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Platform Bargaining Power and Welfare Effects of Self-Preferencing

Chung, Hoe Sang 1

1강원대학교

Accredited

ABSTRACT

This study examines the incentives and welfare implications of self-preferencing by an online platform that uses both wholesale and agency contracts with third-party sellers. Self-preferencing is modeled as a reduction in the transaction costs associated with acquiring information about the platform’s own product at the time of purchase. In particular, I consider Nash bargaining between the platform and a seller over the wholesale price of the seller’s product. The main findings are twofold. First, self-preferencing increases the platform’s profits when the commission fee charged to a seller under an agency contract is sufficiently low. Second, self-preferencing increases (decreases) consumer surplus and social welfare when the platform’s bargaining power over a seller under a wholesale contract is sufficiently high (low). These results suggest that the platform’s bargaining power in wholesale price negotiations should be taken into account when discussing regulations on self-preferencing.

Citation status

* References for papers published after 2024 are currently being built.