@article{ART002137352},
author={Ko Hyun-Bum},
title={Nussbaum’s Disgust Skepticism},
journal={Philosophical Investigation},
issn={1598-7213},
year={2016},
volume={43},
pages={131-160},
doi={10.33156/philos.2016.43..005}
TY - JOUR
AU - Ko Hyun-Bum
TI - Nussbaum’s Disgust Skepticism
JO - Philosophical Investigation
PY - 2016
VL - 43
IS - null
PB - Institute of philosophy in Chung-Ang Univ.
SP - 131
EP - 160
SN - 1598-7213
AB - In contemporary moral philosophy, moral emotions, e.g. sympathy, compassion, indignation, are newly illuminated. But discussions about disgust as strong aversion relatively come short. Based on Rozin’s social psychological and Miller’s social constructivist studies on disgust, Nussbaum criticizes the emotion fiercely. Nussbaum’s study of disgust lies on her persistent investigation of emotion, on the other hand against the backdrop of hot social issues. On the critique of disgust, Nussbaum as a philosopher of law, tries to examine more concrete sentences. In this article, I examine the validity of her claim in the light of philosophy of emotion and moral philosophy.
On cognitivist view which defines emotion as appraisal, Nussbaum claims the appropriateness of moral emotion. But Nussbaum doesn’t approve disgust. For she thinks disgust is based on the thought of negation of human’s animality and finiteness and obsessed by normality, so the emotion threatens the value of equal respect and human dignity. Then, is disgust the threat to the humanity? This article examines objections in the perspective of philosophy of emotion and moral philosophy. This article intends to propose that Nussbaum’s critique is more persuasive than objections.
KW - Disgust;Nussbaum;Animality;Humanity;Cognitivism
DO - 10.33156/philos.2016.43..005
ER -
Ko Hyun-Bum. (2016). Nussbaum’s Disgust Skepticism. Philosophical Investigation, 43, 131-160.
Ko Hyun-Bum. 2016, "Nussbaum’s Disgust Skepticism", Philosophical Investigation, vol.43, pp.131-160. Available from: doi:10.33156/philos.2016.43..005
Ko Hyun-Bum "Nussbaum’s Disgust Skepticism" Philosophical Investigation 43 pp.131-160 (2016) : 131.
Ko Hyun-Bum. Nussbaum’s Disgust Skepticism. 2016; 43 131-160. Available from: doi:10.33156/philos.2016.43..005
Ko Hyun-Bum. "Nussbaum’s Disgust Skepticism" Philosophical Investigation 43(2016) : 131-160.doi: 10.33156/philos.2016.43..005
Ko Hyun-Bum. Nussbaum’s Disgust Skepticism. Philosophical Investigation, 43, 131-160. doi: 10.33156/philos.2016.43..005
Ko Hyun-Bum. Nussbaum’s Disgust Skepticism. Philosophical Investigation. 2016; 43 131-160. doi: 10.33156/philos.2016.43..005
Ko Hyun-Bum. Nussbaum’s Disgust Skepticism. 2016; 43 131-160. Available from: doi:10.33156/philos.2016.43..005
Ko Hyun-Bum. "Nussbaum’s Disgust Skepticism" Philosophical Investigation 43(2016) : 131-160.doi: 10.33156/philos.2016.43..005
