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An Experimental study on Common Agency and Hold-up Problem

Kyungdong Hahn 1 Park Chanyul 1

1한국외국어대학교

Accredited

ABSTRACT

This study analyzes the hold-up problem with an methodology of experimental economics, when cooperative common agency is introduced to resolve the problems of asymmetric trade relations. As a result, we observed that under-investment is intensified due to hold-up problem and the efficiency is lowered under the cooperative common agency. In addition, in the case of lower investment efficiency, these problems are more severe, respectively. These results imply that, in the implementation of the revised Fair Transactions in Subcontracting Act, sufficient institutional complement is required to mitigate hold-up problem due to renegotiation with the cooperative common agency.

Citation status

* References for papers published after 2024 are currently being built.