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A Strategic Analysis of North Korea’s Conditions for Accepting Foreign Aid since 1953

  • Analyses & Alternatives
  • Abbr : A&A
  • 2026, 10(1), pp.45~69
  • DOI : 10.22931/aanda.2026.10.1.002
  • Publisher : Korea Consensus Institute
  • Research Area : Social Science > Social Science in general
  • Received : January 13, 2026
  • Accepted : February 5, 2026
  • Published : February 28, 2026

Jang Ikhyun ORD ID 1 류태경 2

1한신대학교
2이화여대 국제대학원 박사

Accredited

ABSTRACT

This study provides a historical analysis of North Korea's strategic choices, navigating the inherent contradiction between its state ideology of 'Juche' (self-reliance) and the necessity of accepting foreign aid for regime survival. From the post-war reconstruction of the 1950s, which relied on "fraternal support" from the socialist bloc, to the life-saving humanitarian assistance during the 1990s "Arduous March," and the framing of the KEDO project as "just compensation," Pyongyang's approach to aid has evolved according to the nature of each crisis. The analysis reveals that North Korea's acceptance of aid is not a passive behavior but an active, calculated state strategy with regime security and sovereignty as its highest principles. Internally, Pyongyang reinterprets aid to uphold ideological legitimacy; externally, it wields it as a diplomatic lever. It consistently resists external demands for monitoring and transparency, citing "sovereignty infringement" to maintain absolute control. This demonstrates North Korea's unique view of aid as a strategic asset for political messaging and negotiation, not merely as an economic resource. Therefore, effective future engagement policies must be based on a deep understanding of this strategic calculus.

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