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Developmental Exploration of the Denuclearization Measures against North Korea : Application of the DIME conception through the JCPOA case analysis

  • Korea and Global Affairs
  • Abbr : KGA
  • 2021, 5(5), pp.125-150
  • DOI : 10.22718/kga.2021.5.5.005
  • Publisher : Korea Institute of Politics and Society
  • Research Area : Interdisciplinary Studies > Interdisciplinary Research
  • Received : August 20, 2021
  • Accepted : October 2, 2021
  • Published : October 31, 2021

Moon Sung Joon 1

1조선대학교

Accredited

ABSTRACT

North Korea is suffering from triple whammy, including economic sanctions, closure of the border between North Korea and China and food shortages. As a result, North Korea has shown some willingness to improve inter-Korean relations, such as reopening inter-Korean communication lines that it unilaterally blocked. In addition, President Biden and most senior members of the diplomacy for national security group have participated in JCPOA with Iran and they aware of that as a major diplomatic achievement so they are insisting it should be applied to nuclear negotiations with North Korea. The purpose of this study is to analyze the case of a JCPOA with a tool of the DIME elements and find ways to denuclearize North Korea in accordance with its special nature through the DIME conception. For the denuclearization of the North Korea, a ‘Step-by-step Denuclearization Agreement based on Multilateralism’ is needed as a diplomatic conception, and through the intelligence conception, we should return North Korea to the NPT system so that we can access the information on unidentified but essential nuclear programs as a ‘selective verification’ within the international nonproliferation regime. For the military conception, it would require a ‘full spectrum deterrence strategy’ on the acceleration of North Korea’s Nuclear capability and use of nuclear weapons, and for the economic conception, it would include a ‘relaxing sanctions on North Korea corresponding to denuclearization measures’ and a clause that can be snap-back if North Korea fails to implement a crucial agreement.

Citation status

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