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Analysis of China’s Aid to North Korea: Focusing on The Two-level game theory

  • Korea and Global Affairs
  • Abbr : KGA
  • 2018, 2(1), pp.113-136
  • DOI : 10.22718/kga.2018.2.1.005
  • Publisher : Korea Institute of Politics and Society
  • Research Area : Interdisciplinary Studies > Interdisciplinary Research
  • Received : February 13, 2018
  • Accepted : March 8, 2018
  • Published : March 31, 2018

KIM HYUNJUNG 1 Park Sun Hwa 1

1동아대학교

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to start from the recognition of the problem of why the sanctions of the international community could not indicate a great effect. In order to find answers to this question, this study focuses on China’s aid to North Korea and analyzes the determinants of support for North Korea. Despite a tough international community’s sanctions against North Korea, China has taken a dual stance on sanctions and support for North Korea. As for this dual attitude of China, this study approaches the internal and external situation of the support to the North with the rationale for the Two-level game theory. China’s sanction against North Korea could be divided into two categories: external factors and domestic factors. These factors include strengthening supremacy in China, checking the US, playing a responsible role in China, securing resources in North Korea, sustaining stable growth in China, maintaining the legitimacy of China’s socialist political system, and spreading the Beijing consensus. Based on the analysis of these factors, it could be expected that China’s aid for North Korea will be official, informal, or continuous, and it will be difficult for the North to stop supporting North Korea or deteriorating North Korea- China relations.

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