@article{ART002524728},
author={KIM JOO SAM},
title={Efficacy of UN's Sanctions on North Korea's Nuclear and North Korea's Regime Survival Strategy},
journal={Korea and Global Affairs},
issn={2508-8300},
year={2018},
volume={2},
number={1},
pages={69-92},
doi={10.22718/kga.2018.2.1.003}
TY - JOUR
AU - KIM JOO SAM
TI - Efficacy of UN's Sanctions on North Korea's Nuclear and North Korea's Regime Survival Strategy
JO - Korea and Global Affairs
PY - 2018
VL - 2
IS - 1
PB - Korea Institute of Politics and Society
SP - 69
EP - 92
SN - 2508-8300
AB - North Korea conducted a total of six nuclear tests from the 1st test of 2006 to September, 2017. North Korea developed an armed forces security strategy at the level of regime protection and defense to respond to U.S. hostile policy. However, it is certain that strategic goals of North Korea's nuclear test were to overcome a crisis in North Korea's regime through US-North Korea negotiation and complete nuclear armed forces for socialist unification on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea's continuous nuclear test is a direct factor in threatening peace on the Korean Peninsula and an indirect factor in security dynamics of Northeast Asia. The U.N. Security Council has enforced sanctions against North Korea through six resolutions against North Korea's reckless nuclear test for the past 10 years. However, Kim Jong-Un's regime is in a position to stick to simultaneous pursuit of nuclear and economic development in spite of anti-North sanction of international society including U.N. and U.S.A. It is understood that North Korea was stimulated to conduct intense nuclear test as U.N. and U.S.A's anti-North sanction was not effective on North Korea. Full-scale and local wars are expected as military options, one of anti-North sanctions of the Trump administration. The Trump administration has attempted diplomatic pressure strategy as a secondary boycott unlike previous administrations. Nevertheless, North Korea has stood against U.N. and U.S.A's anti-North sanction with brinkmanship tactics, announcing full-scale military confrontation against U.S. It is judged that North Korea will pursue simultaneous nuclear weapons and economic development in terms of regime survival. North Korea will have less strategic choices in that its regime may collapse because of realistic national strategy between U.S.A. and China.
KW - North Korea's nuclear test;UN's anti-North sanction;Regime survival strategy;North America's relations;The variable of regime collapse
DO - 10.22718/kga.2018.2.1.003
ER -
KIM JOO SAM. (2018). Efficacy of UN's Sanctions on North Korea's Nuclear and North Korea's Regime Survival Strategy. Korea and Global Affairs, 2(1), 69-92.
KIM JOO SAM. 2018, "Efficacy of UN's Sanctions on North Korea's Nuclear and North Korea's Regime Survival Strategy", Korea and Global Affairs, vol.2, no.1 pp.69-92. Available from: doi:10.22718/kga.2018.2.1.003
KIM JOO SAM "Efficacy of UN's Sanctions on North Korea's Nuclear and North Korea's Regime Survival Strategy" Korea and Global Affairs 2.1 pp.69-92 (2018) : 69.
KIM JOO SAM. Efficacy of UN's Sanctions on North Korea's Nuclear and North Korea's Regime Survival Strategy. 2018; 2(1), 69-92. Available from: doi:10.22718/kga.2018.2.1.003
KIM JOO SAM. "Efficacy of UN's Sanctions on North Korea's Nuclear and North Korea's Regime Survival Strategy" Korea and Global Affairs 2, no.1 (2018) : 69-92.doi: 10.22718/kga.2018.2.1.003
KIM JOO SAM. Efficacy of UN's Sanctions on North Korea's Nuclear and North Korea's Regime Survival Strategy. Korea and Global Affairs, 2(1), 69-92. doi: 10.22718/kga.2018.2.1.003
KIM JOO SAM. Efficacy of UN's Sanctions on North Korea's Nuclear and North Korea's Regime Survival Strategy. Korea and Global Affairs. 2018; 2(1) 69-92. doi: 10.22718/kga.2018.2.1.003
KIM JOO SAM. Efficacy of UN's Sanctions on North Korea's Nuclear and North Korea's Regime Survival Strategy. 2018; 2(1), 69-92. Available from: doi:10.22718/kga.2018.2.1.003
KIM JOO SAM. "Efficacy of UN's Sanctions on North Korea's Nuclear and North Korea's Regime Survival Strategy" Korea and Global Affairs 2, no.1 (2018) : 69-92.doi: 10.22718/kga.2018.2.1.003
