@article{ART003225241},
author={Cho SooRyong and SongJune Kim},
title={The Political Economy of Lawyer Licensing: A Preliminary Study of Efficient Rent-Seeking},
journal={Journal of Regulation Studies},
issn={1738-7132},
year={2025},
volume={34},
number={1},
pages={3-38},
doi={10.22954/ksrs.2025.34.1.001}
TY - JOUR
AU - Cho SooRyong
AU - SongJune Kim
TI - The Political Economy of Lawyer Licensing: A Preliminary Study of Efficient Rent-Seeking
JO - Journal of Regulation Studies
PY - 2025
VL - 34
IS - 1
PB - 한국규제학회
SP - 3
EP - 38
SN - 1738-7132
AB - This paper explores the lawyer licensing from a political economy perspective of rent-seeking theory, departing from the traditional legal approach. For the purpose of study, we selected four subjects - the introduction of law school system, conflicts with legal-adjacent professions, the legal market opening, and legal-tech conflicts - through semantic network analysis. To compare the short-term social waste due to rent-seeking in these subjects, we derived criteria of competitiveness, openness, and complexity based on Tullock's efficient rent-seeking theory. The results show that the increase in the number of lawyers due to the introduction of law schools and the resulting conflicts with legal-adjacent professions led to social waste in the lawyer licensing. In contrast, social waste from legal-tech conflicts showed little short-term change, while the one from legal market opening with entry barriers actually decreased. This demonstrates that long-term efforts to minimize rent can create short-term conflicts and social costs, potentially leading to unintended consequences. Therefore, to minimize social waste, policies should be designed considering short-term efficiency while removing rent in the long-term, such as reducing the number of rent-seekers and limiting the power of interest groups. Despite methodological limitations, this study is significant as a preliminary application of efficient rent-seeking theory to the lawyer licensing, showing potential for future research in various fields.
KW - lawyer licensing;legal market;political economy;efficient rent-seeking
DO - 10.22954/ksrs.2025.34.1.001
ER -
Cho SooRyong and SongJune Kim. (2025). The Political Economy of Lawyer Licensing: A Preliminary Study of Efficient Rent-Seeking. Journal of Regulation Studies, 34(1), 3-38.
Cho SooRyong and SongJune Kim. 2025, "The Political Economy of Lawyer Licensing: A Preliminary Study of Efficient Rent-Seeking", Journal of Regulation Studies, vol.34, no.1 pp.3-38. Available from: doi:10.22954/ksrs.2025.34.1.001
Cho SooRyong, SongJune Kim "The Political Economy of Lawyer Licensing: A Preliminary Study of Efficient Rent-Seeking" Journal of Regulation Studies 34.1 pp.3-38 (2025) : 3.
Cho SooRyong, SongJune Kim. The Political Economy of Lawyer Licensing: A Preliminary Study of Efficient Rent-Seeking. 2025; 34(1), 3-38. Available from: doi:10.22954/ksrs.2025.34.1.001
Cho SooRyong and SongJune Kim. "The Political Economy of Lawyer Licensing: A Preliminary Study of Efficient Rent-Seeking" Journal of Regulation Studies 34, no.1 (2025) : 3-38.doi: 10.22954/ksrs.2025.34.1.001
Cho SooRyong; SongJune Kim. The Political Economy of Lawyer Licensing: A Preliminary Study of Efficient Rent-Seeking. Journal of Regulation Studies, 34(1), 3-38. doi: 10.22954/ksrs.2025.34.1.001
Cho SooRyong; SongJune Kim. The Political Economy of Lawyer Licensing: A Preliminary Study of Efficient Rent-Seeking. Journal of Regulation Studies. 2025; 34(1) 3-38. doi: 10.22954/ksrs.2025.34.1.001
Cho SooRyong, SongJune Kim. The Political Economy of Lawyer Licensing: A Preliminary Study of Efficient Rent-Seeking. 2025; 34(1), 3-38. Available from: doi:10.22954/ksrs.2025.34.1.001
Cho SooRyong and SongJune Kim. "The Political Economy of Lawyer Licensing: A Preliminary Study of Efficient Rent-Seeking" Journal of Regulation Studies 34, no.1 (2025) : 3-38.doi: 10.22954/ksrs.2025.34.1.001
