An explanatory study on Regulation of Online Platform Collusion by Algorithm (온라인플랫폼 알고리즘 담합규제에 관한 탐색적 연구)

Yang Ji Won (양지원); Tae-Yun Kim (김태윤)

doi:10.22954/ksrs.2023.32.1.001

An explanatory study on Regulation of Online Platform Collusion by Algorithm

Journal of Regulation Studies
2023, 32(1), pp.3~35
DOI : 10.22954/ksrs.2023.32.1.001
Publisher : 한국규제학회
Research Area : Social Science > Public Administration
Received : January 17, 2023
Accepted : March 6, 2023
Published : June 30, 2023

Yang Ji Won ¹, Tae-Yun Kim ²

¹(재) 강원연구원
²한양대학교

Accredited

ABSTRACT

There are many discussions about whether Collusion by Algorithm can be regulated under the fair trade regulatory framework. However, there is no discussion considering the uniqueness of online platform market structure. With this problem in mind, this paper attempts to analytically identify the regulatory possibility of Collusion by Algorithm linking the market structure specificity of online platforms. As a result of the analysis, depending on the type of Collusion by Algorithm, it was found that even information exchange agreements could not be confirmed. In addition, in the competitive bottleneck market, which is the market structure specificity of the online platform, the competition restriction of Collusion by Algorithm is ambiguous. Thus, it is not easy to judge the competition restriction in reality. This study found that, considering the uniqueness of the market structure of online platforms, Collusion by Algorithm may have different regulatory possibilities and policy considerations in the stages of proof of agreement and competition restriction, depending on the type of Collusion by Algorithm.

KEYWORDS

Online Platform, Collusion by algorithm, Fair Trade Regulation, Regulatory Policy

Citation status

* References for papers published after 2023 are currently being built.

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Journal of Regulation Studies 2023 KCI Impact Factor : 0.78

An explanatory study on Regulation of Online Platform Collusion by Algorithm

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Citation status

* References for papers published after 2023 are currently being built.

Journal of Regulation Studies 2023 KCI Impact Factor : 0.78

An explanatory study on Regulation of Online Platform Collusion by Algorithm

ABSTRACT

KEYWORDS

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