2015, Vol.24, No.4

Journal of Regulation Studies 2023 KCI Impact Factor : 0.78

pISSN : 1738-7132
https://journal.kci.go.kr/ksrs2002

This paper investigates the quantitative effects of firing costs on permanent contracts and promotions for fixed-term contracts. Once firing costs are introduced, the employment share of permanent contracts falls, whereas the employment share of fixed-term contracts rises. Firing costs lead firms with vacancies to search for workers under fixed-term contracts than under permanent contracts. Therefore, the worker’s probability of finding a permanent job decreases, but the probability of finding a fixed-term job increases. In addition to firing costs, the effect of a permanent increase in the probability with which temporary workers are promoted to permanent positions is assessed. Quantitative exercises give the similar results to the increased promotion probability.

In this paper, we attempt to measure the adequacy of the industrial electricity price in the aspect of generation cost in the situation that the recent industrial electricity experiences intensive and a sharp increase. The results of our study suggest that the effect of generating cost savings in the industrial sector are larger compared to other sectors. This is because generation cost are cheaper from high voltage usage, higher load factor from the plant from construction investment amount of savings, transmission line saving costs. In particular, we can expect that the room for reducing electricity prices exist when taking into account the power supply, demand conditions and institutional conditions. To summarize the discussion on these, industrial electricity prices than the actual costs of supply are determined to be overly been rising when compared to the actual generation costs increase. These results suggest that Korean regulation authorities needs to draw up measures to help improve the competitiveness of those firms which possess high portion of electricity costs, but experience the rapid rate increases in recent years.

Logrolling is a virtually universal phenomenon in Korean politics. The purpose of study is to analyze logrolling in the legislation process of regulation bills initiated by members of National Assembly (members, hereafter) through the Network Analysis. The regulation bills are classified into three types (political party, terms of office and constituency) and an individual network of members. The empirical results of the network analysis with three types are: First, logrolling occurs in the same party which has a strong membership and between the parties which have similar political orientation. Second, a newly-elected or re-elected members tend to initiate more bills than the other members. Third, both the Seoul/Gyeonggi-do members and proportional representatives show similar voting tendency. They have more logrolling activities than the members in other constituencies. On the other hand, the network analysis of the individual member of National Assembly shows: First, the logrolling of New Politics Alliance for Democracy (NPAD) members is more common than Saenuri members in view of the high tendency of joint submission and their policy coordination efforts. Second, NPAD members have a higher tendency of compensation for loss than Saenuri members when the bills fail to become a law.