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A Study on the More Efficient Regulatory Pricing Mechanism in Electricity Industry

  • Journal of Regulation Studies
  • 2006, 15(1), pp.191-218
  • Publisher : 한국규제학회
  • Research Area : Social Science > Public Administration

이성우 1

1한성대학교

Accredited

ABSTRACT

This paper investigates causes and types of inefficiency problems of the rate-of-return regulation currently instituted in Korean electricity industry. The inefficiency problems inherent in profit-level R-o-R regulation are numerous such as the Averch-Johnson effect and X-inefficiency and agency problems. This paper suggest a shift from profit-level rate-of return regulation to price-level regulation since the latter is theoretically more efficient regulatory mechanism than the former. Under rate-or-return regulation, the regulated firm is largely indifferent to cost increase and lacks incentives to strive for cost efficiency. By breaking the equations between the firm's actual internal costs and allowed revenues, price level regulation regenerates the managerial incentives for profit maximization. Once the maximum price level constraints or ceiling is set as in price cap regulation, the regulated firm loses cost enhancing moral hazard incentives and loses control over revenue enhancing efforts as Hillman and Braeutigam mentioned. The regulated firm's profit maximization becomes mainly a matter of cost minimization. In this respect the goals of productive efficiency, profit maximization and social welfare can be well achieved. This paper investigates also various types of incentive-oriented electricity pricing methods and suggests price-cap regulation.

Citation status

* References for papers published after 2023 are currently being built.