2016, Vol.25, No.1

Journal of Regulation Studies 2023 KCI Impact Factor : 0.78

pISSN : 1738-7132
https://journal.kci.go.kr/ksrs2002

By using univariate time series model to eliminate the effect of electricity-saving measures in estimating electricity sales volume of 2012 and 2013, we estimated the imaginary GDP level through time series regression when there were no electricity-saving measures. Assuming that this level of estimated GDP represents the national welfare, we tried to compare this GDP level with the actual realized GDP. Without electricity-saving measures, we estimated using Holt’s*** that annual electricity sales growth rate would have been 2.1%p higher from 2012 to 2013. It is also estimated that annual GDP growth rate would have been 0.7%p higher from 2012 to 2013 without electricity-saving measures. Sufficient power supply that would have covered peak load increase of 2012 and 2013 amounting 2, 502MW and 5, 247MW respectively would have asked net cost increase around 650.6 billion won, only2.4% of the loss of national welfare amounting 27 trillion won.

This paper empirically examines how deregulation of telemedicine will affect consumer surplus. To that end, conjoint analysis and binomial logit model are applied to household-level survey data. We find that through the deregulation, if nurses are allowed to assist doctors in providing telemedicine services, or if telemedicine services can be provided to new patients as well as returning patients, then consumer surplus decreases. However, if prescriptions of drugs and treatments as well as examinations and counseling are possible through telemedicine services, or if telemedicine services can be provided in general hospitals as well as private hospitals, then consumer surplus increases. Dividing the entire sample into three income subgroups (low-, middle-, and high-income groups), we obtain the same estimation results. Our findings suggest that when discussing the introduction of telemedicine, the issues regarding medical quality and medical accessibility need to be considered separately.

What caused the disaster of Ferry Sewol? Many criticized the actions of the captain and most of the crew of the ferry. More criticized the South Korean government for its responses.Then, what’s wrong with the government regulation? This study tries to identify the problem of regulation by the perspectives of the political economic theory of regulations. Three causes are said to be at the center of this accident; deregulation of the limit of ship age, captured and spoiled bureaucrats by interest group, and price regulation. Eased regulation and the import of aged ship is not the major cause of the sinking. Sewol was nearly 20 years old but a little younger than 20 at the time of the accident. Capture and intimate connection between the ferry operator and the regulators is not the direct cause, either. There were some corruptions. However, the ship itself had no fundamental problem to be forbidden from operating by the bureaucrats. The hidden cause of the accident could be the price regulation for the passengers and the shipments. Price regulation can totally changes the business conditions. The operators are forced to commit abnormal actions to keep the business continue. To board more passengers, extra passenger cabins were added. To load more cargo, extra equipment was also installed. To earn more money, the ferry operator tried to load more cargo giving them much more benefits. Due to these reasons, Sewol lost restoring force. To cut the cost, aged ship was imported. Lowly paid part-time captain and crew abandoned the ship right after the accident leaving their passengers inside the cabins.