted communication. Can the psychoanalytic approach itself have a practical applicability to realize the emancipatory interest in the actual life? Since the ideological in social structure, which produces domination, is reduced to the notion of a distorted communication, the psychoanalytic model has been fated to bear another ideology in itself. Even though Habermas is directed to freedom and emancipation, his idea is separated from practical life because of its idealist character.

Conclusion

We examined a certain disagreement incompatible laid down between the two thinkers. Whereas the hermeneutic project of Gadamer stresses the priority of tradition and linguisticity of human existence and is directed to *participation* in tradition, that of Habermas emphasizes the

priority of reflection on institutionalized domination and is characterized as the alienating distanciation. The discordance causes some potential hermeneutic productivity. As Ricoeur says, each has a privileged place and a different regional preference. The two poles of the antinomies, the critique of ideology and the recollection of tradition, or critical consciousness and hermeneutic awareness, must be constantly retained in all comprehensive hermeneutics dialogues.

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Truth and Criticism: Two Different Faces of the Hermeneutic Task

Hiheon Kim

The aim of this paper is to examine two different hermeneutic voices of Hans-Georg Gadamer and Jürgen Habermas and then to reveal a constructive task of hermeneutic activities in the interpretation of texts, social events, and the past history. Each thinker has his own methodology in appreciating the role of hermeneutics. Gadamer seeks to reveal the ontological condition from which understanding arises, while Habermas establishes a self-reflective structure of discourses that functions as a foundation of a critical theory for ideologies. Contrasting discords incompatibly lying on the differences between the two thinkers, this paper exposes the potential productivity of constant dialogues of the two differently oriented hermeneutics, whose interest is basically in the participation in tradition in Gadamer's case and the reflective criticism of institutionalized ideas in Habermas' case.

Specifically, this paper focuses on the historical debates that took place in 1967 through 1971. During this relatively short period, there was a permanent legacy out of the debate for those who attempted to envision an inclusive and comprehensive hermeneutics like Paul Ricoeur. However, the primary concern of this paper needs to be confined to examine the legacy, not as sufficient ideas, but as necessary elements for our contemporary hermeneutic activities.

First of all, this paper observes the basic ideas of each thinker for the preparation of following discussions. Then, a dialogue proceeds under the two headings, "Authoritative Tradition and Criticism of

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Ideology and “Hermeneutic Claim to Universality: Linguisticity. After showing the different voices of both thinkers and alluding a possible complementarity to each other, the paper concludes with a brief evaluation of both.

Key Words: Hermeneutics, Tradition, Ideology, Language, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jürgen Habermas

김희현 e-mail: kimhiheon@empal.com

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