본문 바로가기
  • Home

Bargaining and Rationalist Explanations for War

  • Korean Social Science Journal
  • Abbr : KSSJ
  • 2012, 39(1), pp.37-58
  • Publisher : Korean Social Science Research Council
  • Research Area : Social Science > Social Science in general

Min Ye 1

1Coastal Carolina University

Accredited

ABSTRACT

The traditional division between crisis bargaining and intrawar bargaining lacks sound theoretical grounds and, therefore, fails to capture the nature of using force in international politics. Instead, I propose to integrate traditional crisis bargaining and intrawar bargaining into a continuous process. The difference between a crisis and a war is captured by their bargaining costs and risks in each round of bargaining. The application of the integrated model demonstrates that with complete information the status quo can be revised even if both states are satisfied.

Citation status

* References for papers published after 2022 are currently being built.