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Analysis on the Diplomatic Dilemma of the US-ROK Alliance: Take the Trump-Moon Jae-in administration as an example

  • Analyses & Alternatives
  • Abbr : A&A
  • 2025, 9(2), pp.35~65
  • DOI : 10.22931/aanda.2025.9.2.002
  • Publisher : Korea Consensus Institute
  • Research Area : Social Science > Social Science in general
  • Received : February 2, 2025
  • Accepted : May 22, 2025
  • Published : June 30, 2025

Wei—Jian Gu 1 Kim Jae kwan 2

1NanTong University
2전남대학교

Accredited

ABSTRACT

This paper uses the Autonomy-Security Trade-off Model as the analytical framework, combining the Entrapment-Abandonment Dilemma and Balance of Threat theory and so on, starts with the North Korean nuclear issue and the issue of the defense cost sharing of the alliance which have had a significant impact on the development of the US-ROK alliance, and makes a detailed exploration on the diplomatic dilemma faced by the alliance under the governance of the Trump and Moon Jae-in administrations. Through analysis and comparison: It is believed that the United States and South Korea adjust their respective autonomous proportions in the alliance, therefore, the overlap of interests between allies has decreased, and the cohesion of the relationship between the United States and South Korea has weakened. The motivation behind the U.S. and South Korea's requirements for adjusting the alliance’s autonomy is to safeguard their own interests, and the inconsistency of the interests of the two parties triggers conflicts and games among allies. However, because of the inconsistency of interests, the alliance system not only did not collapse, but enabled itself to maintain normal operations, and gave it a longer vitality. The fundamental reason is that the United States and South Korea belong to an asymmetric alliance. The weaker side of the alliance depends on the security provided by the stronger one. This also resulted in South Korea having to make concessions on the issue of autonomy. The United States will undoubtedly increase its security payment costs while expanding its autonomy in the alliance. When it cannot meet the payment requirements, the United States will cause dissatisfaction among its allies. This paper argues that: Under the asymmetric alliance system, autonomy-security trade-off between allies cannot achieve a complete equilibrium. Therefore, the conflicts and games between allies around the balance of autonomy and security always run through the political interaction process of the alliance itself.

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