The Effect of Malice on Retainers and Pleading Choices

In Oh Cho (조인오); Chulyoung Kim (김철영); Sangyoon Nam (남상윤); Iksun Yu (유익선)

The Effect of Malice on Retainers and Pleading Choices

Korean Social Science Journal
Abbr : KSSJ
2020, 47(1), pp.21-32
Publisher : Korean Social Science Research Council
Research Area : Social Science > Social Science in general
Received : April 23, 2020
Accepted : May 22, 2020
Published : June 1, 2020

In Oh Cho ¹, Chulyoung Kim ¹, Sangyoon Nam ², Iksun Yu ¹

¹연세대학교
²University of Southern California

Accredited

ABSTRACT

In a standard model of nuisance lawsuits, we consider a plaintiff who obtains malice utility from the loss of a defendant. Confirming our intuitions from casual observations in reality, we find that a more malicious plaintiff is more likely to file a nuisance suit in equilibrium. We also find that the plaintiff’s equilibrium filing cost decreases in malice whereas the equilibrium answering cost and settlement value do not depend on malice. When we allow the defendant to pay a retainer before the plaintiff’s filing decision, we find that the defendant is willing to use the retainer option as long as it is not too costly. Thus, the retainer option is effective in deterring a nuisance lawsuit, although the defendant must spend a larger retainer as the plaintiff becomes more malicious.

KEYWORDS

nuisance lawsuit․malicious lawsuit․retainer․filing cost․answering cost․ settlement

Citation status

* References for papers published after 2023 are currently being built.

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