Ownership and Efficiency : Evidence from the Korean Electricity Market (기업의 소유권과 효율성에 관한 연구 -전력산업을 중심으로-)

Kim Dae-Wook (김대욱); 김유수

Ownership and Efficiency : Evidence from the Korean Electricity Market

Journal of Regulation Studies
2010, 19(1), pp.155-178
Publisher : 한국규제학회
Research Area : Social Science > Public Administration

Kim Dae-Wook ¹, 김유수 ²

¹숭실대학교
²에너지경제연구원

Accredited

ABSTRACT

In theory, private power plants have incentives to withhold outputs to exercise market power. On the other hand, they also have incentives to operate power plants efficiently to minimize operation costs. Therefore, the ultimate answer for this question is an empirical subject. Using two types of unbalanced panel data, we estimate input demand function to examine whether private power plants used fuels efficiently relative to a set of plants that remained under government control or experienced recent ownership changes. Our estimation results suggest that private power plants used fuels efficiently about 6.3%～10% relative to a set of other power plants. In addition, private power units operated about 14% efficiently compared to public power plants.

KEYWORDS

ownership, electricity, efficiency

Citation status

* References for papers published after 2023 are currently being built.

[journal] 김대욱 / 2008 / Competition and Efficiency: Evidence from the Korean Electricity Market / 자원환경경제연구 / 한국환경경제학회 17(1) : 23~49

[journal] 김대욱 / 2008 / Restructuring and Efficiency: Evidence from the Korean Electricity Market / 법경제학연구 / 한국법경제학회 5(1) : 129~140

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