Regulatory Stringency: With the Application of Report Regulations in Korea
This study aims at suggesting analytical definition of regulatory stringency and then verifying the validation of such definition through the analysis of the report regulations in Korea. Under the analytical definition of regulatory stringency as a level of composite three factors of uncertainty of legal completion of act, compliance burden, and the degree of punishment, 8 stereotypes with respect to regulatory stringency are developed. For instance, type1 is the case where uncertainty of act completion is high, burden of satisfying the regulation is severely high, and at the same time the level of punishment in the case of breaching the regulation is relatively harsh. Typically permission is a good example of the type 1 regulation. Similarity, type2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 represent each category, with examples in the same order such as corruption-prone in fact permission(type2), anarchistic permission(type3), discretion administration(type4), registration(type5), high pressure administration(type6), gate tax regulation(type7), report regulations(type8). And then in order to verify whether the above analytical definiton and categories are valid, this study analyzes the actual report regulation in the Korean registration system via the operational definitions and concepts.
The results of the analysis on the report regulations in Korea are as follows. First, substantially true report regulations were only 20% of the total number of the registered as report regulations in Korea. Second, the considerable number of report regulations are found to suffer from relatively strong punishment that does not correspond with an intrinsic attribute of the report regulation. Third, the relative number of substantially burdensome report regulations appear to be more than 30% of the total. It shows that the current report regulations in Korea shift unnecessary burden onto private sectors.