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The EC Leniency Policy on the Whistle Blowers in Cartel Cases and Its Lessons

  • Journal of Regulation Studies
  • 2009, 18(1), pp.39-72
  • Publisher : 한국규제학회
  • Research Area : Social Science > Public Administration

Lee, Hosun 1

1국민대학교

Accredited

ABSTRACT

Cartel is one of the most serious violations of competition law, so it is (should be) severely punished by every competition authorities, even the participant's staffs being sentenced to imprisonment. However, since its covert disposition makes it disclosed, competition authorities are trying to dissolve and prevent cartels through the leniency policy to the 'whistle blower' as well as harsh retribution. In this article, the author has studied and searched in why the EC Commission has changed its leniency program since 1996, when its first Notice had been introduced. The focuses are on the goal and means of Commission's current leniency program, especially on the way of removing legal uncertainty, and worse position in the public or civil judicial procedure than those cartel participants who keep silent. While exploring this topic, some useful ideas are compared with our leniency system to enable to carry its policy reasonably. The author cannot agree with the policy that the absolute immunity contains not only the fines but also remedy measures, and that the cooperator after the investigation might enjoy the equal benefits as the whistle blower. This article also shows that we need to establish the criteria on how the evidences are collected, placed, and used to protect the whistle blower's adverse legal position in the third countries' court.

Citation status

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